Eritrea's Views on Initial Measures and Ground Rules for the Proposed Talks


The border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea continues unabated posing a serious threat to regional peace and security. Tens of thousands of lives have been lost through direct military conflict. Hundreds of thousands of innocent persons have lost their livelihoods through displacement and destruction of their property. The war has incurred a heavy economic burden and slowed down growth in both countries. The economic downturn is occurring at a time when several years of failed rains have left millions of populations in the Horn of Africa susceptible to hunger and famine. The situation is particularly precarious in Ethiopia where eight million people are reportedly facing acute starvation.

The conflict was triggered by Ethiopia's acts of aggression to alter the international boundary between the two countries. In October 1997, Ethiopia published a new map of the Administrative Region of Tigray carving out large swathes of sovereign Eritrean territory. This act of unilateral revision of an international boundary is in contravention of international law and the OAU's fundamental principle on the sanctity of colonial boundaries.

The preparation of Ethiopia's new map took three and a half years, illustrating that the fateful decision to violate Eritrea's international boundary was taken much earlier. In the meantime, Ethiopia resorted to piecemeal and forceful acts of aggression against Eritrea to create facts on the ground; the recent of which were encroachments in western Eritrea and the occupation of Adi Murug (eastern Eritrea) and dismantling of its administration in June-July 1997. (The OAU High Level Delegation was provided, during its first visit to Eritrea on 18 June 1998, with the letters that the Eritrean President sent to the Ethiopian Prime Minister when these ominous events occurred.)

These acts prompted Eritrea to urge the formation of the Joint Border Commission. Eritrea did not at the time suspect that this was part of a long-term and coherent design orchestrated by the authorities in Ethiopia in accordance with a hidden agenda. Accordingly, Eritrea responded with restraint and responsibility, and earnestly sought a resolution of the problem through amicable and bilateral channels.

In spite of, or because of, Eritrea's restraint and sincere efforts to contain the crisis, Ethiopia persisted in its agenda of territorial aggrandizement. On 6 May 1998, Ethiopian contingents in the Badme area attacked Eritrean patrol units killing several officers. These attacks continued for two days, provoking a series of clashes until May 12, and culminating in the declaration of war by Ethiopia. Ethiopia further escalated the war by unleashing an air strike against Eritrea's capital on June 5, 1998. Eritrea had to act in legitimate self-defense. But it continued to insist on legality and the non-use of force firmly believing, as it does, that the border dispute cannot be resolved militarily. In this spirit, Eritrea consistently urged the non-use of force and the cessation of hostilities. Eritrea thus welcomed in good faith the agreement on a moratorium on air strikes (brokered by the United States in July 1998). But true to form, Ethiopia violated the agreement on February 6, 1999, with impunity and launched another round of aggression against Eritrea.

Parallel with its declaration of war against Eritrea, Ethiopia boycotted the Eritrean ports precipitously as it closed its border with Eritrea with the aim of imposing air, land and sea blockade. In the process, Ethiopia callously abandoned perishable grain shipments destined to its population. Ethiopia now refuses to accept grain shipments through those ports to feed its suffering people thereby subordinating the grave humanitarian issues to its agenda of war. It insists on transporting aid shipments slowly and laboriously through other more distant routes at considerable added expense to the international community.

Ethiopia has expelled from its territory close to seventy thousand persons, most of whom were life-long Ethiopian citizens, because of their Eritrean ancestry. Tens of thousands of these persons are living in refugee camps in Eritrea near the border. Ethiopia has detained around 1,500 Eritrean youth for almost two years now in concentration camps in violation of international law. Many have been killed and several hundred are missing.

This war has caused, and will continue to cause, severe damage and deprivation to millions of innocent people who can ill afford it and must not be asked to. Eritrea merely restates the obvious in declaring the following:

Eritrea has been clear in its position on the correct location of the international boundary--that the boundary remains in its longstanding historic location--and submitted its case to the OAU High Level Delegation during their visit to Eritrea on 18 June 1998. But Ethiopia has to date refused to clearly state where it believes the boundary to lie, or to submit its claims to legal processes. Eritrea notes that during the time since Eritrea's formal independence, Ethiopia has on numerous occasions published officially maps depicting the Ethiopian/Eritrean border, and in particular that in 1995 Ethiopia published an official, cartographically precise map depicting the border in precisely the identical location indicated by Eritrea in its official map of that year (see Attachment 1). Ethiopia however published a new map in October 1997, as stated earlier, that incorporates large chunks of Eritrean sovereign territory, which it did not rescind thereafter. If Ethiopia believes that its 1995 map no longer accurately depicts its territorial claims, it is incumbent on Ethiopia to state as much publicly at the present time, and to indicate where it believes that the border ought in the alternative to be situated.

Eritrea has affirmed, both verbally and through an official letter of acceptance to the OAU Chairmen respectively, its acceptance of the Organization of African Unity proposals to end the conflict. If Ethiopia has really accepted these proposals, Eritrea calls for the following immediate measures that are enshrined in the same proposals. These initial steps ensure that the proposed talks will start with earnest to elaborate the Details of Implementation of the OAU peace agreements.

I. Imperative of Signing the Framework Agreement and the Modalities of Implementation

The two States should immediately sign the two legal instruments: the OAU Framework Agreement adopted at the Summit of the Central Organ in Ouagadougou on 17 December 1998, and the Modalities for Implementation adopted by the 35th Summit of Heads of State and Government in Algiers on 14 July 1999. This is provided for by operative paragraph 9 b) of the Framework Agreement which calls for the signature of the document(s) so as to establish a Follow-up Committee of the two sides in order to determine the details of implementation. Formal signature of the two documents is one of the legal guarantees by which the parties can demonstrate without equivocation their commitment and adherence to the peace agreement. Separate letters of acceptance cannot serve as a substitute since the Framework Agreement specifically calls for signature and since "qualifications" have been inserted in those letters. The controversy that arose regarding the Framework Agreement due to "different interpretations" is a vivid case in point. In this regard, Eritrea declares its immediate readiness formally to sign the two instruments. It is also incumbent on the facilitators to uphold the provisions of the Agreements and insist on signature by both parties.

II. Imperative of Signing a Ceasefire Agreement

The two States should sign a formal ceasefire agreement if they adhere to the fundamental principle of non-use of force for resolving disputes which is incorporated in the Framework Agreement and enshrined in the OAU and UN Charters. Indeed, the first article of the Framework Agreement states: "The Two Parties commit themselves to an immediate cessation of hostilities." Furthermore, it is clear that serious and sincere negotiations for a comprehensive peace agreement cannot be conducted under the threat or blackmail of the use of force. Eritrea declares its readiness to immediately sign a ceasefire agreement. Again, it is the duty of the facilitators to insist on the implementation of this imperative if they are to be faithful to the provisions of the Agreements.

In addition, the two States should immediately commit themselves formally to full compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law and to respect the inviolability of diplomatic personnel and property. In this regard, Ethiopia must stop the illegal deportation of ethnic Eritreans and take expeditious measures to reinstate confiscated property. Furthermore, Ethiopia must immediately release the 1,500 Eritrean youth detained in the Dedesa concentration camp. Ethiopia must also respect its Headquarters Agreement with the OAU and allow Eritrea to enjoy its right of representation to the continental body.

Eritrea further proposes the following measure in order to alleviate human suffering and so as to create a better climate for peace:

The two States should cooperate with the international community in the ongoing endeavours to ensure the flow of humanitarian aid to drought and famine affected areas. In this regard, Eritrea reiterates its readiness to allow the use of Assab Port for the delivery of humanitarian food assistance to drought victims in Ethiopia.
Eritrea believes that implementation of the above-described ceasefire and humanitarian commitments should begin immediately and, furthermore, that the first act of the forthcoming talks will be the formal signature of the two legal instruments, namely the Organization of African Unity Framework Agreement and the Modalities of Implementation. These preliminary measures and explicit commitments are simple consequences of the Agreements that the two States have already indicated their "acceptance" of. They are also compelled by general principles of international law and vital for enabling the two sides to immediately work out--through direct or proximity talks--the comprehensive confidence building and other necessary interim measures for the period leading up to the complete and final resolution of the dispute through demarcation. These consist of: In this regard, Eritrea shall submit its comprehensive proposals on Details of Implementation at the start of any forthcoming talks in accordance with the ground rules proposed below. In the event that agreement is not reached in the talks, Eritrea remains ready to sign the Technical Arrangements as originally formulated by the experts assembled from the Organization of African Unity, the United Nations, Algeria and the United States.

Ground Rules for the Proposed Talks

The peace talks have been stalled for almost eight months now because Ethiopia rejected the whole peace plan, under the pretext of modifying the Technical Arrangements. The Technical Arrangements were prepared by experts from the OAU, the UN, Algeria and the US on the basis of prior commitment by both parties, under the insistence of the authorities in Ethiopia, that they will not be open to amendments. This course of action was chosen because Ethiopia refused at the time to engage in proximity talks in Algiers to work out the details of implementation. Ethiopia has now gone back on its promises.

But responsibility for the time lost cannot be attributed to Ethiopia alone. Eritrea believes that it is imperative that ground rules agreed upon by the two sides should not be shifted arbitrarily in mid-term. They must be adhered to fully. The custodians of these ground rules are the OAU and its partners and it behooves them to ensure the integrity of the peace process.

As we embark on a new phase of talks to work out details of implementation of the Framework Agreement and the Modalities of Implementation, Eritrea believes that there must be clarity on the ground rules that will govern the negotiations. These ground rules must be accepted by both sides and adhered to fully throughout the negotiating process.

Eritrea reiterates its preference and readiness for direct talks. In Eritrea's view, this is the best format for expediting the negotiating process and for enabling both parties to communicate their views and proposals to each other in the most effective way. This will reduce the burden on the facilitators who may otherwise have to shuttle between the two sides, which is not different in substance from the operational pattern of mediation in the past two years.

If Ethiopia is not willing to enter into direct talks, however, Eritrea is ready to engage constructively in proximity talks. In Eritrea's view, the ground rules for proximity (or direct) talks should consist of:

  1. Full clarity and understanding from the outset that the Details of Implementation will have to be acceptable to both sides. The document to be produced cannot be "non-amendable" in view of the precedence created in the past seven months;
  2. Full understanding on the mandate of the facilitators whose function must be facilitation of communication and negotiations between the two parties;
  3. Full adherence to the principle of transparency in the negotiations. In this regard, the negotiations shall be carried out in accordance with the following format:
    1. formal submission of the views of each party in written form;
    2. exchange of these documents between the two parties;
    3. written response or counter-proposals, if any, by each party on the submission of the other party;
    4. identification of the points of mutual agreement (through open discussion between the two parties in direct talks and through the facilitators acting as intermediaries in the proximity talks);
    5. negotiations on the points of divergence in the original submissions and/or counter-proposals;
    6. formal signature on the points of agreement as endeavours to narrow differences continue;
  4. Identification of outstanding issues for further negotiations;
  5. Proper documentation of the negotiations whose transcript shall be available to both sides.


    The rules governing investigation that may have to be undertaken must also be clarified. Vital in this regard is clarity on the terms of reference of the investigating body through consultation with the parties and full transparency regarding the outcome which should be available in its entirely to the parties. Eritrea attaches paramount importance to this issue because its legitimate right and express requests to receive the report of the OAU Committee of Ambassadors were denied. The conclusions of any report cannot, evidently, have validity in the absence of transparency and in the circumstances in which the party concerned is not allowed to raise legitimate issues.

    Eritrea also deems it important that there be clear guidelines on the interaction of the parties with the OAU and other partners (the United States, the United Nations, etc.) that are actively involved in the mediation process. Eritrea's view in this regard is for working out an appropriate structured mechanism that formalizes the role and modus operandi of the partners of the OAU. Particular emphasis must be given to the manner of involvement of the United Nations. The UN is not only a guarantor (assisting the OAU) "for the scrupulous implementation of all the provisions of the Framework Agreement, in the shortest possible time," but it will also be responsible for the implementation of key components of the peace agreement. Moreover, operative paragraph 9 a) of the Framework Agreement explicitly provides for its early involvement to assist the OAU in the formulation of the peace implementation plan.

    Finally, Eritrea wishes to see a consultation mechanism regarding the public statements that may be issued by the mediators.

Asmara, 23 April 2000