It all started with the Indian Ocean Newsletter (ION). In its February 12th issue (Issue # 891), the periodical, which reports on the goings-on of the region, reported that Ethiopia would “launch a massive military offensive against neighboring Eritrea, somewhere between Tsorona and Zalambesa and sometime within the next few weeks, [February 15 – February 20] in a bid to capture Senafe, key to the capital Asmara.” Given its habit of quoting anonymous sources, ION is only slightly more reliable than the always-wrong “Africa Confidential”; thus, it was easy to dismiss the ION report as yet another bogus alert.
What made ION’s report credible was that it was crediting, on record, the United States Central Command (USCC) (http://www.centcom.mil) as being the source of its report. USCC is the successor to the old US Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. Formed in 1983, USCC “monitors” 25 nations (including Eritrea and Ethiopia) as part of the Sole Superpower’s mission to police the world. According to its website, USCC’s mission includes maintaining “command readiness to fight and win decisively at all levels of conflict.” This requires heavy eavesdropping on communications in the entire unified command of the Horn of Africa.
President Moi of Kenya must have received an advance copy of USCC alert (after all USCC’s mo includes to “establish and maintain close relationships with regional political and military leaders”) because the long-dormant Moi had a press conference to express his concern about the deteriorating situation in the Horn and that “Kenya could no longer sit and watch the situation worsen.” Moi went on his own peace-shuttle to Ethiopia and Eritrea on February 9 – 10 and got the predictable response (No from Ethiopia; Yes from Eritrea) but in the process, he ended up biting two days from the Ethio Government’s count to doomsday.
Around the same time Kenya was playing the peacemaker, another neighbor, Djibouti, was continuing on with its newfound role as the transit hub for Ethiopia. According to the 894 issue of ION, “At the beginning of February, observers reported the arrival of many military troop-carriers heading for Ethiopia.” This is in addition to the 40 T-55 tanks that were ferried in October 1999 through Port Autonome International de Djibouti (PAID) Paid in Birr, that is. You will recall that Djibouti’s alleged reason for breaking off its diplomatic ties with Eritrea was that the Eritrean president had the gall to accuse it of being the conduit for Ethiopia. Such unfounded allegation.
Armed to the teeth and ready for some muscle flexing, the Ethiopian Government would now set in motion the requisite war hysteria to sustain its war effort. Mekele, capital of the Lone Star State, the Republic of Tigray and home to the power-brokers of EPRDF, would be the perfect venue. On Saturday, February 19, 2000, on a ceremony marking the 25th anniversary of the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF), Meles Zenawi pulled his best Malcolm-X impression to the throngs of people assembled to see the unveiling of the 40 million birr memorial. (What drought? What famine?) Said Meles “X” Zenawi that for Ethiopia “the time has come to regain its sovereignty by force". Moroever, Ethiopia would do so “by every means available." Just to make sure that world understood his message, the Ethiopian news agency, Walta, rushed an “unofficial” translation of his threats the next day, February 20, 2000.
On Tuesday, February 22, 2000, the now-awake mediators sprang to action to start yet another round of shuttle diplomacy. On Wednesday, February 23, 2000, Anthony Lake, the US Envoy, arrived in Asmara, Eritrea. The OAU Chairman’s Envoy, Ouyahia, trekked to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Given that Eritrea had already agreed to all of OAU’s terms, it is unclear what Lake was doing in Eritrea other than to get assurances as in, “you haven’t changed your minds, have you?”
The same day, as if on cue, the Ethiopian military strategists—who scoff at the surprise element when waging warfare and are habitual announcers of their plans in advance—attacked Eritrea on the Burie front (Southeast Eritrea) while the peace-brokers were busy shuttling between the two capitals. Piercing that flank would have enabled Ethiopia to initiate the other phases along Badme, Zalambesa and all the way to Senafe, Eritrea. Why would Ethiopia want Senafe, Eritrea? Well, the Ethiopian PM had threatened that he would get his way by any means necessary including occupying Eritrean territories deep inside Eritrea, perhaps as a bargaining chip. Ethiopia was rebuffed and it was back to the high alert and super tense status.
A day later, on Thursday, February 24th, Lake joined his OAU partner in Addis Ababa and they met with the Ethiopian leaders in an effort to get Ethiopia to accept the Technical Arrangement. By Friday, February 25th, after the mediators had met with the Ethiopian Foreign Minister, Rueters was reporting that the “US and African mediation has yet to persuade Ethiopia to accept the current text of a key document aimed at delivering peace with Eritrea.” The paper went on to quote the Ethiopian spokesperson as saying that “…nothing short of the status quo ante is acceptable.” In other words, no flexibility, no compromise. The mediators did what they always do: they advised both parties to show maximum restraint then they embarked on The Road Frequently Traveled: to push the one party that has accepted their peace treaty, Eritrea, to be even more accommodating, more flexible of Ethiopia’s wish list.
The mediators traveled to Asmara, Eritrea on Sunday, February 27 and did not leave until Friday, March 3, 2000. As the Asmara-based diplomats and the OAU general secretary expressed optimism, for six days, the mediators tried to do the impossible: to amend a contract that included a clause that said the contract was not subject to amendment. In the end, there was no “breakthrough” because a breakthrough can only come about if the belligerent party—Ethiopia—complied with the terms of the agreement.
On Friday, March 3, 2000, the mediators left for Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. At Addis, they had what the press called a “second round of talks” with the Ethiopian Prime Minister. Presumably, Mr. Lake informed Mr. Zenawi that his efforts to amend the un-amendable Tech. Arrangement had been a bust. This was the wiggle room Ethiopia had been seeking since the Tech. Arrangements were put on the table back in August 1999. The long sessions Ouyahia and Anthony Lake conducted and the selective leaks by the OAU General Secretary made it sound that Ethiopia, the OAU and the US envoy all agreed that there was a need for fundamental change in the Tech. Arrangements and it was only Eritrea that was holding out. On Sunday, March 5, 2000, the Ethiopian Spokesperson, in what the AFP called “the government's first positive statement since August” issued a statement claiming that “significant progress” was made in the latest round of shuttle diplomacy. The “significant progress”, it turns out, is that, instead of pressuring Ethiopia to accept the Tech. Arrangements, the mediators spent most of their time trying to convince Eritrea to buy into Ethiopia’s amendments. This, in Ethiopian parlance, was Ethiopia being vindicated.
By March 6, 2000, the mediators—who had pledged to be in the area until peace was secured—were back to their hometowns to report on the futility of their entire exercise. But diplomats being diplomats, they had to define the glass as half-full. So, it was left to the OAU to announce, through a press release, that Eritrea and Ethiopia had reached “partial consensus” on the Tech Arrangements. News bulletin to the OAU: both Eritrea and Ethiopia had “partial consensus” on the Tech Arrangements back in August 1999; unfortunately, the only part of the Tech Arrangements Ethiopia accepts is that Eritrea will withdraw from the disputed territories.
The mediators leave the area in the same sad shape they found it in before their shuttle diplomacy: with the belligerent party given more time to stall and re-arm and retrain, more assured that no demands it puts on the table are considered irrational; with heavily-armed soldiers on both side of the border a trigger-pull away from what threatens to be the deadliest war in Africa. All they’ve done is briefly interrupt Ethiopia’s attack.
Under the guise of “clarification”, Ethiopia is seeking amendments. It is hard to see why the world looks the other way as Ethiopia rejects a proposal put on the table by the OAU and endorsed by the world. It is not like the world does not know about the repugnant nature of the Ethiopian Government. Around the same time the mediators were shuttling, the US State Department issued yet another damning Human Rights report on Ethiopia. It includes statements like “The [Ethiopian] Government’s human rights record generally was poor…” and “Since the outbreak of the border conflict in May 1998, more than 67,000 such persons (Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin) have left Ethiopia for Eritrea; the vast majority were deported…Another 1,200 male Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin are being held in internment camps.” And “In February an Ethiopian plane bombed the Eritrean village of Laili Deda, killing at least five Eritrean civilians and wounding several others.” The Ethiopian Government has “provided financial support to a coalition of Eritrean opposition groups based in Sudan, which laid landmines in Eritrea that resulted in several civilian deaths.” Some of the prisoners in Ethiopia “staged a 10-day hunger strike to protest the prison policy of keeping them in handcuffs 24 hours a day.” And on and on.
The Eritrean Government has a tough call to make. If it believes that the world, eventually, will take a principled stand and uphold the OAU Agreements in their entirety and hold Ethiopia accountable, it will stick to its guns and insist that the OAU stay true to the unadulterated Tech Arrangements. If it believes that all agreements are subject to amendment and after all, we are trying to make peace with Ethiopia and not the world, then it will agree, on principle, to amendments. But fairness dictates that if one party is given the opportunity to amend the agreement to its liking, the other party should be given the same opportunity Otherwise, the OAU and the US might as well abandon all pretense of neutrality and give Ethiopia carte-blanche authority to re-write the entire agreement. Under either scenario, peace is further than it was before the latest shuttle diplomacy and all that stands between Ethiopia’s military offensive and Eritrean annihilation is the Eritrean Defense Forces.