Disinformation in Tigray: Manufacturing Consent For a Secessionist War

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Cover Photo: TPLF leader “Aboy” (father) Sebhat Nega captured by Ethiopian National Defense Forces on January 8, 2021. (Courtesy of Ethiopian News Agency)

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Executive Summary

The conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray state, one of Ethiopia’s ten regional states, is an irredentist, ethnic secessionist war led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) against the multiethnic federal government. Although the conflict officially started on November 4, 2020 after TPLF attacked the federal government’s Northern Command based in Tigray, this showdown had been brewing for many years—decades, actually.

Following the fall of the previous regime in 1991, TPLF assumed power and created a system of “ethnic federalism” in which newly delineated regional states were created on the basis of ethnicity. TPLF, which governed Ethiopia through corruption and ethnocentric policies with US support, fell from power in 2018 following mass protests that brought to power a new Prime Minister, Dr. Abiy Ahmed Ali. Though PM Abiy has inherited a poisoned chalice, he has worked to end Ethiopia’s era of ethnicity-based politics.

The US and EU, which provided TPLF support during its 27-year reign, continued to lend support to TPLF after 2018 even as it was greatly weakened and forced to retreat from Addis Ababa to its regional capital, Mekelle. Emboldened by the Western media, NGOs and governments, TPLF, by its own admission, started the conflict in November with secessionist and irredentist aims. Federal forces quickly captured Tigray’s capital city in little over three weeks and TPLF was forced to retreat.

Since the start of the conflict until the present moment, the majority of coverage on Tigray has been marked by massive levels disinformation. This report shows in detail why and how the disinformation is propagated—via print and social media—by predominantly Western sources. Ultimately, the disinformation serves to manufacture consent for an unpopular irredentist, ethnic secessionist war that could not be justified in the eyes of the international public through honest reporting. This publication shows how a “communications blackout” is used as a justification by the media to accept and forward information of poor integrity.

With the fall of TPLF in late November came the consequent failure of US policy in the Horn of Africa. Since then, the Western media has, retroactively and proactively, forwarded a number of allegations of crimes against the people of Tigray perpetrated by the Ethiopian and Eritrean militaries. Eritrea has served as the primary scapegoat.

Alleged crimes include massacres, mass rape and sexual violence, looting, extrajudicial killings, genocide, ethnic cleansing and war crimes. Much of the reporting of these crimes, devoid of evidence and context, has proven sensational and racist with simplistic savage-like portrayals of Eritreans and Ethiopians that draw on old colonial tropes of Africans. This report looks beyond the gaudy headlines and provides sober, evidence-based analysis of the major allegations. Significant focus is given to social media as most disinformation about Tigray originates there.

Additionally, this report assesses the nature of and problems with Western media’s overall coverage of the Tigray conflict. Lastly, it provides analysis of the actions by Western governments and likely consequences of those actions to encourage better policy decisions in the Horn of Africa moving forward.

New York/Asmara, May 9, 2021
Historical Context

The current region of Tigray is Ethiopia’s northernmost region, bordering Eritrea and Sudan. Its people, who speak Tigrinya, a language shared with the Tigrinya people of Eritrea, trace their history back two millennia to the ancient Kingdom of Axum, whose capital was located in the modern-day city of Axum.

During medieval times, the region was absorbed into the highland feudal state of Abyssinia, which shifted political power southward to the Amharic-speaking people, who are today based in the Amhara region that neighbors Tigray. The Tigrayan nobility shared political power in the new kingdom and coronation of the Abyssinian monarch took place at Axum, the religious center of the polity. Abyssinia’s name was later changed to “Ethiopia” in the 19th century under Emperor Menelik II.

From the late 19th through much of the 20th centuries, imperial conquests by the then multiethnic ruling class of settler colonialists from the Shewa region—today, pejoratively referred to as neftegnas, meaning “riflemen”—expanded national boundaries and imposed Amhara cultural hegemony throughout the empire under a Shewan aristocracy. As part of this conquest, Eritrea, which had been successively colonized by the Ottomans, Italians and British, fell under Ethiopia’s colonial rule in 1952 and was illegally annexed in 1962, gaining for itself the second most industrialized state in Africa at that time (only second to South Africa). The 1974 military overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie ended the imperial monarchy and gave way to a burgeoning Ethiopian revolution, later hijacked by the quasi-communist Derg (Amharic for “committee”) regime that continued to enforce Amharic cultural hegemony by masking it in Marxist rhetoric.

Following in the footsteps of revolutionary Eritrean liberation movements that had been at war with Ethiopia’s government since 1961, most notably the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF; known locally as Jebha) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF; known locally as Shaebia), various oppressed ethnic nationalities organized armed liberation movements in their respective territories inside Ethiopia. Drawing inspiration, training and material support from EPLF, a small group of Tigrayans formed the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF, known locally as Weyane):

The instrumentality of the EPLF in inspiring, training and arming the TPLF could not be disputed. It is now a matter of public knowledge that the first batch of TPLF fighters were trained and launched from Eritrea with EPLF commanders playing a prominent role in assuring the viability of the fledgling band of TPLF fighters. … Almost all of the current TPLF leadership was among the group that was trained and organized in the Eritrean fields by the EPLF. The EPLF provided not only the first guns but also the commanders, including the now legendary Mussie and Jamaica, who led the group into Tigray and launched the armed struggle.2

Like EPLF, TPLF sought independence for its “nation.” Unlike Eritrea, however, Tigray was not an independent nation or colony during either the


medieval Abyssinian era or the European colonization of Africa as it was instead a central piece of the empire’s feudal aristocracy. Despite this reality, a small group of Tigrayans formed TPLF in 1975 after receiving training from EPLF in 1974.³

In 1976, TPLF published in its founding manifesto plans to create an independent Tigrinya-speaking “Republic of Greater Tigray” by expanding “its” territory in northern Ethiopia to include the lands of neighboring ethnic groups, acquiring coastal lands within Eritrea and seceding from Ethiopia to form a new republic.⁴ According to EPLF’s leadership, Tigray’s initial manifesto did not include the Eritrean coast but would later be revised to include it.⁵ Aspirations for an independent expanded Tigray were first expressed in the 1940s by the meddling of British colonialists in Eritrea who proposed a union between Eritrea and northern Ethiopia, which they called “Greater Tigrai” (Fig. 2).⁶

The Derg regime was toppled in 1991 by a coalition of liberation forces led primarily by EPLF and TPLF.⁷ Eritrea went on to become an independent country in 1993. Ascending to power in Ethiopia, TPLF steadily worked towards achieving the goals laid out in its manifesto by establishing Ethiopia’s system of “ethnic federalism” mandated by a constitution ratified in 1994 that—through the controversial Article 39—allowed for secession of ethnic states in the federation through unconditional self-determination.⁸

As an example of the application of this system elsewhere, had it been applied to the United States, each state would be designated for each ethnicity or race: California for Asian-Americans, Mississippi for African-Americans, Texas for Mexican-Americans, etc. Governing through repression in a newly created ethnicity-based ruling coalition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), TPLF was able to maintain a dominant position in the coalition, expand its territorial boundaries and enrich the Tigray region, which comprises only six percent of the national population, to the detriment of other Ethiopian regions.⁹

![Figure 2. British map of proposed partitioning of “Greater Tigrai.” Source: International Affairs/ Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-], Vol. 21, No. 3 [Jul., 1945], pp. 363-369.](image)

In May 1998, the TPLF-led EPRDF government drew Ethiopia into a two-and-a-half year deadly “border” war with Eritrea, which resulted in multiple offensives to capture coastal cities and the final drive to capture Addis Ababa, EPLF sent EPRDF (i.e. TPLF, OLF and other Ethiopian rebel forces) 8 brigades and a mechanized unit, including tanks, to assist them. Without EPLF’s participation—or merely the threat of it—the capture of Addis Ababa and the prior negotiations with the Derg to stand down and surrender would not have been possible.

⁵ Email conversation with a veteran fighter and former leader of EPLF on January 24, 2021.
⁶ International Affairs [Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-], Vol. 21, No. 3 [Jul., 1945], pp. 368.
⁷ During the war, TPLF did not own a single tanks and relied heavily on EPLF mechanized armies in battle. In
³⁸ McCracken, Abusing Self-Determination, 185. Article
the occupation of the border town of Badme—internationally recognized as Eritrea's in 2002 by binding arbitration—followed by a 20 year-long unresolved war of attrition. During the hot stages of the war (1998 - 2000), more than 80,000 ethnic Eritreans were deported to Eritrea from Ethiopia—infamously for “the color of their eyes”—drawing condemnation by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.

Similar ethnic cleansing policies and wars for territorial expansion and resources were to be carried out by TPLF inside of Ethiopia itself, leading to genocide against Oromos, Annuaks, Somalis, Amharas and other ethnicities, all of which have been well-documented by Genocide Watch, US Congress and the US Justice Department. Keeping true to its manifesto, Tigray’s boundaries expanded in all directions after 1991. Recent maps show how Tigray grew to include the Amhara regions of Welkait and Raya, the Eritrean town of Badme and other surrounding areas (Fig. 3). In 2009, International Crisis Group (ICG) published “Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and its Discontents”, a report assessing TPLF’s ethnic federalist model and the future of Ethiopia. According to the report:

Critics decry worsening ethnic relations as a result of ethnic-based competition. In their view, the political system divides rather than unites people, by creating mutual suspicion and rancour and instituting tribal dynamics that could easily spiral out of control. The constitutional clause [Article 39] that gives nationalities the right to secede is touted as proof of the EPRDF’s anti-Ethiopian stance. Eritrea’s independence, which turned Ethiopia into a landlocked country, is viewed as further evidence of a desire to dismember it. A recurrent claim is that the EPRDF has unduly privileged its Tigray base and regional state to the national detriment.

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The claim that TPLF privileged Tigray at the expense of the nation is perhaps best corroborated by the fact that, according to a Global Financial Integrity report, TPLF looted Ethiopia of $2.6 billion annually. However, it is worth noting that the average Tigrayan citizen likely did not see the benefits of these illicit funds since more than a million depended on annual humanitarian food assistance from foreign donors funneled into Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP).

Although the ICG report did not cover these class issues in detail, it did conclude that TPLF’s ethnicity-based system of governance “decisively transformed politics” whereby “relations between ethnic groups have become increasingly competitive, as they vie for control of administrative boundaries and government budgets in addition to land and natural resources.” ICG cited as the system’s principle problems, (1) the reality that “Ethiopia’s ethnic dispersion is seldom homogenous” and (2) the

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right of "unconditional 'self-determination'". As a result, "ethnic federalism has sharpened differences among groups since 1991, and ethno-nationalist grievances with the nation-state, which the TPLF set out to end, remain."

Thus, it was clear to the international community decades ago that as TPLF moved forward with its secessionist ethnic agenda as laid out in its 1976 manifesto—changing boundaries, fighting territorial wars and looting state resources—the Ethiopian federal system was becoming increasingly unstable. In spite of these concerns, TPLF forged ahead with its ethnic federal system, winning in elections in 2010 and 2015 by 99.6% and 100%, respectively.\(^\text{16}\)

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While these results drew great concern worldwide, they hardly came as a surprise as the ruling party itself warned in 1993 that “if we lose in the elections even once, we will encounter a great danger”.\(^\text{17}\) In the mind of TPLF, which represents an ethnic minority, losing its supreme position is an impossible scenario. As long-time Ethiopia journalist Rene Lefort wrote in 2016, a more equitable share of federal power among all ethnic groups "would be an even more hazardous leap for the TPLF, abandoning its domination and betting that a genuinely democratic federalism would emerge. In other words, that nations or a coalition of nations much more populous than the Tigreans would not impose majority rule, threatening the preservation of what for the Front is non-negotiable: Tigreans remaining in charge of Tigray."\(^\text{18}\)

After many years of religious, ethnic and popular protests, namely the Oromo protests, the ruling coalition elected Dr. Abiy Ahmed as the Prime Minister in April 2018, who quickly made peace with Eritrea, released political prisoners, introduced a series of liberal reforms, appointed a progressive cabinet and enacted anti-corruption efforts that led to the arrest of high-profile TPLF officials.\(^\text{19}\) TPLF was forced to retreat to its regional capital Mekelle. In contrast to TPLF's ethno-nationalist agenda, Abiy articulated his philosophy of medemer ("synergy") to de-ethnicize Ethiopia and promote national unity. In December 2019, Abiy merged EPRDF to form the non-ethnicity-based Prosperity Party (PP) with TPLF refusing to join despite Abiy imploring them to do so.\(^\text{20}\) Between late 2019 and mid-2020, Abiy sent multiple delegations to Tigray to encourage dialogue and mediation between TPLF and PP, which failed to bear any fruit.\(^\text{21}\)

TPLF media organs like Tigrai Media House, began to increase their broadcasts about the nascent "Agazian" movement to create a new state exclusively for Tigrinya-speaking Orthodox Christians. Based on the xenophobic, anti-Muslim ideas of the Christian-Zionist, Eritrean-British Tesfazion Gerhelase, the Agazian ideology sought to provide the sociopolitical underpinnings for a Republic of Greater Tigray that could justify the erasure of a multi-religious Eritrean state in the name of returning to an mythical "Agazian" past that never existed.\(^\text{22}\)

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22 "ምንቅስቓስ ያገ(swipe for tab) በወንበር ያስተማጠል እና 12 ክፋል/6/29/2020]....#tmh #SupporTMH #TegaruMedia". Tigray Media House.
On account of the COVID-19 pandemic, the federal government announced in March 2020 that it would postpone national elections until at least 2021. Observing that similar actions have been taken by democracies worldwide, The Economist magazine explained, “Just as delaying elections is not inherently authoritarian, ploughing ahead with a vote can be antithetical to democratic principles.” In spite of global public health concerns, TPLF held military parades in Tigray in August followed by regional parliamentary elections in September, winning 98.2% of the vote (winning 100% of contested seats). On October 24, TPLF blocked the federal appointment of a newly assigned brigadier general to the Northern Command stationed in Tigray on the grounds that the federal government was unelected and thus illegitimate. This justification allowed TPLF to avoid allegations of sedition. It is worth noting, however, that even prior to claims of federal illegitimacy due to delayed elections, TPLF had already engaged in outright sedition by refusing to hand over TPLF’s spy chief Getachew Assefa, who was indicted by the federal attorney general. On the same day when TPLF blocked the new brigadier general’s appointment, Tigray state officials complained that $7.6 million was being withheld by the federal government, which in response said that money, moving forward, would be disbursed directly to local administrators rather than regional bodies (i.e. TPLF leadership itself). Failing to recognize the federal government—perhaps a miscalculation by TPLF—Tigray would inevitably face issues with currency, trade, communications, banking and other sectors influenced by Addis Ababa.

Six days later, ICG issued a briefing warning of looming conflict in Tigray for which a willing and capable TPLF was preparing itself: “Tigray itself is prepared for a struggle. Its well-armed regional paramilitary force is led by former national army generals. It also boasts a large militia full of war veterans. TPLF leaders say that many officers in the units of the Northern Command, which still patrols the Eritrea border, would not be likely to support any federal intervention, and some could even break and join Tigray’s forces.”

TPLF’s belief in its own superiority in a wartime scenario with Ethiopia likely arises from the fact that it felt Ethiopia was diplomatically isolated in the international community. In an interview with Dimst Weyane TV, ex-ambassador to Somalia and high-ranking TPLF member Wondimu Asaminew spoke with braggadocio about TPLF’s diplomatic prowess and explained that Abiy was isolated, weak and incapable of surviving the diplomatic “jungle”:

Now, at home we are not at peace with ourselves. ... In fact, now, due to our weakness, there are many countries emboldened to bully us around. So one of the reasons why our policy—foreign policy and diplomacy—is a problem is that the domestic foundation of a strong foreign policy is now deconstructed. Not only that. You are strong in foreign relations as strong as your allies. And, unfortunately, we have deconstructed, now, the foreign policy, diplomacy, security architecture we had carefully built in the last 27 years. Now, IGAD is rendered irrelevant. We have disregarded the African Union. We [Ethiopia] are alone. We are isolated. Perhaps the only friend we have, if we are going to call him a friend, is [Eritrean]

26 “Ethiopia’s Tigray blocks general’s appointment in blow to Abiy”, Al Jazeera English, October 30, 2020.
After shunning all routes to dialogue, TPLF attacked the federal government’s Northern Command during the morning of November 4 (or the evening of November 3; exact time is unknown), effectively starting the conflict. TPLF did not hide this fact. Central committee member Sekoutoure Getachew admitted on a televised program of TPLF’s Dimtsi Weyane TV that TPLF forces had conducted a “preemptive strike” and made comparisons to similar actions taken by Israel against Arab nations.

In review, consider that TPLF:

- has pursued a secessionist trajectory in accordance with its 1976 manifesto;
- introduced the “ethnic federalist” system via a constitution that allowed for Tigray’s unilateral secession through Article 39;
- used EPRDF to expand Tigray’s regional boundaries and enrich TPLF leaders to strengthen its position upon eventual secession (possibly for an “Agazian” state);
- fought a war of attrition with Eritrea that sought to capture the necessary coastal cities outlined in the 1976 manifesto;
- refused to join the reformed, de-ethnicized ruling coalition (i.e. Prosperity Party) which served to isolate Tigray from Ethiopia politically and administratively;
- refused to recognize the legitimacy of PM Abiy Ahmed and the federal government, leading to disruptions in finance, currency, trade, communications and banking;
- held gratuitous military parades, held an illegal election and rejected multiple mediation efforts to deescalate tensions with the federal government;
- grew emboldened by the perceived isolation and diplomatic naivety of Abiy and PP;
- prepared itself for war with the federal government; and

As a challenge to the federal government, Wondimu appears to have set up a de facto foreign ministry for Tigray through “the newly-formed Tigray Friendship Liaison Office, which helps Tigrayan officials communicate with other governments, trade councils and cultural bodies. … The office represents an effort by Tigrayans ‘to explain ourselves to the world’, Wondimu said, and to distance themselves from a fraught democratic transition under Abiy that has been undermined by persistent ethnic violence. … ‘While the whole country is in shambles, our institutions are working,’ Wondimu told AFP.”

In a November 1 tweet about his virtual meeting with EU officials, TPLF Spokesperson Getachew Reda made it clear that dialogue with Abiy and PP was impossible: “I did reiterate TPLF’s position that an all inclusive political dialogue is the only way out and that @AbiyAhmedAli and #PP have neither the capabilities nor the legitimacy to lead such a dialogue. TPLF has not and will not agree to bilateral negotiations with #PP or #Abiy.”

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33 Tweet by @reda_getachew posted on November 1, 2020. Access here: https://twitter.com/reda_getachew/status/1322951891815452672
initiated the war by attacking the Northern Command and bragged about it on television afterward.

Therefore, it is clear that TPLF, prior to armed conflict in November 2020, was on a route towards secession to expand its territory into both Ethiopia and Eritrea and sought to make war with those countries inevitable. Rather than wait passively for such a war to arrive, TPLF opted instead for brinkmanship and escalation of the possibility of war with Ethiopia and Eritrea. By TPLF’s own rationale—faulty as it may have been—such a war was its only option because negotiating away concessions for a more equitable balance of power among all ethnic regions was a perceived impossibility since Tigrayans, an ethnic minority, would forever be marginalized in a majority-rule ethnic federal system that TPLF itself created. Thus, for TPLF an unjust, seemingly unwinnable war was a fait accompli.

“Therefore, it follows that TPLF and its supporters must—by logical necessity—create, adopt and disseminate disinformation about the Tigray crisis across all media in order to manufacture consent for an unjust war of aggression and territorial expansion. TPLF and its supporters, by default, rely on a false narrative to support their war effort.”

However, the justification for the start, continuation and resolution of any war in the modern era depends on legal, moral and logical considerations in the court of international public opinion. As such, TPLF’s plan for a secessionist war of aggression and territorial expansion would be rejected by the international community because it could not be justified on legal, moral or logical grounds. Therefore, it follows that TPLF and its supporters must—by logical necessity—create, adopt and disseminate disinformation about the Tigray crisis across all media in order to manufacture consent for an unjust war of aggression and territorial expansion. TPLF and its supporters, by default, rely on a false narrative to support their war effort. As such, TPLF cannot look like the aggressor but instead the victim. The conflict cannot be limited to a mere law enforcement operation against criminals but instead a “civil war” against the people of Tigray. The conflict cannot be limited to the Tigray region but must instead be expanded into neighboring regions and internationalized to include Eritrea and other nations. The conflict cannot be deescalated towards a negotiated peace based on equitable rule but instead be escalated towards war that ends in secession and territorial expansion—or, at the minimum, a return to a reconfigured coalition arrangement that gives TPLF unjust and inequitable ethnic rule (i.e. the status quo ante).

Lowering Evidentiary Standards

“Communications Blackout”

Although TPLF may depend on disinformation to manufacture consent for war, that disinformation would presumably be rejected by ethical journalists and media. However, information of low quality and integrity is willingly accepted. The media’s justification is the presence of an information blackout. According to the Washington Post, the Ethiopian government is at fault: “By blocking communications and access to Tigray, the government helped create conditions where disinformation and misinformation can thrive.”

Rather than exercising patience and waiting for credible evidence to emerge in a cloud of disinformation, the media instead justified the immediate use of highly questionable witness testimony by alleging a deliberate blackout by the government.

As a case in point, in regards to allegations about an Eritrean troop presence, AP correspondent Cara Anna wrote, “With almost all journalists blocked from Tigray and humanitarian access and communications links limited, witness accounts give the clearest picture yet of the Eritreans’ presence.”

How is it possible that anonymous hearsay—impossible to substantiate and prone to

35 “In Ethiopia’s digital battle over the Tigray region, facts are casualties”, Alex Drew and Clair Wilmot, Washington Post, February 5, 2021.

personal bias or error—gives the “clearest picture” in Tigray? Given the touchy nature of ethnic politics in modern day Ethiopia and the highly propagandized nature of Tigray under 30 years of TPLF, how can one simply accept at face value anonymous testimony by Tigrayan civilians about persons of other ethnicities and nationalities that they have been expressly propagandized against? Is hostile witness testimony not a consideration? Why does the AP ignore and discount the role of video, photo or hard evidence?

Quoting an “Addis Ababa-based foreign correspondent”, Simon Allison of Mail & Guardian wrote in a November 16 piece that “The only people who have access to communication are the Ethiopian [sic] troops and the militias” and therefore deemed this “censorship” and “a throwback to the dark days of Ethiopian journalism”. However, this was simply false. AFP correspondent Robbie Corey-Boulet tweeted on November 9: “Separately, AFP and other outlets reached Dansha, in Tigray, earlier today. Federal forces controlled Northern Command 5th Division post (and police posed for pics in front of entrance). But we were soon made to leave town because of, we were told, fighting in the area.”

Reuters’ East Africa deputy bureau chief Maggie Fick also confirmed the presence of “Reuters reporters in the area this week” on November 10 in an article equipped with photos from Dansha. Another article written by the Reuters staff on November 13, also included photos of Amhara militia forces in Dansha taken by Reuters photographer Tiksa Negeri.

How was such on-the-ground reporting possible if, as Allison alleged, there was a “province-wide communications blackout imposed by the national government”? Large sections of the media are using a “communications blackout”, which is typically the case with conflict-stricken regions, as an excuse to lower the evidentiary standards such that disinformation is not only accepted but afforded mass dissemination.

“Large sections of the media are using a ‘communications blackout’...as an excuse to lower the evidentiary standards such that disinformation is not only accepted but afforded mass dissemination.”

Furthermore, they deem this blackout as a deliberate effort of the government, allowing for the wholesale rejection of all video, photo and hard evidence provided by Ethiopian government sources. Though it is true that communications were down in Tigray, as admitted by the government, it is not true that the federal government was responsible for its shutdown during the conflict.

On December 14, following the capture of Mekelle by federal forces, the government acquired and released CCTV from November 4 of Ethio Telecom’s Mekelle Core Center premises, showing that a group of individuals deliberately cut off communication lines. Mekelle, at that time, was still under the control of the TPLF, making it hard to argue that this was the work of federal operatives. However, this news garnered no attention in the international media, which instead chose to argue, moving forward, that “Internet blocks during times of conflict or unrest in Ethiopia aren’t new” to insinuate deliberate government censorship.

On January 27, Washington Post’s editorial board even went as

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38 Tweet by @rcoreyb posted on November 9, 2020. Access here: https://twitter.com/rcoreyb/status/1325760812296843264?lang=en
42 Tweet by @SOEFactCheck posted on December 14, 2020. Access here: https://twitter.com/SOEFactCheck/status/1338484976124309505
far as saying that “journalists have been banned”, which clearly contradicts facts on the ground.\textsuperscript{44}

On December 17, VOA, citing the UN sources, confirmed that there was “restoration of some telecommunications this week.”\textsuperscript{46} Ethio Telecom announced on February 8 the completion of maintenance repairs of telecommunications infrastructure destroyed by TPLF and reactivation of mobile service to Tigray covering 363 mobile sites that included major cities and towns like Mekelle, Adwa, Axum, Adigrat, Shire Endesellase, Dansha, Edaga Hamus, Humera, Maykadra and Alemata.\textsuperscript{46} Additionally, banks were given priority and broadband internet was restored for banking in Mekele, Adigrat, Shire Endesellase, Axum and Adwa.

Strangely, however, the media ignored this news. Michelle Gavin wrote for the Council on Foreign Relations on February 10 of a supposed “communications blackout”, as did James Jeffrey for Al Jazeera on February 16.\textsuperscript{47} AP’s Kelvin Chan shamed the federal government, writing in an article headlined “Internet cuts become favored tool of regimes” that “Another long-running internet shutdown is in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, which has been choked off since fighting started in early November – the latest in a series of outages with no sign of service returning anytime soon.”\textsuperscript{48} Quoting Arnaud Froger of Reporters Without Borders, VOA journalist Salem Solomon wrote on February 12 that “Journalists have been prevented first from accessing the region. The Tigray region has been mostly in total internet shutdown since it all began in November. No access to information, no possibility to communicate with your sources on the ground, and RSF has recorded at least seven arbitrary arrests of journalists.”\textsuperscript{49} These reports not only ignored the restoration of internet by Ethio Telecom but – through pure speculation – suggested that the government was deliberately blocking access to prevent reporting from Tigray. In late February, the federal government granted the following new outlets access to Tigray: AFP, Al Jazeera, New York Times, France 24, Reuters, BBC and Financial Times.\textsuperscript{50}

**“Restricted Humanitarian Access”**

Alleged restrictions to humanitarian access to Tigray have also been used as a pretext to lower evidentiary standards since aid workers are capable of assessing the plight of civilians. While there were obvious disruptions at the start of the conflict, humanitarian access has steadily improved since the capture of Tigray’s capital city Mekelle on November 28. On December 2, the UN announced that an agreement was reached with the Ethiopian Government to allow “unimpeded, sustained and secure access” for humanitarian supplies to reach civilians in need in areas controlled by the government.\textsuperscript{51} That same day, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi appeared on CNN and said, “I don’t think there’s been a sealing off, a deliberate blockade but it’s very difficult to move through a war area.”\textsuperscript{52}

In a December 14 tweet, Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, confirmed that humanitarian assistance had started to reach Tigray and expressed its encouragement.\textsuperscript{53} On December 8 and 14, ICRC tweeted, with video evidence, that it


\textsuperscript{45}“UN Sends Millions in Humanitarian Aid to Ethiopia”, \textit{Voice of America}, December 17, 2020.

\textsuperscript{46}Tweet by @ethio telecom posted on February 8, 2021. Access here: https://twitter.com/ethio telecom/status/1358847656198569993


\textsuperscript{48}“Digital siege: Internet cuts become favored tool of regimes”, \textit{Associated Press}, February 11, 2021.


\textsuperscript{50}“Broadcasting authority urges int’l journalists in Tigray to respect law”, \textit{Fana Broadcasting Corporation}, February 25, 2021.

\textsuperscript{51}“Ethiopian Government and UN strike deal for unimpeded humanitarian access in Tigray”, UN News, December 2, 2020.

\textsuperscript{52}“Forces from Ethiopia’s Tigray region say Eritrean troops are part of the conflict and the war is far from over”, Nima Elbagir, Barbara Arvanitidis and Eoin McSweeney, \textit{CNN}, December 4, 2020.

\textsuperscript{53}Tweet by @NorwayMFA posted on December 14, 2020. Access here: https://twitter.com/NorwayMFA/status/1338506105530540035
started water distribution in Mekelle and commenced distribution of medical supplies throughout the region. By January 25, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) explained in a situation report that “Movements of humanitarian cargo inside Tigray is improving substantially.” On February 6, Executive Director of the World Food Programme, David Beasley, visited Tigray with Ethiopian government officials, commended their recent humanitarian efforts and struck a deal to immediately scale up emergency food distributions for 1 million civilians. The next day, Beasley tweeted a video from a Mekelle warehouse as WFP was unloading 20,000 tons of food for distribution for 1.3 million civilians.

On February 11, the UN team based in Ethiopia tweeted, “There’s important progress b/wn the humanitarian community & Ethiopian Gov’t (https://cutt.ly/6kmBNlf) & now: clearances for 44 international experts to help scale up the Gov’t-led response for the people of #Tigray. Thanks @WFPChef @UN @Refugees & @UNDSS @PMEthiopia”.

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“... the EU alleged that PM Abiy’s government was limiting access and threatened to withhold hundreds of millions of euros of aid as ‘political leverage’. In response, PM Abiy warned, ‘Threatening Ethiopia for coins will not work.’”

In spite of all the evidence since December that Ethiopia’s government was increasing humanitarian access, the media continued to report that the government was deliberately blocking humanitarian corridors. In the lead up to a visit by the EU’s Crisis Management Commissioner Janez Lenarčič at the end of November, the EU alleged that PM Abiy’s government was limiting access and threatened to withhold hundreds of millions of euros of aid as “political leverage”. In response, PM Abiy warned, “Threatening Ethiopia for coins will not work.”

On January 25, the EU suspended budget support for Ethiopia worth 88 million euros ($107 million). Recalling that OCHA on that very same day claimed that humanitarian aid distribution was “improving substantially”, the EU’s top diplomat Josep Borrell confusingly said, “We are ready to help, but unless there is access for humanitarian aid operators, the EU cannot disburse the planned budget support to the Ethiopian government.” These claims came as a surprise since no major western power had withheld aid to Ethiopia under any previous friendly or hostile regime (i.e. Haile Sellasie, the communist Derg or TPLF) - threatening Ethiopia for coins will not work.

On the very same day that WFP brokered a deal to scale up food distribution, a VOA headline confusingly read, “Ethiopian Government Blocking

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54 Tweet by @ICRC_Africa posted on December 8, 2020. Access here: https://twitter.com/icrc_africa/status/133630026709
7235456?lang=en ; Tweet by @ICRC_Africa posted on December 14, 2020. Access here: https://twitter.com/icrc_africa/status/133630026709
7235456?lang=en

56 “Joint UN-Government Tigray mission highlights humanitarian needs and path forward”, World Food Programme, February 6, 2021.
57 Tweet by @WFPChef posted on February 7, 2021. Access here: https://twitter.com/WFPChef/status/1358510664822
759436

58 Tweet by @UNEthiopia posted on February 7, 2021. Access here: https://twitter.com/UNEthiopia/status/135993360251
6107267

60 Tweet by @PMEthiopia posted on November 30, 2020. Access here: https://twitter.com/PMEthiopia/status/13393360251
6107267

Aid in Tigray, UN Says.”63 Reading the actual text of the article reveals that the government “block” was instead OCHA awaiting clearances to enter non-government-controlled areas. It must be recalled that four humanitarian workers were killed in November (three from the Danish Refugee Council and one from the International Rescue Committee), and aid agencies told BBC December that “violence against staff” was a legitimate reason for concern for delayed aid deliveries.64 Tigray Regional State official Abraha Desta told VOA Amharic that TPLF remnants were blocking humanitarian aid delivery and that “drivers are afraid” to deliver aid.65 However, such concerns were not expressed in the English-language Western press.

Senior government official Redwan Hussein told the AP in December that “No entity, multilateral or unilateral, is supposed to supplant the government” and that humanitarian assistance must be escorted by defense forces.66 This sentiment is shared with humanitarian agencies. During an interview on CNN on February 18, UNHCR chief Filippo Grandi said, “Access is difficult. This is still an insecure region so we have to deal with that as well. But we have also established a system of coordination between civilian organizations like ours, the military – the Ethiopian military in the Tigray region – that was also a request that we had made.” Is it not the federal government’s responsibility to ensure the safety of aid workers, especially after safety concerns were explicitly cited by aid agencies as a cause for delayed aid deliveries?

When media outlets like The Economist report that the federal government “restricts the movement of aid workers” it must be understood that they are merely stating the obvious: movement of aid workers is always “restricted” in all countries and conflict zones since aid workers must undergo standard government regulations.67 Thus, choosing to explicitly mention this fact without citing details is merely propagandistic.

On January 23, The Economist magazine went as far making the extraordinary claim that food was being used as a weapon in a sort of throwback to the 1983-85 famine under Ethiopia’s brutal Derg regime: “Things were supposed to be different under Abiy Ahmed, the Ethiopian prime minister who was hailed as a reformer when he took charge in 2018, and who won the Nobel peace prize the following year. Yet once again it looks as if hunger is being used as a weapon in Africa’s second-most-populous nation. And once again the scene of the horror is Tigray.”68 In support of this argument, it claims that “there are credible reports of government forces or their allies killing livestock and burning crops. If true, both the perpetrators and those who gave the orders are guilty of war crimes.” Where are these “credible reports”? Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence yet none has been presented thus far.

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Additionally, Human Rights Watch’s Associate Director Gerry Simpson tweeted on February 3 that “Officials who #Ethiopia has put in charge of running #Tigray + the EU + some UN officials + some aid charities all agree that the government is obstructing aid flow to millions in need, triggering claims it’s ‘using hunger as a weapon to

68 “Ethiopia’s government appears to be wielding hunger as a weapon”, The Economist, January 23, 2021.
subdue’ the region”. Again, where is the evidence? AP journalist Cara Anna also made claims of starvation by citing “opposition parties” and the “minutes obtained by The Associated Press” of a “crisis meeting of government and aid workers”. Again, where is the evidence? What do these minutes say? The likely politicized and propagandized words of unnamed opposition parties hardly count as solid evidence. Yet these are the sources of such extraordinary claims of “starvation” that are used to make calls for intervention in Tigray through the Security Council.

According to Ethiopia’s National Disaster Risk Management Commission, no one has yet died of starvation and all 4.5 million Tigrayans in need of food aid have received assistance with 70 percent of the aid subsidized by the government. No evidence of starvation has yet been presented in spite of the international media’s access to the region. Notably, hunger was already a major problem in Tigray before the conflict while TPLF governed the region. More than 1.5 million Tigrayans were already on some form of food assistance prior to the crisis.

Perhaps one of the more egregious misrepresentations about humanitarian aid access and delivery took place on February 10 when AFP misquoted the Ethiopian Red Cross Society’s president Abera Tola, claiming that “80 percent of the conflict-hit Tigray region was cut off from humanitarian aid and warned tens of thousands could starve to death.” The Ethiopian Red Cross Society issued a press release rejecting AFP’s claim and clarified its president’s
call for intervention in Tigray through the Security Council.

“was rather expressing lack of capacity and shortage of resources we are currently encountering to reach 80% the vulnerable community in Tigray. The fact that we have so far reached close to 400,000 beneficiaries in Tigray, close to 20% of the total beneficiaries in need of assistance is what our president alluded to.” The false claim was propagated widely in the international media while AFP has still failed to issue an apology, retract the article or delete the associated tweet. How can such a grave mistake be so widely disseminated and disregarded by the originator?

Therefore, it is clear that the exaggerated restrictions on communications, journalists and humanitarian aid—claimed to be deliberately blocked by the government—have been used by the media and human rights groups as the basis of accepting allegations, many of which are hyperbolic in nature, about the Tigray crisis that cannot be substantiated by any evidence. While TPLF and its supporters depend on disinformation, it is the media that is chiefly responsible for its acceptance and spread by using the pretext of a government-driven blackout.

Assessing the Allegations

Presence of Eritrean Troops

On July 9, 2018, Eritrea and Ethiopia signed the Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship between Eritrea and Ethiopia, which states that “The two governments will endeavor to forge intimate political, economic, social, cultural and


75 “Dear national and international media”; Aseged Woldemariam, Ethiopian Red Cross Society, February 11, 2021.

76 Tweet by @AFPAfrica posted on February 10, 2021. Access here: https://twitter.com/AFPAfrica/status/1359509175483645953

77 “More than 50,000 Ethiopia civilians have been killed, Tigray opposition says”, Cara Anna, Associated Press, February 2, 2021.; ”Extreme urgent need: Starvation haunts Ethiopia’s Tigray”, Cara Anna, Associated Press, January 17, 2021.


69 Tweet by @GerrySimpsonHRW posted on February 3, 2021. Access here: https://twitter.com/GerrySimpsonHRW/status/1356875926668255234

70 “More than 50,000 Ethiopia civilians have been killed, Tigray opposition says”, Cara Anna, Associated Press, February 2, 2021.; ”Extreme urgent need: Starvation haunts Ethiopia’s Tigray”, Cara Anna, Associated Press, January 17, 2021.


security cooperation that serves and advances the vital interests of their people”; and that “Both countries will jointly endeavor to ensure regional peace, development and cooperation.”77 After 27 years of hostilities between the two countries, this Declaration, which won Abiy the Nobel Peace Prize, set a new precedent for security cooperation in one of the most conflict-riddled regions in the world. Thus, upon the start of the Tigray conflict by TPLF via its “preemptive strike” on November 4, the terms of the Declaration would be in effect governing how Ethiopia and Eritrea would move forward from a security perspective.

PM Abiy told his parliament that, immediately in the wake of the attacks on the Northern Command, Ethiopian soldiers – disarmed and disrobed at gunpoint by mutinous TPLF-aligned officers – retreated into Eritrea where they were “fed, clothed and armed” such that they could return to battle in Tigray.78 He went on to say that “The Eritrean people have shown us...they are a relative standing by us on a tough day.”

On November 10, TPLF’s leader Debretsion Gebremichael said in a statement aired on local station Tigray TV that “Since yesterday, the army of Isaias have crossed the country’s boundary and invaded. They were attacking via Humera using heavy arms.”79 In response, Eritrea’s Foreign Minister Osman Saleh said, “This is an internal conflict. We are not part of the conflict.”80 Similarly, Ethiopian officials also denied the allegations.81 Shortly after these denials, however, TPLF fired missiles on civilian targets in Eritrea’s capital city Asmara and began shelling border towns.82 The missile attacks, 15 in total, were launched in two rounds on November 14 and 27, in violation of the Geneva Conventions that prohibit indiscriminate attacks.83

As would later be revealed by PM Abiy in parliament on March 23, Eritrean troops, in response to TPLF attacks on Eritrea, took up exposed trench positions on the Ethiopian side of the border as federal forces left them empty to pursue TPLF, creating a security threat. The nature and rationale of Eritrea’s actions were explained by PM Abiy as follows:

One should know their friends and foes. The Ethiopian people, government and military were betrayed by one of their own. We are forever indebted to the Eritrean people and government who treated our fleeing troops and supported them to move freely wherever we sought. ... Now, there are some fools who expect us to reject, deny or badmouth [Eritrea]. We will not do that. We thank Eritrea’s people and government for everything they have done. That being said, the Eritrean military, after supporting us, crossed the border. What they have done while moving inside of Ethiopia cannot be called crimes against our people. We would not accept such actions from Eritrean troops nor our own. Our current campaign is against our clearly identified enemies, not our own people. To

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77 The Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship between Eritrea and Ethiopia was sign in Asmara, Eritrea on July 9, 2018 between President Isaias Afwerki on behalf of the State of Eritrea and Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed Ali on behalf of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.
81 “Ethiopia’s PM vows ‘final and crucial’ offensive in Tigray”, Cara Anna, Associated Press, November 17, 2020
this end, we have sent four or five delegations of high-ranking officials back-and-forth between here and Eritrea. … The rationale by the Eritrean government for their troops’ presence across the border area in Ethiopia says, “You vacated your trenches where Ethiopian troops were for the past 20 years. In addition to all the harm inflicted on us by TPLF over these last 20 years, they now fired rockets on us and provoked us to enter. Because you abandoned your trenches to pursue TPLF within the interior of Tigray, you have presented them with the opportunity to attack us from those positions, which is a national security threat. This is why we took up those border positions. If you take those positions back, we will vacate the next day because we don’t want to be there.”

Little fuss was made about Eritrea’s actions in November as the US clearly understood that TPLF not only started the war but sought to escalate the conflict. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy proceeded to condemn TPLF’s actions, calling them an attempt to “internationalize the conflict”. Secretary Pompeo even went as far as thanking Eritrea: “We appreciate Eritrea’s restraint, which has helped prevent further spreading of the conflict.”

Eritrea’s limited and self-contained actions—restricted to taking up exposed trench positions along the border in coordination with the Ethiopian government—were seen as self-defense, cooperative and falling within the framework of the 2018 Declaration. Following such actions, Eritrea’s government, though cagey on the matter, never officially denied a troop presence in Ethiopia.


“Exclusive: U.S. thinks Eritrea has joined Ethiopian war, diplomats say”, Phil Stewart and David Lewis, Reuters, December 8, 2020
appropriate engagement with Eritrea in a new Horn of Africa mired in uncertainty. The interesting question here, however, is this: If the US State Department knew Eritrean troops were in Tigray in mid-November and took no issue with it then, why did it feel the need to make this announcement on December 8?

The US position—and the Western media and NGO narrative buttressing it—was certainly influenced by battlefield outcomes in Tigray that saw an unexpected, early retreat from Mekelle by TPLF, which was previously said to have 250,000 “battle-hardened” troops equipped with commandos that would likely take control of the Northern Command’s heavy artillery and personnel and overpower Abiy’s untested 140,000-man force (see Portrayals of TPLF as ‘Battle Hardened’ section). How could such a swift defeat be rationalized by the US and Western media after their nonstop prognostications of a TPLF victory—or at the minimum, a stalemate—versus PM Abiy’s supposedly weak federal forces? What excuse would be given for TPLF’s failure? As the ensuing days, weeks and months following November 28 would reveal, Eritrea became the chosen scapegoat (see Scapegoating Eritrea section).

Although TPLF claimed Eritrean military involvement and crimes since the start of the conflict, the Western media only took it seriously following a report by CNN on December 4, four days before the Reuters exclusive. CNN not only provided TPLF’s spokesman the platform to give the official excuse for a premature retreat (e.g. “we did not want to give [federal forces] the pretext to bombard [Mekelle] back to the stone age”) but also to turn international attention to Eritrea: “Some of these refugees described to CNN being beaten and tortured by Eritrean soldiers.” CNN provided the world, for the first time since the start of the conflict, allegations against Eritrea’s military of crimes in Tigray made by non-combatants rather than TPLF. This may come as a surprise, since evidence now suggests that Eritrea, in addition to occupying trenches in response to TPLF missile attacks, also took part in protecting Eritrean refugees under attack in refugees camps near the border (see Abduction and Killing of Eritrean Refugees section).

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With the CNN article bringing Eritrean military involvement to world attention and alleging its criminality against innocents in Tigray and the Reuters exclusive providing US confirmation of an Eritrean troop presence, the media would progressively increase the allegations and condemnation of crimes by Eritrea commensurate with TPLF’s battlefield failures.

With the capture, killing and jailing of TPLF’s founders and top brass by federal forces during the first two weeks of January 2021,88 the Western media turned attention to “Eritrean troops in Tigray” that were supposedly committing wanton acts of sexual violence, theft and murder that constituted war crimes. Most of these allegations came retroactively, claiming to have occurred during November and being labelled “massacres”.

On January 27, an AP article reported a new US State Department statement demanding Eritrea to “immediately” leave Tigray.90 However, the statement also went on to state, “It remains unclear how many Eritrean soldiers are in Tigray, or precisely where.” Such an assertion is absurd. If, according to the Reuters exclusive, the US had satellite imagery and intercepted communications

88 “Forces from Ethiopia’s Tigray region say Eritrean troops are part of the conflict and the war is far from over”, Nima Elbagir, Barbara Arvanitidis and Eoin McSweeney, CNN December 4, 2020.
as evidence proving an Eritrean troop presence in Tigray, then how is it possible for them not to know where or how large the supposed Eritrean presence is?

The AP on February 4 reported, “Eritrean forces are almost everywhere in Tigray.”91 This echoes the claim from the December CNN piece by TPLF spokesperson Getachew Reda that “90% of the forces operating in Tigray are from Eritrea.”92 Even more shocking, was the allegation by TPLF’s Mulugeta Gebrehiwot, in a “recording of a phone call from somewhere in rural Tigray” that Eritrea sent “42 divisions” to Tigray.93 Given that one division (known in Eritrea as a kifleserawit) comprises 5,000 troops, Mulugeta was claiming that there were approximately 210,000 troops in Tigray. Writer and historian Jeff Pearce highlights the absurdity of this allegation: “Mulugeta’s own assertions undermine his credibility. He mentions 42 divisions of Eritrean troops. Really? What, is Eritrea planning on storming Normandy? Military experts will tell you that even from 1998 to 2000, Eritrea had at most 28 divisions made up of four light brigades, and downsized in the years after that.”

AP reporter Cara Anna wrote, “Despite the denials, the Eritrean soldiers aren’t hiding. They have even attended meetings in which humanitarian workers negotiated access with Ethiopian authorities.” Note that Anna is not quoting or referencing any source but is making this claim herself. When one considers the parallel allegations that Eritrean troops are supposedly looting, kidnapping, murdering and raping throughout Tigray, one must ask the following: How can Eritrean troops who are supposedly busy looting, raping and murdering across Tigray—in capable of being captured in a single photo or video—somehow have the time and audacity to attend meetings with humanitarian workers? How can such a narrative exist inside a world not entirely satirical?

On February 4, following months of similar allegations against Eritrean troops, VOA reported the US State Department claim that it “received credible reports of looting, sexual violence, assaults in refugee camps and other human rights abuses. It cited evidence that Eritrean soldiers are forcibly returning Eritrean refugees to their home country.”94 The article also referred to the testimony of an Eritrean armed opposition leader and fugitive wanted for high treason, who claimed that Eritrean forces entered Tigray and were killing Eritreans in refugee camps. What the article fails to mention is that the opposition leader admitted on June 19, 2020 in a radio interview that he visited Tigray multiple times that year to form a “tactical alliance” with TPLF.96 This would make him party to the conflict and thus a biased, hostile witness.

So far, all claims of Eritrean crimes in Tigray are based on hearsay or anecdotal evidence that is impossible to substantiate. Notably, the Ethiopian government has informed Tigrayan citizens that some of the alleged “Eritrean” crimes that they do indeed witness may be the result of TPLF deception. On November 12, Ethiopian General Mohammed Tessema explained that TPLF soldiers were dressing up in military uniforms produced at the Almeda Textile Factory to mimic those of the Eritrean Defense Forces in order to claim that Eritrean troops were present throughout Tigray.96

Despite condemnation by the Western media, an Eritrean troop presence itself is not the problem given TPLF’s missile attacks and Eritrea’s bilateral security arrangement with Ethiopia. The alleged crimes by those troops being propagated in the

92 “Forces from Ethiopia’s Tigray region say Eritrean troops are part of the conflict and the war is far from over”, Nima Elbagir, Barbara Arvanitidis and Eoin McSweeney, CNN, December 4, 2020.
93 “They Have Destroyed Tigray, Literally: Mulugeta Gebrehiwot speaks from the mountains of Tigray”, World Peace Foundation, January 29, 2021. The interview was conducted by Alex de Waal.
96 Tweet by @SOEFactCheck posted on November 12, 2020. Access here: https://twitter.com/SOEFactCheck/status/1326781302092296193
media, however, are indeed serious issues that must be assessed carefully.

**Rape and Sexual Violence**

On January 22, the UN’s special representative on sexual violence in conflict, Pramila Patten, said that the UN had received “disturbing” reports about sexual violence taking place in Tigray but this was non-specific and did not allege who was behind the rapes. Since the release of this statement, various questionable articles in the media suggested that Eritrean and Ethiopian troops were taking part in some sexual violence but it wasn’t until Lucy Kassa’s story for the Los Angeles Times on February 11 that the media narrative shifted to casting Eritrean troops as the primary perpetrators of rape in Tigray.

Gang rape, which is virtually unheard of in Eritrea, was supposedly unleashed on the Tigrayan population. According to the article, Eritrean troops raped a woman for two weeks until they broke her spine and left her paraplegic. Kassa does not provide the victim’s first name, photos nor medical records, making substantiation impossible. The primary reason for the prominence of Lucy’s story in the Western media was due to her allegation that her home was raided by the federal government. Lucy sent the media a photo of her home after the alleged raid, which was included in a VOA article (Fig. 4).

Reminiscent of a Hollywood set, the photo appears to be staged. Nothing is broken but simply turned, angled and disordered as though the photographer did not want to go through the trouble of repurchasing destroyed items afterward: unbroken TV perfectly turned to its side, couch angled upwards at a 45 degree angle to suggest papers were hiding underneath and a ruffle of papers.

Lucy’s argument following the said government raid, published in another piece for the LA Times, was essentially that she was an ethnic Tigrayan being targeted for reporting the truth about her people since the war was supposedly against Tigray and not just TPLF, as the government claimed. She provided no evidence in support. Furthermore, she explained that the government confiscated her laptop and flash drive, which had all the photos and videos to prove that Eritreans were raping civilians in Adigrat, Tigray. Coincidentally, her laptop and flash drive, had they survived, would contain the only forms of proof in all of Ethiopia that Eritrean troops were not only deep in Tigray but also raping civilians.

Since Lucy’s LA Times piece, the Western media has failed to contextualize the rapes in Tigray. Prior to the conflict, rape was already a serious problem in the region, which was known to have a pervasive rape culture. In an interview with TRT news, Ethiopian journalist Samuel Getachew stated, “even before, the region has been known for being unfriendly to women.” Samuel explained that activists, prior to the conflict, had

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97 "United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Ms. Pramila Patten, urges all parties to prohibit the use of sexual violence and cease hostilities in the Tigray region of Ethiopia", www.un.org, January 21, 2021.
100 “I Reported on Ethiopia’s War. Then Came a Knock at My Door”, Lucy Kassa, Los Angeles Times, February 11, 2021.
101 Tweet by @TRTWorldNow posted on February 13, 2021. Access here: https://twitter.com/TRTWorldNow/status/1360510270716710919
been pushing TPLF to take actions against rape. However, TPLF was well known to challenge these efforts.

In 2019, TPLF blocked an anti-rape rally in Mekele.\textsuperscript{102} One of the leading activists Meaza Gidey, who has been described as “one of the leading faces of the #StopWarOnTigray, Ethiopia movement”, tweeted in 2019 that “rape culture is ubiquitous in Tigray oftentimes stigmatizing & shaming female rape survivors into marrying their rapist.”\textsuperscript{103} Today, Meaza seems to ignore the possibility of endogenous sources of rape in Tigray and instead exclusively points the finger at Eritrean and Ethiopian troops.\textsuperscript{104} Only a few months before the start of the Tigray conflict, BBC Tigrinya reported that 133 Tigrayan girls and women, aged between 3 and 25, reported being raped within the previous three months.\textsuperscript{105} Many of the perpetrators were fathers, brothers, uncles and neighbors.

**Widespread Criminality in Tigray**

The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC), led by Daniel Bekele, the former Africa Director at Amnesty International, conducted a two-week human rights investigation of the Tigray region and reported on February 11 that all prisoners from ten prisons had been released following TPLF’s retreat.\textsuperscript{106} All documentation of inmates was destroyed, which “made the task of tracking major offenders nearly impossible and that it is one of the causes for the substantial increase of looting, gender-based violence and other major crimes.” This alarming news, inexplicably, was not reported in the Western media.

So obvious to local Tigrayans was the sudden explosion of prisoners and crimes against civilians that even TPLF-mouthpiece Tigrai Media House (TMH) was forced to admit, in a news broadcast that aired on February 18 and was later deleted from their YouTube page, that TPLF itself was responsible for the rise in crimes taking place in Tigray.\textsuperscript{107} His shocking admission, translated from Tigrinya into English, reads as follows:

> At this time there are a large number of criminal elements operating in the city of Mekele. When news broke out that the Ethiopian army was making its way to Mekele, the Tigray regional police forces and the prison forces disbanded abandoning their posts. As a result of this, the prison doors were left open and all the hardcore criminals escaped into the community. It is believed that these criminals are now operating in the city and, in particular, the rural areas, especially the remote ones. These criminals are known to harass the people, be involved in violent robberies and commit murder. At this time the most shocking thing and sad thing is that in Tigray, Tigrayans are stealing from their fellow Tigrayans, Tigrayans are being killed by their fellow Tigrayans.

> At the time when the entire world is against us, it is disheartening to see such things happen between us.

**It’s extremely sad to see the Tigrayan youth engaged in large numbers in such activities.** Everyone is sad at this situation and the entire community is disheartened. The information that is coming out of Mekele is that when you want to catch a taxi, the safest thing to do is board at the

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\textsuperscript{102} "TPLF bans anti rape protest rally in Tigray Mekele city, Ethiopia’s northern region", *Brana Press*, October 18, 2019.

\textsuperscript{103} "A women led movement: An introduction to Meaza." OMNA Tigray, February 27, 2021.; Tweet by @meazaG, posted on October 19, 2019. Access here: https://twitter.com/meazaG_/status/118574918815384833

\textsuperscript{104} Tweet by @meazaG, posted on March 8, 2021. Access here: https://twitter.com/meazaG_/status/1368801454941560834

\textsuperscript{105} "የተባለጆች: ከጠኞች ከጠኞች ያወርጋል: ለስልተ ከ133 ከጠኞች ከጠኞች ያወርጋል ከጠኞች ለስልተ ያወርጋል”, *BBC Tigrinya*, June 4, 2020.


\textsuperscript{107} "EmbassyMedia - TPLF mouth piece TMH admits, Stealing & Killing by Tigray Criminals in Mekele", *Eritrea Embassy/Media*. Uploaded to YouTube on February 21, 2021. Access here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6sz7FmtddtM
taxi ranks. This is because the taxis or minibuses on the ranks are well known and their particulars are registered. Therefore, even if a crime is committed in these vehicles they can be traced. What is happening is that rogue taxis and minibuses are carrying gangs of criminals masquerading as passengers and when people stop them on route they think that they are passengers and board these vehicles. Once these innocent travelers are in the vehicle they are taken hostage by the gang and taken to a remote area, they are then robbed of all their possessions. They will have all their money taken, their mobile phone taken and anything of value taken from them before they are dumped somewhere. If the person is lucky his life will be spared. [Emphasis added]

The fact that the video was later deleted by TMH suggests TPLF’s culpability.

The claims by both EHRC and TMH, were further corroborated by the Deputy Administrator of Tigray’s Northern Zone, Muluberhan Haile. Speaking with the Ethiopian Press Agency, Muluberhan said, “Prior to the widespread looting of public and civilian property in Tigray State, the TPLF junta had intentionally set free over 10,000 prisoners who are accused of and convicted with serious crimes.” He also indicated that TPLF was propagandizing and conducting psychological operations on the Tigrayan population, citing the example of TPLF distributing condoms and telling locals to prepare themselves for invading Eritrean troops who would soon be raping them.

Unlike TPLF, Eritrea’s PFDJ government, an erstwhile victim of UN sanctions, has every reason to act ethically and tread lightly in Tigray so as not to draw attention, much less hostility by Tigrayan civilians and the international community. As such, it makes little sense that the Eritrean government would command its soldiers to engage in needless acts of wanton sexual violence and criminality. Therefore, this becomes a question of the discipline of the Eritrean military and the culture of Eritrean society. Is the Eritrean military undisciplined? Is rape, theft and murder normal and widespread in Eritrean culture?

“Therefore, this becomes a question of the discipline of the Eritrean military and the culture of Eritrean society. Is the Eritrean military undisciplined? Is rape, theft and murder normal and widespread in Eritrean culture?”

History shows that EPLF, the name of PFDJ during the liberation war, was renowned worldwide for its discipline and humanity. In 1996, the Christian Science Monitor called EPLF, “one of the most disciplined and cohesive rebel forces in modern history.” The research division of the Library of Congress shared similar sentiments in a country study, stating that “In addition to its highly disciplined combatants, the EPLF benefited from its broad base of popular support and its political organization.” According to Horn of Africa scholar John Markakis, EPLF “laid heavy emphasis on political education and internal security, which made the EPLF the most disciplined and effective movement in the Horn of Africa.” More recently GlobalSecurity.org indicates: “As the second largest army in Africa, Eritrea’s Army is well staffed, well trained, and compared to the vast majority of African armies, well-funded. Indeed, during Eritrea’s fight for independence from Ethiopia, the Eritrean military was once widely admired as one of the most effective fighting organizations in the world.”


In 1985, during an Ethiopian famine deemed one of the worst in modern history, 60 Minutes visited an EPLF camp for Ethiopian prisoners of war for a documentary and found that EPLF soldiers were feeding the POWs “900 grams of food a day while Eritrea’s own starving people make due with 500 grams a day”. This highlights the humanity EPLF or, by the most cynical interpretation, its keen awareness of maintaining positive international publicity. The behavior shown towards POWs seems to have been reflective of EPLF’s leadership as well. Writing for The Baltimore Sun, Jane Perlez explains how Eritrea’s leader Isaias Afwerki took no pleasure in seeing the hardships of his recently defeated enemies: “Deeper inside Eritrea, between the towns of Teseney and Barentu, lay the bodies of Ethiopian soldiers, victims of the last battle for the province. For Mr. Isaias and those with him, the sights struck a sobering mood that proved difficult to lift with music from the – board tape deck.” He lamented, “When you see such destruction you forget about victory. It’s a very sad thing to see these innocent people put in this position, thirsty and hungry and even if they survive, no future to look forward to.”

Thus, Eritrea’s military and its leadership have a longstanding history demonstrative of high discipline. However, if one were to assume Eritrean soldiers broke discipline on a mass scale such that mass rape, looting and murder would be possible, then one would have expect an Eritrean culture marked by moral depravity and barbarism. The historical record suggests otherwise.

Congressman Dan Burton in testimony before the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee had this to say about Eritreans: “The Eritreans have won the love and respect of all who have come to know them. ... Their humility and perseverance are worthy of our awe. And the humane treatment which the Eritreans have meted out to their enemies is unfortunately all too rare in this world.” Former US Ambassador Robert Houdek said, “The incorruptibility and dedication of these people is extraordinary”.

“The Western media’s unsubstantiated allegations of mass rape, theft and murder by the Eritrean military in Tigray, in spite of the history and data, is a referendum on the Western media’s perception of Eritrean culture, which ultimately sees the Eritrean people as undisciplined savages—as barbarians incapable of resisting carnal desire. This is fundamentally racist.”

Robert D. Kaplan wrote in 2003 that Asmara “not only is one of the cleanest capital cities in Africa but also may be the only capital south of the Sahara where one can leave the car doors unlocked or prowl the back streets at all hours without fear of being robbed, even though the police are barely in evidence.” UN Resident Coordinator Christine Umutoni said in 2017 that the “Eritrean people are very honest, and are very accountable people.” In 2017, Carol Pineau, former reporter for CNN, BBC and NPR, said, “The Eritreans could be infuriating. They would often not tell you anything. The one thing I will say though – I never caught them in a lie. They always told the truth.”

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119 Carol Pineau, Keynote Address, 2019 Conference of the National Council of Eritrean Americans. “NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ERITREAN AMERICAN I CONFERENCE 2019”. Uploaded to YouTube on
Robert D. Kaplan wrote in The Atlantic in 2003 that Eritrea is “most civil of societies” and “has achieved a degree of non-coercive social discipline and efficiency enviable in the developing world.”

Kaplan would likely be shocked to hear about mass rape by Eritrean troops, the sons and daughters of liberation fighters whom he met in the 1980s and described as follows: “In the cramped, frontline quarters, although men and women sleep side by side, sex is said to be rare; and pregnancies are unusual despite the unavailability of any means of birth control. The EPLF evidently has a puritanical streak.”

The aforementioned descriptions run counter to the sensationalized depictions of Eritrean soldiers in Tigray. The Western media’s unsubstantiated allegations of mass rape, theft and murder by the Eritrean military in Tigray, in spite of the history and data, is a referendum on the Western media’s perception of Eritrean culture, which ultimately sees the Eritrean people as undisciplined savages—as barbarians incapable of resisting carnal desire. This is fundamentally racist.

**Mai Kadra Massacre**

From November 9 to 10, a TPLF-backed militia known as the “Samri” and Tigrayan special police forces carried out the murder of 600+ ethnic Amhara day laborers in the village of Mai Kadra in retaliation for a recent battlefield defeat against Ethiopian federal forces. While in retreat, militia members went door-to-door hacking victims to death with machetes and knives and burning homes, in addition to many other gruesome crimes. These accounts were confirmed by Amnesty International in their November 12 publication that stated, “The organization’s Crisis Evidence Lab has examined and digitally verified gruesome photographs and videos of bodies strewn across the town or being carried away on stretchers. It confirmed the images were recent and using satellite imagery, geolocated them to Mai-Kadra in western Tigray state (14.071008, 36.564681).”

The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) deployed a team to Mai Kadra to investigate and concluded in their November 24 preliminary report that “local security apparatus in charge helped and collaborated with the group known as Samri” and that their actions “strongly indicate the commission of grave human rights violations which may amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes.” These findings were welcomed by the AU’s African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

According to the Ethiopian government, Samri militia members, made up of young men ideologically aligned with TPLF, fled to Sudanese refugees camps following the massacre and were providing false testimony to reporters there. These claims were corroborated by both private local and international media. On November 23, Ethiopian Satellite Television (ESAT) correspondent Fasil Yenealem reported from UNHCR’s Hamdayet refugee reception center in Sudan, explaining that Samri militia members who fled the scene of Mai Kadra were reorganizing themselves in the camps, recruiting new members, blocking aid disbursement to non-Tigrayan refugees and—most notably—misinforming international media and organizations.

August 8, 2019. Access here: [https://youtu.be/NuS5yBjsvXs](https://youtu.be/NuS5yBjsvXs)


Tweet by @achpr_cadhp posted on November 24, 2020. Access here: [https://twitter.com/achpr_cadhp/status/1331326212677963780](https://twitter.com/achpr_cadhp/status/1331326212677963780)


“Ethiopia - ESAT DC Daily New Mon 23 Nov 2020”, [ESATtv Ethiopia](https://www.esatvethiopia.com/). Uploaded to YouTube on November
refugee camps and Mai Kadra and revealed how Tigrayan refugee testimony while Mai Kadra resident testimony blamed the TPLF-backed militias. How could this be possible? Who should be believed: the actual residents of Mai Kadra with bodies to corroborate claims or refugees in Sudanese camps claiming to be from Mai Kadra? In a more recent investigative report published in the Italian weekly magazine Panaroma, journalist Francesca Ronchin found that the Hamdayet camp was where “many militiamen of the now defeated TPLF have found refuge” and that they were “not impartial voices.”

Video footage from the camps aired on November 27 on the Amhara Mass Media Agency’s daily news program, which has Samri members on record saying in Amharic that they will “exterminate every Amhara”. Rather than ring alarm bells, Reuters downplayed the threat of the genocidal TPLF-backed Samri militia, euphemistically labelling them a “Tigrayan youth group” in an article with the following misleading headline: “Tigrays accused of massacre in Ethiopia war, both sides claim advances”. TPLF or TPLF-backed militias do not equate to “Tigrayans”.

The Western media not only buried this story, which revealed the genocidal criminality of TPLF, but also went as far as providing exposés of other, unrelated alleged war crimes painting the opposite image: TPLF and Tigrayans as victims of Amhara militias and federal forces. For instance, the New York Times, which did not even report the massacre, published an article on December 9 highlighting the crimes by Amhara—not Tigrayan—militias known as “Fano.” Although such alleged crimes should be taken seriously and investigated, the reality is that the Times seems to have manufactured this story. The article focuses on the story of the Tigrayan victim Ashenafi Hailu, who was supposedly beaten and dragged by noose along a dirt road of an unnamed town in Tigray. The article includes a photo of Ashenafi’s neck as proof of the event (Fig. 5).

According to medical experts, this scar is more than three months old. However, the Times article was published only a month after the conflict began, meaning that Ashenafi’s account does not hold water.

HRW’s Horn of Africa Director Laetitia Bader, while acknowledging the “chilling” findings of the EHRC, stated on Twitter that “The lack of independent investigations & access to monitors make it difficult to corroborate and identify claims of who may be responsible for such abuses.” It is almost unfathomable that Bader questions EHRC and Amnesty’s independence given that the latter works closely with HRW and the former is led by her own colleague, HRW’s former Africa Director.


130 “Tigrayans accused of massacre in Ethiopia war, both sides claim advances”, Reuters, November 24, 2020.
have interviewed more than 10 refugees from Maikadra in Eastern Sudan who claim the federal army / Amhara militias massacred people”.\textsuperscript{132} He later deleted this tweet, which has been saved to Google's cache.\textsuperscript{133} Again, this appears to be victim-blaming. Kenneth Roth, the executive director of HRW, went as far as blaming the entire atrocity at Mai Kaidra on “pro-government militias” in multiple tweets (Fig. 6 - 7)

\textsuperscript{132} Tweet by @_Will_Brown posted on November 24, 2020. Access here: https://twitter.com/_will_brown/status/1331264653771632656?lang=en

\textsuperscript{133} Google cache link of quote tweet of @_Will_Brown by @endalk2006 from November 24, 2020:

After the damage had already been done within the 24-hour news cycle, he then deleted the tweets the following day and tweeted a seemingly disingenuous apology, using the opportunity to demand more “access” from the government (Fig. 8).

\begin{center}
\textbf{Figure 6.} Kenneth Roth's first deleted tweet falsely blaming “a pro-government militia”. Courtesy: Twitter.
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Figure 7.} Kenneth Roth’s second deleted tweet blaming “pro-government militiamen”. Courtesy: Twitter.
\end{center}

“... photo journalist Jemal Countess ... visited Mai Kadra in March and conducted 47 interviews with residents including their full names and photos. All testimonies blame TPLF and Samri youth. Thus, there is now no question as to who was responsible for the Mai Kadra massacre.”
How does one accidentally blame the wrong side in a massacre this serious and this large? According to Bronwyn Bruton of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, Roth’s tweet was “not an adequate apology for mistakenly accusing the wrong party of a genocidal act. I take note of @HRW reluctance to properly allocate responsibility for this atrocity to #TPLF, even in the correction.”

Perhaps the clearest evidence that TPLF, rather than the federal government or Amhara militias, was behind the Mai Kadra massacre, comes from the groundbreaking work of staff photographer for Getty Images and photo journalist Jemal Countess who visited Mai Kadra in March and conducted 47 interviews with residents including their full names and photos. All testimonies blame TPLF and Samri youth. Thus, there is now no question as to who was responsible for the Mai Kadra massacre.

The testimonies also verify that Samri youth were posing as refugees in Sudanese camps and falsely testifying that Amhara victims were perpetrators. One of the survivors, 35-year old Tilahun Baye, stated, “But once I got to Sudan we saw those youths who killed our friends, claiming they are civilian refugees. When they recognized me they even accused me of being a killer and prohibited [sic] from getting medical treatment.” According to Countess, who was contacted by writer and historian Jeff Pearce for an investigative piece on the massacre, TPLF was not only infiltrating the Sudanese refugee camps but also key positions inside Tigray that could help forward the TPLF narrative to the international media. For instance, Countess explained that a “TPLF guy” was falsely translating for Reuters and had to be switched out upon discovery. “Even the witnesses and survivors talking to the Reuters reporter apparently realized that something was off, noticing how the translator began spinning tales of Fano coming along and committing war crimes,” wrote Pearce.

**Axum Massacre**

On February 26, Amnesty international issued a report investigating an alleged massacre of “hundreds” that they claim took place on November 28 and 29 in the ancient town of Axum, home to the Maryam Tsion Church. The report concluded “that the indiscriminate shelling of Axum by Ethiopian and Eritrean troops may amount to war crimes, and that the mass execution of Axum civilians by Eritrean troops may amount to crimes against humanity.” The
event was explained to have taken place on November 28 and 29. Remarkably, Amnesty did not visit Axum. Instead, it claims that it conducted 11 days of research and interviews from mid- to late January at the Hamdayet refugee reception center in eastern Sudan and via phone interviews from February 3 to 15 with witnesses in Axum. In all, Amnesty conducted 41 interviews with unnamed persons, making substantiation and evidence-based analysis impossible. In its totality, the non-peer-reviewed publication—devoid of a “methodologies” section—was found to be extremely problematic and rife with flagrant errors too numerous to list in this report. However, a review of the most egregious errors, contradictions and counter-evidence are more than sufficient to reject Amnesty’s conclusions.

Although the alleged massacre is said to have taken place on November 28 to 29, it was first reported in January. An organization calling itself the Europe External Programme with Africa (EEPA), which had been publishing daily “Situation Reports” on the Tigray conflict since November 17, reported that “Maryam Tsiyon Church has been attacked (local people believe with the aim to take the Ark of Covenant to Addis Ababa). Hundreds of people hiding in the Maryam Tsiyon Church were brought out and shot on the square in front. The number of people killed is reported as 750.” No date for the event is provided.

Ex-BBC Africa journalist Martin Plaut, republished the EEPA report verbatim on his “Eritrea Hub” blog and followed up with his own blog post providing additional details. According to Plaut, approximately 1,000 churchgoers were met by advancing “Ethiopian federal troops and Amhara militia” who threatened to take the famed Ark of the Covenant stored inside, provoking church members to go outside in defense. “A confrontation ensued. Everyone in the compound was forced into the square outside the cathedral. As the crowd milled around, there was further shouting and the troops opened fire on the protesting crowd. As many as 750 people are reported to have been killed,” Plaut wrote. He dated the event to December 15.

Jan Nyssen from Ghent University in Belgium repeated EEPA and Plaut’s claims but changed the perpetrators to Eritrean troops, citing “colleagues” and travelers to Mekelle—all anonymous. Next, Fionn Shiner picked up the story for Aid to the Church in Need UK (ACN-UK) highlighting multiple attacks on churches and spinning the conflict in Tigray as an assault on Christianity. A dubious blog going by Tghat, entirely dedicated to covering the Tigray conflict, published on February 13 a supposed eyewitness account by Getu Mak, who described himself as a lecturer at Adigrat University in Tigray.

Getu claimed for the first time that: (1) the event took place in late November and (2) the alleged massacre was not a church event targeting churchgoers but rather a city wide one targeting all civilians. This new narrative was then picked up by AP’s Cara Anna, who quoted Getu and anonymous sources, and claimed that bodies were buried in “mass graves.” This retelling of the story, largely as recounted by Getu and reported by Anna in mid-February, is ultimately what became Amnesty’s “Axum Massacre” report.

The progression of reporting by various sources on events at Mai Kadra can be visualized and compared in Table 1.

140 "ETHIOPIA: Surge in violence leads to up to 1,000 deaths", Fionn Shiner, Aid to the Church in Need UK, January 22, 2021.
Axum was under federal control as of November 20.142 Although federal forces captured Mekelle on November 28 and declared the operation over, Reuters reported that TPLF retook Axum on November 29.143 According to the Amnesty report, however, TPLF fighters in the city were routed by Eritreans on the morning of November 28 and “Eritrean soldiers carried out house-to-house raids in the afternoon of 28 November and the morning of 29 November.” Clearly, this is impossible if TPLF controlled Axum.

Even in spite of the “communications blackout”, why did it take so long to report the killings? It is unlikely that a November massacre of this magnitude, which would provide additional diplomatic support for TPLF, would go unmentioned and unnoticed until January, especially when TPLF’s leaders were tweeting and in communication with the international media by text and phone throughout December.144

Furthermore, how is it possible for the massacre—that Amnesty reported left “smelly” corpses “in every corner” out “in the open for a day or two” whereby “the atmosphere is a sad one”—to take place one day before the world-renowned Maryam Tsion festival? Celebrated annually on November 30, the festival once again took place in 2020 with event proceedings and interviews broadcast on Fana TV.145 The seemingly unconcerned festivalgoers interviewed acknowledged a lower turn out because of the conflict but stated that the event went well, without any issues. How did the Axum civilians have time for a festival—including evening mass on November 29 while Eritrean troops were supposedly still out killing—but no time to properly bury bodies such that they had to be hurled into mass graves? This is absurd.

Additionally, Amnesty claimed it conducted phone interviews with witnesses in Axum as early as 040913408; “Fighting flares in Ethiopia’s Tigray as army says closing in on rebellious force”, Reuters, December 5, 2020.

142 “Ethiopia claims two key towns seized from Tigray fighters”, Al Jazeera, November 27, 2020.
143 “Tigray forces claim to have taken back Ethiopian town after Government announces end to military offensive”, ABC News (Australia), November 29, 2020.
144 Tweet by @reda_getachew posted on December 22, 2020. Access here: https://twitter.com/reda_getachew/status/134129151

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<td>Dec 17-20</td>
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<td>800</td>
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<td>Eritrean</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
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Table 1. Progression of reports about the alleged Axum massacre.
February 3 yet Ethio Telecom, as previously mentioned (see “Communications Blackout” section), did not restore phone lines until February 8, meaning those supposed phone interviews were impossible.

In a statement on February 27, US Secretary Antony Blinken said USAID would be deployed to Tigray. On March 3, TPLF-mouthpiece Tigray Media House (TMH) reported that USAID representative named “Dr. Asmelash” had been sent to Axum to investigate the massacre. He met with the Deputy Administrator of the Maryam Tsion Church and asked to see the bodies. According to TMH’s host Stalin Gebreselassie, the church representative said, “We cannot show you the burial grounds, because they were buried in different places and churches around Axum, including the suburbs. We did not bury them in a single mass grave.” When Dr. Asmelash asked to visit families of the dead, the church representative said, “The people do not want to meet with you since you came accompanied by the military. People are scared and it’s inconvenient for families.” According to Stalin, the investigator did not find a single body or talk to a single family member of the deceased. How then is it possible to take Amnesty’s claims of a “massacre” seriously?

On March 5, HRW released its own report on the events of Axum in November and blamed the inability to identify bodies on hyenas. This latest report, which provides no evidence outside of anonymous, unsubstantiated witness testimony from phone interviews with 28 supposed witnesses, indicates: “Hyenas had eaten the corpses on May Quho, so we didn’t collect many dead bodies from there,” said one man carrying the dead. ‘I counted around 25 remains that could not be identified.’ Another said: ‘The hill was like a graveyard, a ghost hill.’” So critical was this new finding—missed by Amnesty and others—that HRW’s Deputy Africa Director Ida Sawyer felt the need to tweet this exact quote in the marketing campaign of the report. All excuses for failing to find corpses are now accounted for. The lack of bodies for evidence, however, still did not stop false photos of bodies from the alleged massacre from spreading on Facebook. An investigative report by Kenya’s The Star newspaper showed how a photo from a burial of farmers massacred in Nigeria by Boko Haram was falsely used as evidence of a massacre in Axum.

A Tigrayan man from Axum, having recognized the growing concerns on the internet about the alleged massacre in his city, conducted an investigation of the matter and released a Facebook video of his findings. In the video, he concluded that the allegations were “totally a lie. Period.” A priest from Maryam Tsion also came out and claimed that not one person was killed in the alleged massacre.

These findings by local Axumites hardly come as a surprise if one reads only a few testimonies from the Amnesty report, which prove so theatrical and absurd that no honest observer could take them seriously. Take for instance, this account from page 12:

“They [Eritrean soldiers] only shot twice for the six people... They shot three people with one bullet. The first and second fell dead. The third one was injured, about to fall. They

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149 Tweet by @ida_sawyer posted on March 6, 2021. Access here: https://twitter.com/ida_sawyer/status/1368292801687875585

150 Facebook image doesn’t show massacre victims in Ethiopia’s Tigray”, PESA CHECK Fact Checker, The Star (Kenya), March 14, 2021.

151 Facebook video uploaded by user “Hadnet Kiflemariam” on February 27, 2021. Access here: https://www.facebook.com/helen.gebreamlak.54/videos/1902655983244043/

152 Tweet by @NahomAbraham14 posted on March 13, 2021. Access here: https://twitter.com/NahomAbraham14/status/1370872967970893827
shot him a second time and killed the three others with the same bullet. They were lined up perfectly. “

Who could take such testimony seriously and call this report “credible”? Therefore, the Amnesty report is not credible, its findings are premature and contradicted by USAID’s investigation. Getu Mak provides the only verifiable source but his account is purely anecdotal and is contradicted by counter-evidence (e.g. dates and bodies). Amnesty, alternatively, opted for purely anonymous testimony, with phone interviews being impossible based on dates provided. All in-person interviews were conducted at the Hamdayet refugee reception center where, as previously mentioned, was overrun with TPLF-backed Samri militias who were found to be providing misinformation.

The Amnesty report was rejected by both the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments. On March 3, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister’s Office stated that it was looking into “credible allegations” of atrocities that would also be “including in Axum.” AP correspondent Cara Anna used this announcement to misleadingly proclaim an official change of position by the PM’s Office thereby, as the article’s title stated, “Ethiopia now calls Axum massacre allegations ‘credible’.” The Prime Minister’s Office said nothing of the “Axum massacre” alleged by Amnesty but was clearly referring to alleged atrocities in general.

Maryam Dengelat Massacre

On February 26, CNN ran its “Massacre in the Mountains” story about the alleged mass killing of 80 - 150 Tigrayan civilians by Eritrean troops on November 30, 2020 at Maryam Dengelat Church and the surrounding town of Dengelat. Interestingly, reporting of the event mirrored—the reporting of the “Axum Massacre.” First reports came from another EEPA “Situation Report” (12/19/20) with follow up reports on Plaut’s Eritrea Hub blog (12/25/20), Jan Nyssen’s paper (01/11/21) and Fionn Shiner for ACN-UK (01/11/21). How is it possible that, in the early months of the conflict, the exact same entities reported the two separate events in the exact same order? See Table 2 for the progression of reporting on the Maryam Dengelat massacre.

The CNN Dengelat story, like the Amnesty report on Axum, provided a megaphone and international attention to previously obscure reporting by the same cast of characters on the alleged mass killing. In fact, both publications of these alleged Eritrean massacres against Christians were published on the exact same day providing maximum impact for Western audiences in the lead up to the US assuming the presidency of the UN Security Council.

“Interestingly, reporting of the event mirrored—almost exactly—the reporting of the “Axum Massacre.” … How is it possible that, in the early months of the conflict, the exact same entities reported the two separate events in the exact same order?”

Notably, the focus on massacres by Eritreans on Christian communities in Tigray, both taking place on one of Ethiopia’s holiest Christian holidays, plays into false historical depictions by Western scholars of Eritrea, despite the nation’s almost 50-50 split between Muslim and Christian believers, as an encroaching Muslim threat on Ethiopia, the supposed “island of Christianity in a sea of Islam.”

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154 Tweet by @PMEthiopia posted on March 3, 2021. Access here: https://twitter.com/PMEthiopia/status/1367136074938597381
The CNN article, embedded with an accompanying documentary film narrated by their international correspondent Nima Elbagir, is rife with errors and sensationalism. CNN did not visit Tigray. From the video, Elbagir indicates that video footage “was secretly taken and smuggled out to CNN to avoid Ethiopian and Eritrean troops” and that they used animation and actors’ voices to hide identities. “Through a network of activists and relatives, CNN tracked down eyewitnesses to the attack,” states CNN. Who exactly are these “activists” and why are they not named? Only pseudonyms are provided.

Upon review of the reportedly smuggled video footage, it becomes clear that these activists provided manipulated content to CNN. The day after the release of the CNN story, the original video “obtained by CNN” was released in its totality on Twitter.158

In the video, the man recording the footage and a second man to the left of him are clearly seen and heard coaching an elderly man in the video on what to say. Speaking in Tigrinya, the man holding the camera whispers to the assistant that he’s going to ask the elderly Tigryan villager (location unknown) how many people died and that the villager should reply with “265”. The assistant walks up to the villager and whispers in the villager’s ear, and cameraman then asks the villager the question to which the villager responds with “around 200” and “maybe 220”. The frustrated assistant walks up and whispers in the villager’s ear once again, and the villager finally responds with “265”. The villager looks noticeably uncomfortable with long pauses between answers, suggesting he may have been coerced.

This video is absolutely damning for the CNN story and the activist intermediaries involved as it reveals clear manipulation by the activists of content from sites of alleged massacres in Tigray—creating facts on the ground for TPLF’s version of events. Why has the Western press remained silent on this blunder by CNN? Is Elbagir being duped?

The CNN team seemed to overlook another equally damning fact: Maryam Dengelat church is currently closed. According to an Ethiopia Observer article from May 4, 2020:

The church, situated near Adigrat across the Agame Massif, was inaccessible for about 400 years since a section of the mountain collapsed, taking with it the entrance of the church. On 24 March 2019, for the first time in more than 400 years, priests were able to celebrate a mass in the church, after having climbed 30 meters. ... A lot of work remained before the troglodyte church could be

158 Tweet by @SirakBahlbi posted on February 27, 2021. Access here: https://twitter.com/SirakBahlbi/status/1365676785313185793

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
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<th># Dead</th>
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<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
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<td>EEPA, Anonymous</td>
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<td>Jan 11</td>
<td>Dec 17-20</td>
<td>80-150</td>
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<td>Feb 26</td>
<td>Nov 28-29</td>
<td>100+</td>
<td>Eritrean</td>
<td>Self</td>
<td>“Abraham said he buried more than 50 people that day” and “... most of them were eaten by vultures before they got buried”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 2. Progression of reports about the alleged Maryam Dengelat massacre.
returned to the community. ... Maryam Dengelat’s door is closed again but there is an ongoing project to set up a museum in an existing building located at the base. Since the site itself will not be open to the public, the museum would display photographs of the church’s mural paintings and artifacts of the church.¹⁵⁹ [Emphasis added]

The church is carved into a mountainside. For the sake of argument, even if one were to assume that they didn’t mean the church per se but perhaps another building within what CNN called a “monastery complex” it is clear that their story doesn’t stack up. According to the CNN video footage and animation, the village is located in the valley while the church (or monastery complex) is located at the edge of a mountain (Fig. 9 - 11). No buildings or homes are at a higher elevation than the church. Despite this obvious fact, the article states, “Samuel, another eyewitness, said that he had eaten and drank with the soldiers before they came to his house, which is just behind the church.” This is impossible since there are no homes behind the church, which is perched at the side of a mountain. “But, as congregants were celebrating mass around midday, shelling and gunfire erupted, sending people fleeing up mountain paths and into nearby homes,” the article maintains. Again, this is impossible.

While members of the congregation were apparently running uphill away from the church, CNN explains that people were also running away from the village toward the church: “Marta, who was visiting Dengelat for the holiday, says she left the church with her husband Biniam after morning prayers. As the newlyweds walked back to their relative’s home, a stream of people began sprinting up the hill, shouting that soldiers were rounding people up in the village.” Why are people fleeing toward the gunfire coming from the church? Instead of fleeing with the other panicked villagers, Marta and Biniam continued on to their house only to be shot and killed. This makes no sense.

The article goes on:

After they killed them outside their houses, they were looting and taking all the property,” Samuel said. As the violence

raged, hundreds of people remained in the church hall. ... With nowhere to run to, Abraham sheltered inside Maryam Dengelat, lying on the floor as artillery pounded the tin roof. ‘We lost hope and we decided to stay and die at the church. We didn’t try to run,’ he said.

The only way for artillery to pound on the church’s roof is for the soldiers to be above the church firing downward, which is not possible given the church’s elevation, or to use projectiles fired up into the sky from far away. In either scenario, the artillery would have totally destroyed the “tin” roof and the entire church. After the barrage of deadly artillery fire, witnesses somehow only “saw cracks in the church walls where artillery hit.”

“Whether by hyenas or vultures or some other means, bodies in Tigray have a strange penchant for disappearing.”

Like the alleged Axum massacre, the burial and location of bodies in Dengelat appears problematic. After a few days “the soldiers allowed informal burials to take place, but threatened to kill anyone they saw mourning. Abraham volunteered. ... Abraham said he buried more than 50 people that day, but estimates more than 100 died in the assault.” How can one person bury 50 bodies in one day? Such a herculean effort seems unlikely, if not impossible.

Instead of hyenas eating bodies such that all would evidence disappear, in Dengelat “most of them were eaten by vultures before they got buried, it was horrible.” Whether by hyenas or vultures or some other means, bodies in Tigray have a strange penchant for disappearing.

The Shooting of Monalisa Abraha

On February 15, BBC reported that 18-year-old schoolgirl Monalisa Abraha lost her right hand defending herself from an Ethiopian soldier who tried to rape her and force her grandfather to have sex with her. According to BBC:

On 3 December, the teenager said that a soldier, dressed in an Ethiopian military uniform, entered their house demanding to know where the Tigrayan fighters were. ... “He then ordered my grandfather to have sex with me. My grandfather got very angry and... they started fighting,” she says. ... “He said: ‘No-one can save you now. Get your clothes off.’ I begged him not to but he repeatedly punched me.” ... Their struggle continued for several minutes - though she felt disorientated from the blows - and in the end he became so angry that he turned the gun on her. ... “He shot my right hand three times. He shot my leg three times. He left when he heard a gunshot from outside.”

Eritrean soldiers who were “searching the area” found her grandfather and her two days later. The article explains that “They said the Eritreans had tended to their wounds - and handed them over to Ethiopian troops who took them to Mekelle as the hospital in Abiy Addi was shut.” At the hospital in Mekelle, she had her right hand amputated.

Oddly, the same story about Monalisa was reported, once again, by Al Jazeera English on March 1. This time, however, Monalisa had changed her story: “December 4 is a date that fills Mona Lisa Abraha with horror. It was then, the 18-year-old says, that Eritrean soldiers entered her village of Tembin in Ethiopia’s embattled region of Tigray.”

Why did Monalisa shift the blame to Eritreans, who apparently had rescued her? Recall that the US State Department began its campaign of scapegoating Eritrea on December 8 as TPLF’s prospects of victory in the battlefield looked increasingly impossible. It is also worth noting that the Al Jazeera’s March 1 article on Mona Lisa, which followed a week of articles tarnishing the Eritrean military’s image, was published the day that the US, which called for Eritrean troops to

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161 “Trauma, anger as Tigrayans recount Eritrea troops’ grave crimes,” Al Jazeera English, March 1, 2021.
“leave” Tigray, would assume the presidency of the UN Security Council.

On March 3, the credibility of Monalisa’s story took another significant blow. Her father admitted the following on TPLF news outlet Dedebit Media: “My daughter told me she was in Mekelle. She told me not to worry. She had to go to the hospital in Mekelle because she was shot on November 4. However, when I first asked her if she was shot, she said she wasn’t.” He explains that he continued communicating with his daughter by audio and hadn’t seen a picture of her amputated hand until the Al Jazeera story broke.

The fact that Monalisa was shot on November 4 – the day of the start of the conflict – and in Mekelle means that Eritrean (or Ethiopian) troops could not have been involved since Mekelle was still fully under TPLF’s control at that time. Furthermore, Mekelle is the headquarters of the Northern Command, which was attacked that night. The fact that her father explicitly asked if she was shot and also explicitly mentioned “November 4” as a synecdoche for the start of the Tigray conflict – a date of infamy among all Ethiopians and Tigrayans – suggests that she may have been a combatant involved in TPLF’s surprise attacks on the Northern Command.

In December, Al Jazeera published a doctor’s account of events that transpired in Mekelle’s main hospital during the start of the war: “On the night of November 3 [or morning of November 4], I was in the hospital’s operating room. Suddenly, the lights went out. The emergency room was then flooded with severely wounded soldiers. They were at least 60 from both sides.” Was Monalisa among the wounded soldiers? Either way, her allegation of rape by Eritrean soldiers does not stand up to scrutiny and evidence.

Monalisa’s false testimony is oddly reminiscent of the false testimony by Nayirah al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti Ambassador, before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus on October 10, 1990, which led to US entering the Gulf War.

### Abduction and Killing of Eritrean Refugees

On December 11, Filippo Grandi, the head of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), said on Friday it had received an “overwhelming” number of reports of Eritrean refugees in Tigray had been killed, abducted or forcibly returned to Eritrea over the prior month. Eritrea’s Foreign Minister rejected these allegations. Without providing any evidence, TPLF leader Debretsion Gebremichael said in text messages to Reuters that Eritrean soldiers had raided Hit-stats and Shimelba refugee camps in Tigray and abducted some residents.

In a January 17 article, the AP’s Africa correspondent Cara Anna wrote, “New satellite images of a refugee camp in Ethiopia’s embattled Tigray region show more than 400 structures have been badly damaged in what a research group believes is the latest ‘intentional attack’ by fighters.” Anna indicates that the images were from a recent report by U.K.-based DX Open Network that was shared with the AP.

Despite lacking any evidence to back her claims, Anna – herself – insinuates that Eritrea’s military was involved: “Neither the U.N. nor DX Open Network has blamed anyone for the attacks, but the presence of troops from Eritrea, a bitter enemy of the Tigray region’s now-fugitive leaders, has caused alarm. Grandi noted ‘many reliable reports and firsthand accounts’ of abuses including the forced return of refugees to Eritrea.” Note how the speculative statement that Eritrea, which Anna opines is the “bitter enemy of Tigray”,

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164 “Reports of killings, abductions of Eritrean refugees ‘overwhelming’ - U.N.”, *Reuters*, December 11, 2020


has caused “alarm” is purely Anna’s own opinion, not Grandi’s. Is this an opinion piece?

Nevertheless, the satellite images from DX Open Network were later used by freelance journalist Zecharias Zelalem in an investigative piece for VICE News to level additional allegations against the Eritrean government of killing and abducting Eritrean refugees housed at the Hitsats and Shimelba camps and destroying the facilities of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC).  

What is DX Open Network, exactly? According to the UK corporate registrar, the company has no physical address in UK and no officers — despite claiming otherwise on their website — save for a Malaysian 26-year old named Alexander Lee. What credibility does Lee have to speak on issues in Tigray and advanced satellite imagery? Notably, DX Open Network registered for a Twitter account in May 2020 and had only 330 followers at the time of this publication. The company’s lack of credibility did not stop the AP, VOA, VICE, Bloomberg, Reuters and other major media outlets from using Lee’s analysis of satellite imagery. Contrary to the claims made about Eritrean troops against Eritrean refugees, a video produced by an AFP team on February 1 from the Mai Aini refugee camp, where many Eritrean refugees had fled to after violence broke out at the Shimelba and Hitsats camps, reveals that Eritrean refugees were instead attacked by Tigrayan militias, not Eritrean troops. According to Eritrean refugee “Girmay”:  

There are ladies which are raped by the local people just due to this war because they believe that our soldiers, or our Eritrean soldiers, are [killing] their brothers. Just the soldiers, the Tigrayan soldiers, they believe that, so they are raping our sisters, mothers, and they are killing our brothers.

Even migrant anthropologist Natalia Paszkiewicz, who has worked with Eritrean refugees in Tigrayan refugee camps and is a vocal critic of the Eritrean government, admitted in a tweet on February 11 that Eritrean refugees were under attack at the Hitsats camp by the “Tigray militia”.

She included photos of injured migrants. In a follow up Twitter thread in March, she explained that 200 to 300 refugees had been killed on December 4 and 5 and that the refugees had the list of names but were not making it public. Eritrean migrants themselves have come forward with their identities and stories, which is now public knowledge. Sources in Asmara indicate that funerals have been held for the deceased throughout the last three months. Many of the refugees are in Addis Ababa or have made their way back to Eritrea with the support of the Eritrean government at the Ethiopian border. Are attacks by TPLF against Eritrean refugees a one-off event? The truth is that TPLF has a long history of exploiting Eritrean migrants, and using violence against them, as part of its political strategy against Eritrea and Ethiopia. Paszkiewicz and journalist Nizar Manek wrote in the London Review of Books in May 2020:

In March, refugees in Hitsats told us, a group of Tigrayans in uniform and Eritrean opposition militants entered the camp with...
pistols, trying to press-gang refugees into one of the armed Eritrean opposition groups in Tigray. They were told to chant: ‘Down with Issayas! Down with Abiy!’

Before the peace deal, especially outspoken refugees were often forced to make false confessions and declare themselves ‘Eritrean spies’. Several were imprisoned at the end of March but released after a few days. Some want to be relocated elsewhere in Ethiopia, as insecurity heightens, along with fear of deportations.173

It is no surprise that both the Hitsats and Shimelba camps were slated to close in 2020. Some critics of this move saw this as political.174 In reality, however, there were clear signs that the camps were fraught with serious issues that had gone unchecked for years until Abiy came to power. For instance, Shimelba is located only 20 kilometers from the border, which is a violation of UNHCR policy that requires all camps be at least 50 kilometers away from borders.175 All of the camps were erected while Ethiopia’s refugee agency, the Agency for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA), was under TPLF’s control. Although ARRA is technically under federal control, it has little to no control of refugee camps in Tigray largely under TPLF militia control.176

According to a May 2020 publication in Africa Confidential, TPLF was using the camps to recruit and raise an Eritrean opposition force to use against the Eritrean government:

The TPLF is sending signals of its own to both Addis and Asmara by maintaining a clutch of anti-Issayas Eritrean exile organisations, some of them armed. A former deputy leader of Ethiopia’s top intelligence organisation, the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), Issayas Woldegiorgis, has been seen near the Tigray-Eritrea border trying to recruit newly arrived Eritrean military defectors for the anti-President Issayas cause, according to an Eritrean source in Tigray.177

These efforts are not new. TPLF has long used Eritrean migrants for economic and political reasons. According to a leaked 2008 US diplomatic cable, exposed by Wikileaks, the US Embassy in Addis Ababa felt that “a priority of ARRA’s refugee program”, which was then under TPLF’s control, “was to address Ethiopia’s national security concerns with Eritrea. Post cannot confirm complicity between ARRA and the opposition groups, but we do note that ARRA, as an organization, falls under the purview of the Ethiopian National Intelligence Security Service.”178

Under TPLF, refugee affairs have become a cash cow and an industry with both economic and political dimensions. TPLF has been exploiting Eritrean refugees for a long a time in its war against Eritrea. This was acknowledged in

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175 Explained by Ethiopia’s refugee agency in a tweet. Tweet by @EthRefugee posted on February 5, 2021. Access here: https://twitter.com/EthRefugee/status/1357713360981282820
Assessing Western Media Coverage

How can one justify the Western’s media coverage of the Tigray conflict? The repeated use of false information has had the effect of driving a false narrative about the realities of the conflict, which is now driving a dangerously misguided international response in Ethiopia and the broader Horn of Africa region.

The Western media has proven itself to be on TPLF’s side, emboldening the militant secessionist organization to carry out provocative criminal and genocidal actions in the Horn and engendering the destabilization of the strategically important Horn of Africa and Red Sea basin regions.

“Let the record be set straight: TPLF started the conflict. It even bragged about it. TPLF’s central committee member Sekoutoure Getachew appeared on TPLF’s Dimtsi Weyane television program on November 13, explaining that TPLF had carried out a "preemptive strike" on the Northern Command, comparing its actions to those taken by Israel against its enemies.”

TPLF Started and Internationalized the Conflict

Consider the casus belli of the conflict. Even months after the attack on the Northern Command, the Western media still failed to acknowledge who started the conflict when TPLF itself admitted to it. The lede of an NYT article from February 26 entitled “Ethiopia’s War Leads to Ethnic Cleansing in Tigray Region, U.S. Report Says” reads as follows: “An internal U.S. government report found that people in Tigray are being driven from their homes in a war begun by

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Ethiopia, an American ally – posing President Biden’s first major test in Africa.”

The phrase “in a war begun by Ethiopia” leaves no room for ambiguity as to who is guilty: PM Abiy’s government. Other articles, like the CNN report on the “Dengelat Massacre”, attempt to create confusion by watering the issue down to a he-said-she-said: “He accused the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which ruled Ethiopia for nearly three decades before Abiy took office in 2018, of attacking a government military base and trying to steal weapons. The TPLF denies the claim.” Similarily, AFP on November 27 stated that “Wondimu Asamnew, told AFP, ‘There was no attack.’ Instead, the TPLF says, the story was concocted as a pretext to turn on them.”

Let the record be set straight: TPLF started the conflict. It even bragged about it. As mentioned above, TPLF’s central committee member Sekoutoure Getachew appeared on TPLF’s Dimtsi Weyane TV program on November 13, explaining that TPLF had carried out a “preemptive strike” on the Northern Command, comparing its actions to those taken by Israel against its enemies. Reuters and the AP confirmed this account, citing Sekotoure’s comments.

Alula Solomon, a TPLF media activist and CEO of TPLF-mouthpiece Tigray Media House, appeared on a televised program of Kush Media Network on February 14 and bragged, “Whether you call it the Eritrean military or some other entity, none of them started the war by their own will. All forces were dragged into the war by TPLF, who started the war by their own will.”

US Secretary of State Pompeo tweeted on the day of the attacks “We are deeply concerned by reports that the Tigray People’s Liberation Front carried out attacks on Ethiopian National Defense Force bases in Ethiopia’s Tigray region. We urge immediate action to restore the peace and de-escalate tensions.” Steven Feldstein of Carnegie Endowment had the following to say about TPLF’s role in starting the conflict:

There is little question that the TPLF leadership has carried out a strategy of provocation meant to undermine and weaken Abiy. Their disdain for him and their corresponding resentment of their diminished political stature is well known. The TPLF’s armed attack against the Ethiopian army’s northern command headquarters in early November forced Abiy’s hand. If Abiy had not responded forcefully to the TPLF’s latest incursion, not only would he have risked emboldening a key rival, but it would have signaled weakness to other groups desiring further autonomy.

More importantly and above all else, TPLF’s actions were illegal on the grounds that it

184 “TPLF Spokesman Admits to Sparking the Conflict in Ethiopia and Plunging Tigray into Darkness”, Teodrose Fikremariam, Ghion Journal, November 14, 2020. ; Interview with Sekutoure Getachew.
186 Tweet by @SecPompeo posted on November 4, 2020. Access here: https://twitter.com/SecPompeo/status/1324121664108580875
organized and carried out a treasonous insurrection against the sovereign federal government. Legal arguments trump moral arguments of a so called “just war” by TPLF against a supposedly unjust legal system since the legal system in Ethiopia was entirely created, codified and designed by TPLF itself, from drafting the constitution in 1994 to commanding the federal legal system over the following 27 years.

The inability of the Western media to plainly lay blame on TPLF for the start of the war, seems to be part of the larger agenda to make the belligerent front appear as the victim in this conflict. TPLF, after obstructing every avenue for mediation and de-escalation with the federal government, opted instead for dangerous brinksmanship and began planning for war many months before the conflict started. Robbie Corey-Boulet of AFP wrote the following in November:

In retrospect, Bisober residents say, the first sign of the conflict came seven months ago, when members of the Tigray Special Forces took over the village’s elementary school, which had been emptied because of the coronavirus pandemic.

By early November, when the first shots were fired, some 250 pro-TPLF troops were encamped there, digging trenches behind classrooms and storing weapons in what was once the principal’s office.

The Tigrayan fighters’ decision to base themselves in the centre of Bisober helps explain the carnage that ensued, said Getachew Nega, the village administrator.

“The TPLF lost hope and they came and put heavy weapons and other weapons in this village. They shouldn’t have done this,” Getachew said.

Once the fighting started, Tigrayan combatants broke into abandoned homes from which they fired on Ethiopian soldiers, witnesses said, inviting massive damage.\(^{189}\)

Clearly, TPLF prepared for the war far in advance of November and used civilians and civilian infrastructure – against the explicitly expressed wishes of local civilians – with the intent of escalating the confrontation with the federal government into internecine war. Civilians appear to be cannon fodder to TPLF.

According to the US Institute for Peace (USIP), American officials felt that, in spite of the outbreak of conflict, most of Ethiopia was peaceful and that the TPLF attacks united the country behind PM Abiy:

For their part, American officials have asserted that the conflict in Tigray has served to unite Ethiopians. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Tibor Nagy told journalists on November 19 that “it seems like [the conflict in Tigray] has brought the Ethiopian nation together, at least for the time being, in support of the prime minister …” Ambassador Raynor added that “the rest of the country actually remains quite calm at present, no indications of anyone taking up comparable actions elsewhere, and in fact the opposite. Seemingly both regional governments, federal governments, and large swaths of the people galvanizing around the [federal] government.”\(^{190}\)

Rather than deescalate, however, the Western media choose to embolden and intensify conflict to the point of internationalizing it. An opinion piece in The Africa Report, a magazine subsidiary of the French firm Jeune Afrique edited by Englishman Patrick Smith of Africa Confidential, explained that “This is arguably, Africa’s hidden world war.”\(^{191}\) In order to support this view, the article alleged the involvement of Somali forces on

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behalf of Eritrea in Tigray, which quickly proved itself to be absurd and was debunked on February 16 on Twitter by an investigation by VOA’s Harun Maruf.\textsuperscript{192} Rather than publishing articles to clear up the confusion about Somali involvement, the media has remained silent on the issue ever since.

Under the cover of relatively silent international media coverage, TPLF began attacking Eritrea in mid-November. TPLF fired two rounds of missile attacks on civilian targets in Eritrea on November 14 and 27—in violation of the Geneva Conventions, which prohibit indiscriminate attacks.\textsuperscript{193} According to sources that include even Eritrea’s most ardent critics, TPLF began shelling Eritrean border towns.\textsuperscript{194} US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Assistant Secretary of State of African Affairs Tibor Nagy condemned TPLF’s actions and called them an attempt to “internationalize the conflict”.\textsuperscript{195} Note that the US, with all its satellite and surveillance technology, said nothing of Eritrean involvement in Tigray but opted instead to show its gratitude to Eritrea: “We appreciate Eritrea’s restraint, which has helped prevent further spreading of the conflict.”\textsuperscript{196} Although there was some initial condemnation of TPLF’s belligerence under the Trump administration, no such bold and forthright action against TPLF has been taken under the Biden administration thus far.

\textit{Portrayals of TPLF as “Battle Hardened”}

On November 14, Nizar Manek authored a piece in Foreign Policy entitled “In Ethiopia’s Civil War, Sudan Will Decide the Outcome”, arguing in patronizing fashion that Ethiopia’s military had virtually no agency and that—as the title suggests—Sudan was the ultimate arbiter of Ethiopia’s fate in the conflict.\textsuperscript{197} In doing so, the article argued, that TPLF, which it said had captured half of Ethiopia’s military hardware based in the Northern Command, would use its military prowess to make an Ethiopian federal victory unlikely:

Although Tigray is small, it is well armed, and its forces are battle-hardened. Tigray’s regional special forces, which a senior Ethiopian diplomat estimates have grown to at least 20,000 commandos—led by senior Tigrayan officers forced into retirement by Abiy, plus a standing body of reserve special forces made up of military-trained militia and armed farmers—together have an estimated total of up to 250,000 armed fighters. Until recently, however, it lacked the heavy weaponry required to directly confront a fully-equipped division.

\textsuperscript{192} Tweet by @HarunMaruf posted on February 16, 2021. Access here: https://twitter.com/HarunMaruf/status/1361894913189756929
\textsuperscript{195} Tweet by @AsstSecStateAF posted on November 15, 2020. Access here: https://twitter.com/AsstSecStateAF/status/1328015362999414786; Tweet by @SecPompeo posted on November 17, 2020. Access here: https://twitter.com/SecPompeo/status/1328721926643195907
\textsuperscript{197} “Sudan Will Decide the Outcome of the Ethiopian Civil War”, Nizar Manek and Mohamed Kheir Omer, 	extit{Foreign Policy}, November 14, 2020.
The romantic and fawning portrayal of TPLF as “battle-hardened” was seemingly ubiquitous in the Western media, violating journalistic ethics of neutrality and non-bias and endangering the lives of millions of Ethiopian civilians.

“‘The romantic and fawning portrayal of TPLF as ‘battle-hardened’ was seemingly ubiquitous in the Western media, violating journalistic ethics of neutrality and non-bias and endangering the lives of millions of Ethiopian civilians.’”

Al Jazeera English indicated on November 24 that TPLF had “a generation of battle-hardened tacticians” while Reuters on November 10 held that “Tigrayan forces and militia are battle-hardened, have large stocks of military hardware and number up to 250,000 men, experts say.” Another Reuters piece, explicitly pointed out, in contrast, that federal forces were only 140,000.

Herman Cohen, the former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs under George H.W. Bush, tweeted, “Ethiopian P.M. Abiy is fooling himself if he believes his inexperienced army can defeat the battle hardened TPLF military, even with Eritrean support.” Reuters East Africa deputy bureau chief Maggie Fick wrote, “Ethiopia expert Alex de Waal said Abiy may have underestimated the Tigray leaders’ skills at both politics and war. The Tufts University academic recalled the words of Tsadkan Gebretensae, a Tigrayan who once commanded Ethiopia’s army against Eritrea, in a conversation with him: ‘War is primarily an intellectual activity.’ Is this not bragging, instigating and emboldening TPLF?

Expert analysis by Crisis Group in the lead up to the conflict, as previously mentioned, played a critical role in driving the world to believe that TPLF had the upper hand in any ensuing conflict:

Tigray itself is prepared for a struggle. Its well-armed regional paramilitary force is led by former national army generals. It also boasts a large militia full of war veterans. TPLF leaders say that many officers in the units of the Northern Command, which still patrols the Eritrea border, would not be likely to support any federal intervention, and some could even break and join Tigray’s forces.

Despite the Western media’s incessant assuring and reassuring of the international audience that TPLF would come out victorious in the conflict, TPLF instead lost control of Tigray’s capital city Mekelle in a little over three weeks, officially falling to federal forces on November 28. In fact, Mekelle’s fall would have likely come sooner had PM Abiy not given TPLF a 72-hour ultimatum to “surrender peacefully” in order to prevent harm to civilians. The Western media took PM Abiy’s 3-day armistice and his government’s consideration for civilian life as an opportunity to flip the narrative and make TPLF look like the victim under Abiy’s aggression. In a November 25 tweet, BBC Monitoring’s Twitter account falsely reported Abiy saying that his forces “will not stop, no matter who dies” in the impending siege of Mekelle.

https://twitter.com/cohenonafrica/status/1324445096381557093

202 Fick M., Reuters, “Battle-hardy”.
205 “Ethiopia PM gives Tigray forces 72 hours to surrender regional capital“, Reuters, November 22, 2020.
Figure 12. A falsely translated tweet that was later deleted by BBC Monitoring. Courtesy: Twitter.

BBC Monitoring later deleted the tweet and issued an apology after the damage had already been done.206 The AP, BBC and Reuters also misreported Ethiopian Colonel Dejene Tsegaye as saying that his forces would have “no mercy” on Mekelle’s Tigrayan civilians and that they should “save themselves” when he was, in actual fact, referring to TPLF’s leadership who had been using human shield tactics.207

While BBC and AP issued no correction, Reuters later quietly – and with no apology – updated their article to include a correction issued by Ethiopian spokeswoman Billene Seyoum (i.e. no explicit mention of what error or update was made). Again, the damage had already been done at that point. Perhaps even worse than Reuters and BBC’s initial misreporting was HRW’s misuse of that misreporting. HRW’s Horn of Africa director Laetitia Bader tweeted a link to the yet updated Reuters article and wrote, “Treating a whole city as a military target would not only unlawful [sic], it could also be considered a form of collective punishment”.208

Former National Security Adviser and current Director of the United States Domestic Policy Council Susan Rice quote-tweeted Bader’s tweet and wrote, “In other words, war crimes.”209 Thus, misreporting by primary sources turned into war crimes allegations by American leaders in a sub-24-hour social media news cycle in spite of late half-hearted apologies by the misreporting sources. This small example, a microcosm of broader reporting on the conflict, is one of many similar examples leading to a warped image of realities in Tigray.

“Civil War” as a Self-Fulfilling Prophesy

While the federal government dubbed its efforts in Tigray as a “law enforcement operation” and provided its reasoning for this phrasing,210 the Western media opted instead to call it a “war” from the very outset of the conflict. In fact, they initially posed the idea that it was an imminent “civil war.” Take for example these headlines during the first week of the conflict:

2. Quartz Africa: “Ethiopia is on the brink of civil war after the government orders attacks on a key region”, Samuel Getachew, 11/4/20

206 Tweet by @EthioEmbassyUK posted on November 25, 2020. Access here: https://twitter.com/EthioEmbassyUK/status/1331611737200660480

208 Tweet by @LaetitiaBader posted on November 22, 2020. Access here: https://twitter.com/laetitiabader/status/1330508431522926595?lang=en
During the second week of the conflict, the headlines evolved from merely toying with the possibility of civil war to outright declaring it to be one:

1. Foreign Policy: “Sudan Will Decide the Outcome of the Ethiopian Civil War”, Nizar Manek and Mohamed Kheir Omer, 11/14/20
2. The Telegraph: “Ethiopia’s civil war becomes regional as missiles strike Eritrea’s capital”, Will Brown and Zecharias Zelalem, 11/14/20
4. LA Times: “As Ethiopia descends into civil war, civilians by the thousands begin to stream out”, Jacob Kushner, 11/16/20
5. The Economist: “Ethiopia’s civil war is spreading outside its borders”, 11/16/20
10. VICE: “‘We’re Ready to Die’ – Ethiopian Civil War Reaches Crucial Stage”, Samuel Gebre, 11/24/20

With the writing on the wall during the twilight days of the operation to capture Mekelle and after Mekelle’s capture on November 28, the media started to shift the narrative to a “guerilla war” that was “protracted” and “hidden” in nature:

1. BBC: “Ethiopia’s Tigray crisis: Fears of a march into guerrilla warfare”, 11/27/20
2. ABC News: “Ethiopia declares victory in fight over Tigray region, but guerrilla warfare likely to continue”, Dragana Jovanovic, 11/28/20
3. Toronto Star: “Ethiopian civil war likely to end up as a prolonged guerrilla conflict”, Gwynne Dyer, 12/1/20
4. Reuters: “Ethiopia war may turn into guerrilla insurgency, experts say”, Reuters Staff, 12/1/20
5. ABC News: “Ethiopia’s hidden war in Tigray threatens return to ethnic violence and instability”, Morgan Winsor, Guy Davies, and Bruno Roebber, 12/4/20

The Western media seemed to ignore the critical fact that all of TPLF’s supply lines had been cut off from all sides, as it was hemmed in from four directions with Tigray’s borders closed off with Sudan, Eritrea, the Amhara region and the Afar region. This obvious reality was only later acknowledged in late January after TPLF had been decimated and most its leaders apprehended. NYT’s Declan Walsh and Simon
Marks wrote on January 22: “Although analysts initially estimated the T.P.L.F. had 250,000 men under arms, it quickly became clear that its force was much smaller. Government soldiers and allied ethnic militias surrounded the T.P.L.F.’s forces by sealing Ethiopia’s borders with Eritrea and Sudan, effectively severing the rebels’ supply lines.”

*International Crisis Group’s Pro-TPLF Bias*

The “analysts” that Walsh and Marks referred to were most notably those from ICG. Nairobi-based ICG analyst Rashid Abdi was so bold to go as far as suggesting divine intervention in his analysis: “God gave me the gift of prognosis. I have never gone wrong on Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia. It is in your best self-interest to take me very serious. Again, I say to PM Abiy, the odds are not in your favour in this conflict. You still have time to end it.” Such a fanatical belief in a TPLF victory, imbued with dangerous levels of hubris, can only serve to cloud judgement and prevent sober analysis.

“If one were to have applied Davison’s logic to 1930’s Germany, he would have opposed global anti-Nazi mobilization, not on the basis of morality and justice but on the grounds that the Nazis—much like TPLF—had party support, control of their territory and were relatively popular on core issues among their people, thus making opposition to them too “dangerous” to pursue.”

Ethiopia-based ICG analyst William Davison proved equally problematic, given his longstanding alignment with TPLF. Davison is on the record in a 2015 tweet openly coaching the then TPLF central committee member and foreign minister Tedros Adhanom—now director-general of the World Health Organization—on how to use the international media to gain “positive publicity” for TPLF. Rather than holding TPLF’s feet to the fire, Davison has served as their publicist and sycophant.

On November 12, Davison tweeted, “While it’s legit for fed govt to hold TPLF leaders responsible, they have party support, party controls region, and many Tigrayans back region on core disputes. So, anti-TPLF mobilisation is - in effect - against Tigray, and its people. That’s v dangerous - to say the least.” If one were to have applied Davison’s logic to 1930’s Germany, he would have opposed global anti-Nazi mobilization, not on the basis of morality and justice but on the grounds that the Nazis—much like TPLF—had party support, control of their territory and were relatively popular on core issues among their people, thus making opposition to them too “dangerous” to pursue. Like the Nazi’s expansionist *Lebensraum* program posed a dangerous threat to Europe and the world, TPLF’s Greater Tigray program poses a similar threat to the Horn of Africa and African continent yet this danger is ignored by Davison. In an interview with ESAT on March 10, Davison went as far as denying that TPLF started the conflict and made his case to legitimize TPLF’s “preemptive strike”:

That’s why the call for negotiations was there and also that’s where there was this understanding of the build up to war where, yes, the takeover the Northern Command gave the federal government no option, but there does seem to be some fairly strong evidence that the federal military was preparing to intervene in Tigray to remove Tigray’s government. Therefore, arguably,

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213 Tweet by @wdavison10 posted on February 1, 2015. Access here: https://twitter.com/wdavison10/status/561778061688188929

214 Tweet by @wdavison10 posted on November 12, 2020. Access here: https://twitter.com/wdavison10/status/1326792840375099392
you’re legitimizing this preemptive claim from the Tigrayan side.215

He promoted false reports from questionable websites, like the highly-checkered “Somali Guardian”, suggesting that Eritrea was using Somali troops in Tigray as cannon fodder.216 Again, this claim was debunked by VOA’s Somalia correspondent Harun Maruf.217 On November 18, a leaked email revealed that Davison was forwarding TPLF talking points from Wondimu Asaminew of the “Tigray Friendship Liaison Office” to the international media correspondents on the ground in Addis Ababa.218 Four days later, Davison was deported by the Ethiopian government.219 Following Davison’s expulsion and the capture of Mekelle only a few days later, ICG’s president Robert Malley issued an introspective statement on ICG’s position on Ethiopia that essentially admitted the organization’s failure to properly calculate events in Tigray and requested that Ethiopian authorities lay blame on ICG rather than Davison.220 Malley also admitted, “the humanitarian catastrophe we feared has not occurred and must acknowledge that we described a potential outcome that thankfully did not materialise.”

In spite of failure, miscalculation and bias, however, Davison continues to persist with Western media still eagerly seeking his expert insight. On March 26, he told France 24 that “With regards to the conflict dynamics, if there is a complete withdrawal of Eritrean troops, it would reduce the pressure on the TPLF, and the Ethiopian military may well not be able to defeat Tigray’s resistance without Eritrean support.”221 Given that Davison and ICG have called for the alleged Eritrean troops to leave Tigray, one can naturally draw the conclusion that they seek to “reduce the pressure on TPLF” and prevent the defeat of TPLF.222 Is this not interference and taking sides in a conflict?

Also on ICG’s staff is Dinesh “Dino” Mahtani, a known advocate of regime change in Eritrea. In October 2014, Mahtani found himself embroiled in a UN scandal. While serving as a member of the Somalia Eritrea Monitoring Group, mandated to monitor UN sanctions on Eritrea, he was caught using his position at the UN to influence and organize regime change operations in Eritrea, and met with projected transitional leaders.223 As proof of the veracity of this allegation, Mahtani resigned – under UN pressure – only one day after this news came to light via groundbreaking reporting by Matthew Russell Lee of Inner City Press, who published a leaked letter written by Mahtani revealing his plans to organize travel for a coup plotter during an ensuing “uncertain period in [Eritrea’s] history”. Today, Mahtani is vocal in his advocacy for TPLF in the Tigray conflict. In a November 10 article for The Africa Report, co-authored by his ICG colleague Davison, Mahtani held that “the confrontation is likely to be fierce and prolonged”, would draw in Eritrea and Sudan

221 “Ethiopian PM’s week of dramatic disclosures evades root of Tigray crisis”, Leela Jacinto, France 24, March 26, 2021.
222 “Q&A: Tigray – the Fighting will Continue & Exacerbate Civilian Suffering”, Nalisha Adams, Inter Press Service, Feb 19 2021.
and create a “nightmare scenario” that would be “reminiscent of the scenes of misery during Ethiopia’s civil war of the 1980s.” With the swift defeat of TPLF, no such nightmare has yet materialized.

**Ignoring TPLF’s Unpopularity in Tigray**

Rather than presenting one-sided views in support of TPLF, why not instead listen to Tigrayan critiques of TPLF? Talking to Anadolu Agency, TPLF co-founder Aregawi Berhe makes it clear that TPLF failed in the recent conflict because it had no popular support: “They [TPLF] overestimated their military strength and underestimated the federal army,” he said. They also thought that the people of Tigray would support them. The whole assumption went wrong, consequently, resulting in the TPLF to lose the war, Berhe added.

Even before the war started, it was well known among Tigrayans that TPLF would not have the support of its population in Tigray. Last July, investigative journalist Araya Tesfamariam, who is of Tigrayan descent, explained to Meron Fufa on the Mosob Fana program broadcast on Fana TV that TPLF was preparing the Tigrayan people for war, creating many enemies and asking poor Tigrayans to send their children to fight in the war. He explained that TPLF leaders looted billions, with TPLF co-founder Sebhat Nega and the Seyoum Mesfin being the worst among them all. According to Araya, Seyoum purchased a $2 million dollar Persian rug while his son Mebrahtu was known to drive a $100,000 car in Maryland. Sebhat’s son Haki bought a massive home in a Mekelle neighborhood so vastly unequal and detached from the average local Tigrayan that it is known among the locals as the “Apartheid” district. “TPLF leaders sent their sons and daughters to US and Europe, and they want the sons of daughters of poor Tigrayans to die in a war,” explained Araya.

How could a geriatric, criminal leadership so detached from the suffering of its largely peasant population be expected to draw popular support when already unpopular in Tigray? An essential feature of any guerilla force that seeks to turn a conflict into a protracted “people’s war” — necessitating it to embed itself within the civilian population—is that guerilla force’s material commitment to “serve the people.” Instead of serving or protecting the people, however, TPLF has clearly demonstrated, throughout the conflict, a penchant for deceiving and exploiting Tigrayan civilians and worsening their material conditions.

**Ignoring TPLF’s Assault on Tigrayan Civilians**

In a November 8 address aired on Dimtsi Weyane TV, TPLF leader Debretsion Gebremichael told Tigrayan civilians that “children will participate in the war.” As shocking as this claim may be, potentially drawing critiques that Debretsion may have been quoted out of context, the reality is that BBC also reiterated these same claims on November 18: “As fighting raged on Wednesday, Mr Gebremichael said his forces were inflicting ‘heavy defeats on all fronts against the forces that came to attack us’. He called on all Tigrayans including children to mobilise and join the ‘struggle’. Again, in a January 10 speech aired on Dimtsi Weyane radio and rebroadcast on Tigray Media House, he spoke in past tense about Tigrayan farmers providing their children to the meeting Chang Szu-teh, held by departments directly under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

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227 “Serve the People”, Mao Tse-Tung, September 8, 1944. This speech was delivered at the memorial meeting Chang Szu-teh, held by departments directly under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.


war effort and “sending your children to the battlefields to fight against the enemy.”

TPLF’s use of child soldiers is a violation of international law since Ethiopia is signatory to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (General Assembly resolution A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 2000).

As the seemingly inexperienced federal forces somehow managed to close in on TPLF, who ICG said had a battle-hardened army of 250,000 fighters and also had the advantage of pre-planning for its pre-emptive strike, the beleaguered TPLF forces began to retreat from major cities in the final week of the conflict and opted to carry out scorched earth tactics, laying waste to critical infrastructure in their own regional homeland. On November 23, state-owned Fana Broadcasting Corporation posted pictures on Twitter of a destroyed Axum airport tarmac with the linked article stating, “TPLF junta which could not care about the people and the country, has plowed and destroyed the airport which was [sic] contributed a lot for the economy and the people of Axum.” Amidst claims of misinformation by TPLF supporters, BBC confirmed the airport’s destruction.

A December video report on Belgian public news network VRT showed how retreating TPLF forces destroyed bridges behind them such that federal forces, in pursuit, could not pass. In the documentary, VRT’s foreign correspondent Stijn Vercruysse pointed across a destroyed bridge and explained, “The Tigray region’s forces have cut through the road, so no one can pass. We can’t either. That’s where all journalists and aid organizations want to go, as no one knows what’s going on there.” Thus, Vercruysse blamed “Tigray region’s forces” (i.e. TPLF), rather than federal forces, for destroying transport infrastructure that consequently blocked media and humanitarian access in Tigray.

TPLF used civilians as human shields in violation of the Geneva Conventions. As previously mentioned, TPLF, according to civilians in Bisober talking to AFP, had been “digging trenches behind classrooms and storing weapons in what was once the principal’s office.” TPLF also hid weapons at religious sites. Following the capture of Mekelle, Fana Broadcasting Corporation aired footage of TPLF’s heavy artillery hidden in churches that had been abandoned upon retreat. Although the footage came from a state

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233 Tweet by @fanatelevision posted on November 23, 2020. Access here: https://twitter.com/fanatelevision/status/1336770042879995041


channel, Tigrayan locals, including church clergy, were on record confirming that TPLF hid weapons in churches and vehemently lambasting the “junta” for its actions. Thus, it comes as little surprise that TPLF, instigating and thus expecting bombardment and destruction of religious monuments, would prematurely point fingers at religious sites like Axum Tsion and Maryam Dengelat for presumed “massacres.” They were merely projecting and revealing their own hand. This tactic of offenders blaming victims of crimes of which offenders themselves are guilty is known as “accusations in the mirror” and was a tactic used by the Interahamwe.239

**Coordinated Disinformation Campaign?**

From the outbreak of the conflict to the fall of Mekelle to the ongoing pursuit of TPLF leaders, the Western media has coddled and protected TPLF, taking its side in the conflict and delaying resolution of hostilities. Likewise, Western governments have interfered in Ethiopia’s internal affairs, endangering the Ethiopian people— including Tigrayan civilians—and causing them needless suffering.

Why does the US continue to provide such strong support for a greatly weakened—if not largely destroyed—TPLF against its own interests? Why is Washington willing to ignore growing anti-US sentiment and potential widespread hatred in a nation considered a close ally and historic “anchor state” in Africa?

**TPLF Disinformation Network**

**Unilateral Secession Requires Disinformation**

Washington and Western capitals might be the victims of their own Frankenstein’s monster developed over the last three decades: a US-supported, pro-TPLF disinformation network comprised of TPLF members, media personnel, academics, NGO personnel and state officials. This network may have served the West well in the past but its continued existence is likely putting long term US and EU interests at risk.

Does such a network exist? In reviewing the overall reporting on Tigray since early November, patterns and nodes of disinformation emerge. As highlighted by Tables 1 and 2, which track the progression of emerging reports on the herein discredited Axum and Maryam Dengelat “massacres”, the same entities reported on the two events in the same pattern. Note how “unconfirmed reports” devoid of evidence evolve into official reports and high-level human rights publications that ultimately manufacture the consent for Western governments to intervene in Tigray—actions that would have otherwise been unjustifiable.

As the disinformation progresses from its origin supposedly in Tigray—or manufactured in the diaspora—to its endpoint residing in Western state capitals, one can identify six distinct stages with clear signs of coordination between TPLF and Western actors (summarized on pg. 52).

**Stage 1: Briefing Western Contacts**

TPLF leaders serve as a primary starting point of disinformation. Although disinformation can emanate from many sources, *disinformation of consequence* mostly originates from “unconfirmed reports” first propagated by those in communication with TPLF’s leadership. Take for example, Wondimu Asaminew’s leaked email to William Davison on behalf of the Tigray Friendship Liaison Office briefing him on talking points regarding the situation in Tigray. Recall, Mulugeta Gebrehiwot briefing Alex de Waal on battlefield conditions. TPLF’s leadership feeds its Western contacts, which it has developed over the last three decades as a close ally of the US and EU.

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1. Briefing Western Contacts

- TPLF leadership send their Western contacts updates on battlefield conditions and express their propaganda needs.
  
  **Example:** Wondimn Asaminew emailing William Davison and Addis-based correspondents talking points through the Tigray Friendship Liaison Office; Mulugeta Gebrehiwot briefing Alex de Waal.

2. Developing a Pro-TPLF Narrative

- Western contacts publish TPLF’s version of events in “unconfirmed” reports on their social media accounts and blogs that cite anonymous sources.
  
  **Example:** Mirjam van Reisen publishing EEPA “Situation Reports”; Martin Plaut posting Eritrea Hub articles; Alex de Waal writing pieces on World Peace Foundation website.

3. Creating Facts on the Ground

- TPLF activists in Tigray and the diaspora use deceptive tactics to create facts on the ground that become “evidence” in primary source reporting in the Western media, thus confirming initial reports and serving as footnotes in future reporting.
  
  **Example:** Coaching civilians (Maryam Dengelat video for CNN; Sky News witness), providing false testimony (Samri youth masquerading as Mai Kadra survivors for NYT), soliciting false testimony (Alula Solomon soliciting testimony on Twitter for AP’s Cara Anna and AFP’s Maggie Fick), mistranslating civilians (as witnessed by Jemal Countess), doctor photos, etc.

4. Amplifying Primary Sources

- TPLF activists in the diaspora spread primary sources on social media in a coordinated campaign with human rights NGOs and journalists.
  
  **Example:** Alula Solomon, OMNA Tigray, #StopWarInTigray and TPLF diaspora activists retweeting pro-TPLF primary sources (articles, videos, etc.) with HRW, Amnesty and others.

5. Producing High-Level Reports

- Conduct an investigation of an alleged crime on the basis of growing reports in the media and publish a high-level report that is impossible to substantiate.
  
  **Example:** Amnesty report on Axum “massacre”, ICG briefs, Bellingcat investigations, etc.

6. Demanding International Action

- Western governments use high-level reports to guide new policy and force action in support of TPLF.
  
  **Example:** Pressure on Ethiopia, EU sanctions on Eritrea.
As previously mentioned, Davison, a supposed neutral journalist, openly displayed on Twitter his efforts to coach TPLF central committee members like Tedros Adhanom on creating positive publicity for his regime. De Waal eulogized the late TPLF leaders Meles Zenawi and, more recently, Seyoum Mesfin, speaking of his close relationship to them and displaying an extreme affection for the party. The CEO of the Oslo Freedom Forum went as far as calling de Waal's eulogy for Meles in the New York Times “the most unspeakably sycophantic eulogy”.

"Washington and Western capitals might be the victims of their own Frankenstein’s monster developed over the last three decades: a US-supported, pro-TPLF disinformation network comprised of TPLF members, media personnel, academics, NGO personnel and state officials.”

These friendly Western contacts of TPLF do not speak Tigrinya nor Amharic; nor do they have an advanced understanding of local geography and culture. They must trust wholly in the integrity of the information as it is given to them by TPLF, a party to the war. There is no longer any question as to whether or not TPLF is merely erring in the spread of misinformation or knowingly propagating disinformation. According to Alexi Drew and Claire Wilmot writing in a Washington Post article, TPLF leader Debretsion Gebremichael’s “false claim” that Ethiopian forces bombed the Tekeze Dam was “intentional”. TPLF’s leaders cannot be taken at their word and cannot be expected to provide accurate briefings on the situation in Tigray, which supports the earlier claim that TPLF must—by logical necessity—produce disinformation in order to manufacture consent for an unjust war (see Historical Context section).

**Stage 2: Developing a Pro-TPLF Narrative**

TPLF’s small coterie of friends in the West, once briefed, proceed to publish TPLF’s version of events in “unconfirmed” reports via their social media accounts, blogs and non-mainstream platforms. Evidence is not provided and sources are anonymous such that substantiation is impossible. The end result is the creation of an updated conflict narrative that suits TPLF efforts in the battlefield. For example, if supply lines are cut off, as is inevitably the case for the encircled TPLF, a narrative of Eritrean troops “blocking humanitarian aid” emerges with fresh allegations.

The main sources of this type of reporting that seed the media with TPLF’s narrative are the following three entities:

1. Europe External Programme with Africa (EEPA);
2. Eritrea Hub; and
3. World Peace Foundation (WPF).

EEPA, which calls itself an organization, is essentially an online blog created by Belgian activist Mirjam van Reisen, which up until the start of the Tigrayan conflict in November, was almost exclusively focused on reporting and commenting on Eritrea in promotion of regime change. Her precipitous switch to covering the conflict suggests her politics towards Tigray and TPLF are an extension of her regime-change politics toward Eritrea. In 2012, she penned an article calling for an “Arab Spring 2.0” in Eritrea. She gloated in her cruel efforts to stop EU development aid—non-military in nature—from reaching the Eritrean people: “The EU had reserved dozens of millions of euros for Eritrea, but – I am happy to note – that this money was


242 "In Ethiopia’s digital battle over the Tigray region, facts are casualties", Alexi Drew and Claire Wilmot, Washington Post, February 5, 2021.

never paid out. I had written to EU Development Cooperation Commissioner Andris Piebalgs in October 2011 to pledge him not to transfer the funds to the dictator. The West shouldn’t support dictatorships, I implored."

Aside from her hostility towards Eritrea’s leadership and people, she appears to hold contempt for Eritrea’s sovereignty on the whole as she called the Eritrean-Ethiopian border “very artificial” and likened the two countries to one nation divided by a Berlin Wall. On the eve of Eritrean Independence Day in 2014, she demanded the Dutch government close the Eritrean embassy.

Van Reisen’s hostility toward Eritrea cannot be overlooked. The EEPA blog has been publishing daily “Situation Reports” on Tigray since November 17 and much of the reporting entails alleged crimes by Eritrean troops and exudes an air of deep animosity towards Eritrea.

Eritrea Hub is another key source of unconfirmed reports in support of TPLF. The blog is maintained by Ex-BBC Africa journalist Martin Plaut, who makes no effort to hide his admiration for TPLF and deep-seated contempt for Eritrea’s government. On April 25, he attended a TPLF anti-government rally in London, posing in photos with a raised fist alongside TPLF activists. In a 2015 interview on The Foreign Desk program on the London-based Monocle 24 radio station, Plaut had the following to say:

Eritrea is one bullet away from fundamental change. If Isaias was eliminated, it would be the end of repression or at least there will be a great hope. One shouldn’t forget, I’m never in favor of assassination normally but if you look at what happened when Admiral Carrero Blanco was blown over the church in Madrid, the death of one man was the end of the Franco era in Spain.

Speaking at the “Building Democracy in Eritrea Conference” in April 2019, he advised Eritreans about “manufacturing the news” and recommended that they “Do not demonstrate in front of Eritrean embassy unless you are going to burn it down.”

By his own admission, Plaut has had an axe to grind against the Eritrean government following actions in the 1997 against his friend Ermias Debessai, the first Eritrean high official arrested on corruption charges. Aside from his militant animosity, he has demonstrated a propensity to employ deception about Eritrea. He was caught falsely reporting that Eritrea voted against Palestine obtaining “Non-Member Observer State” status in the UN in 2012 (hours before the vote had even taken place), and he misleadingly used a photo from a massive Albanian Eid al Adha prayer gathering to claim that Eritreans were protesting against their government in 2015.

“The main sources of this type of reporting that seed the media with TPLF’s narrative are the following three entities: 1. Europe External Programme with Africa (EEPA); 2. Eritrea Hub; and 3. World Peace Foundation (WPF).”

Like van Reisen, Plaut holds extremes views of TPLF and Eritrea and has a history of fraudulent reporting, making him unfit to report on Tigray and Eritrea, especially when he provides no substantive evidence and expects the media to...
take him at his word. He now claims Eritrean troops are in Oromia, citing nothing other than the Eritrean regime-change activists. How can anyone take him and his reporting seriously?

WPF, the third critical source of unconfirmed reports from Tigray, is an outfit managed by Alex de Waal. As previously mentioned, de Waal is extremely close to TPLF's leadership and strongly averse to Eritrea's government. Like van Reisen and Plaut, he seeks regime change in Eritrea and uses his reporting to bring about this end. De Waal is one of the leading propagators of the claim of starvation in Tigray, implicating the Eritrean and Ethiopian militaries in deliberately destroying civilian food supplies. He likens these supposed efforts to those of Mengistu Hailemariam during the 1984 famine.

Ironically, de Waal published an article in the New York Times in 2016 entitled “Is the Era of Great Famines Over?” while TPLF oversaw one of the worst bouts of hunger that decade. Shockingly, he declared that “20 million Ethiopians – one-fifth of the population – desperately short of food...aren’t starving to death” to suggest that the democratic governance of TPLF, which won 100 percent of the vote the prior year, was mainly responsible for “success in averting another disaster” since “there is no record of people dying of famine in a democracy.” To de Waal, it was very much the case then, as it is today, that his official declaration or disregard of famine was largely a cynical exercise in public relations for a given government.

Van Reisen, Plaut and de Waal account for the majority of initial, unconfirmed reports before their stories get picked up by major Western news outlets. In order for the outlets to publish their work, however, facts on the ground must be created.

**Stage 3: Creating Facts on the Ground**

The next stage of the TPLF disinformation propagation network requires that TPLF create “facts on the ground” in Tigray or in cyberspace in order for their desired evolving narrative to make the news. TPLF activists are integral to this stage.

Recall the CNN video of the Dengelat villager being coached on what to say for video cameras. Africa correspondent Nima Elbagir said, “Through a network of activists and relatives, CNN tracked down eyewitnesses to the attack.” Notice that reporters like Elbagir, who do not speak Tigrinya, depend on this “network of activists” to liaise with civilians. The activists in this case were caught on camera telling the villager to change his words and lie. CNN used the video in spite of the clear deception and has yet to issue an apology or retraction. This fact serves as clear proof that TPLF activists’ efforts to manufacture evidence in Tigray ex post facto is effective in turning unconfirmed reports into “credible” evidence cited in the Western media.

Similar examples of “civilian coaching” abound. In another case, a Sky News video report on March 20 from a Sudanese refugee camp – where TPLF activists are known to dwell in heavy numbers – captures a Tigrayan woman being told exactly what to say in response to an interviewer. After the interviewer asks her a question, she begins answering, only to be interrupted by a man to her right, outside the video camera’s field of view. In a loud whisper, he instructs her to say, “We came because of the war. We’ve been robbed of our belongings, money and animals.” She repeats his words. Tearful and distressed, one must consider the possibility that she may have been providing testimony under duress and coercion as refugees are among the most vulnerable and insecure populations.

Facts on the ground are also produced through activists providing mistranslations favorable to TPLF. Recalling the work of Jemal Countess and Jeff Pearce who interviewed him, TPLF members

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not only infiltrated Sudanese refugee camps where they would provide reporters with false testimony, but also served as translators of civilians for visiting reporters. Consequently, it comes as no surprise that the Ethiopian government would eventually take some sort of actions to rein in false translators. After announcing on February 24 its invitation of seven international media outlets to visit and report on Tigray, a government official issued a follow up warning that actions would be taken against persons that “are trying to supply wrong information to media crew that has set feet in Tigray.” Unsurprisingly, translators for the Financial Times, BBC and AFP were arrested, investigated and released shortly after. TPLF, through its network of media fixers, translators and minders developed over 27 years of repressive ethnic rule, works to insulate honest reporters in Tigray from unfiltered civilian testimony. In addition to coaching, posing as civilians, mistranslating and insulating, TPLF members also instruct their supporters to provide manufactured atrocities using visual media. 

Unsurprisingly, the video has since been deleted from Facebook but copies have been reposted on Twitter. Social media is littered with similar calls by diaspora TPLF activists to get Tigrayans to openly lie to visiting foreigners to cast a false image of genocide. In one case, one activists called on all diaspora Tigrayans to call their family members in Tigray to tell women to wear black dresses as though mourning, to cover clothes in red as though covered in blood and wail loudly in distress as though a massacre had just taken place.

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255 “Ethiopian military detains BBC reporter, translators for AFP and FT”, Committee to Protect Journalists, March 1, 2021.
257 Twitter thread by @HermonE_J posted on April 25, 2021. Access here: https://twitter.com/HermonE_J/status/1356938145145757698
258 Twitter thread by @TPLF_Lies posted on M, 2021. Access here: https://twitter.com/TPLF_Lies/status/1370571385249038336
Founder and CEO of Tigrai Media House, Alula Solomon, is a staunch TPLF member and the most prominent among diaspora activists. TMH’s YouTube videos are the most viewed by TPLF supporters. Alula regularly manufactures “facts” about Tigray in cyberspace, often deleting his posts shortly after. On March 23, for example, he tweeted a photo of the identification card of a supposed Eritrean soldier killed in action in Oromia, located in West Ethiopia (see Fig. 13). It was soon discovered that the ID was actually that of an elder Eritrean man living Sweden named Mehari Tesfay. Alula or an intermediary (perhaps KMN media) acquired the photo after a nostalgic Mehari posted a photo of his ID from his younger years in Eritrea on Facebook on March 13.

Note that Alula posted this tweet only one day after Plaut published a blog post about Eritrean soldiers fighting in Oromia, highlighting once again the coordinated nature in which TPLF activists are manufacturing evidence after Western contacts, in cooperation with TPLF leaders, publish the initial unconfirmed reports.

259 Twitter thread by @TPLF_Lies posted on March 23, 2021. Access here: https://twitter.com/TPLF_Lies/status/1374563220417957891

It is important to understand that Alula did not merely make a mistake but is knowingly deceiving international audiences. There are many examples of similar deleted, deceptive tweets. Capturing every lie is beyond the scope of this report. However, a simple Twitter search of the terms “Alula Solomon deleted” will easily return countless results.

Alula’s behavior is common culture within the TPLF activist community on social media. On New Year’s Day, activist Henock Yebyo, an epidemiologist at the University of Zurich, tweeted a picture of young girl and explained that Eritrean troops raided her family’s house, told her mom “you hurt us to cry blood tears, now is your turn” and then proceed to shoot the girl, killing her in revenge (Fig. 14). The very next day, a video of the girl, who actually was an Eritrean-American living in California, was posted online.260 “I did not die. I'm still here. Happy New Year,” she told her viewers.

260 Twitter thread by @Adulis_Kiloma posted on January 2, 2021. Access here: https://twitter.com/Adulis_Kiloma/status/1345377893053067273
Western correspondents. However, some of those correspondents do not passively wait for TPLF’s disinformation to come to them—they actively seek it.

On February 13, Alula tweeted, “The great journalist from AP, Cara Anna, wants to speak with eyewitnesses of the Axum massacre in order to write about it. Those of you who have the phone numbers of eyewitnesses, direct message me” (translated from Tigrinya). Five days later, Anna officially broke the story on the “Axum Massacre”, the first article in the mainstream media officially confirming an atrocity in Tigray since the conflict started in November.

Notice the coordination ranging from the TPLF leadership’s calls for international action against Eritrea to van Reisen and Plaut’s timely ‘unconfirmed’ reports about Axum to TPLF activists like Alula providing evidence to a willing and enthusiastic Anna. The synchronization is clear and overt.

Notably, Anna co-publishes and works closely with fellow AP correspondent Elias Meseret, an ethnic Tigrayan who for many years published articles highly favorable to TPLF and antagonistic to Eritrea. Anna’s reporting appears to be an extension of Elias’s efforts to buttress TPLF. Aside from bias, Anna has displayed an alarming lack of basic literacy on Africa. In 2016, she wrote about “Kenya’s Mount Kilimanjaro”. How does an Africa correspondent, let alone one based in Kenya, not know that Africa’s highest mountain is in Tanzania? Given the history of colonial reporting on Africa, Anna’s brazen disregard for elementary African facts taught to even school children, suggest a racist level of willful ignorance. This may explain why she felt emboldened enough to push African atrocity propaganda through racist trope-like characterizations of Eritrean troops in Axum.

Anna is one among a coterie similar Africa-based Western journalists reporting on Tigray. Maggie Fick, Reuters East Africa Bureau Chief, has also openly wooed Alula Solomon, tweeting on December 14: “@Alula_Solomon please could you follow me for a DM? I’m a Reuters journalist. Thank you.” Her tweet drew widespread anger and consternation from Ethiopians and Eritreans on Twitter.

“Notice the coordination ranging from the TPLF leadership’s calls for international action against Eritrea to van Reisen and Plaut’s timely ‘unconfirmed’ reports about Axum to TPLF activists like Alula providing evidence to a willing and enthusiastic Anna. The synchronization is clear and overt.”

Stage 4: Amplifying Primary Sources

The next stage of disinformation propagation is amplification of newly published primary sources as was displayed in the wake Anna’s article on the “Axum Massacre”. Anna’s article, and similar articles from wire services reporting in Tigray, are republished worldwide by newspapers, providing mass dissemination of TPLF narratives around the world. With the production of new mainstream content, the discussion instantly moves to social media where TPLF activists play another crucial amplifying role in disinformation propagation.

Two articles from the Washington Post published in November and February highlight how TPLF activists are mobilizing on social media to wage a digital war. In the November piece, Wilmot analyzed “90,000 tweets” on the Tigray conflict suggests that “anti-government” entities (i.e. TPLF) were organizing on Twitter:

261 Twitter thread by @Alula_Solomon posted on February 13, 2021. Access here: https://twitter.com/Alula_Solomon/status/1360745657070477315
263 Twitter thread by @MaggieFick posted on December 14, 2020. Access here: https://twitter.com/MaggieFick/status/1338375276036808709
Twitter data collected from Nov. 1 to 10 showed that 30 percent of tweets about Tigray and Abiy were from accounts created this year. Nearly half (47 percent) of these tweets were from accounts created in late October and early November. After Nov. 4, the number of new accounts created per day grew from an average of 21 to 245. Their tweets are overwhelmingly (although not exclusively) anti-government.

Despite their single-issue focus and clustered creation dates, most of these accounts do not behave like bots. But they do seem coordinated.

“It is an organized movement,” a Tigrayan community organizer in Canada noted during an interview. “Documents, even an online webinar, taught people how to share materials on Twitter,” he said. Like others in this article, he spoke on the condition of anonymity because of fear of reprisal. He described a loose network of activists using WhatsApp to teach people how to set up accounts and promote hashtags like #StopTheWarOnTigray. Users are told to tweet in English, when possible.264 [Emphasis added]

There is nothing inherently wrong with coordinating and organizing a campaign on social media assuming that it is based on truth and justice. Herein lies the problem: TPLF propagates disinformation and ethnic hatred for an unjust ethnic secessionist war using manufactured evidence that — by the time it reaches the Tigrayan community in the diaspora — cannot be forwarded in good conscience. Those who knowingly forward disinformation are not merely members of the “Tigrayan community” but rather TPLF activists — a key distinction overlooked by Wilmot. One also cannot ignore the “fear of reprisal” mentioned by the anonymous community organizer interviewed by Wilmot. Who is this person fearing? If the intentions of this campaign are indeed good, why the secrecy and anonymity? One reason may be that diaspora relatives of TPLF, many of whom are known to use false Eritrean identities to resettle in the West (due to UNHCR’s favorable Eritrean migration policies), are reluctant to use their names publically.265 There is also some emerging evidence that members of the “Tigrayan community” in the diaspora — representing an elite, culturally distinct from the common Tigrayan peasant — may be facing intimidation or threats of ostracization from powerful TPLF activists in their community for failing to go along with TPLF’s disinformation (Fig. 15).

Wilmot co-published a follow-up piece with Alexi Drew several months after the capture of Mekelle. In their analysis of “500,000 tweets” on Tigray, they observe the following about “Pro-Tigray activism online”:

#StandWithTigray is a central source of activism for pro-Tigray campaigns. Its website shares instructions for using Twitter, along with pre-written content for followers to share. ... 

... 


265 "Human Trafficking and the Human Rights Agenda Against Eritrea", Simon Tesfamariam, Black Agenda Report
“New” activist accounts were created throughout the conflict. We found over 3,000 such accounts between November and the end of January. These accounts demonstrate a low level of digital literacy, few followers and short-term engagement.

Accounts with opaque credentials claim expertise or positions aimed at boosting their credibility. They claim to be academics or aid workers but have little or no online presence beyond Twitter, making their credentials difficult to verify. These accounts may be problematic because they can obtain significant “reach” based on unsubstantiated claims.266

In addition to #StandWithTigray, there are also the #StopWarOnTigray and OMNA Tigray campaigns. The campaigns work closely with one another and promote the hashtag #TigrayGenocide as can be shown by their cache of Google Drive documents instructing them to do so.267 Additionally, the Stand With Tigray website contains preformed tweets and forms prepopulated with disinformation to be used by campaign adherents to share with their respective followers.268 As an example of the dishonesty and ethnic hatred displayed by this website, the wording of one petition to be signed denies TPLF culpability in the Mai Kadra massacre on the grounds of Tigrayan ethnic superiority:

We were shocked and dismayed by the suggestion that forces loyal to the Tigray Regional State were responsible for the massacre of their own people. It defies logic to indicate that the highly disciplined, well-trained, and well-armed forces of the regional state, which had been administering the area for more than 30 years, would be used to commit such horrific crimes using rudimentary weapons. The sudden outburst of such ghastly ethnic-based attacks also runs contrary to the fact that Tigray was Ethiopia’s most peaceful regional state prior to the war, with no reports of ethnic-based violence among its diverse population. Conversely, the Amhara and Oromo regions have become the hotbeds of ethnic strife and mass killings since Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s rise to power.

Notice how this petition argues, not from evidence or data, but from the tribalist belief that TPLF forces could not possibly be behind the Mai Kadra massacres because they were essentially too good to use “rudimentary” weapons like machetes and that such behavior was more akin to Oromos and Amharas.269

Notably, Wilmot and Drew, ignoring evidence to the contrary, excuse TPLF activists’ questionable tactics on the grounds that they do not have resources comparable with that of the government:

The #StandwithTigray campaign is organized similarly [sic] to many other social justice campaigns on social media. Pre-written tweets build momentum around hashtags and connect to potential influencers like foreign officials, U.N. agencies or foreign ministries. This is a standard approach for activists, who usually don't have the resources to employ the kinds of PR firms that many governments rely on to manage information (and disinformation) strategies.

Campaigners have raised significant sums of money by deceptive means. For example, Alula Solomon is on recorded in January telling TPLF activists to use funds from the Tigray Development Association (TDA), a humanitarian

267 StandWithTigray Google Drive archive. Access here: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1BxVC1_SHzYaT5xajvuc_TQ0hZvljjn
268 “Stand With Tigray” website. Access here: https://www.standwithtigray.com/
269 “Petition to Amnesty International to protest their biased and unfair report regarding Mai-Kadra, Tigray massacre.” Access here: https://www.standwithtigray.com/amnesty-complaint-letter
and developmental organization, to engage in digital activism (translated from Tigrinya):

Yes, TDA, is good at collecting money. The diaspora efforts have gone in the wrong direction. The direction of our people’s struggle has changed. Our support for building schools and other similar efforts by TDA are no longer applicable. TDA must outsource for things that it isn’t capable of doing. For media, for advocacy work like SJT, we must outsource it. We give them the money, and they speak on our behalf. We can learn from the Houston experience. They took out money and paid for it! Nothing comes free. Therefore, drawing from experiences of external [lobbying] groups, working together with them, learning from them, spending the necessary money on them, working with savvy diaspora youth fighters to produce the best media, diplomacy, advocacy and lobbying work. But we have to pay for it!

TDA is not a political or lobby organization. TDA’s chapter in North America (TDA-NA), where Alula is located and where most donated money emanates from, states the following as its mission statement: “Support in Education, Health, and Capacity building in Tigrai, Ethiopia.” It’s registered with an S99 IRS Activity Code (NTEE Code) meaning that its purpose is “Community Improvement & Capacity Building”. This clearly is not the case since it is involved in international political work and lobbying on behalf of a rebel force, which requires a Q01 designation, at the very minimum.

TDA-NA created a GoFundMe page entitled “I am with the People of Tigray” to specifically meet Alula’s aim. However, the GoFundMe page, misleadingly classified under “Humanitarian Assistance”, states a different cause: “Therefore, Tigrai Development Association is calling on all Tegaru and our peace-loving allies to donate. This donation will be used for medical, food, and various humanitarian supplies.” At the time of this report’s publication, a little over $3.6 of $4 million has been raised to support political activism and lobbying for TPLF. Fundraising is split up in “Teams” that list the amount of money raised by different Tigrayan community centers around the country. Thus, under the cover of “Tigrayan Community Centers” and under false pretenses of humanitarianism, TPLF activists in the diaspora are raising funds to support TPLF in the battlefield. Proof that TDA-NA is withholding donated money from the people of Tigray, as instructed by Alula, is provided by the fact that TDA-NA’s treasurer Mebrahtu Teferi told Tigrai Media House on January 16 that the $2.5 million raised thus far (at that time) would not be sent to Tigray because there was no longer a government in the region. However, this fact has not stopped collection of money which has now reached $3.6 million.

“The direction of our people’s struggle has changed. Our support for building schools and other similar efforts by TDA are no longer applicable. TDA must outsource for things that it isn’t capable of doing. For media, for advocacy work like SJT, we must outsource it. We give them the money, and they speak on our behalf.” – Alula Solomon

Therefore, social media activists in the diaspora who retweet primary sources containing disinformation generated by TPLF are taking part in a dishonest campaign that promotes ethnic hatred and supports TPLF’s aims in the battlefield. Furthermore, these activists are knowingly working in cooperation with TPLF leadership rather than merely supporting the people of Tigray. For instance, TPLF spokesperson Getachew Reda is on record—while actively engaged in combat in Tigray—thanking TPLF digital activist Tseday Mekbib, a digital marketing

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expert leading the #StopWarOnTigray campaign (Fig. 16).

Figure 16. Twitter exchange between Getachew Reda and Tseday Mekbib on March 1, 2021.

Tseday, like TPLF leaders, is also on record calling for the assassination of Eritrea’s president and calling for military action against Eritrea, highlighting a militant anti-peace stance that mirrors TPLF’s battlefield aims (Fig. 17).

Figure 17. Tweet by Tseday Mekbib on April 15, 2021.

Returning to Cara Anna’s article breaking the story about the now debunked Axum Massacre,

one can see how militant TPLF activists on Twitter worked cooperatively on the platform to bring the article to prominence. Most of the likes and retweets for AP Africa’s initial tweet of the article on February 18 are by TPLF activists using the #TigrayGenocide logo (Fig. 18).272

Figure 18. #TigrayGenocide logo.

With this and many other similar examples, it becomes clear that TPLF activists are central to promoting disinformation about the Tigray conflict in cooperation with TPLF’s leadership and Western intermediaries.

Stage 5: Producing High-Level Reports

With enough social media buzz and mainstream republications of a breaking story on Tigray, expert groups and human rights investigators begin making plans to investigate the matter further and release high-level reports of their findings. In a quote tweet of AP Africa’s tweet about Anna’s “Axum Massacre” article, the Deputy Director for Amnesty, Conner Fortune, tweeted, “Bombshell report from Cara Anna at @AP_Africa on a massacre perpetrated by Eritrean forces in #Axum, in Ethiopia’s Tigray region. @amnesty will soon release more detailed reporting on the massacre & its aftermath”. A few days later,

https://twitter.com/AP_Africa/status/1362303937542565889

272 Twitter thread by @AP_Africa posted on February 18, 2021. Access here:
Amnesty Director of Crisis Response Joanne Mariner tweeted her organization “will be releasing a detailed, blow-by-blow account of the massacre in #Axum - what happened and how it happened - which I think will make an important contribution to the public understanding of the #Tigray conflict.” Soon after, Amnesty published its report which would be fraught with the issues mentioned earlier in this report.

“These tweets highlights how TPLF disinformation is taken yet another step further: from social media promotion of a breaking news story of an alleged atrocity to an official investigation accompanied with a propagandistic ‘blow-by-blow’ high-level Amnesty report.”

These tweets highlights how TPLF disinformation is taken yet another step further: from social media promotion of a breaking news story of an alleged atrocity to an official investigation accompanied with a propagandistic “blow-by-blow” high-level Amnesty report. Other human rights NGOs (e.g. HRW, etc.) or academic expert entities (e.g. ICG, etc.) may investigate and produce their own reports. Large collaborative investigative media teams may also produce similar high-level reports dubbed “exclusive” as recently exhibited with the “Mahbere Dego Massacre” that included personnel from CNN, BBC, Bellingcat and Newsy and was reported across all their respective media platforms. As was the case with the alleged Axum and Maryam Dengelat massacres, of course, no substantive evidence is presented.

Stage 6: Demanding International Action

Ultimately, high-level reports manufacture consent for intervention in Tigray. Ignoring the lack of evidence and use of disinformation from TPLF-associated entities, Western governments, particularly that of the US, use the vacuous high-level reports to claim “credible reports” of atrocities in Tigray, feign “concern” and demand international intervention in the name of humanitarianism. As an example, consider the AP’s article on February 28 that makes clear the source of the US Secretary of State’s concern:

The U.S. is “gravely concerned by reported atrocities and the overall deteriorating situation” in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in the toughest statement yet from the U.S. on Ethiopia’s ongoing conflict.

Accounts of atrocities by Ethiopian forces against residents of the country’s northwestern region of Tigray were detailed in reports by The Associated Press and by Amnesty International.274

Another AP article from March 11 also cites the Amnesty report and Anna’s article as the basis for Secretary Blinken’s demand that Eritrean troops “Need to come out”.275 The article even goes a step further and cites TPLF leaders themselves endorsing Secretary Blinken’s demands: “But the fugitive leaders of Tigray seized on Blinken’s comments, issuing a statement on Thursday condemning what they called ‘the genocidal campaign’ targeting their people.” Hence, the disinformation is brought full circle, from TPLF leaders to Western governments and back to TPLF leaders again.

State actors in Washington are critical to TPLF’s disinformation network. Without them, TPLF would have little incentive to peddle disinformation. Thus, who are the entities in


Washington that incentivize TPLF to propagate disinformation?

Supporting TPLF At All Costs

Powerful Friends in Washington

On the basis of the latest “credible reports”, Biden’s administration has recently appointed veteran US diplomat Jeffrey Feltman as a special envoy for the Horn of Africa. Feltman is well-known to many Ethiopians for his obsequious eulogy of the late TPLF leader Meles Zenawi in 2012. His appointment is unsurprising given Susan Rice’s role in Biden’s administration. The influence of Rice, Obama’s former National Security Adviser, cannot be overstated.

President Biden initially sought Rice for Secretary of State but opted for Blinken, a close friend and protégé of Rice who served as her Deputy National Security Adviser, after realizing the Senate would oppose her confirmation. Rice is considered to be the brains behind President Biden’s foreign policy. Former US Ambassador to Germany Ric Grenell told Newsmax TV in March that Susan was “literally behind the scenes, just pulling all the strings” and it was “a joke that we think that she’s not running foreign policy.”

Rice is also known to be extremely close to TPLF and hold strong personal animosity towards Eritrea’s leadership. In a 2002 issue of Current History, Columbia University’s Peter Rosenblum wrote about Rice’s diplomatic failures in engaging Eritrea and Ethiopia as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs for the Clinton Administration. Rosenbaum calls to account the “personalized politics of the Rice team”, citing the criticisms of her State Department colleague Steve Morrison. Described as “brash” and “peremptory”, Rice, along with Gayle Smith who was “known to be close to Meles” and a “booster for Meles”, were dispatched back to Washington for botching mediation between Eritrea and Ethiopia and sparking a return to hostilities:

According to one, Rice was essentially “put on probation,” kept in Washington where the secretary [Albright] could keep an eye on her. “Susan had misread the situation completely,” according to one State Department insider who observed the conflict with Albright. “She came in like a scoutmaster, lecturing them on how to behave and having a public tantrum when they didn't act the way she wanted.” Apparently, Rice provoked a belligerent response from the Eritreans by disclosing the terms of the agreement. Some speculate that she did it to prove that she was making progress. But the effect was to make the Ethiopian counterattack “inevitable,” according to another high-level State Department official.

Rice and Smith were partial mediators that stoked conflict. As mentioned in the first section of this report, the secessionist TPLF sought access to the Red Sea through waging its 1998 - 2000 “border” war against Eritrea, which means Rice and Smith’s actions—that ultimately led to a return to war—could be seen as benefitting their TPLF allies (see Historical Context section). In response to criticisms of Rice’s failed brand of personalized politics that drew unusually intimate connections with African leaders, Rosenbaum quoted—of all people—Alex de Waal who said, “It could just have well have succeeded, in which case we would be celebrating the brilliant use of

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intimate personal contacts in diplomacy.” De Waal’s defense for Rice reveals how Washington—then and now—is rife with TPLF apologists who protect and shield for each other on behalf of TPLF against America’s own interests.

Given Rice’s failures in the Horn, imperious nature, personalized politics and indelible bond to TPLF, her quiet leadership of the Biden administration’s foreign policy will likely lead her to vengefully ram through initiatives to resuscitate TPLF at grave expense to America’s long term interests. As Rosenbaum observed, Rice “burned bridges liberally, alienating and often antagonizing many potential allies.” Such is the case currently with Eritrea and Ethiopia.

“Given Rice’s failures in the Horn, imperious nature, personalized politics and indelible bond to TPLF, her quiet leadership of the Biden administration’s foreign policy will likely lead her to vengefully ram through initiatives to resuscitate TPLF at grave expense to America’s long term interests.”

Feltman, likely appointed through Rice’s recent backdoor efforts, has already antagonized Ethiopia, Eritrea and the Horn of Africa even before taking office as he expressed, in a February Zoom call, desires to undermine all possible African initiatives to address the conflict in Tigray:

Ethiopia has brushed aside African Union mediation efforts and sub-regional organizations that cover the Horn of Africa, the IGAD, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development as authoritarian leaders in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia draw closer at the expense of the wider collective. So I conclude that US coordination with African partners is important but insufficient to prevent a crisis in the heart of Africa. We need to look East: the UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey all exercise extensive influence in the Horn.282

At a time when Africa seeks “African solutions for African problems”, Feltman seemingly demotes African efforts and instead calls for Gulf powers to intervene on behalf of America on the grounds that Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia are “authoritarian.” The irony is not lost on anyone.

When the Biden administration could send anyone as an emissary to Ethiopia to help address the conflict in Tigray, why would it send a person who has demonstrated partiality for TPLF and is largely seen by Ethiopians as a political hack shilling for TPLF? Was someone neutral, even if only on the surface, not available for this diplomatic initiative?

Negotiations to Rescue TPLF

Western governments had 27 years to rein in TPLF for its crimes and genocidal actions against innocent peoples in Ethiopia and throughout the Horn of Africa. Again, they had the opportunity to call TPLF to account once it retreated to Mekelle in 2018, challenged Abiy’s rule through sedition, belligerence and highly provocative criminal behavior. The West failed to push the rogue entity to negotiate with the federal government and to pursue peaceful dialogue. Instead, the West remained dangerously silent and provided TPLF with diplomatic cover for its belligerence and criminality, leading TPLF’s Wondimu Asaminew to make his comments about PM Abiy being unable to survive in the “jungle.” After TPLF’s November 4 attacks on the Northern Command, however, the Western media, NGOs and governments finally broke their deafening silence, not to condemn TPLF aggression but rather to condemn the federal government’s defense of its national sovereignty; and when TPLF failed to achieve its aims, they demanded negotiations.

Only when TPLF had its back to the wall—failing to capture most of the Northern Command’s heavy artillery, firing missiles on Gondar, Bahir Dar

and Asmara and facing battlefield losses that forced its retreat—did Western governments finally begin calling for negotiations. The EU’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said in late November, when federal forces were closing in on Mekelle, that mediation was the “only way forward.” Where were such calls for negotiation before and at the start of the conflict? Rather than calls for meditation, Western governments merely urged for “restraint” by both parties.283

On November 7, The Guardian’s Africa correspondent Jason Burke wrote, “A statement posted on the Facebook page of the Tigray government said it would win the ‘justified’ war, and added that ‘a fighter will not negotiate with their enemies’. ‘Tigray’s people are now armed with modern weaponry that could reach the seat of the infidels,’ it added, an apparent reference to Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa.”284 Does this sound like a party willing to negotiate? Where was the international outcry when TPLF’s confidence in their military prowess was high?

To prevent TPLF from acquiring federal artillery, federal forces quickly proceeded to destroy their own weapons depots—reserved for the Northern Command—via airstrikes and sealed off the border with Sudan.285 On November 9, Sudanese intelligence claimed to have captured 95,000 rounds of ammunition loaded on donkey carts headed toward Ethiopia.286 With supply lines completely cut off and much of its ammunition destroyed or seized by federal forces, TPLF changed its tune and sought for negotiations led by the African Union on November 9.287

Recall that TPLF has already demonstrated a penchant for flouting the terms of negotiated peace deals as was clearly witnessed with TPLF’s 16-year illegal occupation of Badme, Eritrea following a 2002 “final and binding” border delimitation decision that was stipulated in the internationally brokered 2000 Algiers Peace Agreement.288 The international community not only turned the other way but sought to “pin down and punish Eritrea” calling the international community to hold TPLF to account. Negotiations were thus not an initiative to promote peace but an extension of TPLF’s war strategy—a US-led international effort to rescue TPLF during its darkest hours. In light of this history, what makes PM Abiy think TPLF—and the international guarantors that ignored TPLF’s flagrant violations of the peace deal with Eritrea—will not do to Ethiopia what was done to Eritrea?

Therefore, it came as no surprise when PM Abiy’s government rejected TPLF’s November 9 request for negotiations, explaining in a tweet that the time for negotiations had passed and that dialogue would only commence after the “the criminal junta is disarmed, legitimate administration in the region

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restored, and fugitives apprehended & brought to justice - all of them rapidly coming within reach.”

An AU Envoy visited Ethiopia on November 27, appearing to endorse the federal government position. The chairperson of the African Union Commission later declared the federal government’s actions in Tigray as “legitimate” military action as it sought to preserve the country’s unity and stability. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional trade bloc, stated in a communique of a December 10 emergency meeting on the Tigray conflict that it “reaffirmed the primacy of constitutional order, stability and unity of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.” Despite the AU and IGAD siding with the federal government, President Biden’s Secretary of State Anthony Blinken continued to push the AU and “other international partners” to apply pressure on Ethiopia and “work with us to address the crisis in Tigray, including through action at the U.N. and other relevant bodies.”

TPLF: Beyond Accountability

One has to wonder why all the focus and pressure is on the federal government. As Bronwyn Bruton of the Atlantic Council observed in November: “And yet, at no point has any Western or African power called for the TPLF to lay down its arms. At no point have Western powers discussed leveling sanctions on the TPLF officials who authorized the attack. In fact, pointed op-editorials in premier publications have actually blamed the Prime Minister for ‘marginalizing’ the TPLF from power, and held him equally responsible for the escalating tensions.”

“There is no longer any question regarding who started the conflict, who was behind the Mai Kadra massacre and who has been behind other serious war crimes: TPLF. By giving the perception that “both” parties in the conflict may be responsible for any given crime or by exclusively highlighting supposed federal crimes that are impossible to substantiate, the West effectively provides TPLF diplomatic cover and hides their crimes. Whether intentional or not, Western media, NGOs and governments have engaged in, what former Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn has called “bothsidesism”:

“The key problem ... is the assumption of moral equivalence, which leads foreign governments to adopt an attitude of false balance and bothsidesism. Facts and details regarding the true nature of conflicts and the forces igniting and driving them are frequently lost in international efforts to broker peace deals that often crumble as soon as they have been signed.

... After being forced to give up the reins of power due to popular protests against our economic and political mismanagement – which I was a part of – the TPLF leadership


293 “U.S. calls on African Union to exert pressure over worsening crisis in Ethiopia’s Tigray”, Phil Stewart, Reuters, March 1, 2021.

294 “Calls for negotiation are driving Ethiopia deeper into war”, Bronwyn Bruton, Africa Center, Atlantic Council, November 13, 2020.
designed and is now executing a strategy meant to capitalize on the propensity of the international community to fall into its default mode of bothsidesism and calls for a negotiated settlement. The TPLF’s leaders are savvy operators who know how susceptible the international community is to such manipulation.295

Instead of blaming TPLF, the West has opted instead to scapegoat Eritrea for the Tigray conflict. Citing the aforementioned highly-questionable reports of alleged “massacres” and war crimes—notably the Axum massacre and mass rapes—the US sought to take up multilateral action through the UN Security Council. However, the US efforts—in perhaps a sign of its waning international authority—were thwarted in early March “after objections from India, Russia and especially China.”296 Failing to convince the world to intervene in a sovereign nation’s internal affairs, the US then turned to its EU partners for unilateral efforts.

Scapegoating Eritrea

The EU sanctioned Eritrea on March 22 for “serious human rights violations in Eritrea”.297 Notably, nothing was said of Eritrean crimes inside Tigray, suggesting that the EU was unable to come up with any evidentiary support for allegations of those crimes. The measure came after the EU’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell mandated Finnish Foreign Minister Pekka Haavisto to travel as a special envoy to the Horn of Africa to assess the situation in Ethiopia and neighboring countries in order find a peaceful solution to the Tigray conflict.298 During his travels, Haavisto failed to visit Eritrea, which is odd given the EU’s allegations of Eritrean involvement in the Tigray conflict.

In addition to Eritrea, the West also applied direct pressure on Ethiopia to change course in its Tigray operations. On February 28, NYT’s Declan Walsh claimed that an internal US government report documented a “systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing”.299 The report was not made public, and no evidence has yet been presented to support these claims. Coming on the heels of the report was US Secretary Blinken’s calls for the “immediate withdrawal of Eritrean forces and Amhara regional forces” and “unilateral declarations of cessation of hostilities by all parties to the conflict”.300

“While Russia, China and other great powers engage Ethiopia and Eritrea under the diplomatic principles of mutual respect and non-interference, the US and EU actively interfere in the Tigray conflict, taking sides with TPLF and failing to condemn the rebel force’s actions in starting and prolonging the conflict.”

Rather than give in to these demands, Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release rejecting Blinken’s statement and indicated, “An attempt by the US to make pronouncements on Ethiopia’s internal affairs and specifically, the reference to the Amhara regional forces

redeployment in the press statement, is regrettable.”301 Even after US President Joe Biden sent his close ally Senator Chris Coons to visit Ethiopia to persuade PM Abiy to change course, PM Abiy, shortly after Senator Coons departed, told his parliament that “no one could tell Ethiopia, a sovereign nation, where to send its own security forces” and that Ethiopia was “forever indebted” to Eritrea.302 PM Abiy then visited Eritrea only a few days later, adding emphasis to his latter point.303 Thus, Washington’s efforts to scapegoat Eritrea have not worked.

**Failure of US Policy in the Horn**

The US and its Western allies’ efforts to force change in Ethiopia and Eritrea on the issue of Tigray has not proven successful thus far, particularly at a time when America is engaged in so-called “great power competition” in an increasingly multipolar world. While Russia, China and other great powers engage Ethiopia and Eritrea under the diplomatic principles of mutual respect and non-interference, the US and EU actively interfere in the Tigray conflict, taking sides with TPLF and failing to condemn the rebel force’s actions in starting and prolonging the conflict.

On November 13, Ethiopia’s government issued arrest warrants for TPLF’s leadership, which it considered terrorist and treasonous.304 On May 1, the Ethiopian Council of Ministers declared the entire organization terrorist.305 Ethiopia is not alone in this designation. According to the Global Terrorism Database, which is financed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, TPLF is considered a terrorist organization that has registered multiple acts of terror spanning from 1976 to 2018.306 However, AFP’s fact check division (“AFP Fact Check”), in response to a popular Facebook post, appeared to go out of its way to counter these terrorist allegations and declare that “US has not assigned terrorist status to dissident group in Ethiopia’s Tigray region”.307 Though AFP is correct in that TPLF is no longer classified as a “Tier III Terrorist Organization” by the US State Department per se, it is indeed still considered terrorist by a US state-sponsored database. AFP opted to make a strawman argument by attacking a random, poorly-argued Facebook post, obscuring the spirit of the allegation that TPLF is a terrorist organization with a long history of terrorism.

“In if we are not in Arat Kilo [the seat of federal government], we will turn Ethiopia into another Libya, Syria or Yemen. I guarantee it.” – Seyoum Mesfin

In an interview with Dimtsi Weyane TV a few days before the attack on the Northern Command, the late Seyoum Mesfin, co-founder of TPLF and former Ethiopian foreign minister, vowed that “If we are not in Arat Kilo [the seat of federal government], we will turn Ethiopia into another Libya, Syria or Yemen. I guarantee it.”308 He gave

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305 “Ethiopia to designate TPLF, OLF- Shene as ‘terror’ groups”, Al Jazeera, May 1, 2021.
307 “US has not assigned terrorist status to dissident group in Ethiopia’s Tigray region”, Segun Olakoyenikan, AFP Fact Check, Agence France-Presse, December 8, 2020.
the interview in Amharic rather than Tigrinya, suggesting that his comments were a threat directed at the Ethiopian people. Of even greater concern, Jeffrey Feltman, the new US envoy to the Horn of Africa, echoed Seyoum’s threats in his comments to Foreign Policy on April 26: “Ethiopia has 110 million people,” he said. ‘If the tensions in Ethiopia would result in a widespread civil conflict that goes beyond Tigray, Syria will look like child’s play by comparison.”\(^{309}\) The missiles fired by TPLF upon civilian sites in Ethiopia and Eritrea seem to make good on Seyoum’s threat and reveal the international character of TPLF’s terrorism. Feltman’s comments suggest America’s endorsement of that international terrorist threat and the regional lurch to terrorism.

Despite TPLF’s terrorist history, criminality and dangerous ethnic politics in a country comprised of more than 80 ethnic groups, the Biden Administration has opted to back TPLF in its war against the federal government, which is led by a Nobel prize-winning prime minister. Washington seems to ignore the damaging optics of this problematic position, which is not lost on the Ethiopian people and serious international observers.

Bronwyn Bruton of the Atlantic Council noted the growing resentment and hatred towards the US, tweeting that “#China and #Russia are now both being lionized by the Ethiopian public as protectors of African sovereignty. This is a mantle that will serve Russian and Chinese interests well, and will provide the foundation for ever-greater cooperation. This outcome is sadly inevitable because the United States has proven itself incapable of imaging the world from an African perspective.”\(^{310}\)

Jamal Osman, Africa correspondent for Channel 4 News, visited Tigray and four regions of Ethiopia in February and March, travelling extensively throughout the country. After his trip, he took to Twitter to express his thoughts about TPLF vis-à-vis Ethiopia: “Three years ago, today, @AbiyAhmedAli became leader of #Ethiopia. The nation is going through uncertain times. And the war in Tigray has damaged Abiy’s image in the west. But it’s made him popular in many parts of #Ethiopia. Reason? Hatred against TPLF is helping him.” He adds that the “People hate the TPLF so much that they feel they have to support @AbiyAhmedAli and his Govt’s war in Tigray.”

If it is indeed true that hatred of TPLF is great and widespread throughout Ethiopia, what will be the long-term consequences for Washington for having backed TPLF against the wishes of the Ethiopian people? Why does the US continue to provide such strong support for a greatly weakened—if not largely destroyed—TPLF against its own interests? Why is Washington willing to ignore growing anti-US sentiment and potential widespread hatred in a nation considered a close ally and historic “anchor state” in Africa?

**Conclusion**

This report has shown in careful detail that TPLF, by its own admission, started the Tigray conflict by attacking the Northern Command on November 4, 2020 with the goal of triggering a irredentist, ethnic secessionist war or—at the minimum—returning to power in Addis Ababa through military means. Given the unpopular, immoral, irrational and unjustifiable nature of unilateral secession of an ethnic state in a multiethnic Ethiopia, TPLF requires the use of disinformation to manufacture consent for its secessionist war against the Ethiopian people.

During the 27 years prior to the rise of PM Abiy Ahmed in April 2018, TPLF allied itself with elements of the US State Department, putting the interests of Washington and TPLF’s own leaders before those of the Tigrayan and Ethiopian masses, which consequently earned TPLF ardent support within the West and Western media. TPLF’s strong relationship with the US government and Western media, long-known for

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\(^{310}\) Twitter thread by @BronwynBruton posted on April 23, 2021. Access here: https://twitter.com/BronwynBruton/status/1385581090522415113
lavishing praise over TPLF while hiding its crimes, persists today during the ongoing Tigray conflict to such a degree that it forms a coordinated network in support of TPLF and its secessionist aims.

Given TPLF’s dependence on disinformation and the presence of a network of Western media and state entities supporting TPLF, there exists a “TPLF disinformation network” that is actively deceiving the international community about the realities of the Tigray conflict in order to sell TPLF’s secessionist war rebranded as a defensive war against ethnic genocide by the Ethiopian and Eritrean states.

This report has shown, through ample evidence, how consent for TPLF’s war is manufactured in a stepwise fashion. First, TPLF briefs its contacts in the West, who create a favorable narrative to support TPLF objectives in the Tigrayan battlefield. Evidence to support this narrative is manufactured either by TPLF members in Tigray—largely through coached, hostile or false witness testimony potentially mistranslated or given under duress—or by social media activists in the diaspora that use deceptive or altered digital media. Next, Western correspondents and journalists use this manufactured evidence to publish articles about alleged atrocities supposedly exacted by TPLF’s enemies—virtually without critique or question—which provides new content for social media campaigns by dishonest TPLF activists. Dissemination of disinformation-laden articles and TPLF social media activism gives rise to high-level reports by human rights NGOs, expert entities and teams of investigative journalists. Finally, Western governments use these reports to promote a pro-TPLF narrative and demand some form of intervention to support TPLF in the Tigray conflict.

In support of the largely defeated TPLF, which was forced to retreat from its capital Mekelle on November 28, 2020, Western governments have opted to scapegoat Eritrea and allege “ethnic cleansing” by Amhara regional forces and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who—ironically—seeks to undo TPLF’s system of “ethic federalism” (i.e. state-sanctioned ethnocentrism).

While regional and continental organizations like IGAD and the AU are largely in support of Ethiopia’s efforts in the Tigray conflict, the US has sought to take the matter to the UN Security Council to impose its will upon Ethiopia. Washington’s failure to convince Council members to multilaterally intervene in the conflict, relegated it to pressuring the EU to legislate unilateral sanctions against Eritrea despite no evidence of crimes by Eritrea in Tigray. After a reconvening of the UN Security Council in April to readdress the Tigray conflict—under US pressure—the Council’s official press statement not only failed to mention Eritrea but also stated on behalf of its members that it “reaffirmed their strong commitment to the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and unity of Ethiopia.” This is generally seen as an embarrassment of the US.

The Western media’s orchestrated chorus of allegations of crimes by Eritrea’s military, without citing any substantive evidence but instead relying on sensationalist colonialist depictions that caricature them as brute savages, are inherently racist in nature and an assault on Eritrean culture. Pixelated, decontextualized videos of supposed atrocities and hostile witness testimony do not suffice as substantive evidence. Human rights reports without methodology sections or any form of peer-review, similarly, do not suffice as substantive evidence. This report has shown with painstaking detail how the most serious, high-profile allegations of massacres, rape, theft and war crimes by Eritrean and Ethiopian troops do not stand up to any honest, evidence-based analysis. Politicizing and exploiting fictional atrocities, easily debunked by common sense and science, may have the unintended effect in eroding trust in the Western media.

Western political interventions have failed thus far. The Biden administration’s team on Horn of Africa policy is composed of holdovers from the Clinton and Obama years who saw limited successes by forcing unsustainable, short-sighted policies upon the region with TPLF at the helm in Ethiopia, ultimately leading to TPLF’s fall from power and the failure of US policy in the region. These same entities are now using the same outdated strategies, seeking to resuscitate
TPLF in a markedly different Horn expecting the same results. As the saying goes, “generals always fight the last war.” Washington’s stubborn commitment to personnel who lack the political imagination to adapt to a new Horn of Africa that has moved on from TPLF will further hurt the interests of the US and its Western partners.

As the US continues to force TPLF and other ethnic extremist entities upon Ethiopia – as the US once forced the Shah upon Iran – the Ethiopian people may explode in an outburst of widespread, irreversible hatred of the US. The US could permanently lose a key anchor state in Africa, limiting its overall influence on the continent. The Western media’s persistence in pushing obvious TPLF disinformation and forwarding simplistic, racist caricatures of the Ethiopian and Eritrean people has the net effect of pushing the peoples in the region to lose whatever remains of their faith in the Western media; in the US and EU as friends, role models and moral forces.

Meanwhile, great powers like China and Russia will capitalize on the US and EU’s failure, gaining for themselves one of the most strategic regions in the world. Washington’s attempt to destabilize Ethiopia, the only African country that was never colonized and home of the AU, by stoking ethnic warfare – a scorched earth strategy denying regional access to other powers – will likely fail and deliver the coup de grâce to American credibility and influence on the African continent. Therefore, it is in Washington’s long term interest to quickly decouple itself from TPLF and ethnic extremism before it is too late.

**Recommendations**

1. **Stop spreading disinformation.** Stop uncritically accepting and disseminating disinformation about the Tigray conflict. All claims forwarded in the media should be challenged, questioned and—most importantly—supported by substantive evidence.

2. **Stop supporting TPLF.** TPLF is a terrorist organization with an ethnic secessionist agenda that started the Tigray conflict. Promoting TPLF encourages the destabilization of Ethiopia and Africa. TPLF should be brought to justice for crimes against humanity committed over the last three decades.

3. **Stop scapegoating Eritrea.** PM Abiy has clearly stated that “our national interests are inseparably linked to those of our neighbors.” Eritrea is a key actor in stabilizing Ethiopia. Attempting to pry Ethiopia away from Eritrea for narrow, short-sighted geopolitical aims will not bode well for Washington, Brussels and the region.

4. **Stop supporting sectarian politics.** Ethiopia, which has more than 80 ethnic groups any many religions, is plagued by sectarian hostilities from 27 years of TPLF’s ethnic federalist system, religious meddling and divide-and-rule tactics. Western media coverage since 2018 has instigated ethnic and religious conflict. Patience and sensitivity are needed by all actors in order to prevent mass death and suffering. Supporting sectarian politics is supporting destabilization.

5. **Promote peace and reconciliation.** Ethiopia’s primary priority is peace and stability. It requires reconciliation to address historical grievances from 27 years of TPLF rule. The alternative is ethnic violence and destabilization, which could lead to mass migration to Europe, piracy and the spread of terrorism from groups like Al-Shabaab. Africa would be destabilized and the world economy would suffer.