Addis Ababa Regime's Attempts to Confuse the International Community

It is to be recalled that, to resolve the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict peacefully and legally, the OAU adopted the Framework Agreement in November 1998, the Modalities for Implementation of the Framework Agreement (hereafter called Modalities) on 14 July 1999 at the OAU Summit in Algiers, and subsequently on 7 August 1999 the Technical Arrangements for the Implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement and its Modalities (hereafter called Technical Arrangements).

It is a matter of public record that, from the beginning, both the United Nations, through the Special Envoy of the Secretary General, and the United States Government, through high ranking officials of the State Department and the Special Envoy of President Bill Clinton respectively, had been major participating actors in the peace process.

During the whole of last year, the Addis Ababa regime had been incessantly trumpeting that it had accepted the Framework Agreement while Eritrea had rejected it. Notwithstanding that, it has, since Eritrea's acceptance of the said Agreement on 27 February 1999 following its receipt of clarifications and its call for quick implementation, done all it could to effectively derail the peace process by creating preconditions and resuming its aggression against Eritrea. This is effective evidence that the Addis Ababa regime had only been paying lip service to the Framework Agreement and that it has no commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

It is also a matter of record that Eritrea had accepted, without any reservations, the Modalities adopted by the Algiers Summit with a view to giving the Framework Agreement a new lease on life by eliminating any possible obstacles to its implementation. In accepting the Modalities during the conference, Eritrea had to make some concessions in the interests of peace.

On the other hand, the Addis Ababa regime made an overdue and half-hearted declaration of acceptance of the Modalities only after much prevarication, distortion and false accusations which inter alia claimed that it did not believe that Eritrea had accepted the Modalities and only after it had found itself in a corner. It is a matter of common sense that good faith and goodwill would be predicated on, and confirmed by, the acceptance of the agreements and would be guaranteed by the presence of a peace keeping force rather than by the false accusations leveled against one party-and the party that has already accepted the agreements at that-by a party that has rejected them.

After the Algiers Summit, the OAU quickly formulated the Technical Arrangements on 7 August 1999 on the basis of the views of both parties to facilitate the speedy implementation of both the Framework Agreement and the Modalities which both sides had already accepted. Again, Eritrea accepted the Technical Arrangements without delay.

On the other hand, the Addis Ababa regime rejected the latest document on 4 September 1999 on the pretext that it was not in consonance with the previous two documents even after it had duly received unequivocal clarifications for concerns and answers to queries it had submitted to the OAU.

The OAU had made it amply clear to the Addis Ababa regime that the last document was only a detailed exposition of the previous two and was not in any way different from them. It had also categorically informed the regime that, since the OAU and its current Chairman are the sole interpreters of the documents, the Technical Arrangements can neither be amended or altered. Yet, rather than accepting and making preparations for the implementation of the agreements, the Addis Ababa regime has been spreading confusion by proffering different and often contradictory misinformation in different quarters. It will suffice to present only the most important of its numerous misinformations to establish that the Addis Ababa regime is not ready for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

1. The Addis Ababa regime is against a cease-fire, cessation of hostilities and the deployment of a peacekeeping mission. The excuse given by it are that Eritrea has opened a second war front against Ethiopia by its support of Ethiopian opposition movements and that the deployment of a peacekeeping force in the disputed area would violate its sovereignty over "Ethiopian territories." Yet, the activities of Ethiopian opposition movements are an internal Ethiopian problem which existed long before the border conflict, had never been organized by Eritrea and cannot, in any manner whatsoever, be tied to the present border conflict between the two countries. As for Somalia, it is an internationally recognized fact that it is the Addis Ababa regime which, by its military invasion, had committed naked aggression against the people of Somalia and violated sovereign Somali territory under the guise of assisting one faction against the other and the pretext of fighting extremists. Eritrea has not invaded Somalia, has not favored one faction over the other Somali factions, has not introduced troops to Somalia to assist one faction against the other, has never obstructed a peaceful national Somali reconciliation which is supported by all Somalis and, most of all, has never opened a new front against Ethiopia in Somalia.

The OAU has made clear provisions in the Framework Agreement which recognize that there are disputed areas along the common border which have been the causes of the conflict, that there shall be withdrawal of forces and the restoration of civilian administrative structures in certain areas, without prejudicing the question of sovereignty over the areas, until the dispute is resolved by peaceful means on the basis of respect for colonial borders created by colonial agreements and relevant international law applicable to them, and that a peacekeeping mission would be deployed to defuse tension and to guarantee a cease-fire and cessation of hostilities. Yet, it is obvious that there cannot be a withdrawal of forces prior to a cease-fire and the deployment of peacekeeping forces. Is not the rejection of the deployment of peacekeeping forces in the disputed areas then tantamount to a declaration that there were no disputed areas and that therefore there will not be any need for delimitation and demarcation? In short, this is a rejection of the Framework Agreement. This confirms that the Addis Ababa regime has rejected the peaceful resolution of the dispute as an option and is committed to the pursuit of war, and that its repeated professions of acceptance of the Framework Agreement were nothing more than sheer propaganda and hollow public relations ploys.

2. The Addis Ababa regime has declared that it has certain reservations on, and consequently will reject, the withdrawal of forces to positions held before 6 May 1998 and the provisional return of civilian administration in certain areas without prejudging the issue of sovereignty over these areas. The regime is rejecting the provisional nature of any civilian administration restored as per the Framework Agreement and insisting that "its sovereignty" over the areas must, a priori, be confirmed although the two conditions were included in the Framework Agreement at its own insistence in spite of the fact that they were considered unnecessary. By doing this, it is of course rejecting any future resort to arbitration even though it may be disposed to accept delimitation and demarcation.

3. The Addis Ababa regime has been falsely informing certain quarters that it is awaiting clarification on certain legitimate issues that it had raised with the OAU. Yet, the OAU had, as of 23 August 1999, already given clarifications and answers to all the concerns and questions raised by the regime. The OAU has also clearly indicated to the Addis Ababa regime that the Technical Arrangements which had now become part and parcel of the previous two documents is not in any way at variance with the previous two documents and that the regime must accept and implement, or reject, in toto the Technical Arrangements which can be neither amended nor altered and which can be interpreted only "by the OAU and its current Chairman." Yet, the Addis Ababa regime claims, in its press release of 4 September 1999, that it was rejecting the Technical Arrangements because, in its own interpretation, there were differences between the Technical Arrangements and the first two agreements. Soon thereafter, it has also claimed that it will continue to negotiate with the OAU on certain new points on which it has sought clarification. This, however, must be considered as another diplomatic ruse to frustrate the peace process and to abort it by dilatory tactics. It goes without saying that the Addis Ababa regime will have rejected the documents as long as it does not accept them in toto.

4. In other quarters, the regime is claiming that it is being forced to reject the agreements by the role being played by the UN and the US. To this end, the regime has been informing certain parties that the UN and the US, which have become involved as peacebrokers only after the Algiers Summit, have become major obstacles to peace by taking sides with one of the parties.

Yet, is it not well known to everybody that the US, along with Rwanda, was the first to be seized with the matter as a peace facilitator? Is not the US-Rwanda Plan, in fact, the precursor of the OAU peace plan? Who does not know that the UN and the US had been actively involved in the negotiating process from the beginning of the OAU effort through their respective Special Envoys? Who will forget that the Addis Ababa regime was constantly harping on the fact that it had completely accepted the US-Rwanda Plan and various US and UN initiatives for the major part of a year? As for the Technical Arrangements, it is there for all to see and judge that it in no way varies from the other two documents.

It is also clear that the false accusations and baseless allegations which are being systematically leveled against the UN and the US are invidious subterfuges designed to run away from the peace process. All this goes a long way to confirm that the Addis Ababa regime does not accept the Framework Agreement and is deliberately creating obstacles to torpedo any effort to resolve the conflict peacefully.

In conclusion, the Government of Eritrea calls upon the international community and, in particular the people of Ethiopia, to contribute to the peaceful resolution of the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict by being aware of the following fundamental facts:

* The Technical Arrangements is the product of both the Framework Agreement and the Modalities and consequently is not at variance with them. It leaves no room for controversy over implementation and paves a reliable road for the peaceful resolution of the conflict.

* The OAU and its current Chairman are the sole interpreters of all three documents. The OAU has made known to the two parties its decision that the three documents are not susceptible to either amendment or alteration.

* The Addis Ababa regime has received clarifications on all its concerns and answers to all its queries. It has also been informed that it cannot amend or alter the Technical Arrangements.

* Neither the withdrawal of forces nor the delimitation and demarcation of borders is imaginable without a prior cease-fire and the cessation of hostilities, as well as deployment of peacekeeping forces which shall guarantee their observance. This is a process which is clearly identified in the Framework Agreement.

* The OAU has from the beginning collaborated closely with the UN, the US and other concerned parties. It is evident from all available records that the OAU had involved the parties before-and not after-the Algiers Summit.

It is thus inconceivable-and unacceptable-that the Addis Ababa regime would prevaricate and attempt to sow confusion in the face of these incontrovertible facts.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Asmara, 13 September 1999