Date: Monday, 26 November 2018
Earlier this month, on Nov. 7, the State Department announced what appeared to be a significant step forward in relations between the United States and Sudan. A spokesperson said the U.S. would consider removing Sudan from its State Sponsors of Terrorism list if it helps Washington advance some of its foreign policy priorities in Africa and beyond—including cooperating on counterterrorism, ending Sudan’s internal conflicts and isolating North Korea. The statement also called on Sudan to improve its human rights record, respect religious freedoms and meet legal claims related to its previous support of terrorist attacks against American citizens. Removal of the terrorism sponsor designation has long been Sudan’s top priority in Washington because it would potentially unlock access to much-needed U.S. development assistance and international debt relief.
The State Department’s announcement activates the second phase of a re-engagement strategy with Sudan that began under the Obama administration in 2016. The policy shift was a tacit acknowledgement that attempts by successive administrations to isolate Sudan for supporting terrorists and waging war in Darfur had failed to radically shift the conduct of longtime President Omar al-Bashir’s regime. The rapprochement has continued under President Donald Trump, who signed an executive order in October 2017 ending some trade and economic sanctions against Khartoum; a series of sanctions imposed by Congress remain in place. Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan visited Sudan a month later, the most senior U.S. official to travel to the country in many years.
In the months that followed, progress appeared to stall while the State Department finalized what it has called “Phase II” of the re-engagement process. Momentum was lost due to bureaucratic inertia in both countries, which have been grappling with other foreign policy priorities. In Khartoum, officials voiced suspicions that Washington was dragging its feet and lacked the sincerity to follow the process through.
The State Department’s announcement of Phase II, cemented during recent talks in Washington between Sullivan and Sudan’s foreign minister, Dirdeiry Ahmed, allays some of these concerns and suggests that rapprochement remains on track. The overall objective of forging warmer relations with Khartoum is welcome, because attempts to isolate Sudan for more than a quarter of a century only served to reduce U.S. influence in the country. The gap has been filled by China, the Gulf Arab states and, more recently, Russia. However, the reasons given to justify re-engagement are flimsy at best, and this month’s announcement was very short on details.
Washington contends that Sudan deserves to move a step closer to the restoration of full relations because it has achieved progress in five areas subject to review since 2016, which mostly concern U.S. foreign policy priorities. In reality, Sudan’s compliance was patchy at best. Absent from the five-track framework was any specific requirement for Khartoum to improve its domestic human rights record. In this area, the conduct of the Bashir regime is as bad as ever.
Over the past year, Sudanese citizens have taken to the streets to protest austerity policies and the woeful mismanagement of Sudan’s tanking economy. The government violently put down the demonstrations, detained hundreds of protesters without charge—in some cases for several months—and tortured detainees. The authorities have impeded the media from covering the unrest by suspending journalists and deploying the intelligence agencies to inspect newspapers for inflammatory material before approving publication.The Sudanese government’s appalling record suggests it will have difficulty meeting targets for human rights protection.