Despite Ethiopia's repeated assertions, Ethiopia's "irreducible minimum" or "bottomline" is not Eritrean withdrawal from the disputed territories to pre-May 6, 1998 positions and reinstatement of the Ethiopian civilian administration. It is far more ambitious than that. No, no, don't take my word for it. Nor is this a conclusion I reached after reading articles offered by every irresponsible Lema, Tesema and Mamo at Walta. Ethiopia's position was officially articulated right after "Operation Sunset" and before "Operation Sunrise" (aka the Tsorona Massacre.) Just to make sure that there was no ambiguity, the Ethiopian Spokesperson wrote two press releases on the same day, March 12, 1999 (1).
The "irreducible minimum" for peace envisioned by Ethiopia back in March 1999 was for Eritrea to consent to " immediate and unconditional withdrawal from the remaining occupied Ethiopian territory and the return of the status quo ante in full" and that "In light of the huge loss of lives, the humanitarian crisis and the destruction of property caused by the Eritrean aggression, Eritrea must assume full responsibility for all the damages." This wasn't a case of reflexive call; it was a serious proposal that Ethiopia sent all the way to the UN.
After the stinging punishment Ethiopia received at Tsorona, the angry Ethiopian Government added new preconditions. These preconditions were issued by Ethiopia's Foreign Ministry and are housed at the Ethio Spokesperson cite. (2). Here, Ethiopia insists that the peace package could not be implemented "until the government in Asmara officially acknowledges that its troops are occupying sovereign Ethiopian territory and agrees to withdraw them." In essense, Eritrea had to agree that the disputed territories are not disputed and that it was only there because it just has this knack for aggression.
In the months that followed, the Ethiopian Government told anyone who would listen that peace can only come about if the Eritrean Government was sent packing which would happen if sufficient economic pressure was put on Eritrea, etc. The most brazen of the lot of the Ethiopian Charge d'affairs in Sudan who said that Ethiopia was supporting the Eritrean Opposition.
After Eritrea accepted the Modalities, Ethiopia decided that instead of
placing new pre-conditions and digging from the bottomless pit of bottomlines
for peace, it was better off convincing the world that Eritrea really had not
accepted the peace treaty. Really. Unfortunately, this pitch did not gain
much currency outside the Addis Mercato, especially after Eritrea accepted
the detailed Technical Arrangements and showed its willingness to implement
the peace package in its entirety immediately.
After much hair-splitting, the Ethiopian Government finally told the world in
September 14, 1999 that it would not agree to a negotiated peace. Again,
this official Ethiopian position is available for anyone who can read English
at the Ethiopian Spokesperson website. (3) To wit: "The Ethiopian Government
cannot be expected to tell its people after all that has passed that the
restoration of Ethiopian sovereignty is dependent on the decision arrived at
by third parties at a future date." How clearly do they need to state their
position for the world to take them at their word?
CONCLUSION:
The logical conclusion that can be drawn from all of the above is the
following:
To Eritreans, Godot is the UN--but Godot is not coming through. The UN is blinder than Pozzo and muter than Lucky. To the UN, Godot is an enlightened Ethiopian leader--but that leader is not coming, either. Ethiopian history does not include treaties made in peacetime and there is no urgency because time is eternal. So, like the characters in Beckett's play we wait. To wait is to hope--because to lose hope is to lose faith and to lose faith is to blaspheme and to blaspheme is to be damned.
Well, shall we go? Yes, let's go. But where?