Note: The thoughts outlined below are based on discussions (in Addis Ababa between 8 August and 19 September, 1999) that I, intrepid reporter, Fly On Wall, had with a variety of Ethiopian government officials MLLT, TPLF, EPRDF, PMO, MOD, KIRBIT--in other words, five officials of MLLT. Inspired by the cleverness of how five people can have so many accronyms, Fly OnWall had a rountable discussion with FoW, Fly, OnWall and Mr. OnWall to draft this report. I also had discussions with members of the foreign diplomatic community and NGO observers--including some with "information advantage"--at the Addis Sheraton; however, some were too inebriated for their ramblings to make any sense..

1. although "obduracy" and "pig-headedness" were strong runners up, "intransigence" was about as accurate characterization of the Ethiopian position with regard to the present stall in achieving a negotiated settlement to the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict.

2. . The Ethiopian approach to the settlement (or conflict) is NOT driven primarily by internal cleavages within the leadership between "hard-liners" and "moderates" since "moderation" and "pragmatism" are considered heretical within the extreme ideology of MLLT. It is in this light that the word "negotiation" assumes a sign of weakness and the MLLT's position has only hardened since May 6, I mean May 12, 1998. The perceived inability to "sell" a negotiated settlement to a domestic audience is real. After all, it is hard to negotiate for land after you have told your domestic audience that you've had total victory.

3. The MLLT leadership appear unified in their belief that the present "Technical Arrangements" should be referred to as the "present" Technical Arrangement-strongly implying that there was a "past" Technical Arrangement and there will be a "future" Technical Arrangement. Despite the OAU's repeated assertions that the Arrangements are not subject to amendment, the MLLT strongly holds out hope that they will be amended....which will automatically create controversy and give the MLLT room to maneuver from its diplomatic isolation. All in the interest of a durable resolution which can only come about after Eritrea's total and unconditional surrender.

4. The leadership also appear unified in: i) a profound distrust of the Eritrean leadership based on its refusal to cooperate in the MLLT's call that it give up its territories quietly and without fanfare. The MLLT is also very disappointed that the Eritrean Leadership has been very successful at convincing international opinion to believe that it is committed to a peaceful resolution of the conflict despite million-dollar lobbyist in DC working overtime to demonize the Eritrean Government. The MLLT is convinced that Eritrea accepted the Framework Agreement to preserve its tactical position in stark contrast to MLLT which accepted the Framework Agreement because it knew it is subject to endless amendments. ii) a profound scepticism regarding the international community's commitment and capacity to act as a guarantor of an eventual agreement. The MLLT prefers that Ethiopia be the signatory, interpreter, enforcer and guarantor of an eventual agreement--as it has been with all the colonial treaties negotiated with Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan and Eritrea. Dammmit, its says, we want back our glory days. iii) a general belief that Ethiopia's security interests should not be compromised. For explanation of "Ethiopia's security interests" see also: Tigray's security interests. See also Tigray Manifesto. See also Tigray Map 1997. If this means adopting a stance regarding the present negotiations that will lead to major reductions in foreign development assistance flows, it would only mean that the five million starving could increase to ten million starving which still leaves Ethiopia with a population of about forty million + or - a million that can be dispatched to the frontlines.

5. Distrust of the international community (and especially the U.S.), is entirely irrational-and is entirely consistent with the irrational mind of a mental patient who accuses his doctor of poisoning him. This irrational paranoia is despite the fact that, in the past 18 months, the US has shown:
   1. unwillingness to publicly condemn Ethiopia's policy of ethnic cleansing-an act described as "ethnic cleansing" by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch and the United Nations. The US calls each act "ethnic cleansing acts" but it is unsure that each "ethnic cleansing act" when summed to over 60,000 adds up to "ethnic cleansing";
   2. statements by the U.S., U.N. Security Council and others which place Ethiopia and Eritrea in a position of parity with regard to the genesis and resolution of the conflict when they all know that Ethiopia was the one that began the stealth encroachment as early as 1993;
   3. what is perceived as an evident desire on part of U.S. and others to maintain close relations with Ethiopia so that a government that pursues a policy that can be dubbed as "ethno-fundamentalism" could keep in check Sudan's "Islamic Fundamentalism" and Somalia's "One State Fundamentalism")

6. Given these general areas of agreement, there appear to be-to the untrained NGO bottom-feeder-- tactical differences regarding how to proceed. On the one hand, MLLT brags that it has seriously weakened Eritrea's military capability (a sum total of all of Ethiopia's claims would show that Eritrea has lost about 100,000 combatants); on the other hand, it anticipates further "adventurism" (see also: self-defense) from the Eritrean leadership. On the one hand, MLLT threatens Eritrea with war almost weekly; when Eritrea conducts recruitment drives to defend itself, MLLT accuses it of having ambitious military plans. Some appear to believe that only when Isayas has been dealt a decisive defeat and evicted from the areas of Ethiopia that are presently occupied by Eritrean forces, will the political conditions for a durable settlement be in place. This tells volumes about the MLLT plan since Isayas is in Asmara and evicting him from Asmara exposes MLLT's plans of occupying Asmara and beyond. In the interest of fairness, it should be mentioned that the MLLT assessments were made after consuming cases of Johnny Walker--and that thesesame assessments were made in countless "once-and-for-all" offensives by MLLT's predecessor-the Dergue. Others appear inclined to believe that if, and only if, a modification of the Technical Arrangements is achieved which i) clearly specifies the areas from which Eritrea is to withdraw and the route they will take and which day of the week they will do it in advance, MLLT would find easy pickings and it would never have to present the totality of its claims. ii) removes imaginary inconsistencies between the Technical Arrangements and the Framework Agreement and its Modalities (particularly those relating to the distinction between peacekeeping forces [those who can stop evil] and observers [and those who can observe evil]), it would be worth the risk of accepting the deal. Well, at least claiming to accept them. Clearly at this level the economic and developmental costs of continued conflict are factored into the analysis of acceptable risk. Unfortunately for the world, the cost/benefit analysis is conducted by MLLTers who consider Badme (with all its casualties) a victory.

7. From the MLLT perspective, "negative" decisions by international donors to suspend assistance pending a resolution of the conflict are what keeps them awake all night and assuming a fetus position. But, in assessing the cost/benefit analysis using the patented MLLT calculator which has a high threshhold for pain, it is considered useful to put up a brave face and pretend that the donor nations truly care if Ethiopia were to survive as a Federation or to go to hell in a hand basket. Ethiopia has perfected the art of going to the edge of a cliff and threatening that it would jump because it knows that, so far, there isn't a single Clint Eastwood in the international community who will say, "Go Ahead. Make my day."

8. In contrast, "positive" decisions to
   1. modify the Technical Arrangements--that even Mr. Shinn, the Godfather of US Rwanda has described as fair to Ethiopia (and thereby rendering them unacceptable by Eritrea), and
   2. publicly acknowledge what is privately admitted to be Eritrean aggression, might increase the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. Of course, the negotiated settlement is one between the Ethiopian people and the donor nations and does not give any consideration to the peace partner, Eritrea. This would place Ethiopia in the familiar position of Ethiopia + the Entire world vs Eritrea. This would actually make prospects for peace even dimmer but MLLT is not negotiating for peace; it is negotiating its survival.

9. In perverse respects, the present international stance which places the onus of accepting or rejecting a negotiated settlement on Ethiopia (with little apparent attention to the viability of the present package), may increase the incentives for Eritrean forces to provoke an Ethiopian response. A definition of Eritrean provocation includes: breathing, assembling, raising funds, singing, laughing, waving their flag and writing "funny" articles like this one. As has been demonstrated on February 6, 1999 in Adi Grat, Eritreans have the capacity to fly invisible planes that drop imaginary bombs that emit no noise and do no damage. Tricky people, these Eritreans. How can one make peace with these people?