Oldspeak vs. Newspeak
By Richard Joseph
_Journal of Democracy_ 9.4 (1998) 55-61;

Is Ethiopia Democratic? A global intellectual project is under way today as scholars grapple with the mixed nature of many political systems formerly considered to be making a "transition to democracy." By "thinking wishfully," as Adam Przeworski put it, scholars had projected onto the initial processes of regime transformation their hopes for more democratic outcomes.[1] Eventually, models that presumed a linear trajectory toward democracy began to appear less applicable, and new approaches to understanding the complex interplay of political power, institutions, and social forces in the contemporary context had to be devised.

Paul Henze, who brings to the study of post-Mengistu Ethiopia a great store of knowledge, had an opportunity to contribute to this important project. Despite its fascinating history and impressive civilization, Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries on earth. It has also been devastated by war that, unlike elsewhere on the African continent, has been waged with massed troops, tanks, and modern warplanes. Since the replacement of the Derg (a council of soldiers who in 1974 seized power from Emperor Haile Selassie and installed military rule) by the Ethiopian People's Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPRDF) in 1991, Ethiopia has experienced renewed economic development, received generous international assistance, and regained international respect as a bastion of security lodged between a war-torn Sudan and a Somalia in fragments.

A balanced assessment of the travails, dilemmas, failures, and achievements of EPRDF rule would have been of immense value to scholars and policy makers. For reasons best known to himself, however, Henze has chosen not to provide such an assessment of the complex forces at work in post-Mengistu Ethiopia. Instead, he has assumed the task of defending the regime as a sterling builder of democracy, berating its opponents and critics at every turn for being misguided, misinformed, and malicious. This one-sided exercise has relevance beyond Ethiopia and even Africa. Other countries claiming to be democratic have been criticized for human rights abuses, unfair elections, and rule by a militarily dominant minority. Seldom, however, have such charges been dismissed in so sweeping a manner by a respected scholar.

I had looked forward to writing a commentary on Henze's essay before reading it. But I had not anticipated being confronted with such a stark demonstration of how the idea of democracy can be distorted and turned into a shield for what are at best semi-authoritarian practices. My task has thus become the unpleasant one of identifying the threat that such a treatment represents, not just to struggling democratic movements worldwide, but also to the most essential element of our work as scholars and analysts, our reliance on anguage.

Democracy as "Protective Sophism"

As early as February 1992, the editors of Africa Demos noted that democratic transitions in Africa were being "coopted or derailed in several countries."[2] As a result, a quality of democracy index (qdi) was produced and published, along with a list of indicators. The editors added a cautionary note: "The democratic movement in Africa risks giving birth to democracies that are facades behind which monopolistic and repressive practices continue to flourish. It was never the intention of Africa Demos to lend credibility to such deceptions."[3]

Six years later, Africa is becoming not the "workshop of democracy" predicted by Richard Sklar, but a workshop of "democracy as deception." So blatant is Henze's essay in this regard that it prompted me to reread George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four. In the novel, the Ministry of Truth systematically encourages Winston, the protagonist, to abandon Oldspeak and learn "to grasp the beauty of the destruction of words."[4] By acquiring Newspeak, Winston would learn that the past can be altered. In the end, "everything faded into mist. The past was erased, the erasure was forgotten, the lie became truth."[5] Eventually, Winston would even come to accept "that democracy was impossible and that the Party was the guardian of democracy."[6] I then revisited W. Arthur Lewis's small 1965 classic, Politics in West Africa. In his unflinching portrayal of the undermining of Africa's postcolonial constitutional democracies, Lewis emphasizes the distortion of language: "Nearly every leader now calls himself a socialist, or an African socialist, even Houphou=EBt-Boigny [of C=F4te d'Ivoire]."[7] Lewis also criticizes political scientists who, "in the sacred name of 'charisma,' 'modernization,' and 'national unity,' call upon us to admire any demagogue who, aided by a loud voice and a bunch of hooligans, captures the state and suppresses his rivals."[8]

Democratic struggles worldwide are conducted simultaneously on the terrain of thought and action. If the former is lost, there is little hope for the latter. For this reason, Henze's treatise must, and will be, vigorously challenged. The Nigerian scholar Adigun Agbaje has emphasized "the increasing trend of autocrats appropriating the language and symbols of democracy to frustrate democratization and deepen authoritarian rule."[9] Similarly, Celestin Monga advances the term "protective sophism" to refer to the reduction of concepts like "national integration" to slogans used to justify practices by which elite groups pursue their own interests while balkanizing their countries along ethnic lines.[10]

Fortunately, most commentaries, reports, and analyses dealing with Ethiopia since 1991 are still written in Oldspeak. Marina Ottaway informs us that, after seizing power, the Tigre Popular Liberation Front (TPLF) "was politically weak because Tigreans made up only 10 percent of the population." The TPLF remedied this problem by forming "new ethnically based parties" in the regions and by "transforming Ethiopia into a federation of ethnic states." Consequently, "all the regions are governed by EPRDF affiliates," and the much-trumpeted policy of decentralization "has not been accompanied by an increase in political participation." The regime, she tells us, has conducted "three supposedly multiparty elections" in which "political participation has narrowed rather than widened." Finally, the centerpiece of EPRDF governance, "the transformation of Ethiopia into a federation of ethnic states . . . was never open to discussion."[11]

Numerous reports by independent organizations, as well as the U.S. Department of State's annual human rights reports, are all written in Oldspeak. In a 1998 review, Human Rights Watch summarized the essentials of EPRDF rule as follows: By sponsoring 16 parties, "each based on the dominant ethnic groups in the various regions," the regime "ensured a quasi-monopoly of power by the EPRDF and its allied or satellite parties." The elections have been boycotted by major opposition groups "charging, with validity, that the vote was not fair." The government "routinely cracks down on dissenting journalists" while it "detains thousands of suspected militants of separatist groups . . . without charges and subjects many to ill-treatment and torture."[12]

According to Orwell, "the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range of thought."[13] Even the known past could be altered. Weaving through Henze's references to "democratic processes," "democratic procedures," and "a free and open society," the reader will have a difficult time getting clear answers to a central question: How did the TPLF, resting on a minority ethnic base, succeed through the umbrella EPRDF in establishing control over all of Ethiopia and imposing its policies and governing structures while conducting a supposedly democratic transition?

Henze's account of the various stages of the Ethiopian transition deliberately blurs rather than clarifies the EPRDF's political engineering, reducing it to a morality play in which good guys are pitted against bad guys. The EPRDF, he assures us, has fostered an "open political and press debate" and has sought to establish a "more open, tolerant, humane, and prosperous society." The EPRDF was "idealistic" and "well-intentioned" about democratization; if anything, it could be criticized for being "naive in expecting that critics would know how to be responsible." Opposition politicians, however, have displayed "pervasive rejectionism" and pursued actions designed to precipitate "punitive actions by the authorities." They have boycotted elections mainly "to avoid exposing their lack of support among the electorate."

Contrary to the myriad reports of international monitors and observers, Henze states that the EPRDF's "dramatic experiments in governance" have been comparatively peaceful," and marvels that its "leaders have resorted so seldom and so briefly to repressive actions." Instead of conducting the "responsible public debate" desired by the government, however, opposition publications "continue to spread misinformation." Henze finds a way to attribute most of the EPRDF's shortcomings to the misconduct of the opposition. Even the EPRDF's tendency to give priority to its own programs is presented as a consequence of "the opposition's refusal to participate in the political process." In short, the actions of a battle-hardened group of militant leaders, who are well-grounded ideologically and disciplined organizationally, are excused by Henze according to the familiar formula used by children caught misbehaving: "Tommy made us do it."[14]

Now, some of what Henze says about political developments in Ethiopia since 1991 may well be true, but how will the reader distinguish the factual wheat from the rhetorical chaff? Is the EPRDF as benign and well-intentioned, and the opposition as uniformly mischievous and obtuse, as he portrays them? More generally, has Henze provided a useful framework for understanding governance in post-Mengistu Ethiopia? From personal experience, I can vouch that he is not a credible guide to the diverse attitudes of Ethiopian political groups and the complex interplay between them and the regime. Henze refers, for example, to meetings that have taken place in many venues, including Paris and Atlanta, to facilitate the participation of opposition groups in the transitional process. All these efforts, he claims, resulted in "strengthening the pervasive rejectionism" of the opposition, "who voiced ever more provocative demands on the government for coop-eration." I direct readers to the brief report of one of these initiatives, which culminated in meetings at the Carter Center in February 1994.[15] I can attest that Henze's account is misleading as far as it concerns what was revealed about the government and opposition during that exercise.

Defending the Democratic Terrain

The struggle for democracy will continue to be conducted on the terrain of both thought and action. If language is corrupted, however, thought and action can be paralyzed. In essence, Henze asks his readers to reject the evidence produced by several governments, the European Union, as well as nongovernmental organizations and advocacy groups, that belies his contention that democracy-building in Ethiopia since 1991 has "succeeded to a remarkable degree."

In an Africa once again wracked by violence, conflict, and crisis, the Ethiopian experience cries out for objective analysis and assessment. In light of Richard Sklar's reminder that all that is good in politics cannot be defined as democratic, Ethiopia under EPRDF rule would be an ideal subject for applying an analytical framework centered on the reconfiguration of state power in a segmented society and fissiparous polity.[16] Instead, Henze has decided to adopt Newspeak as his mode of communication and to dismiss governmental misconduct with bland phrases such as: "Injustices have undoubtedly been done. In Ethiopia's circumstances, these are inevitable." Notwithstanding the absence of a genuinely open electoral process, he contrasts what he believes most Ethiopians and the Ethiopian electorate really want with the demands of the opposition, using argumentation curiously reminiscent of former colonial authorities throughout Africa. I have tried, with difficulty, to discern some positive value in the appearance of his essay. Perhaps it will prompt another student of contemporary Ethiopia to produce the "balance sheet" that Henze promised. Another would be the jolt that such a blatant attempt to reduce democracy-building to a "protective sophism" might deliver to scholars of democracy who are once again experiencing disenchantment regarding Africa's democratic prospects.

Of particular relevance in this regard is the long struggle over democracy-building and military domination in Nigeria. General Ibrahim Babangida, who ruled from 1985 to 1993, was a masterful practitioner of "democracy as deception." After he annulled his last so-called attempt at a democratic transition in June 1993, I wrote that "only creative artists could convey the distortions introduced in the name of democrat-ization" by his regime.[17] The five brutal years of misrule by his successor, Sani Abacha, were accompanied by a well-funded international effort to present Abacha's military dictatorship as a regime seriously engaged in a democratic transition. Several African leaders, senior representatives of major corporate groups, and many American political and church leaders were mobilized to this end. This campaign enjoyed a certain degree of success despite the mountain of damning evidence produced by human rights groups, intrepid journalists, UN specialized agencies, and the annual human rights reports of the U.S. Department of State.

Abdoulaye Niandou Souley of Niger contends that "democratic construction in Africa is now being conducted on the basis of ambiguities and paradoxes."[18] He emphasizes how much the timid reactions of Western governments to the violation of democratic principles in African states have hurt the democratic movement. These days, virtually any set of authoritarian practices in Africa is being justified as democracy-building and then used, according to Souley, to protect and pry financial assistance from donor countries and institutions.[19] All contemporary African regimes now claim either to be democratic, or in transition to democracy, just as, 20 years ago they all claimed to be pursuing "development," "nation-building," and "political integration."[20] Democracy, however, rests on open deliberation and the free exchange of ideas. This center must hold. Let the political contestants manipulate language to glorify themselves and tar their opponents. A free and informed electorate, when permitted to do so, will punish them accordingly. Scholars, however, must rise above this partisan fray and analyze developments in ways that strengthen rather than erode the very language they must use.

By simply echoing the EPRDF's claims and denials, and adding his own obfuscations, Henze has done a disservice to the Ethiopian government, its people, and the community of scholars and policy analysts. Since the fall of Mengistu's brutal regime, Ethiopia has experienced renewal and recovery in many areas. For the most part, however, the methods used have not been democratic, although they have been so proclaimed to satisfy the rock-bottom standards that the donor community applies to "post-conflict" states in Africa. Had Henze used Oldspeak, he could have provided us with many important insights and a deeper understanding of a complex project that has involved state-building along ethnic lines, "directed democracy," and socio-economic development. But he did not, and so this important subject still awaits a sober, dispassionate, and nonpartisan analysis.

Notes

1. Adam Przeworski, "Democratization Revisited," Items 51 (March 1997): 6-11.

2. Africa Demos 2 (February 1992): 9.

3. Africa Demos 2 (August 1992): 8-9. According to Przeworski, "the 'democratization' crowd has a new catchword =2E.. 'quality of democracy.'" See his "Democratization Revisited," Items 51 (March 1997): 9. Had the institutional resources been available to implement the qdi five years earlier, students of Africa would have been far ahead of the "crowd." Moreover, we might have helped limit the increasingly arbitrary nature of contemporary assessments of democracy-building.

4. George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1949), 52.

5. Ibid., 75.

6. Ibid., 36.

7. W. Arthur Lewis, Politics in West Africa (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1965), 38.

8. Ibid., 89.

9. "Africa Demos: An Evaluation Essay," in Richard Joseph, ed., African Democratic Perspectives: Evaluative Essays on Africa Demos (Cambridge, Mass.: African State and Democracy Program, 1997), 15.

10. Celestin Monga, "La societe civile africaine est-elle civilisee?" in D.C. Bach, ed., Regionalisation, mondialisation et fragmentation en Afrique subsaharienne (Paris: editions Karthala, 1998), 108-109.

11. Marina Ottaway, "Africa's 'New Leaders': African Solution or African Problem?" Current History 97 (May 1998): 210-11.

12. "Clinton Administration Policy and Human Rights in Africa," Human Rights Watch Report 10 (March 1998): 10.

13. George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, 53.

14. Henze's tendency to mystify rather than clarify is seen in his discussion of the "tensions" and "crisis" between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998. A reader unaware that this conflict actually deteriorated into fighting, bombing, and strafing between the armies of these two countries would never guess as much from his account.

15. "Carter Center Convenes Ethiopian Opposition Groups," Africa Demos 3 (September 1994): 14-15.

16. See my discussion in "Africa, 1990-1997: From Abertura to Closure," Journal of Democracy 9 (April 1998): 3-17. Also relevant are John W. Harbeson, "Rethinking Democratic Transitions: Lessons from Eastern and Southern Africa"; Goran Hyden, "Governance and the Reconstitution of Political Order"; and Donald Rothchild, "Ethnic Insecurity, Peace Agreements and State-Building," (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

17. Richard Joseph, "Africa's Diehard Autocracies," Africa Demos 3 (July-August 1993): 1.

18. Abdoulaye Niandou Souley, "Paradoxes et ambiguites de la democratisation," in Daniel C. Bach, ed., Regionalisation, mondialisation et fragmentation en Afrique subsaharienne, 99. See also Crawford Young, " The Third Wave of Contradictions," in State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa, 15-38.=20

19. Ibid., 98-99.

20. In retrospect, an important task performed by Africa Demos during the first half of the 1990s was to reveal the manipulations of language by authoritarian regimes; this was often accomplished by simply publishing the remonstrations of their representatives. There is an urgent need for that exercise to be resumed in some manner, as the distortions have steadily increased.