If you have learned writing the way I have--dipping a finely chiseled nib in an inkpot and writing over the lined pages of a pocket sized "exercise book," the worst disaster that can happen is for you to spill ink on your "sarian." Nowadays, in this cyberbox era, much worse disasters happen. The system could close down before any warning, and you have no way of getting your stuff out, or what you thought was a draft's draft would find its way, mysteriously, I might add, into the public's screen. These two disasters happened to me over the weekend. I felt so bad I longed for the "nib and inkpot" days. The piece that appeared on your screen under my byline last Saturday is an imposter. It was a draft of a draft, more in the form of notes strung together. Here's the corrected version. I apologize for the wayward piece. Here's the corrected version, "The Unrelenting Search for the Deal Breaker."
The international community is about to find out what Eritrea has known right from the start. Ethiopia's minority controlled government has never been interested in a peace full resolution to its conflict with Eritrea. Now the world will understand fully who has been for peace, and who for continued war. All along Eritrea has been for peace, Ethiopia has been creating excuses upon excuses why it can't go for a lasting peace unless it's on its own terms. Although Ethiopia is too coy to say it publicly, what it desperately wants to do is to annul the OAU's Charter's stand on the sanctity of colonial era borders.
Ethiopia is no more interested in a long term peace than it is--to use Abay Tsehai's phrase as quoted by a VOA correspondent a few weeks ago in a speech he gave in Washington, "to break Eritrea's spinal cord." The TPLF Chief Political Commissar's chilling warning was made in Amharic at the same time the OAU was putting together answers as per Ethiopia's request on clarifications on the Technical Arrangements. Eritrea had already accepted and the world has been waiting for Ethiopia to do like wise.
Ethiopia's minority controlled government has perfected "bait and switch" as "high" art diplomacy. Every time a deal appeared imminent, Ethiopia searched high and low for the right deal breaker. Ethiopia has never been for peace; just talked the game about peace. For a long time Ethiopia successfully camouflaged its real intentions by talking smoothly to the international media. It received a lot of help, a lot of hand holding from the American Embassy in Addis.
Ethiopian officials talked peace in English; war in Amharic; and revenge in Tigrinya. Telling people what they wanted to hear, in the language they understood. Ethiopia's leaders know that the international donors want peace; the Amhara intellectuals wish to do away with Eritrea's independence; and TPLF's followers are dreaming of conquest. Fulfilling everyone's fantasy seems the road the TPLF has taken. It was clever, too clever, unfortunately it's more like a Ponzee Scheme soon to collapse under its own weight. Eritreans who speak at least two of the languages know what is going on-- a desperate attempt by the newly minted "Ethiopians" within TPLF trying to cling to power by any means necessary. This has been the story all along, although much of the outside world didn't know much about it. Now the world will listen. After Ethiopia's rejection of the Technical Arrangements, the world has no choice but pay attention. The bait and switch pattern, the relentless search for a deal breaker is there for anyone to see.
At first when the US/Rwanda plan came to the picture, Ethiopia was all out for the plan, particularly when Eritrea expressed reservation about the fairness of the plan. Ethiopia cranked its diplomatic machinery full throttle to let the world know how Ethiopia was for peace and Eritrea was not. Then came the Framework Agreements. Again Eritrea showed reservation, and Ethiopia declared to anyone who would listen, Ethiopia was all for it. "Everything in the plan was acceptable to Ethiopia", was the refrain Ethiopian officials, comfortable in their knowledge that Eritrea did not accept it. Ethiopia had no intention of accepting the plan, but as long as Eritrea did not come aboard, it was a golden opportunity for Ethiopia to appear reasonable and peace loving. Of course, it never was either, but never mind, it served a purpose--a huge purpose. A priceless propaganda payoff at Eritrea's expense.
After Eritrea accepted the Framework, Ethiopia demurred insisting on a reinterpretation of a key clause, in one of a series of attempts to break the peace deal. Ethiopia insisted Badme and its environs meant the whole enchilada, the full 1000km long border. It was a preposterous interpretation, but neither the OAU Secretariat nor the US State Department were willing to take Ethiopia to task. The silence gave Ethiopia the license to continue the war. Eritrea rejected the outlandish new interpretation. Ethiopia continued to paint Eritrea "against peace". It was a topsy turvy world--the warmonger appearing the peace lover. Eritrea's insistence on literal interpretation of the Framework gave Ethiopia the excuse to continue the war while appearing committed to peace.
The gambit worked for a while. Then came the Algiers Summit and the OAU Modalities for the Implementation of the Framework Agreement. Eritrea shocked Ethiopia by accepting the Modalities, including the clause Ethiopia had been demanding that Eritrea returned to the pre May 6, 1998 position. Both governments agreed to let the OAU prepare the necessary technical arrangements to implement the Framework and its Modalities. The OAU, with assistance from the UN and the US, did just that. Eritrea accepted the Technical Arrangements. Ethiopia asked for clarifications. Initially the press reports indicated that the clarifications were minor and that Ethiopia would finally sign. Well not quite. Ethiopia was back to its old trick--bait and switch.
More ominously for the peace process government controlled papers in Addis started hinting that all was not well with the Technical Arrangements, and that Ethiopia may be forced to use, as one Ethiopian expert said it, the "war option." Why exercise the "war option" when by all accounts you are on the verge of a peaceful resolution to the conflict. The answer is fairly simple. War or the threat of war was smart local politics. They whipped intense nationalism. They bought time. If real peace comes you have a lot to account for. They have to explain what happened at Tserona,
So if one is as cynical a politician as the guys running Ethiopia are, you bad mouth the first real break towards real peace. You attack the Technical Arrangements. You direct the papers you control to write editorials lambasting the Technical Arrangements. That's exactly what the Reporter, a paper that reflects official government opinion, in its editorial of August 24, 1999 to write: "Now that the plan which was accepted by both sides has been altered in such a way that Ethiopia would obviously not be able to accept it...the peace plan has been replaced by another one in the name of "technical arrangements" ... it will probably take another war--and more damage--before peace is given a chance again."
Did the Technical Arrangements replace the previous plans --the Proposal for Framework Agreement and the Modalities, as the Ethiopia is alleging? No, none at all. Although the Modalities changed some aspect of he Framework at the behest of Ethiopia, and changes Eritrea accepted to nudge Ethiopia towards peace, there's nothing in the Technical Arrangements that contradicts the Modalities. If anything Ethiopia insisted in bringing to the Technical Arrangements clauses or interpretations that were not in the Frameworks , and not in the Modalities.
Let us explore the three documents on some of the issues Ethiopia has found most worrisome. Ethiopia has asked clarifications on 41 questions on nine broad issues. Buried deep in these questions and statements is an unrelenting search for a "deal-breaker," including the reopening of issues that were agreed to in the previous two documents. If Ethiopia's interpretation of the Framework and the Modalities were to hold, the Technical Arrangement would introduce language to cripple the settled colonial treaties that have for a hundred years formed the basis for the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Take the question of the restoration of civilian administration, for example.
Framework Agreement:
Article 3 talks about the redeployment of Eritrean forces from Badme and its environs to the pre May 6 position as a "mark of goodwill" to the OAU. The same article stated that Eritrea's withdrawal would not "prejudge the final status" of the area to be decided later through delimitation, demarcation and possibly arbitration.
Article 4 is about the role the Group of Military Observers in assisting the reinstated Civilian Administration in the maintenance of law and order during the interim period.
There are two key points to remember. The Frameworks required Eritrea to redeploy from Badme and its surroundings, and nowhere else. The civilian administration was to be reinstated to the same area, and nowhere else. This is what Ethiopia agreed, when it was certain Eritrea would not accept the Framework. Ethiopia's acceptance was predicated on the assumption that because Eritrea wont accept the Framework, Ethiopia could get a "free ride."
After Eritrea accepted the Framework, Ethiopia moved the goal post. It demanded a reinterpretation of Badme and its environs to include the entire stretch of the border--about 1000 km. It also demanded Ethiopian civil administrators to be installed in all of the disputed areas. Both demands were beyond what was stated in the Proposal for a Framework Agreement. Ethiopia's reference to the disputed areas as "occupied" Ethiopian "territories," was a relentless refrain, repeated adinfinitum, to persuade the outside world that Eritrea had invaded sovereign Ethiopian territory, notwithstanding to the Framework's unambiguous reference that ownership of the areas should not be prejudged.
Modalities:
Article 1accedes to Ethiopian blackmail that redeployment to the May 6 positions should cover all the disputed areas, and not Badme and its environs only, contrary to the Framework's article 3. Eritrea accepts the change in interpretation to deny Ethiopia the excuse to continue to wage war. Eritrea decides to make concessions for peace. Contrary to Ethiopia's insistence the disputed area be called Ethiopian territories, their status remains unchanged. Article 4 states emphatically, the "redeployment shall not, in any way, prejudge final status of the territories concerned."
Article 5 states that the modalities for the re-establishment of the civilian administration and population in the concerned territories shall be worked out after cessation of hostilities. All along, Ethiopia had insisted that Eritrea's redeployment should precede cessation of hostilities.
Technical Arrangements
In order to implement the relevant articles in the Framework Agreement and the Modalities, the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea asked the OAU to prepare Technical Arrangements. Ethiopia's 41 questions about the Technical were designed to put enough holes in the document to render it useless. The attempt failed. The Technical Arrangement held up pretty well under Ethiopian assault. It was a faithful an honest and faithful attempt at implementing the framework and Modalities.
Article 8 reiterates that after redeployment and restoration of civilian administration, the status of the disputed territories will not be prejudged. Their final status will be determined at the end of the delimitation and demarcation process.
Article 9 refers to the restoration of civilian administration in the disputed areas. It called the two governments to commit themselves to the following:
Ethiopia's objections to the Articles cited above is based on Ethiopia's insistence on calling the disputed areas as Ethiopian territories. The OAU Framework and the Modalities made it abundantly clear the fate of the disputed territories will be decided at the end through delimitation, demarcation, and possibly arbitration. Ethiopia had accepted the documents knowing full well that neither documents supported Ethiopia's self-designation of the territories as Ethiopian. Ethiopia's refusal to stick to the text is a reminder that it never intended to accept neither the Framework nor the Modalities as a basis for good faith negotiation for finding a lasting solution to the conflict.
Question/Clarification sought
Regardless of what the Framework and Modalities have said on the issue of sovereignty of the disputed areas, Ethiopia continues to assume the areas are Ethiopian, so much so it insisted on its right to deport people from there, people it did not care for. It challenged the Technical Arrangement's prohibition of deportation from the areas where civilian administration has been restored. It argued that the state had a sovereign right to deport anyone it did deemed a threat to national security without indicating what constitutes national threat.
OAU's Response
One more time the OAU reminded Ethiopia that ownership, and hence, sovereignty of the territories cannot be prejudged until a final determination has been made thorough delimitation and demarcation. To the extent persons are a threat to national security, first the threat has to be established through due process in a transparent manner. Given Ethiopia's record of taking physical characteristics in its definition of what constitutes national security, the reminder about due process and transparency is appropriate. Still the fact remains that Ethiopia cannot assert sovereignty over the disputed areas until the issue has been determined through the process cited in the Framework, the Modalities, and the Technical Arrangements.
Question/Clarification sought
Always trying to bring closer the administration in the disputed areas and in Ethiopia proper, Ethiopia insisted that militia in the disputed areas carry their weapon the same way as militia in the rest of Ethiopia do. Ethiopia wants to know why there's prohibition against display of weapons. Also there's the question whether militia and police in the disputed area administered by Ethiopia will have the same functions as police and militia in the rest of Ethiopia. The implication is clear. Ethiopia wants to demonstrate why civil administration activities in the disputed areas cannot be any different from same activities in the rest of Ethiopia, since in Ethiopia's formulation the disputed territories are Ethiopian.
OAU's Response
While acknowledging that it may be necessary for members of militia to carry arms, it found that the prohibition was applicable in populated areas. The response noted that in trying to diffuse armed conflict, it's important to take building confidence measures to reduce tension. And one way of building confidence may be by not carrying weapons in public. The OAU added, rather trenchantly, that "in the climate necessary for the implementation of a specific agreement on the settlement of an armed conflict and with an international presence deployed to observe it with the mutual consent of the two parties, it is not accepted international practice in such circumstances that individuals may brandish weapons in a manner that could intimidate the population."
Question/Clarification sought
Ethiopia complains that the reference to grievance resolution through the auspices of the Peace Keeping Mission was not mandated by the Framework or Modalities. Again this question, too, was linked to Ethiopia's presumed sovereignty over the disputed area. The argument is straightforward: for anyone outside of Ethiopian authorities to enforce peacekeeping measures on Ethiopian soil, is an attack over Ethiopian sovereignty. Without waiting for the delimitation and demarcation process, Ethiopia has single-handedly decided that the territories are Ethiopian, regardless what the Framework and Modalities said. The continued obsession with Ethiopian sovereignty in the disputed areas is nothing but a ruse to force Eritrea to accept Ethiopia's definition of where the borders are.
OAU's Response
The OAU cited specific articles and sections in the Framework and Modalities to justify "local liaison and grievance resolution mechanisms." Surely, said the OAU, prior to the establishment of the grievance and conflict resolution mechanism the concerned parties will be consulted. The OAU found Ethiopia's fear that it was an attack on its national sovereignty groundless.
Ethiopia's fixation with asserting sovereignty over the disputed area was not made without an ulterior motive. The 41 questions are nothing but amendments to the Technical Arrangements to revise the Framework and the Modalities to reflect Ethiopia's need. Never mind the fact that the OAU has said that the Technical Arrangement could not be amended. Still Ethiopia tried mightily, sending broad hints that if it did not get its way, it would resort to war. A blackmail, if ever there was one. The fixation with the disputed areas as Ethiopian territories is part of Ethiopia's relentless search for the deal breaker, to insure there's no real movement towards peace.
Ethiopia is convinced that by sheer repetition the claim that the disputed area are really Ethiopian territories, might stick. If Ethiopia can persuade the OAU and others to accept Ethiopia's interpretation that the disputed areas are indeed Ethiopian territories, then there would be no need to proceed with the current OAU effort. There would be no need to bother with the OAU Charter's stand on the inviolability of colonial era borders. The slightest concession made about the territories being Ethiopian, as the mysterious May 8 Campoare letter tried to do, would enable Ethiopian officials to call off the implementation of the Technical Arrangements. Ethiopia would be able to preempt any reference to "pertinent colonial treaties and international law" to draw the line on the ground. There would be no need to refer to the Cairo declaration of 1964.
Once the area has been identified as Ethiopians then what's needed is to validate Ethiopia's claim to the territories. Delimitation would be unnecessary and demarcation would be based on what Ethiopia is claiming as its territories. In effect the 1900, 1902, and 1908 Treaties between Menelik of Ethiopia and Italy, would be revised to accommodate TPLF's current claim to Eritrean territories. For Eritrea this means accepting the 1997 Tigray map as a fact of life, as the minority controlled government of Ethiopia had intended all along. For Ethiopians in general, it means thousands of Oromos, Amharas and others perished in the bloody war to enable Tigray to expand its borders deep into Eritrea.