"Why Was The Option I Put Forth Not Preferred?" - Meles Zenawi, letter to OAU
Shortly after Eritrea and Ethiopia officially and formally accepted the OAU Framework Agreement ("Framework" for short) and the Modalities for its Implementation ("Modalities" for short), the OAU, in conjunction with technical experts from the US and the UN, drafted up and presented the Technical Arrangements for the Implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement and Its Modalities. ("Arrangements" for short) to Eritrea and Ethiopia.
Eritrea promptly accepted the Arrangements and waited for Ethiopia’s response. Ethiopia requested for clarifications (actually, a wish list) from the OAU in the form of a 4-page long letter it sent on August 13, 1999. On August 26, 1999, the OAU presented the clarifications in writing as well as explain them in person to the Prime and Foreign Ministers of Ethiopia.
The Ethiopian Government was not seeking clarifications; it is actually looking to amend the Framework and the Modalities that it had "fully accepted." The tactic employed seems to have been to assemble every law student from Addis Ababa University and ask them to search for any loophole or any apparent shred of inconsistency between the three documents. This would, given the OAU’s snail pace, delay the peace process long enough for Ethiopia to co-ordinate a diplomatic counter-offensive painting itself as a nation committed to democracy and rule of law and the Eritrean Government as being pro-terrorism, anti-Africa, anti-Arab, anti-Israel, anti-peace…at least long enough for the rainy season to end. Of course, Ethiopia always has the military option and it can always launch war under the flimsiest excuse.
If you think that this is a biased opinion, all you have to do is read the clarifications Ethiopia requested of the OAU. Consider the issue of "Cessation of Hostilities." This is so central to the peace process, it is Item 1 in the Framework: "The two Parties commit themselves to an immediate cessation of hostilities." It was also the first sentence of the Modalities:
"The two Parties reaffirm their commitment to the principle of the non-use of force to settle disputes." So, when the Arrangements (in Annex IV) talks about the sequence of events and states that the Cessation of hostilities will commence on D+2 (2 days after D-Day, the signing of the Framework Agreement), and that the deployment of the Eritrean troops would commence on D+50, anyone who values peace and anyone who has any concern for the starving Ethiopian farmers who are braving minefields to go back to Badme Town and Environs would think that this proposal is logical and good and in the interest of Ethiopia.
But not the Ethiopian Government.
This is actually what Meles Zenawi wrote:
"In my discussions with your Special Envoy I had indicated that verification of lines of redeployment can take place before cessation of hostilities….Why was the option I put forth not preferred?"
The OAU outlines 11 events that have to take place between D-2 (Cessation of hostilities) and D-50 (Eritrean re-deployment of troops). These include establishment of Neutral Commission, the UN Cartographic Unit, Deployment of OAU/UN observers, establishment of Follow-up and Military Coordination Commission, De-mining. Considering that there are nearly 500,000 young men and women with their fingers on the trigger for 15 months separated only by yards of heavily-mined land (including by Ethiopia which has signed conventions against mining), one would think that 48 days between cessation of hostilities and deployment is about reasonable.
But not the Ethiopian Government.
Why is the Ethiopian Government so anti-cessation of hostilities that it would even go to the length of proposing that the redeployment of troops "take place before cessation of hostilities"? Given this mentality, one would not be surprised if Meles were to ask: "while they are withdrawing, could the Eritreans carry a white flag as well?"
Based on the questions asked by the Ethiopian Government, it is no longer a matter of dispute: what Ethiopia wants is total and unconditional surrender by Eritrea. What Ethiopia is saying is-and what it has been saying for a year and half is--: we want Eritrea to withdraw without Ethiopia having to give any assurances of cessation of hostilities much less demarcation and other annoyances of life. Get out and get out now or we will unleash our fury on you.
With the old OAU, this tactic would have worked. But not anymore. Aptidon is retired for good. Campaore and his funny letters are just a microscopic footnote. Even worse, the incoming Chairman, Algeria’s Abdelaziz Bouteflika, has made it plainly clear that "any interpretation of the OAU Framework Agreement and the Modalities is the sole responsibility of the OAU and its current Chairman." In other words, Salim A Salim, can have all the frequent lunches he wants with Seyoum Mesfin but it won’t do Ethiopia any good.
In plain and patient language, the OAU tells Ethiopia, that its request makes no sense. Says the OAU: "As a practical matter, the safety of the members of the Commission as they visit an area currently a military frontline can only be assured in the context of the cessation of hostilities called for in paragraph 2 of the Technical Arrangements." Then it goes on to remind Ethiopia that it has accepted the Framework and the Modalities: "In any event, the Framework Agreement, which remains the reference for the settlement process (supplemented by the Modalities), specifies under paragraph 1 that "the two Parties commit themselves to an immediate cessation of hostilities." As for why it was taking 50 days for Eritrea to deploy its troops, the OAU responds, " Qualified experts from the OAU and the UN have determined that a period of 50 days following signing will be required for the work of the Neutral Commission and deployment of military observers." Further, the OAU reminds Ethiopia that acceptance of the cessation of hostilities is "an indivisible part of their acceptance of the complete Technical Arrangements" which is not subject to amendment.
Diplomatically cornered, the Ethiopian government is still heavily armed and very dangerous. The media reports over the past two weeks clearly indicate to any serious observer of the Ethiopian Government that, once again, it is agitating for war. Over the next few weeks, we can all expect the Ethiopian media organs and its intellectuals to:
put out daily bulletins of "terrorist" attacks in South Ethiopia and how Eritrea is responsible for them and thus, not worthy to be a peace partner;
put out weekly updates that advertise Ethiopia’s march to democracy and the May 2000 elections;
publish articles propagating that the Technical Arrangements are not true to the Framework and the Modalities;
write articles about how Ethiopians in Eritrea are being abused; about how the situation in the "occupied" territories is dire;
issue ultimatums on how Ethiopia has no choice but to defend its sovereignty
This can be expected from a government led by a team that declares war when the options it "put forth are not preferred." The OAU, UN and US technicians have spoken. It is time for the OAU, UN and US politicians to do so. When it comes to the Ethiopian Government, the experience of February - June 1999 has clearly shown that silent diplomacy has been proven to be deadly to the people of Eritrea and Ethiopia. It is time for the officials of the UN, the US, the EU and the UN to stand for peace and the documents they spent a year and half developing.