World News

WorldPoliticsReview.com: Is the Trump Administration Offering to End Sudan’s Isolation for the Wrong Reasons?

Posted by: Berhane.Habtemariam59@web.de

Date: Monday, 26 November 2018

https://static.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/26829/a_sudan-bashir-11262018-1.jpg
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, right, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Sept. 2, 2018 (Pool photo by Nicolas Asfouri via AP Images).
Monday, Nov. 26, 2018

Earlier this month, on Nov. 7, the State Department announced what appeared to be a significant step forward in relations between the United States and Sudan. A spokesperson said the U.S. would consider removing Sudan from its State Sponsors of Terrorism list if it helps Washington advance some of its foreign policy priorities in Africa and beyond—including cooperating on counterterrorism, ending Sudan’s internal conflicts and isolating North Korea. The statement also called on Sudan to improve its human rights record, respect religious freedoms and meet legal claims related to its previous support of terrorist attacks against American citizens. Removal of the terrorism sponsor designation has long been Sudan’s top priority in Washington because it would potentially unlock access to much-needed U.S. development assistance and international debt relief.

The State Department’s announcement activates the second phase of a re-engagement strategy with Sudan that began under the Obama administration in 2016. The policy shift was a tacit acknowledgement that attempts by successive administrations to isolate Sudan for supporting terrorists and waging war in Darfur had failed to radically shift the conduct of longtime President Omar al-Bashir’s regime. The rapprochement has continued under President Donald Trump, who signed an executive order in October 2017 ending some trade and economic sanctions against Khartoum; a series of sanctions imposed by Congress remain in place. Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan visited Sudan a month later, the most senior U.S. official to travel to the country in many years.

In the months that followed, progress appeared to stall while the State Department finalized what it has called “Phase II” of the re-engagement process. Momentum was lost due to bureaucratic inertia in both countries, which have been grappling with other foreign policy priorities. In Khartoum, officials voiced suspicions that Washington was dragging its feet and lacked the sincerity to follow the process through.

The State Department’s announcement of Phase II, cemented during recent talks in Washington between Sullivan and Sudan’s foreign minister, Dirdeiry Ahmed, allays some of these concerns and suggests that rapprochement remains on track. The overall objective of forging warmer relations with Khartoum is welcome, because attempts to isolate Sudan for more than a quarter of a century only served to reduce U.S. influence in the country. The gap has been filled by China, the Gulf Arab states and, more recently, Russia. However, the reasons given to justify re-engagement are flimsy at best, and this month’s announcement was very short on details.

Washington contends that Sudan deserves to move a step closer to the restoration of full relations because it has achieved progress in five areas subject to review since 2016, which mostly concern U.S. foreign policy priorities. In reality, Sudan’s compliance was patchy at best. Absent from the five-track framework was any specific requirement for Khartoum to improve its domestic human rights record. In this area, the conduct of the Bashir regime is as bad as ever.

The Sudanese government’s appalling record suggests it will have difficulty meeting targets for human rights protection.

Over the past year, Sudanese citizens have taken to the streets to protest austerity policies and the woeful mismanagement of Sudan’s tanking economy. The government violently put down the demonstrations, detained hundreds of protesters without charge—in some cases for several months—and tortured detainees. The authorities have impeded the media from covering the unrest by suspending journalists and deploying the intelligence agencies to inspect newspapers for inflammatory material before approving publication.

Meanwhile, fighting has flared up in the Jebel Marra region of Darfur, resulting in the displacement of thousands of civilians. Religious freedom has deteriorated since South Sudan, where most of the Christian population resides, achieved independence in 2011. The small Christian community that remains in Sudan faces persecution. Churches have been demolished by state governments, notably in Khartoum, at the behest of politically connected land developers.

The Phase II framework closes some of the reporting gaps of the previous review by including a requirement for Sudan to enhance “human rights protections and practices, including freedoms of religion and press.” But the Sudanese government’s appalling record suggests it will have difficulty reaching these targets. Other reasons for skepticism include the fact that Bashir’s government is currently locked in a battle for survival in the face of overwhelming political and economic turmoil. Its ability to concentrate on other tasks is limited. Furthermore, the ruling National Congress Party has nominated Bashir as its presidential candidate for elections scheduled for 2020, bypassing its own rules that candidates serve no more than two terms. Bashir came to power in a military coup in 1989 and has been elected president four times in closely controlled elections that have been criticized internationally. This is not an environment in which major improvements to civil liberties can be expected to flourish.

The irony is that the one area where Sudan has been most unequivocally helpful to the U.S. has been counterterrorism cooperation, yet Sudan remains on the state sponsor of terrorism list—for the time being at least. There is no reason to justify its designation, as even the State Department acknowledges. But the list is Washington’s most important source of leverage over a regime that is notoriously quick to renege on its promises. So it should not be given up easily. Even if Trump wanted to strike Sudan from a list that also includes Iran, Syria and most recently North Korea, he would have to navigate a lengthy bureaucratic process that relies on the acquiescence of a Congress containing steadfast opponents of the Bashir regime on both sides of the aisle.

Going forward, the United States needs to be more transparent about its criteria for assessing Sudan’s progress. The benchmarks of this second phase of re-engagement should be fleshed out, so that the American public can scrutinize them, and the Sudanese government can clearly understand the steps it must take. Otherwise, the suspicion will remain that this process is a charade that will be used to justify whatever decision Washington ultimately makes on Sudan—whether to bring it in from the cold or to prolong its isolation.

Richard Downie is senior associate with the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

6ይ ክፋል: ማዕበል ስርሒት ፈንቅል - የካቲት 1990 - ሰነዳዊት ፊልም| sirihit fenkil 1990 - part 6 - ERi-TV Documentary

Dehai Events