The principal instrument for implementing the strategy was the microscopic and time-consuming examination of the Technical Arrangement. Why? Because Ethiopia needed time to arm hundreds of thousands of soldiers for an eventual invasion of Eritrea, under the pretext of "liberating" the contested territory the TPLF was claiming as its own. The strategy was based on three assumptions: the continuing indulgence of the OAU and its partners to Ethiopia's demands and threats; the generosity of the donor community with supplying relief commodities that could be diverted for the war effort; and, buying the silence of domestic critics to the war by dangling Assab to obtain their acquiescence to the military build-up and subsequent invasion of Eritrea.

As the TPLF had expected, the OAU and partners played their part in acceding to every demand to amend an un-amendable Technical Arrangement to guarantee Eritrea's rejection of the document, an to paint Eritrea as the recalcitrant party. The international community, led by the U.S came through with one million tons of relief commodities that were easily diverted for the war effort. The domestic critics kept quiet, hoping Assab would fall on their lap.

Prime Minister Meles had every reason to believe that his strategy would work that he boasted to a journalist that Ethiopia would attack at the right time, not a day early, not a day late. Eritrea did not have a ghost of a chance to survive. Its army would be decimated, its government overthrown. Its sovereignty taken away, only to be returned at Mekele's sufferance after meeting strenuous terms of surrender, including but not limited to the handing over of Assab to Ethiopia. This was the Plan, expected the outcome of the "brilliant" No War, No Peace strategy for which the May 12 invasion was launched. Prime Minister Meles was so certain that the strategy would work that he confidently told a UN Security Council visiting team that Ethiopia would conclude the war quickly, to return to its primary task of fighting hunger and deprivation. The Prime Minister was smugly confident that that the strategy, honed and planned carefully for almost a year, would work. It did not.

After gobbling up empty territory the first few days, and boasting to a gullible world that Eritrea's forces had been "decimated," it looked as if there would be no resistance all the way to Asmara. It appeared as if the plan would work, and that Asmara would soon fall. Much of the world was on a prayer vigil for Eritrea. After the first week or so, hard reality set in. The much-outnumbered Eritrean forces hit back from strategic positions of their choosing. From the top of their inhospitable hills and escarpments, they mowed down waves after waves of humanity. Apparently, all the military analysts and nameless Addis Ababa based diplomats who had projected Eritrea's imminent doom had failed to do their homework: they never bothered to verify the stupendous military "successes" Ethiopia was claiming, or the huge "losses" the Eritrean forces had allegedly suffered. Signs that the numbers Ethiopian commanders were citing of Eritrean divisions "decimated or "put out of action" did not up where everywhere. Secure in their superior knowledge of military science, the analysts did not want to admit that they were wrong. As professionals, however, they worst blunder was not to take into account the iron will of the Eritrean forces to defend the land, or the stout heart of the Eritrean people to fight for their sovereignty no matter what the cost.

Suffering unspeakable carnage at various points, the invasion run out steam. Ethiopia changed course and put everything, about eight divisions backed by a frightening array of heavy equipment, into capturing Assab. The campaign failed, after suffering defeat after defeat over a one-week engagement. Risking further losses deep into Ethiopian territory, Prime Minister Meles was forced to accept the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, June 18. The No War, No Peace strategy on which Mekele's war planners had counted heavily to give them control of Eritrea was a miserable failure. Still too weak to resume the war, but lacking in courage to make peace, and yet needing time to know what to do next, the TPLF returned with an updated version of its failed strategy: No War, No Peace: The Next Generation.

The purpose of the updated version of the failed strategy was to buy time by dragging the implementation of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, to avoid demarcation at all cost. As it did with the Technical Arrangement, Ethiopia would come with amendments and proposals intended to gut the Agreement. To provoke Eritrea into taking retaliatory actions, so as to stop, or at least delay the deployment of UN peace keeping forces in the border. By laying mines in the occupied Eritrean areas, to prevent the return of the civilian population to their homes and fields, to prevent them from planting crops. Domestically the TPLF has tried to hold the regime's critics at bay by selling them political opium, that the campaign against Eritrea was consistent with Ethiopia's role as Regional Power. But in doing so, the government opened a Pandora's box, giving legitimacy to discussions it could not control, and whose end result would be, at best, problematic for the regime.

There are several reasons the updated strategy of delaying the process may not work. This time it's not the OAU, but rather the UN Security Council that's driving the implementation of the OAU peace package. What's on the table is not the Technical Arrangements that could be held hostage through TPLF's intransigence. What we have is the implementation of the Agreement for Cessation of Hostilities, under the auspices of the Security Council, and at the request of the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea. With the approval of sending 100 military observers, the Security Council has set in motion the implementation of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. Ethiopia would find it difficult, if not impossible to derail the momentum towards the redeployment of Ethiopian forces from Eritrean soil. Once the entire UN peacekeeping force assigned for the mission is in place inside Eritrea, Ethiopian forces would have to leave occupied Eritrean territory. The UN Cartographic Unit would commence delimitation and demarcation, according to the OAU Framework Agreement. How long would it take to complete the process? It depends on how serious is the Security Council in insisting that the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities and the OAU Framework for Peace which Ethiopia and Eritrea have agreed, are implemented without delay. Ethiopia should not be allowed to weak havoc with the Agreements and the OAU peace package as it did with the Technical Arrangements.

Would the TPLF enjoy the sight of three to four thousand UN peacekeeping forces on the Eritrean side of the border, spending hard currency on goods and services Eritrea will provide? Very unlikely. Either the TPLF would cooperate as expeditiously so as to cut the troops' stay on Eritrean soil, or, Meles, to bring in hard currency for Tigray, would change his mind about UN troops on Ethiopian soil. But since the UN mandate is on the Eritrea side of the border, TPLF's request for a portion of the troops may not be easily accommodated. So it's quite possible that the TPLF may prefer to expedite the process.

Ethiopia cannot, and will not openly defy the Security Council by resuming the war. Even if it wanted to, economically it lacks the wherewithal for another major operation. Donors are least likely to fund, even indirectly, another campaign. Ethiopia's economic situation has reached crisis proportion. As the Addis Ababa based paper Monitor has noted (August 1) "the general economic problem of the country is really colossal and frightening." The paper also estimated that last year's revenues would be two third of the estimate, while ruefully acknowledging that Ethiopia cannot "expect to get external financial resources because of her characteristic defiance to being ordered by big ad rich foreign powers." It never occurred to the paper that the deficit might have something to do with the costly war. What the UN Security Council, the epitome of the "big and rich foreign powers" is saying is that Ethiopia should live up to the terms of the agreement it has signed.

Furthermore, it is possible that the "big and rich countries" have learned a valuable lesson. Their generous assistance to help Ethiopia's needy had been diverted to finance an invasion of a member of the United nations of nations, creating a massive humanitarian crisis, catastrophic damages and destruction of economic and social assets, and massive looting. The preliminary estimate, which still does not include the areas still occupied by Ethiopian troops, runs over 300 million dollars.

The donor community has never faced a situation such as this. It is a unique situation in which an aid and relief assistance financed invasion generates massive damages in another country which would further necessitate for the world community to step in to fix the damage its ill advised aid had wrought. What's more had the world community tried harder to rein in Ethiopia, had it not indulged Ethiopia every step of the way the previous two years, the invasion would never have taken place. Now the world has learned its lesson. Ethiopia is unlikely to receive the huge amounts of assistance it was able to divert for the war effort. Without such aid, Ethiopia does not has more about Massawa, the closest port to the Tigray heartland, than it does about Assab. But to get indirect control over Massawa, it must be able to form a government in Eritrea answerable to Mekele. But its failure to seize Assab, meant zero possibility of imposing draconian terms of surrender, to force Eritreans to accept a Mekele blessed government in Asmara. While the critics were only interested in severing Assab from Eritrea, the TPLF aimed higher: how to bring all of Eritrea under Mekele's control. The regime's critics would give up all the contested areas north of Tigray for Assab, a nightmarish trade off inconceivable for the TPLF. Still the TPLF would not mind its critics' continuing fixation with Assab as it thinks this might influence the decision on delimitation and demarcation.

When the May 12 invasion failed in the red-hot oven of the Bure line the second week of June, TPLF's dream of hegemony over Eritrea crumbled. The failed invasion, however, had another unwelcome byproduct for the regime: it emboldened the regimes opponents to demand to renegotiate Eritrea's independence. This TPLF could not, or would not do. It put Meles in the unusual position of having to declare that Assab is Eritrean. The TPLF knows, better than its critics that the Eritrean people would fight tooth and nail to defend the land. The TPLF knows what it is talking about because it tried and failed, at a horrendous cost to its economy and people. The No War, No peace: the Second Generation strategy would do no better than the original version. It will fail.

The redeployment of Ethiopian forces from occupied Eritrea will not bring peace, nor does it guarantee against another war. But it will give Eritrea time to resettle the displaced into their homes and fields. In the short run, the plight of the displaced is the most serious problem facing Eritrea. The same intensity, the same dedication that went into the defense of the land should be expended on taking care of the displaced, repairing the infrastructure, private sector development, social protection and rehabilitating the institutions. A recent World Bank team that visited Eritrea has determined that the war has created a human crisis of major proportion as well as extensive damages and destruction of physical, social and economic assets. The Bank has given preliminary estimate of the damage to slightly over 300 million dollars. The figures do not include estimates for areas still under Ethiopian control.

In the long run, however, Eritreans have to come to terms with the vulnerability of their sovereignty that it cannot be taken for granted. The TPLF will not quit trying to subjugate Eritrea, although the attempt would be doomed that the misguided effort will eventually take Ethiopia down with it. The proponents of Ethiopia as a Regional Power will not quit talking about their country's "manifest destiny" until there is a government in Ethiopia that abides by international maritime law that governs the right of land locked countries to access to the sea. Unfortunately, Eritreans cannot count that there will be one anytime soon. Until current and future rulers of Ethiopia learn the hard way that any foolish attempt to takeaway Eritrean sovereignty would certainly render Ethiopia ungovernable, Eritreans have to maintain the highest level of vigilance and preparedness.

Therefore, the task for Eritreans is to prepare militarily, economically and politically, by building on the unique unity of purpose between the government and the public that they demonstrated in foiling the most recent invasion. The old way of doing things, when everyone thought Eritrea's sovereignty was safe, will never do. New challenges require new approaches. Militarily this may mean making huge qualitative improvements since we cannot hope to match our adversary's huge numbers.

Economically, and in the short term the focus should be on rehabilitating the economic assets intentionally destroyed and damaged by the marauding TPLF army. In the long run, we have to think creative ways to spur private sector investment while we continue with the remarkable public sector investment on infrastructure.

Politically we have to open up. All should embrace a climate that embraces open political discourse. The politics of liberation has been replaced by the politics of the defense of the land, national unity and the imperatives of a constitutional form of government. The TPLF would always remain a threat to Eritrea's sovereignty. What the TPLF tried to win militarily, it would attempt to achieve politically by secretly interfering in Eritrean political affairs. It will attempt to inject deadly viruses, most commonly, ethnic discord, regionalist tendencies, and religious disaffection into the Eritrean body politic, to destabilize Eritrea. But the effort is doomed to fail. Eritreans are impervious to the politics of hate and intolerance. They have learned their lesson from the old Ethiopian politics of divide and rule, perfected by successive Ethiopian regimes into an art form. The Eritrean political landscape is inhospitable for the TPLF cancerous political virus.

It does not take a sophisticated mastery of political science to understand that politically Eritreans are fully capable of comprehending of what is important for them: they are committed to their land; they have a reverence for justice; and, they pray for peace. Whoever can protect the land, dispenses equitable justice, and works for peace better than others, will get their support. The Eritrean public is astute enough to decide who is for real, which is an imposter; who is a patriot, and who is a traitor. Eritreans are wise and farsighted. They want political leaders who are at least as good as the people; they want a government at least as good as themselves.

The present government has been excellent where it counted the most: it brought independence and defended it successfully. Still people know it can get better at governing the country. All it has to do is to embrace an environment where its best ideas for the good of the country will go head to head against that of others who have proven their mettle by standing firm with their people during the invasion. The country can only get better, and stronger, from the competition of good ideas. The people will benefit. In the end Eritrea's survival as a sovereign and independent State is contingent on the degree to which Eritreans live up to the core values-justice and peace-- proudly inscribed in their Constitution. Those values and the deep commitment to defending the land is what make Eritreans who they are, Eritreans.