Although the resumption of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea at any moment can never be ruled out, it appears that Ethiopia has settled on a no war no peace strategy as a substitute for an immediate instigation of the shooting war. The premise behind the strategy is that in a long drawn out period of uncertainty and the threat of war hanging over Eritrea like the sward of Damocles, Ethiopia would force Eritrea to spend down its resources on national defense. The most likely scenario, Ethiopian planners hope, is that Eritrea would be too weak too withstand any push by Ethiopian forces at the right time, and Ethiopia would be able to defeat Eritrea with minimal cost to Ethiopia.

Yet the strategy, as elegant as is it may appear on paper, misses two crucial factors. It neglects the role of the donor community as the principal provider of resources without which the war would not continue. Without the donors' cooperation Ethiopia's no war no peace strategy is meaningless. Furthermore, the strategy is a double-edged sword. If Eritrea's economy were destroyed, nothing much would be left of Ethiopia's. What we are then left with is this: by their financing of the implementation of the strategy, the donors bear major responsibility to the continuation of the bloody war and to its inescapably horrendous outcome. Their culpability to the catastrophe cannot be questioned.

Ethiopia's plan is based on three assumptions which, on close scrutiny none is tenable. One: that Eritrea is unaware of the implication of the strategy, or if it did, any counter-measures it would take would fail. Second: that Ethiopia can withstand politically and economically whatever adverse impact the strategy may bring to Ethiopia. Three: that the donor community is unaware that it is oiling Ethiopia's war machine, and that at it will continue its contribution to the war effort until Eritrea blinks. These are not well thought out assumptions, for they have failed to appreciate the options the other side may have that will eventually undermine Ethiopia's war strategy.

There is no doubt that Ethiopia's strategy is draining Eritrea's economy from lost production, trade deficits, inflationary pressure, hard currency shortage, and direct military related expenditures. But to say that Eritrea is hurting is not to claim that Ethiopia has been spared. The strategy designed to put a hurt in Eritrea's economy is actually a two-edged sword. Evidence is mounting that the strategy is affecting Ethiopia's economy. Ethiopia's foreign exchange earning is down at a time when Ethiopia needs huge amounts of hard currency to finance its purchases of fighter planes, tanks and all sorts of artillery pieces. The doubling of crude prices the past year in world markets, and the increased distance oil trucks have to travel to their destinations to avoid using Eritrea's sea ports, have added to the cost of production of anything made or grown in Ethiopia. Add to this the diversion of fuel for military purposes away from civilian uses and a clear picture emerges of the cost of the no war no peace strategy to Ethiopia's economy.

Earlier decision to shun Assab and Massawa has created transportation inefficiencies to the extent Ethiopia is having problems getting its products into world markets. Total exports for 1999 was down by 16 percent compared to the previous year's estimate. Coffee, Ethiopia's principal cash crop was down by 29 percent (by volume). Slightly over a hundred (103) tons of coffee was shipped out of a total of 143 tons in storage. When one remembers that coffee generated US$358 million out of a total exports valued at US$576 million in 1998, a 29% reduction in coffee shipped will have a sizable impact on Ethiopia's foreign exchange earnings. Add to these additional woes from the export sector. Exports of skin, oil crops, and fruits and vegetables were down by 52, 39 and 66 percent. A policy initially designed to put a squeeze into Eritrea's economy is having a boomerang effect on Ethiopia's. If foreign exchanges earnings are not enough to finance Ethiopia's war machine, then what is Addis Ababa to do? Apparently there is not much to worry as long as donors are there to bail out the Ethiopian government's war induced finances, or if that were not enough, Ethiopians could be obligated to make up the deficit out of their pocket.

During the first half of 1999, when military mobilization was at its highest, donors, including the U.S., Canada, Japan, Ireland, Italy, Sweden, and China provided Ethiopia with one billion Bir (US$1=8.13 Bir) worth's of assistance. When that was insufficient to recruit, train and maintain a one million strong army, additional surcharges were levied on imports, and the price of fuel was raised by as much as 17 percent with the proviso that it would be raised again in the next three months. The recent pleadings of the government through the Relief Society of Tigray to divorce politics and humanitarian assistance, is an indirect admission of the role externally generated finances have played in the preparation for the coming invasion of Eritrea. If it were not for the donors, Ethiopia would not have the capacity to launch an offensive as large as the one that's in the works. How much of an army could Ethiopia field with a per capita income of US$110? Not much but for the donors assistance.

Regardless of the demographic illusion that has blinded Ethiopia's war planners, Ethiopia is less equipped to withstand her own strategy than does Eritrea. Eritreans know that no war no peace is another word for continuing a war to subvert Eritreans' independence and national sovereignty. Hence they are psychologically and materially prepared to cope with it, to wait it out, and in the end, if necessary, to find a way of relieving the pressure. What about on the Ethiopians' side---that is, the people, not the government? Is there a comparable resolve to fight it out to the bitter end when an alternative in the form of a peace proposal is on the table, a proposal the Ethiopian government had championed once? How many Ethiopians believe that more death and more destruction are justified when there is no rational reason to do so, when Ethiopia's hard won independence or territorial integrity is not at stake? How far are Ethiopians willing to go, how much are their willing to pay to keep the Marxist Leninist League of Tigray in power?

Ethiopia's strategic thinkers are struck in the diplomatic milieu of the nineteenth century where population size and natural resources endowments are supposed to matter. Because Ethiopia bests Eritrea on both counts, the assumption is that Ethiopia will be able to dictate the course of the war, and ultimately the shape of the ensuing peace. There are two problems with the premise even if the demographic impact on war outcome were true. Although Ethiopia's size is large, the portion of the Ethiopian population that feels that it has a direct stake in the war is miniscule, about 6 percent of the population. The war, waged in Ethiopia's name by the Tigray based ruling elite is seen by many Ethiopians as a war that attempts to advance a purely TPLF objective that does not always coincides even with Tigray's let alone Ethiopia's. While the war may mean something to the Mekele based warlords, the war's continuation at a tremendous material and human cost when the alternative to peace is on the table means little to the rest of Ethiopia. Hence Ethiopians by large numbers cannot be expected to shed their blood to defend TPLF's war aims. So even population size makes a difference, it is not an advantage the minority-controlled government can count on.

Any war planner worth his salt should appreciate his adversaries' counter reaction. No Ethiopian war planner should take for granted the generosity of the donor community for continuing to provide resources to underwrite the no war no peace strategy. At some point the generosity is likely come to an end before the strategy has achieved its purpose. Making grants, loans, and outright emergency assistance as a fulcrum of a war strategy is as shortsighted as a strategy can be. There's ample documentary evidence that Ethiopia has massively redirected emergency aid and grants for the war effort, and that the donor community is beginning to become aware of the practice. The question is: what will the donors do? How soon will they act? How many would have to perish before the donors realize what they have done to the people of the Horn? The time has come for he United Nations Security Council to act.