We have overdosed from bad news for most of the past 30 months that when something seemingly positive but admittedly out of the ordinary hits our television screens, we are at a loss to explain it even to ourselves . Indeed, December 4 brought two extraordinarily important news items that, if true, will mark at least on the surface, the beginning of the end of the Horn region's 30 months nightmare. Perhaps this may be a case of our hope running away from our realistic expectations. But for now at least we ought to savor the two announcements, uncertain as we may be whether the end result would justify our current euphoria. Still the two announcements appear to provide a ray of hope that seems to be saying that, after all, we are not destined to suffer endlessly, and needlessly. It may be wishful thinking but may be, just may be this is the beginning of the endÖ.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Eritrea issued a press release announcing to the world that Eritrea and Ethiopia will sign a "peace" agreement in Algiers, December 12. The second and equally compelling piece of news was the announcement of the first and successful meeting of the Military Coordination Commission of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). According to the UNMEE spokesman Albert Wong, the Military delegation from Ethiopia and Eritrea, "concluded ahead of time a successful and cooperative meeting." They even agreed on a "formula for the redeployment and rearrangement of forces on both sides." These two items appear to provide the sort of breakthrough for which people on both sides have been praying. Does that mean the prayers have been answered? We are not sure, although we like to think this time it maybe someone "up there" is listening. But as "wounded" veterans of countless crushed hopes we have no choice but to hedge our bets.

We have to qualify our enthusiasm because we have been down this path before only to hit cement block after cement block. The heart of the problem is that Eritrea is dealing with a slippery adversary, whose words cannot be trusted. The other side has a habit of accepting agreements in "principle" but shortly after the agreement is flouted, as if no agreement had been reached. Remember the Technical Arrangements? The cessation of Hostilities? Both were agreed in principle, later we discovered to our dismay that the acceptance was just a ruse to buy time, in pursuit of the ultimate military solution.

This is the same government that had no problem building new trenches and laying land mines in the occupied territories at the same time Prime Minister Meles was professing his commitment to a comprehensive settlement last September. Even after signing the June 18 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, Ethiopia came with a new set of unrelated demands, attempting to effectively annul the agreement it had signed before the ink was dry. Our skepticism that Prime Minster Melesí government cannot be trusted to do the right thing is amply justified from past experience.

The Agreement President Isaias and Prime Minister Meles are scheduled to sign in Algiers, December 12, is not significantly different from the one that has been on the table since Summer 1999. It addresses the same three issues: delimitation and demarcation; investigation of origins of the conflict; and, compensation. The major difference between the agreement pending and the previous ones revolves around two related issues: whether delimitation and demarcation decision would be subject to arbitration, and what the precise role of the UN Cartographic Unit would be. Ethiopia made two demands in earlier proximity talks and discussions with the facilitators: that arbitration should replace delimitation and demarcation in a one step process and there should be no role for the UN Cartographic Unit. But as the facilitators knew, accepting Ethiopiaís demand was tantamount to gutting the OAU peace package. Delimitation and demarcation had to be considered as discrete steps that, if necessary, would lead to arbitration. And even if demarcation were subjected to arbitration the base line information on which the appeal could be made would have to include the Cartographerís input.

The December 12 agreement treats delimitation and demarcation as a two step process not subject to appeal or arbitration. The commissionís decision is final. But whether the commission is also an arbiter is a matter of semantics, probably a distinction without a difference. The commission would depend for its decision on the expertise of the UN Cartographic Unit, not much different from what was anticipated in the previous peace package. While the Cartographic Units lacks the authority to independently delimit and demarcate the border as was envisioned as the first step, even then subject to reversal under arbitration, the latest version envisions the UN Cartographic Unit to function as the Border Commissionís technical arm. Article 4:7 of the December 12 Agreement states: "the UN Cartographer shall serve as the Secretary to the commission and undertake such tasks as assigned to him by the Commission, making use of the technical expertise of the UN Cartographic Unit" (emphasis added). While the two parties would be allowed to bring their experts to help them prepare their case, the UN Cartographic Unit will remain the Commissionís principal in house source of expertise. To a very large degree, the UN, through its Cartographic Unit, remains fully engaged in the process, something Ethiopia had fought against without much success, but for the right aid package was willing to swallow. And swallow it did.

The Border Commissionís mandate has not changed from the thrust of the OAU peace package. Article 4:2 of the Agreement defines the mandate: "to delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border based on pertinent colonial treaties (1900, 1902, and 1908) and applicable international law." The Agreement denies Commissioners any leeway in injecting their subjective interpretation of the treaties and international law, as the agreement specifically requires them not to make decisions ex aequo et bono ( rough translation: whatís equitable and fair). No subjective interpretation of the facts is permissible. Everything should be based on accepted international legal norms, including a strict and technical interpretation of the law or treaties that is precluded from advancing any notion of fairness or equity.

The Agreement mandates delimitation and demarcation on the basis of pertinent colonial treaties and applicable international law. Of course whatís "pertinent" and whatís "applicable" will be for lawyers and experts to thrash out. What is important, however, is the recognition is that the matter is before a competent international body, whose decision is not only binding but also would have the full weight of international law. If all works out as planned, six months after December 12, demarcation should be completed, and the international community would formally recognize post-independence Eritrea's border with Ethiopia. Regardless which way the final decision comes out on the various segments of the disputed border, the commissionís decision must be accepted as legally binding.

The agreement the two leaders are expected to sign next week is fair in that itís largely consistent with the OAU peace package both have said repeatedly that they had accepted. Itís a far cry from the draconian peace terms Ethiopiaís leaders had hoped to impose on Eritrea, flushed as its leaders were with excessive truimphalism their over-hyped military "achievement" briefly last summer. All the bluster of last summer has given in to the grim realization that winning a battle or two is a far cry from winning the war. Had Ethiopia won the war in strategic and political terms it would not have agreed to the terms specified in the Agreement.

 The Agreement makes no reference to Ethiopiaís demand that Eritrea be forced to reduce its military posture; that the UN should not be involved; and, that Eritrea compensate Ethiopia for the "destruction" of Zalambesa, and for what was lost at the Massawa and Asab ports before other war related claims could be considered. There would be no separate "commercial" claims. All claims would be treated as a whole as claims against "loss, damage, or injury." And more ominously for Ethiopia the commission would entertain claims based on violations of international law, including those of the 1949 Geneva conventions. Ordinarily these violations include denationalization, deportation, expulsion and/or detention, not to mention rape and torture. The Agreement treats the two countries as sovereign states with a border dispute and not as a "victor" dictating terms to a "vanquished" adversary as Prime Minister Meles had hoped initially.

But the reality is different from the mass delirium in Addis Ababa caused by the exuberance of the "three-days wonder" of penetration of Eritrean territory last May. The fact is that thirty months of conflict has not solved much other than bankrupting both economies while sowing hatred and bitterness which will take generations to eradicate. As has always been the case whether there will be peace or war depends on the decision makers in Addis Ababa who would have to decide whether itís to anyoneís interest to continue the conflict. If they are committed to resolving the problem, then thereís no better way to start than immediately implementing the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities as required by Article 1:2 of the Agreement to be signed, December 12.

 At the minimum this means withdrawing from all occupied territory and return to the May 6 line, two weeks after the full UN peacekeepers contingent has moved in. In fact we would know very early whether Ethiopia is serious about implementing the peace agreement. The government of Ethiopia has to resist the temptation to cheat on the precise location of the May 6 line since it has steadfastly refused to indicate where the line is. The international community and Eritrea know where the May 6 border was. If, for whatever reason, Ethiopia refuses to move to the real May 6 line, then we are back to square one. There will be no peace, no cessation of hostilities, now or ever, as long as Ethiopian troops remain on undisputed, sovereign Eritrean territory.

Given our experience with Ethiopiaís un-kept promises, what reason do we have to dare to hope that may be this time we are onto something. Our reasoning is straightforward. This time we believe, something has fundamentally changed, because the powers that enforce the law in our part of the world, for whatever reason, appear to have decided that Enough is Enough, and that the region must have an orderly demarcation of the border. It is not that we believe peace is around the corner. No, in fact itís not. Thereís a fundamental difference between peace and the absence of conflict, or armed hostilities. What we are hoping is a permanent cessation of hostilities, a conflict free co-existence among neighbors. Peace, like the healing of the heart, cannot be forced. It will come, if it ever does, slowly and naturally.

Recent events give us some hope as they seem to indicate the donor community that financed the wretched war maybe finally be poised to use its leverage to force the government of Ethiopia to act responsibly. Donors have sent notice that they are not about to write a check for 1.7 billion dollars to supplement Ethiopiaís current budget as Addis Ababa has requested unless Prime Minister Meles takes meaningful steps to resolve his countryís conflict with Eritrea.

For too long Prime Minister Meles has played the donor community as if they were a bunch of marionettes, always giving him assistance even when they knew it was being diverted for the war effort. Let us be blunt. The donors that funded Ethiopiaís war cannot afford not to see the irony of what their assistance has done to the region and its people. No wonder they are trying to force a peaceful solution to the conflict. By providing Ethiopia with 1.2 million metric tons of food and other relief commodities Ethiopia was able to shift the responsibility of feeding its people to the international community, while it went on a shopping spree on sophisticated arms and high priced mercenaries, paying out of funds targeted for development projects. Using aid money it mobilized a huge army, essential for the May 12 invasion of Eritrea.

Itís possible that the donors have finally wised up that it makes no sense for one of the worldís poorest countries in which three out of four of the population lives for two dollars or less per day to spend astronomical amounts to support an unnecessary military posture. According to official Ethiopian estimates, the countryís defense bill for 2000 was 6.2 billion bir, the equivalent of 775million dollars (one dollar to eight bir exchange rate), or approximately 13 dollars per day per person. Nothing illustrates Ethiopiaís lopsided priority better than a policy that spends six dollars per day on the military for every dollar its people have to live on.

If the donors appear to have come to their senses, the question remains why Prime Minister Meles agreed to the peace terms, a far cry from what he had in mind last summer. What has altered the Prime Ministerís mind about the shape of the agreement is the prospect of getting a favorable decision on debt relief for Ethiopia. Economically Ethiopia meets and even exceeds all criteria for eligibility for the High Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC). The problem has been the war. Without the war, Ethiopia would have been one of the first to qualify. The prospect of qualifying for the relief has turned Meles into a peace-nick. Three to four hundred million dollars a year for several years is a lot of money.

Under HPIC, Ethiopia would be allowed to spend the money on poverty reduction programs, including investments on health, education, nutrition, and other social sector programs. Three hundred million dollars translates into 2.4 billion bir of extra spending a year, which is far in excess of what the country spends on all educational and health programs. On the average, from 1991 to 2000, Ethiopia spent 531 million bir a year on education, and 1, 358 on health, for a total of 1,889 million bir, far less than what would be available under debt relief. The prospect of so much extra money was enough to turn Meles into a champion of peace with Eritrea. Thereís no guarantee that the saving from the debt relief would be invested to help Ethiopiaís poor.

It is a monumental irony that resources that could have gone to improve lives were cynically diverted to destroy lives and economies with full knowledge of donors; and, when the destruction has subsided, and a partial accounting of the damage has come into full view, an embarrassed donor community is scrambling to repair its misplace "generosity" had wrought. Strange as it may seem, and indeed it is, donors indirectly underwrote the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of soldiers, and now the same donors are prepared to pay for the demobilization of those their assistance had mobilized. Strange but true.

The World Bank of Governors has approved a 400 million plus dollars emergency rehabilitation package to mitigate the ill effects of the war. Itís a package that has the markings of "payoff" written all over it. Prime minister Meles has, in effect, told donors that either they give him the money heís asking all he will continue the war. The hugely inflated aid package goes well beyond mitigating the effect of the war on the land or people of Ethiopia. Because the war was largely on Eritrean soil, there was minimal damage on the infrastructure of Tigray, at least nothing remotely close to what has been as depicted in the package. The package talks about providing financial assistance to 635,000 displaced people on the Ethiopian side. Where did the numbers come from?

 We know that when the conflict started the authorities in Tigray had forced 300,000 or so Tigrayans to move in preparation for the military offensive, and the number was used to justify request for relief commodities. Now, the number has more than doubled even after Ethiopia had claimed a "smashing " victory against Eritrean forces. As always the numbers that originate from official Ethiopia sources donít add up, in fact they never do. Whatís amazing is that the Bank staff who are trained to spot fudged numbers decided to go along with the cooked up numbers to justify massive and unjustifiable, an admission perhaps that donors would have to bribe Meles for peace to peace in the region to have a fighting chance.

 Then thereís the question of money for demobilization, another ruse to shove more money to Ethiopia. A part of the money, about 170 million dollars is for demobilization and integration. Anyone who knows anything about the government in Addis Ababa knows that the combatants to be "demobilized" are probably the wounded and the unfit, who would have been let go only to be replaced by fresh recruits later, leaving the net reduction in force minimal. Thereís no way for the Bank to ascertain that demobilization had indeed taken place. In fact, it probably wonít. What the Bank is doing is what it had been doing in the past: finance Ethiopiaís military preparedness, albeit indirectly. This time it may not be against Eritrea, but definitely against the various internal insurrections plaguing the country.

An Ethiopian region that suffered minimally from the war has been awarded a huge package simply because the countryís Prime Minster who has been blessed with the uncanny ability of how to effectively blackmail the donor community is from the particular region. In effect donors are helping to entrench an ethnic based government whose consuming passion is building the economy of its home region at the expense of the rest of the country on a resentful Ethiopian public.

 We have to suspend our well-founded skepticism to entertain the belief that may be this time we have reached the beginning of the end of our nightmare, a nightmare of having to defend Eritreaís hard won sovereignty with the blood of the offspring of those that won it in the first place. To be sure, thereís a general weariness with the war in both countries, but itís weariness with a difference. For most Ethiopians itís the slow realization that they have been had by a minority government that has mortgaged the countryís youth and resources in pursuit of local territorial expansionism; for Eritreans itís the grim determination that the war will never be over until the last Ethiopian soldier leaves sovereign Eritrean territory, voluntarily or involuntarily

As this sorry episode appears to wind down, the lesson for Eritrea and the international community is clear. Itís one thing to get Meles to sign an agreement, and entirely different to get him to comply with the terms. The donor community should use its newly rediscovered clout by linking assistance to compliance with the terms of the Agreement. Under no circumstances should the December 12 Algiers Agreement be known as the Horn of Africaís version of the Oslo Accords. Still, we have to have hope that the end may be in sight. If May 6, 1998 marked the end of a hopeful beginning in the lives of the two countries, itís possible that December 12 could very well herald the beginning of the end of the conflict. Just may be.