I begin my assessment of the "Consolidated Technical Arrangement" with the  following premise, which is also articulated in the OAU's peace proposals:  the ultimate goal of a peace process is to find a solution that is acceptable  to both Eritrea and Ethiopia. Any proposal that is acceptable to Eritrea but  not to Ethiopia or vice versa gets each party to say "Aha, we knew it!" but,  in the end, it is self-defeating.

II. Who Wrote The Consolidated Technical Arrangement

With that explanation, let me detail a serious critique of what Ethiopia  calls the "Consolidated Technical Arrangement" ("CTA" for short), which,  under that heading, has appeared at Walta. I don't know if this is the same  as the "non paper" that I have not seen but have heard referenced to by the  OAU Chairman in his post-Proximity Talks communiqué of May 6, 2000, a "non  paper." (Non-starter?) According to the OAU Chairman, Ethiopia's "non  paper" after being reconciled with Eritrea's (and formerly OAU's) Technical  Arrangement is supposed to result in a "Consolidated Technical Arrangement."  But to add to the confusion, Ethiopia is referring to its "non paper" (its  proposal) using the same terminology reserved for OAU's final proposal, i.e.  "Consolidated Technical Arrangement." In this paper, when I refer to the  "CTA", I will use quotes to indicate that this is Ethiopia's designation.

The prematurely named "CTA" bills itself as having been the result of a long  dialogue and consultation between Ethiopia and the OAU and, again, I have no  way of confirming or denying that claim. And, frankly, given the  inconsistent transparency shown by the OAU, the not too-subtle pro-Ethiopia  hand of the US, and the partisan exaggerations of Walta, I wouldn't be  surprised when the claim is confirmed or denied.

The good news is this. A side-by-side comparison of the "CTA" with the  Technical Arrangement (TA) will show that in many, if not in most cases, the  paragraphs are identical. In fact, in the rush job they did to put the "CTA"  together (which suggests that this paper really is not the result of a long,  deliberative, consultation process but a PR move to play catch-up with  Eritrea's series of document dumpings display) the drafters of the "CTA"  borrow the same references from the TA even after they've changed and  inserted whole paragraphs that would render the references meaningless. And  now for the bad news: where there have been changes, they are so dramatic  that the "Consolidated Technical Arrangement" should be renamed the  "Consecration of the Technical Arrangements".

III. ETHIOPIA'S ARGUMENT

To understand why Ethiopia is insisting on the changes, one has to understand  the Ethiopian Government mindset which goes something like this: before we  talk about cessation of hostilities, demilitarization, delimitation,  demarcation, we have to talk about how to get Eritrea out of the disputed  territories and how to go about reinstating the Ethiopian civilian  administration. This would reinstate status quo ante and restore "Ethiopian  sovereignty" which is important in sending the message that aggression must  not be rewarded and the rule of the jungle does not prevail. The Ethiopian  Government also wants to redefine the role of the OAU and the UN (enhancing  the former and minimizing the latter). The reasons given for this are that  that was what was envisioned in the Framework Agreement (FA) and the  Modalities (MI) and the TA, above all, must be consistent with the FA and MI.  Moreover, assigning an expansive role-including peacekeeping mission, human  right violation ombudsman, intruding in the work of the reinstated civilian  administration, monitoring deportations is an intrusion of Ethiopia's  sovereignty.

III. 1: OAU & UN Reject ETHIOPIA'S ARGUMENT

Ethiopia's argument is coherent except for one problem: neither the OAU nor  the UN has found Eritrea guilty of aggression. In fact, the Ethiopian  Government frequently laments that the "International Community" has refused  to assign Eritrea and Ethiopia the aggressor and the aggressed label.  Ethiopia's claim that the OAU has found Eritrea guilty of aggression is not  supported by facts either. The OAU has decided that it will defer the issue  of who was the aggressor party until an investigation is conducted. The OAU  has found that the territories in question used to be administered by  Ethiopia pre-May 6, 1998, a fact that was not contested by Eritrea, its  argument being that the territories were illegally annexed by Ethiopia. Nor  does the OAU agree that the events of May 12, 1998 were "unprovoked" as  Ethiopia claims; as a matter of fact, the OAU states that the incidents of  May 12, 1998 were the results of long degeneration in the relationship  between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Ethiopia's efforts since the peace process  began have been two-fold (a) to convince the international community that its  conclusions are wrong and Eritrea really is the aggressor and a peace  proposal should reflect this and/or (b) to re-write the peace agreements so  that they are in sync with the argument that Eritrea is the aggressor and  Ethiopia is the victim. The Ethiopian Government's sole leverage to affect  (b) is to threaten to unleash a war.

For the sake of brevity, in this paper I will deal with the issue of  re-deployment and how the original TA differs from the "CTA" and why, in my  opinion, the "CTA" is not only impractical but bad for Eritrea AND Ethiopia.

After the signing of the documents and the commitment to cessation of  hostilities, the re-deployment of troops is to be done with the help of (1)  the Neutral Commission, (2) the Peacekeeping Mission, and (3) the Military  Coordination Commission.

• IV. 1 The Neutral commission is to be established by the Current Chair of OAU  in consultation with Secretary General of the UN and OAU. Its mandate is to  conduct an on-the-ground investigation to determine areas of re-deployment  for both Parties. Its timeline from beginning to end is 3 weeks (more time  if necessary.) The role of the Parties would be to co-coperate. It would  submit its findings to the Current Chairman of the OAU and its decision would  be binding on both Parties until such time that the territory is demarcated
• IV. 2 The Peacekeeping Mission is to be under the authority of the UN  Security Council and led by a Special Representative of the UN Secretary  General who will work closely with the OAU Secretary General. The UN  Peacekeeping mission will be preceded by an OAU liaison officers/observers  who will eventually be part of the UN Peacekeeping Mission. Its mandate is  to assist with de-mining, approve redeployment plans of the parties, observe  redeployment, oversee demilitarization, assist and monitor re-instated  civilian administration, and establish grievance resolution mechanism.
• IV. 3 The Military Coordination Commission which has a self-explanatory title  and whose membership would include Eritrean and Ethiopian officers but  chaired by a UN representative.

I'll focus my critique of the CTA as it relates to the dramatic changes made  to the first two and only in dealing with the issue of redeployment. The  changes made in the areas of administration, human rights monitoring,  investigation into roots of conflict are not minor but they will be looked  into in detail in a different report.

V. The "CTA" & How It Deals With Redeployment

Whereas in the original TA the issue of redeployment is the third issue, the  "CTA" addresses deployment first, right after the preamble. (The preamble  itself is a bit embellished and re-sequenced but that is a different issue.)

V. 1 The Neutral Commission

Here, the Neutral Commission has been considerably localized and emasculated.  Its work is at the mercy of the two Parties and its establishment is  exclusively the domain of the OAU: there is no role for the UN Secretary  General, not even consultation. But that's not all. The two parties are  also not just limited to cooperating with the commission, they have a say in  its formation, which will be done "with the agreement and acceptance of the  two Parties." The two Parties have the responsibility to "facilitate" its  work and its movement and guarantee its security. Conversely, the Neutral  Commission has to "consult continuously" with the two parties, and when it is  done with its work in three weeks, it will no longer give its report to the  Current Chairman of the OAU but to the two Parties.

The Parties get the report within 4 days and they have 3 days to respond.  And then: "When the positive response of each of the two Parties has been  received by the Neutral Commission, the latter shall then submit its findings  to the Current Chairman and the Secretary General of the OAU."

V.1.1 The Booby Trap:

If either party can object to the composition of the Neutral Commission, what  happens next? Presumably, more drag-out "consultation and dialogue" until an  acceptable member is found. The "CTA" is also silent on what happens if  there is a negative response to the findings of the Neutral Commission. In  other words, the results of the Neutral Commission are not binding if one or  both parties argue with its findings. Where the original TA said, " The  determination of the Neutral Commission is binding on the Parties" the "CTA"  says, "The ACCEPTANCE of the determination of the Neutral Commission is  binding on the Parties ONCE THE RE-DEPLOYMENT HAS BEGUN AND THROUGHOUT THE  ENTIRE PROCESS." (Emphasis Added). This is a subtle but HUGE difference. It  will be virtually unworkable because any party can hold the process hostage.  It is also inconsistent with Ethiopia's earlier objection that D + 50 was too  long a delay for Eritrea's redeployment. This process could actually take  much longer if either party can argue endlessly about the members of the  Neutral Commission and their findings.

The "CTA" changes the name, mandate and scope of the work of the peacekeeping  mission. Most of the job duties assigned to it in the original TA would be  absorbed by the Parties themselves (which explains why the Parties are given  a lot of responsibility in facilitating the work of the Neutral Commission)  Renamed the Military Observer Mission (MOM), the group will be deployed by  the OAU (with assistance from the UN). There is no mention of the UN Security  Council or a Special Representative of the UN Secretary General leading it.  This is because its mandate will be determined in "consultation and the  acceptance of the two Parties." It will number between three to five hundred  of military observers and staff and its job will be over once the area is  delimited and demarcated.

V. 2. 1 The Booby Trap:

A Military Observer Group deployed by the OAU (with no political or military  backing from the UN Security Council) and one that has to rely on the Parties  approval to do its work will have no assurance that it can do its work.  Over the last two years, the two Parties have amply demonstrated that they  have no trust of each other. Why would this change overnight? And why is  the OAU being asked to do the work it has said, on record, that it cannot  because "in practical terms, the OAU is constrained in its logistics and  financial means"? Moreover, the active support and participation of the UN  was elaborated on in the Framework Agreement when addressing the issue of  redeployment and reinstatement of civilian administration (Article 4),  delimitation and demarcation (Article 6), Human rights monitoring (Article  8), resettlement (Article 9), and guaranteeing faithful and expeditious  implementation of the peace treaty (Article 11). Further, the Modalities  describe the scope and mandate of the Military Observors as carrying out "all  other duties that are entrusted to it, in conformity with the provisions of  the Framework Agreement." Why, then, is the role of the UN being curtailed  dramatically?

The "CTA", at least the parts I've seen--I haven't seen the two annexes (V  and VI) that have been referenced which, by definition, have to either  contradict or void parts of the existing four annexes in the original TA-- is  not in the interest of Eritrea because (1) it allows the Parties wide  latitude to obstruct the work of the Neutral Commission and the Peacekeeping  Mission (how is this even in the interest of Ethiopia?) and (2) it  significantly reduces the role of the UN which, according to the Framework  Agreement and the Modalities is a co-guarantor of the peace agreements.  Conversely, the Consolidated TA empowers the OAU beyond its means and  mandate. This is ideal for Ethiopia because, as the British publication  "Independent" reported on April 27, 2000, the "conviction that their own side  is right" is not just limited to Eritrean and Ethiopian citizens but applies  "to the diplomatic and expatriate communities in each place." Given that the  OAU is headquartered in Addis Ababa, it would be in the best interest of  lasting peace and justice that the UN, rather than the OAU, takes on a more  prominent role in the peace process.

In the meantime, the Parties need to sign the FA and the MI now.

Question:

If the TA itself envisioned that the signing of the FA, MI and TA  will be a consolidated affair (D-Day), why is the Eritrean Government now  insisting that the FA and MI be signed as a first step, after it had waived  off this requirement earlier? Isn't this a new pre-condition?

When Eritrea agreed to defer the signing of the FA and MI (in direct  contradiction to the call of the FA and the MI) it was with the understanding  that the OAU was working on a TA that was not open to amendment. I have read  the Ethiopian Prime Minister's address of May 8, 2000 to the diplomatic  community in Addis where he states that, despite the written statements he  received from the OAU in late August 1999 (OAU Clarification, III.  Conclusions, B) stating that the "document containing the Technical  Arrangements is not open to amendment", he was "as surprised as everybody"  that the TA's were a take-it-or-leave it document. This claim cannot be  taken seriously given the fact that Ethiopia had an opportunity in November  1999 to comment on everything it found objectionable in the TA AND the  Clarifications to the TA (in a document that Walta calls "A Memorandum  Submitted By Ethiopia in November 1999 Towards Making The Technical  Arrangements Consistent With The Framework Agreement And The Modalities").  Nowhere in the voluminous document did Ethiopia object to the OAU's  characterization that it was understood by all Parties that the TA was not  amendable.

If signing documents is politically unpalatable, then the two Parties should  at least send a letter stating: "I, (insert name and title), on behalf of  (insert official name of nation) hereby accept the Framework Agreement and  the Modalities for its implementation AS THEY ARE. I agree that the OAU  Current Chairman is the sole interpreter of these agreements and, in cases of  dispute; I agree to adhere to his interpretation without any argument. I  accept that the OAU and the UN are the guarantors for faithful and  expeditious implementation. By writing this letter, I agree that whatever  acceptance letters I have written previously and the qualifiers I included in  such documents are null and void. Signed this date, etc.

VI. A Word from Two Poets

Everything I have written above is one man's opinion and, therefore, could be  wrong. But the call for peace and the rejection of war is universal and, I  believe, shared by almost every Eritrean and Ethiopian. I hope where  partisan polemic fails to persuade the poets will and I will quote from two  Americans:

"Father, father; We don't need to escalate  You see, war is not the answer; For only love can conquer hate" - Marvin  Gaye, Singer, Song-writer

"Listen, my wary one, it's far too late to unlove each other." - William  Mathews, poet

May May 2000 be the last May we pray for peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia.