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GlobalResearch.ca: Libya: Before and After Muammar Gaddafi. Dramatic Collapse in the Standard of Living

Posted by: Berhane.Habtemariam59@web.de

Date: Saturday, 18 January 2020

Libyan chaos as Berlin conference approaches and Italian fiasco

On January 14th 2020, the notorious Russian Telegram channel "Directorate4" showed the ID card of a Syrian "rebel" (by the name Muhammet Turkman) that was recovered in an area in the south-east of Tripoli, bringing up more evidence about the arrival of Syrian jihadists that have been transferred by Turkey from the north-west of Syria in order to support the Islamist government led by al-Serraj. A predictable move after Tripoli's official request for support that was granted by a signed agreement with Ankara.

The flow of Syrian jihadists to Libya was also cited by King Hussein of Jordan during an interview with the French TV channel France 24.

These same militias that were used in Syria with the objective of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad's government. An internationally-backed project that failed thanks to the Russian military intervention initiated in September 2015.

Additionally, the links between militias fighting on Tripoli's side and jihadists belonging to Isis and Ansar al-Sharia have emerged on several occasions and, as a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning the presence of individuals such as Adel al-Rubaie, Issa al-Busti, Massound al-Akouri and Mohamed Mahmoud Ben Dardaf; this last name was well known in East Libya as the jihadist was included in Haftar's "most wanted list"  due to his participation in the assault against the US Consulate in Benghazi, back in September 2012. Ben Dardaf was killed in May 2019 by a Russian made "Kornet" missile that targeted his position. He was fighting in the lines of the Somoud Brigade, in support to al-Serraj's forces.

 

The presence of imported jihadists in Western Libya is an additional destabilizing factor for Libya and serious problem for Europe. It is also an issue that could have been prevented.

It is not a sin to say that part of the responsibility can also be traced to Italy's initial decision to support al-Serraj's government, due to its debatable legitimacy provided by actors such as the UN.

Italy and Libya

Italy historically maintained strong links with Western Libya (not only as a former colony, but also due to Eni installations and economic relations with Tripoli ); as a consequence, it was preferred to take Fayez al-Sarraj's side (together with Turkey and Qatar) while in the meantime maintaining the rhetoric of mediation, claiming not to be in favor of anyone but rather "in favor of the Libyan people".

However, Rome's connections to the GNA are evident from Italy's strong activity through its diplomatic HQ in Tripoli, its military presence (around 350 soldiers) in Misrata to safeguard the military field hospital, its political support to the al-Sarraj government and material support to its militias operating on the coast, officially to "contain illegal immigration", even though the results were not as positive as expected. Let's keep in mind how in July 2019 al-Sarraj flew to Milan to meet with Matteo Salvini (who was Minister of Interior at the time) in order to look for support as the situation became far more complicated for Tripoli. It was already clear at the time how Italy was moving towards a more neutral position, retreating the support to Serraj while, at the same time, not taking side with Haftar.

 

Was it a wrong move? Not necessarily. Infact, Italy should have never backed al-Serraj's government in the first place and the risks of such support were predictable.

First of all, al-Sarraj was not supported by a real army, but rather by a galaxy of militias related to different realities such as Ikhwanis, Salafis, local warlords and former members of the Libyan army, all kept together by specific economic and political interests. These militias have managed to create an oligopoly of resources, influencing all sectors in Western Libya. Can such actors be considered reliable representatives in order to pursue a stability in Libya? Obviously not.

Secondly, it is very likely that it is not Fayez al-Sarraj who is controlling the militias but it's rather the other way around.

Thirdly, al-Sarraj's government is heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood*, a radical Islamist organization that has been blacklisted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Emirates, Syria and Russia. Siding with Tripoli and Misrata means siding with Islamist and jihadist factions and facts speak for themselves. Any country that is taking into consideration a potential line up with Islamists should ponder very well such option, because it will very likely lead to serious consequences in the medium-long term, as Libya could very well become the next Syria.

 

In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the vicinity between the Islamist government in Tripoli and Rome can also be partially considered a heritage of the disastrous foreign policy perpetrated by the Obama administration during the so-called "Arab Springs", when the Muslim Brotherhood became the privileged political actor that was due to take over in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria as part of a regime-change project. However, things did not evolve as planned and the whole region collapsed into chaos.

The big question is, how wide is the Italian government's maneuver margin? Even within issues of its own national interest? Backing a side that showed clear signs of unreliability and making decisions that, as a consequence, brought hundreds, if not thousands, of jihadists a few miles away from the Italian coasts cannot be considered as pursing Italy's best interests.

Italian Communist leader Marco Rizzo recently claimed, during a video speech on Assad's interview that was transmitted by the Italian national TV "Rai", that in Italy there is no decision-making, but only executors who carry out directives that come from abroad. That's a very interesting point that is worth pondering on: how far can Italy go in taking decision for its own benefit?

In the meantime, the only thing to do is wait for the upcoming talks organized in Berlin, in order to see what the next chapter in Libya's tragic turmoil will be. At the moment the situation seems clear: Russia and Turkey are the ones in charge, Italy lost its "mediating" role, putting at stake its own interests and the EU does not have a common foreign policy in Libya.


Читайте больше на https://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/144227-libyan_chaos/

Libyan chaos as Berlin conference approaches and Italian fiasco

On January 14th 2020, the notorious Russian Telegram channel "Directorate4" showed the ID card of a Syrian "rebel" (by the name Muhammet Turkman) that was recovered in an area in the south-east of Tripoli, bringing up more evidence about the arrival of Syrian jihadists that have been transferred by Turkey from the north-west of Syria in order to support the Islamist government led by al-Serraj. A predictable move after Tripoli's official request for support that was granted by a signed agreement with Ankara.

The flow of Syrian jihadists to Libya was also cited by King Hussein of Jordan during an interview with the French TV channel France 24.

These same militias that were used in Syria with the objective of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad's government. An internationally-backed project that failed thanks to the Russian military intervention initiated in September 2015.

Additionally, the links between militias fighting on Tripoli's side and jihadists belonging to Isis and Ansar al-Sharia have emerged on several occasions and, as a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning the presence of individuals such as Adel al-Rubaie, Issa al-Busti, Massound al-Akouri and Mohamed Mahmoud Ben Dardaf; this last name was well known in East Libya as the jihadist was included in Haftar's "most wanted list"  due to his participation in the assault against the US Consulate in Benghazi, back in September 2012. Ben Dardaf was killed in May 2019 by a Russian made "Kornet" missile that targeted his position. He was fighting in the lines of the Somoud Brigade, in support to al-Serraj's forces.

 

The presence of imported jihadists in Western Libya is an additional destabilizing factor for Libya and serious problem for Europe. It is also an issue that could have been prevented.

It is not a sin to say that part of the responsibility can also be traced to Italy's initial decision to support al-Serraj's government, due to its debatable legitimacy provided by actors such as the UN.

Italy and Libya

Italy historically maintained strong links with Western Libya (not only as a former colony, but also due to Eni installations and economic relations with Tripoli ); as a consequence, it was preferred to take Fayez al-Sarraj's side (together with Turkey and Qatar) while in the meantime maintaining the rhetoric of mediation, claiming not to be in favor of anyone but rather "in favor of the Libyan people".

However, Rome's connections to the GNA are evident from Italy's strong activity through its diplomatic HQ in Tripoli, its military presence (around 350 soldiers) in Misrata to safeguard the military field hospital, its political support to the al-Sarraj government and material support to its militias operating on the coast, officially to "contain illegal immigration", even though the results were not as positive as expected. Let's keep in mind how in July 2019 al-Sarraj flew to Milan to meet with Matteo Salvini (who was Minister of Interior at the time) in order to look for support as the situation became far more complicated for Tripoli. It was already clear at the time how Italy was moving towards a more neutral position, retreating the support to Serraj while, at the same time, not taking side with Haftar.

 

Was it a wrong move? Not necessarily. Infact, Italy should have never backed al-Serraj's government in the first place and the risks of such support were predictable.

First of all, al-Sarraj was not supported by a real army, but rather by a galaxy of militias related to different realities such as Ikhwanis, Salafis, local warlords and former members of the Libyan army, all kept together by specific economic and political interests. These militias have managed to create an oligopoly of resources, influencing all sectors in Western Libya. Can such actors be considered reliable representatives in order to pursue a stability in Libya? Obviously not.

Secondly, it is very likely that it is not Fayez al-Sarraj who is controlling the militias but it's rather the other way around.

Thirdly, al-Sarraj's government is heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood*, a radical Islamist organization that has been blacklisted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Emirates, Syria and Russia. Siding with Tripoli and Misrata means siding with Islamist and jihadist factions and facts speak for themselves. Any country that is taking into consideration a potential line up with Islamists should ponder very well such option, because it will very likely lead to serious consequences in the medium-long term, as Libya could very well become the next Syria.

 

In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the vicinity between the Islamist government in Tripoli and Rome can also be partially considered a heritage of the disastrous foreign policy perpetrated by the Obama administration during the so-called "Arab Springs", when the Muslim Brotherhood became the privileged political actor that was due to take over in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria as part of a regime-change project. However, things did not evolve as planned and the whole region collapsed into chaos.

The big question is, how wide is the Italian government's maneuver margin? Even within issues of its own national interest? Backing a side that showed clear signs of unreliability and making decisions that, as a consequence, brought hundreds, if not thousands, of jihadists a few miles away from the Italian coasts cannot be considered as pursing Italy's best interests.

Italian Communist leader Marco Rizzo recently claimed, during a video speech on Assad's interview that was transmitted by the Italian national TV "Rai", that in Italy there is no decision-making, but only executors who carry out directives that come from abroad. That's a very interesting point that is worth pondering on: how far can Italy go in taking decision for its own benefit?

In the meantime, the only thing to do is wait for the upcoming talks organized in Berlin, in order to see what the next chapter in Libya's tragic turmoil will be. At the moment the situation seems clear: Russia and Turkey are the ones in charge, Italy lost its "mediating" role, putting at stake its own interests and the EU does not have a common foreign policy in Libya.


Читайте больше на https://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/144227-libyan_chaos/

Libyan chaos as Berlin conference approaches and Italian fiasco

On January 14th 2020, the notorious Russian Telegram channel "Directorate4" showed the ID card of a Syrian "rebel" (by the name Muhammet Turkman) that was recovered in an area in the south-east of Tripoli, bringing up more evidence about the arrival of Syrian jihadists that have been transferred by Turkey from the north-west of Syria in order to support the Islamist government led by al-Serraj. A predictable move after Tripoli's official request for support that was granted by a signed agreement with Ankara.

The flow of Syrian jihadists to Libya was also cited by King Hussein of Jordan during an interview with the French TV channel France 24.

These same militias that were used in Syria with the objective of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad's government. An internationally-backed project that failed thanks to the Russian military intervention initiated in September 2015.

Additionally, the links between militias fighting on Tripoli's side and jihadists belonging to Isis and Ansar al-Sharia have emerged on several occasions and, as a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning the presence of individuals such as Adel al-Rubaie, Issa al-Busti, Massound al-Akouri and Mohamed Mahmoud Ben Dardaf; this last name was well known in East Libya as the jihadist was included in Haftar's "most wanted list"  due to his participation in the assault against the US Consulate in Benghazi, back in September 2012. Ben Dardaf was killed in May 2019 by a Russian made "Kornet" missile that targeted his position. He was fighting in the lines of the Somoud Brigade, in support to al-Serraj's forces.

 

The presence of imported jihadists in Western Libya is an additional destabilizing factor for Libya and serious problem for Europe. It is also an issue that could have been prevented.

It is not a sin to say that part of the responsibility can also be traced to Italy's initial decision to support al-Serraj's government, due to its debatable legitimacy provided by actors such as the UN.

Italy and Libya

Italy historically maintained strong links with Western Libya (not only as a former colony, but also due to Eni installations and economic relations with Tripoli ); as a consequence, it was preferred to take Fayez al-Sarraj's side (together with Turkey and Qatar) while in the meantime maintaining the rhetoric of mediation, claiming not to be in favor of anyone but rather "in favor of the Libyan people".

However, Rome's connections to the GNA are evident from Italy's strong activity through its diplomatic HQ in Tripoli, its military presence (around 350 soldiers) in Misrata to safeguard the military field hospital, its political support to the al-Sarraj government and material support to its militias operating on the coast, officially to "contain illegal immigration", even though the results were not as positive as expected. Let's keep in mind how in July 2019 al-Sarraj flew to Milan to meet with Matteo Salvini (who was Minister of Interior at the time) in order to look for support as the situation became far more complicated for Tripoli. It was already clear at the time how Italy was moving towards a more neutral position, retreating the support to Serraj while, at the same time, not taking side with Haftar.

 

Was it a wrong move? Not necessarily. Infact, Italy should have never backed al-Serraj's government in the first place and the risks of such support were predictable.

First of all, al-Sarraj was not supported by a real army, but rather by a galaxy of militias related to different realities such as Ikhwanis, Salafis, local warlords and former members of the Libyan army, all kept together by specific economic and political interests. These militias have managed to create an oligopoly of resources, influencing all sectors in Western Libya. Can such actors be considered reliable representatives in order to pursue a stability in Libya? Obviously not.

Secondly, it is very likely that it is not Fayez al-Sarraj who is controlling the militias but it's rather the other way around.

Thirdly, al-Sarraj's government is heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood*, a radical Islamist organization that has been blacklisted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Emirates, Syria and Russia. Siding with Tripoli and Misrata means siding with Islamist and jihadist factions and facts speak for themselves. Any country that is taking into consideration a potential line up with Islamists should ponder very well such option, because it will very likely lead to serious consequences in the medium-long term, as Libya could very well become the next Syria.

 

In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the vicinity between the Islamist government in Tripoli and Rome can also be partially considered a heritage of the disastrous foreign policy perpetrated by the Obama administration during the so-called "Arab Springs", when the Muslim Brotherhood became the privileged political actor that was due to take over in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria as part of a regime-change project. However, things did not evolve as planned and the whole region collapsed into chaos.

The big question is, how wide is the Italian government's maneuver margin? Even within issues of its own national interest? Backing a side that showed clear signs of unreliability and making decisions that, as a consequence, brought hundreds, if not thousands, of jihadists a few miles away from the Italian coasts cannot be considered as pursing Italy's best interests.

Italian Communist leader Marco Rizzo recently claimed, during a video speech on Assad's interview that was transmitted by the Italian national TV "Rai", that in Italy there is no decision-making, but only executors who carry out directives that come from abroad. That's a very interesting point that is worth pondering on: how far can Italy go in taking decision for its own benefit?

In the meantime, the only thing to do is wait for the upcoming talks organized in Berlin, in order to see what the next chapter in Libya's tragic turmoil will be. At the moment the situation seems clear: Russia and Turkey are the ones in charge, Italy lost its "mediating" role, putting at stake its own interests and the EU does not have a common foreign policy in Libya.


Читайте больше на https://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/144227-libyan_chaos/

Libyan chaos as Berlin conference approaches and Italian fiasco

On January 14th 2020, the notorious Russian Telegram channel "Directorate4" showed the ID card of a Syrian "rebel" (by the name Muhammet Turkman) that was recovered in an area in the south-east of Tripoli, bringing up more evidence about the arrival of Syrian jihadists that have been transferred by Turkey from the north-west of Syria in order to support the Islamist government led by al-Serraj. A predictable move after Tripoli's official request for support that was granted by a signed agreement with Ankara.

The flow of Syrian jihadists to Libya was also cited by King Hussein of Jordan during an interview with the French TV channel France 24.

These same militias that were used in Syria with the objective of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad's government. An internationally-backed project that failed thanks to the Russian military intervention initiated in September 2015.

Additionally, the links between militias fighting on Tripoli's side and jihadists belonging to Isis and Ansar al-Sharia have emerged on several occasions and, as a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning the presence of individuals such as Adel al-Rubaie, Issa al-Busti, Massound al-Akouri and Mohamed Mahmoud Ben Dardaf; this last name was well known in East Libya as the jihadist was included in Haftar's "most wanted list"  due to his participation in the assault against the US Consulate in Benghazi, back in September 2012. Ben Dardaf was killed in May 2019 by a Russian made "Kornet" missile that targeted his position. He was fighting in the lines of the Somoud Brigade, in support to al-Serraj's forces.

 

The presence of imported jihadists in Western Libya is an additional destabilizing factor for Libya and serious problem for Europe. It is also an issue that could have been prevented.

It is not a sin to say that part of the responsibility can also be traced to Italy's initial decision to support al-Serraj's government, due to its debatable legitimacy provided by actors such as the UN.

Italy and Libya

Italy historically maintained strong links with Western Libya (not only as a former colony, but also due to Eni installations and economic relations with Tripoli ); as a consequence, it was preferred to take Fayez al-Sarraj's side (together with Turkey and Qatar) while in the meantime maintaining the rhetoric of mediation, claiming not to be in favor of anyone but rather "in favor of the Libyan people".

However, Rome's connections to the GNA are evident from Italy's strong activity through its diplomatic HQ in Tripoli, its military presence (around 350 soldiers) in Misrata to safeguard the military field hospital, its political support to the al-Sarraj government and material support to its militias operating on the coast, officially to "contain illegal immigration", even though the results were not as positive as expected. Let's keep in mind how in July 2019 al-Sarraj flew to Milan to meet with Matteo Salvini (who was Minister of Interior at the time) in order to look for support as the situation became far more complicated for Tripoli. It was already clear at the time how Italy was moving towards a more neutral position, retreating the support to Serraj while, at the same time, not taking side with Haftar.

 

Was it a wrong move? Not necessarily. Infact, Italy should have never backed al-Serraj's government in the first place and the risks of such support were predictable.

First of all, al-Sarraj was not supported by a real army, but rather by a galaxy of militias related to different realities such as Ikhwanis, Salafis, local warlords and former members of the Libyan army, all kept together by specific economic and political interests. These militias have managed to create an oligopoly of resources, influencing all sectors in Western Libya. Can such actors be considered reliable representatives in order to pursue a stability in Libya? Obviously not.

Secondly, it is very likely that it is not Fayez al-Sarraj who is controlling the militias but it's rather the other way around.

Thirdly, al-Sarraj's government is heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood*, a radical Islamist organization that has been blacklisted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Emirates, Syria and Russia. Siding with Tripoli and Misrata means siding with Islamist and jihadist factions and facts speak for themselves. Any country that is taking into consideration a potential line up with Islamists should ponder very well such option, because it will very likely lead to serious consequences in the medium-long term, as Libya could very well become the next Syria.

 

In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the vicinity between the Islamist government in Tripoli and Rome can also be partially considered a heritage of the disastrous foreign policy perpetrated by the Obama administration during the so-called "Arab Springs", when the Muslim Brotherhood became the privileged political actor that was due to take over in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria as part of a regime-change project. However, things did not evolve as planned and the whole region collapsed into chaos.

The big question is, how wide is the Italian government's maneuver margin? Even within issues of its own national interest? Backing a side that showed clear signs of unreliability and making decisions that, as a consequence, brought hundreds, if not thousands, of jihadists a few miles away from the Italian coasts cannot be considered as pursing Italy's best interests.

Italian Communist leader Marco Rizzo recently claimed, during a video speech on Assad's interview that was transmitted by the Italian national TV "Rai", that in Italy there is no decision-making, but only executors who carry out directives that come from abroad. That's a very interesting point that is worth pondering on: how far can Italy go in taking decision for its own benefit?

In the meantime, the only thing to do is wait for the upcoming talks organized in Berlin, in order to see what the next chapter in Libya's tragic turmoil will be. At the moment the situation seems clear: Russia and Turkey are the ones in charge, Italy lost its "mediating" role, putting at stake its own interests and the EU does not have a common foreign policy in Libya.


Читайте больше на https://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/144227-libyan_chaos/

Libyan chaos as Berlin conference approaches and Italian fiasco

On January 14th 2020, the notorious Russian Telegram channel "Directorate4" showed the ID card of a Syrian "rebel" (by the name Muhammet Turkman) that was recovered in an area in the south-east of Tripoli, bringing up more evidence about the arrival of Syrian jihadists that have been transferred by Turkey from the north-west of Syria in order to support the Islamist government led by al-Serraj. A predictable move after Tripoli's official request for support that was granted by a signed agreement with Ankara.

The flow of Syrian jihadists to Libya was also cited by King Hussein of Jordan during an interview with the French TV channel France 24.

These same militias that were used in Syria with the objective of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad's government. An internationally-backed project that failed thanks to the Russian military intervention initiated in September 2015.

Additionally, the links between militias fighting on Tripoli's side and jihadists belonging to Isis and Ansar al-Sharia have emerged on several occasions and, as a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning the presence of individuals such as Adel al-Rubaie, Issa al-Busti, Massound al-Akouri and Mohamed Mahmoud Ben Dardaf; this last name was well known in East Libya as the jihadist was included in Haftar's "most wanted list"  due to his participation in the assault against the US Consulate in Benghazi, back in September 2012. Ben Dardaf was killed in May 2019 by a Russian made "Kornet" missile that targeted his position. He was fighting in the lines of the Somoud Brigade, in support to al-Serraj's forces.

 

The presence of imported jihadists in Western Libya is an additional destabilizing factor for Libya and serious problem for Europe. It is also an issue that could have been prevented.

It is not a sin to say that part of the responsibility can also be traced to Italy's initial decision to support al-Serraj's government, due to its debatable legitimacy provided by actors such as the UN.

Italy and Libya

Italy historically maintained strong links with Western Libya (not only as a former colony, but also due to Eni installations and economic relations with Tripoli ); as a consequence, it was preferred to take Fayez al-Sarraj's side (together with Turkey and Qatar) while in the meantime maintaining the rhetoric of mediation, claiming not to be in favor of anyone but rather "in favor of the Libyan people".

However, Rome's connections to the GNA are evident from Italy's strong activity through its diplomatic HQ in Tripoli, its military presence (around 350 soldiers) in Misrata to safeguard the military field hospital, its political support to the al-Sarraj government and material support to its militias operating on the coast, officially to "contain illegal immigration", even though the results were not as positive as expected. Let's keep in mind how in July 2019 al-Sarraj flew to Milan to meet with Matteo Salvini (who was Minister of Interior at the time) in order to look for support as the situation became far more complicated for Tripoli. It was already clear at the time how Italy was moving towards a more neutral position, retreating the support to Serraj while, at the same time, not taking side with Haftar.

 

Was it a wrong move? Not necessarily. Infact, Italy should have never backed al-Serraj's government in the first place and the risks of such support were predictable.

First of all, al-Sarraj was not supported by a real army, but rather by a galaxy of militias related to different realities such as Ikhwanis, Salafis, local warlords and former members of the Libyan army, all kept together by specific economic and political interests. These militias have managed to create an oligopoly of resources, influencing all sectors in Western Libya. Can such actors be considered reliable representatives in order to pursue a stability in Libya? Obviously not.

Secondly, it is very likely that it is not Fayez al-Sarraj who is controlling the militias but it's rather the other way around.

Thirdly, al-Sarraj's government is heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood*, a radical Islamist organization that has been blacklisted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Emirates, Syria and Russia. Siding with Tripoli and Misrata means siding with Islamist and jihadist factions and facts speak for themselves. Any country that is taking into consideration a potential line up with Islamists should ponder very well such option, because it will very likely lead to serious consequences in the medium-long term, as Libya could very well become the next Syria.

 

In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the vicinity between the Islamist government in Tripoli and Rome can also be partially considered a heritage of the disastrous foreign policy perpetrated by the Obama administration during the so-called "Arab Springs", when the Muslim Brotherhood became the privileged political actor that was due to take over in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria as part of a regime-change project. However, things did not evolve as planned and the whole region collapsed into chaos.

The big question is, how wide is the Italian government's maneuver margin? Even within issues of its own national interest? Backing a side that showed clear signs of unreliability and making decisions that, as a consequence, brought hundreds, if not thousands, of jihadists a few miles away from the Italian coasts cannot be considered as pursing Italy's best interests.

Italian Communist leader Marco Rizzo recently claimed, during a video speech on Assad's interview that was transmitted by the Italian national TV "Rai", that in Italy there is no decision-making, but only executors who carry out directives that come from abroad. That's a very interesting point that is worth pondering on: how far can Italy go in taking decision for its own benefit?

In the meantime, the only thing to do is wait for the upcoming talks organized in Berlin, in order to see what the next chapter in Libya's tragic turmoil will be. At the moment the situation seems clear: Russia and Turkey are the ones in charge, Italy lost its "mediating" role, putting at stake its own interests and the EU does not have a common foreign policy in Libya.


Читайте больше на https://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/144227-libyan_chaos/

Libyan chaos as Berlin conference approaches and Italian fiasco

On January 14th 2020, the notorious Russian Telegram channel "Directorate4" showed the ID card of a Syrian "rebel" (by the name Muhammet Turkman) that was recovered in an area in the south-east of Tripoli, bringing up more evidence about the arrival of Syrian jihadists that have been transferred by Turkey from the north-west of Syria in order to support the Islamist government led by al-Serraj. A predictable move after Tripoli's official request for support that was granted by a signed agreement with Ankara.

The flow of Syrian jihadists to Libya was also cited by King Hussein of Jordan during an interview with the French TV channel France 24.

These same militias that were used in Syria with the objective of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad's government. An internationally-backed project that failed thanks to the Russian military intervention initiated in September 2015.

Additionally, the links between militias fighting on Tripoli's side and jihadists belonging to Isis and Ansar al-Sharia have emerged on several occasions and, as a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning the presence of individuals such as Adel al-Rubaie, Issa al-Busti, Massound al-Akouri and Mohamed Mahmoud Ben Dardaf; this last name was well known in East Libya as the jihadist was included in Haftar's "most wanted list"  due to his participation in the assault against the US Consulate in Benghazi, back in September 2012. Ben Dardaf was killed in May 2019 by a Russian made "Kornet" missile that targeted his position. He was fighting in the lines of the Somoud Brigade, in support to al-Serraj's forces.

 

The presence of imported jihadists in Western Libya is an additional destabilizing factor for Libya and serious problem for Europe. It is also an issue that could have been prevented.

It is not a sin to say that part of the responsibility can also be traced to Italy's initial decision to support al-Serraj's government, due to its debatable legitimacy provided by actors such as the UN.

Italy and Libya

Italy historically maintained strong links with Western Libya (not only as a former colony, but also due to Eni installations and economic relations with Tripoli ); as a consequence, it was preferred to take Fayez al-Sarraj's side (together with Turkey and Qatar) while in the meantime maintaining the rhetoric of mediation, claiming not to be in favor of anyone but rather "in favor of the Libyan people".

However, Rome's connections to the GNA are evident from Italy's strong activity through its diplomatic HQ in Tripoli, its military presence (around 350 soldiers) in Misrata to safeguard the military field hospital, its political support to the al-Sarraj government and material support to its militias operating on the coast, officially to "contain illegal immigration", even though the results were not as positive as expected. Let's keep in mind how in July 2019 al-Sarraj flew to Milan to meet with Matteo Salvini (who was Minister of Interior at the time) in order to look for support as the situation became far more complicated for Tripoli. It was already clear at the time how Italy was moving towards a more neutral position, retreating the support to Serraj while, at the same time, not taking side with Haftar.

 

Was it a wrong move? Not necessarily. Infact, Italy should have never backed al-Serraj's government in the first place and the risks of such support were predictable.

First of all, al-Sarraj was not supported by a real army, but rather by a galaxy of militias related to different realities such as Ikhwanis, Salafis, local warlords and former members of the Libyan army, all kept together by specific economic and political interests. These militias have managed to create an oligopoly of resources, influencing all sectors in Western Libya. Can such actors be considered reliable representatives in order to pursue a stability in Libya? Obviously not.

Secondly, it is very likely that it is not Fayez al-Sarraj who is controlling the militias but it's rather the other way around.

Thirdly, al-Sarraj's government is heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood*, a radical Islamist organization that has been blacklisted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Emirates, Syria and Russia. Siding with Tripoli and Misrata means siding with Islamist and jihadist factions and facts speak for themselves. Any country that is taking into consideration a potential line up with Islamists should ponder very well such option, because it will very likely lead to serious consequences in the medium-long term, as Libya could very well become the next Syria.

 

In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the vicinity between the Islamist government in Tripoli and Rome can also be partially considered a heritage of the disastrous foreign policy perpetrated by the Obama administration during the so-called "Arab Springs", when the Muslim Brotherhood became the privileged political actor that was due to take over in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria as part of a regime-change project. However, things did not evolve as planned and the whole region collapsed into chaos.

The big question is, how wide is the Italian government's maneuver margin? Even within issues of its own national interest? Backing a side that showed clear signs of unreliability and making decisions that, as a consequence, brought hundreds, if not thousands, of jihadists a few miles away from the Italian coasts cannot be considered as pursing Italy's best interests.

Italian Communist leader Marco Rizzo recently claimed, during a video speech on Assad's interview that was transmitted by the Italian national TV "Rai", that in Italy there is no decision-making, but only executors who carry out directives that come from abroad. That's a very interesting point that is worth pondering on: how far can Italy go in taking decision for its own benefit?

In the meantime, the only thing to do is wait for the upcoming talks organized in Berlin, in order to see what the next chapter in Libya's tragic turmoil will be. At the moment the situation seems clear: Russia and Turkey are the ones in charge, Italy lost its "mediating" role, putting at stake its own interests and the EU does not have a common foreign policy in Libya.


Читайте больше на https://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/144227-libyan_chaos/

Libyan chaos as Berlin conference approaches and Italian fiasco

On January 14th 2020, the notorious Russian Telegram channel "Directorate4" showed the ID card of a Syrian "rebel" (by the name Muhammet Turkman) that was recovered in an area in the south-east of Tripoli, bringing up more evidence about the arrival of Syrian jihadists that have been transferred by Turkey from the north-west of Syria in order to support the Islamist government led by al-Serraj. A predictable move after Tripoli's official request for support that was granted by a signed agreement with Ankara.

The flow of Syrian jihadists to Libya was also cited by King Hussein of Jordan during an interview with the French TV channel France 24.

These same militias that were used in Syria with the objective of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad's government. An internationally-backed project that failed thanks to the Russian military intervention initiated in September 2015.

Additionally, the links between militias fighting on Tripoli's side and jihadists belonging to Isis and Ansar al-Sharia have emerged on several occasions and, as a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning the presence of individuals such as Adel al-Rubaie, Issa al-Busti, Massound al-Akouri and Mohamed Mahmoud Ben Dardaf; this last name was well known in East Libya as the jihadist was included in Haftar's "most wanted list"  due to his participation in the assault against the US Consulate in Benghazi, back in September 2012. Ben Dardaf was killed in May 2019 by a Russian made "Kornet" missile that targeted his position. He was fighting in the lines of the Somoud Brigade, in support to al-Serraj's forces.

 

The presence of imported jihadists in Western Libya is an additional destabilizing factor for Libya and serious problem for Europe. It is also an issue that could have been prevented.

It is not a sin to say that part of the responsibility can also be traced to Italy's initial decision to support al-Serraj's government, due to its debatable legitimacy provided by actors such as the UN.

Italy and Libya

Italy historically maintained strong links with Western Libya (not only as a former colony, but also due to Eni installations and economic relations with Tripoli ); as a consequence, it was preferred to take Fayez al-Sarraj's side (together with Turkey and Qatar) while in the meantime maintaining the rhetoric of mediation, claiming not to be in favor of anyone but rather "in favor of the Libyan people".

However, Rome's connections to the GNA are evident from Italy's strong activity through its diplomatic HQ in Tripoli, its military presence (around 350 soldiers) in Misrata to safeguard the military field hospital, its political support to the al-Sarraj government and material support to its militias operating on the coast, officially to "contain illegal immigration", even though the results were not as positive as expected. Let's keep in mind how in July 2019 al-Sarraj flew to Milan to meet with Matteo Salvini (who was Minister of Interior at the time) in order to look for support as the situation became far more complicated for Tripoli. It was already clear at the time how Italy was moving towards a more neutral position, retreating the support to Serraj while, at the same time, not taking side with Haftar.

 

Was it a wrong move? Not necessarily. Infact, Italy should have never backed al-Serraj's government in the first place and the risks of such support were predictable.

First of all, al-Sarraj was not supported by a real army, but rather by a galaxy of militias related to different realities such as Ikhwanis, Salafis, local warlords and former members of the Libyan army, all kept together by specific economic and political interests. These militias have managed to create an oligopoly of resources, influencing all sectors in Western Libya. Can such actors be considered reliable representatives in order to pursue a stability in Libya? Obviously not.

Secondly, it is very likely that it is not Fayez al-Sarraj who is controlling the militias but it's rather the other way around.

Thirdly, al-Sarraj's government is heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood*, a radical Islamist organization that has been blacklisted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Emirates, Syria and Russia. Siding with Tripoli and Misrata means siding with Islamist and jihadist factions and facts speak for themselves. Any country that is taking into consideration a potential line up with Islamists should ponder very well such option, because it will very likely lead to serious consequences in the medium-long term, as Libya could very well become the next Syria.

 

In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the vicinity between the Islamist government in Tripoli and Rome can also be partially considered a heritage of the disastrous foreign policy perpetrated by the Obama administration during the so-called "Arab Springs", when the Muslim Brotherhood became the privileged political actor that was due to take over in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria as part of a regime-change project. However, things did not evolve as planned and the whole region collapsed into chaos.

The big question is, how wide is the Italian government's maneuver margin? Even within issues of its own national interest? Backing a side that showed clear signs of unreliability and making decisions that, as a consequence, brought hundreds, if not thousands, of jihadists a few miles away from the Italian coasts cannot be considered as pursing Italy's best interests.

Italian Communist leader Marco Rizzo recently claimed, during a video speech on Assad's interview that was transmitted by the Italian national TV "Rai", that in Italy there is no decision-making, but only executors who carry out directives that come from abroad. That's a very interesting point that is worth pondering on: how far can Italy go in taking decision for its own benefit?

In the meantime, the only thing to do is wait for the upcoming talks organized in Berlin, in order to see what the next chapter in Libya's tragic turmoil will be. At the moment the situation seems clear: Russia and Turkey are the ones in charge, Italy lost its "mediating" role, putting at stake its own interests and the EU does not have a common foreign policy in Libya.


Читайте больше на https://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/144227-libyan_chaos/

Libyan chaos as Berlin conference approaches and Italian fiasco

On January 14th 2020, the notorious Russian Telegram channel "Directorate4" showed the ID card of a Syrian "rebel" (by the name Muhammet Turkman) that was recovered in an area in the south-east of Tripoli, bringing up more evidence about the arrival of Syrian jihadists that have been transferred by Turkey from the north-west of Syria in order to support the Islamist government led by al-Serraj. A predictable move after Tripoli's official request for support that was granted by a signed agreement with Ankara.

The flow of Syrian jihadists to Libya was also cited by King Hussein of Jordan during an interview with the French TV channel France 24.

These same militias that were used in Syria with the objective of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad's government. An internationally-backed project that failed thanks to the Russian military intervention initiated in September 2015.

Additionally, the links between militias fighting on Tripoli's side and jihadists belonging to Isis and Ansar al-Sharia have emerged on several occasions and, as a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning the presence of individuals such as Adel al-Rubaie, Issa al-Busti, Massound al-Akouri and Mohamed Mahmoud Ben Dardaf; this last name was well known in East Libya as the jihadist was included in Haftar's "most wanted list"  due to his participation in the assault against the US Consulate in Benghazi, back in September 2012. Ben Dardaf was killed in May 2019 by a Russian made "Kornet" missile that targeted his position. He was fighting in the lines of the Somoud Brigade, in support to al-Serraj's forces.

 

The presence of imported jihadists in Western Libya is an additional destabilizing factor for Libya and serious problem for Europe. It is also an issue that could have been prevented.

It is not a sin to say that part of the responsibility can also be traced to Italy's initial decision to support al-Serraj's government, due to its debatable legitimacy provided by actors such as the UN.

Italy and Libya

Italy historically maintained strong links with Western Libya (not only as a former colony, but also due to Eni installations and economic relations with Tripoli ); as a consequence, it was preferred to take Fayez al-Sarraj's side (together with Turkey and Qatar) while in the meantime maintaining the rhetoric of mediation, claiming not to be in favor of anyone but rather "in favor of the Libyan people".

However, Rome's connections to the GNA are evident from Italy's strong activity through its diplomatic HQ in Tripoli, its military presence (around 350 soldiers) in Misrata to safeguard the military field hospital, its political support to the al-Sarraj government and material support to its militias operating on the coast, officially to "contain illegal immigration", even though the results were not as positive as expected. Let's keep in mind how in July 2019 al-Sarraj flew to Milan to meet with Matteo Salvini (who was Minister of Interior at the time) in order to look for support as the situation became far more complicated for Tripoli. It was already clear at the time how Italy was moving towards a more neutral position, retreating the support to Serraj while, at the same time, not taking side with Haftar.

 

Was it a wrong move? Not necessarily. Infact, Italy should have never backed al-Serraj's government in the first place and the risks of such support were predictable.

First of all, al-Sarraj was not supported by a real army, but rather by a galaxy of militias related to different realities such as Ikhwanis, Salafis, local warlords and former members of the Libyan army, all kept together by specific economic and political interests. These militias have managed to create an oligopoly of resources, influencing all sectors in Western Libya. Can such actors be considered reliable representatives in order to pursue a stability in Libya? Obviously not.

Secondly, it is very likely that it is not Fayez al-Sarraj who is controlling the militias but it's rather the other way around.

Thirdly, al-Sarraj's government is heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood*, a radical Islamist organization that has been blacklisted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Emirates, Syria and Russia. Siding with Tripoli and Misrata means siding with Islamist and jihadist factions and facts speak for themselves. Any country that is taking into consideration a potential line up with Islamists should ponder very well such option, because it will very likely lead to serious consequences in the medium-long term, as Libya could very well become the next Syria.

 

In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the vicinity between the Islamist government in Tripoli and Rome can also be partially considered a heritage of the disastrous foreign policy perpetrated by the Obama administration during the so-called "Arab Springs", when the Muslim Brotherhood became the privileged political actor that was due to take over in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria as part of a regime-change project. However, things did not evolve as planned and the whole region collapsed into chaos.

The big question is, how wide is the Italian government's maneuver margin? Even within issues of its own national interest? Backing a side that showed clear signs of unreliability and making decisions that, as a consequence, brought hundreds, if not thousands, of jihadists a few miles away from the Italian coasts cannot be considered as pursing Italy's best interests.

Italian Communist leader Marco Rizzo recently claimed, during a video speech on Assad's interview that was transmitted by the Italian national TV "Rai", that in Italy there is no decision-making, but only executors who carry out directives that come from abroad. That's a very interesting point that is worth pondering on: how far can Italy go in taking decision for its own benefit?

In the meantime, the only thing to do is wait for the upcoming talks organized in Berlin, in order to see what the next chapter in Libya's tragic turmoil will be. At the moment the situation seems clear: Russia and Turkey are the ones in charge, Italy lost its "mediating" role, putting at stake its own interests and the EU does not have a common foreign policy in Libya.


Читайте больше на https://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/144227-libyan_chaos/

Libyan chaos as Berlin conference approaches and Italian fiasco

On January 14th 2020, the notorious Russian Telegram channel "Directorate4" showed the ID card of a Syrian "rebel" (by the name Muhammet Turkman) that was recovered in an area in the south-east of Tripoli, bringing up more evidence about the arrival of Syrian jihadists that have been transferred by Turkey from the north-west of Syria in order to support the Islamist government led by al-Serraj. A predictable move after Tripoli's official request for support that was granted by a signed agreement with Ankara.

The flow of Syrian jihadists to Libya was also cited by King Hussein of Jordan during an interview with the French TV channel France 24.

These same militias that were used in Syria with the objective of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad's government. An internationally-backed project that failed thanks to the Russian military intervention initiated in September 2015.

Additionally, the links between militias fighting on Tripoli's side and jihadists belonging to Isis and Ansar al-Sharia have emerged on several occasions and, as a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning the presence of individuals such as Adel al-Rubaie, Issa al-Busti, Massound al-Akouri and Mohamed Mahmoud Ben Dardaf; this last name was well known in East Libya as the jihadist was included in Haftar's "most wanted list"  due to his participation in the assault against the US Consulate in Benghazi, back in September 2012. Ben Dardaf was killed in May 2019 by a Russian made "Kornet" missile that targeted his position. He was fighting in the lines of the Somoud Brigade, in support to al-Serraj's forces.

 

The presence of imported jihadists in Western Libya is an additional destabilizing factor for Libya and serious problem for Europe. It is also an issue that could have been prevented.

It is not a sin to say that part of the responsibility can also be traced to Italy's initial decision to support al-Serraj's government, due to its debatable legitimacy provided by actors such as the UN.

Italy and Libya

Italy historically maintained strong links with Western Libya (not only as a former colony, but also due to Eni installations and economic relations with Tripoli ); as a consequence, it was preferred to take Fayez al-Sarraj's side (together with Turkey and Qatar) while in the meantime maintaining the rhetoric of mediation, claiming not to be in favor of anyone but rather "in favor of the Libyan people".

However, Rome's connections to the GNA are evident from Italy's strong activity through its diplomatic HQ in Tripoli, its military presence (around 350 soldiers) in Misrata to safeguard the military field hospital, its political support to the al-Sarraj government and material support to its militias operating on the coast, officially to "contain illegal immigration", even though the results were not as positive as expected. Let's keep in mind how in July 2019 al-Sarraj flew to Milan to meet with Matteo Salvini (who was Minister of Interior at the time) in order to look for support as the situation became far more complicated for Tripoli. It was already clear at the time how Italy was moving towards a more neutral position, retreating the support to Serraj while, at the same time, not taking side with Haftar.

 

Was it a wrong move? Not necessarily. Infact, Italy should have never backed al-Serraj's government in the first place and the risks of such support were predictable.

First of all, al-Sarraj was not supported by a real army, but rather by a galaxy of militias related to different realities such as Ikhwanis, Salafis, local warlords and former members of the Libyan army, all kept together by specific economic and political interests. These militias have managed to create an oligopoly of resources, influencing all sectors in Western Libya. Can such actors be considered reliable representatives in order to pursue a stability in Libya? Obviously not.

Secondly, it is very likely that it is not Fayez al-Sarraj who is controlling the militias but it's rather the other way around.

Thirdly, al-Sarraj's government is heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood*, a radical Islamist organization that has been blacklisted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Emirates, Syria and Russia. Siding with Tripoli and Misrata means siding with Islamist and jihadist factions and facts speak for themselves. Any country that is taking into consideration a potential line up with Islamists should ponder very well such option, because it will very likely lead to serious consequences in the medium-long term, as Libya could very well become the next Syria.

 

In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the vicinity between the Islamist government in Tripoli and Rome can also be partially considered a heritage of the disastrous foreign policy perpetrated by the Obama administration during the so-called "Arab Springs", when the Muslim Brotherhood became the privileged political actor that was due to take over in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria as part of a regime-change project. However, things did not evolve as planned and the whole region collapsed into chaos.

The big question is, how wide is the Italian government's maneuver margin? Even within issues of its own national interest? Backing a side that showed clear signs of unreliability and making decisions that, as a consequence, brought hundreds, if not thousands, of jihadists a few miles away from the Italian coasts cannot be considered as pursing Italy's best interests.

Italian Communist leader Marco Rizzo recently claimed, during a video speech on Assad's interview that was transmitted by the Italian national TV "Rai", that in Italy there is no decision-making, but only executors who carry out directives that come from abroad. That's a very interesting point that is worth pondering on: how far can Italy go in taking decision for its own benefit?

In the meantime, the only thing to do is wait for the upcoming talks organized in Berlin, in order to see what the next chapter in Libya's tragic turmoil will be. At the moment the situation seems clear: Russia and Turkey are the ones in charge, Italy lost its "mediating" role, putting at stake its own interests and the EU does not have a common foreign policy in Libya.


Читайте больше на https://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/144227-libyan_chaos/

Libyan chaos as Berlin conference approaches and Italian fiasco

On January 14th 2020, the notorious Russian Telegram channel "Directorate4" showed the ID card of a Syrian "rebel" (by the name Muhammet Turkman) that was recovered in an area in the south-east of Tripoli, bringing up more evidence about the arrival of Syrian jihadists that have been transferred by Turkey from the north-west of Syria in order to support the Islamist government led by al-Serraj. A predictable move after Tripoli's official request for support that was granted by a signed agreement with Ankara.

The flow of Syrian jihadists to Libya was also cited by King Hussein of Jordan during an interview with the French TV channel France 24.

These same militias that were used in Syria with the objective of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad's government. An internationally-backed project that failed thanks to the Russian military intervention initiated in September 2015.

Additionally, the links between militias fighting on Tripoli's side and jihadists belonging to Isis and Ansar al-Sharia have emerged on several occasions and, as a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning the presence of individuals such as Adel al-Rubaie, Issa al-Busti, Massound al-Akouri and Mohamed Mahmoud Ben Dardaf; this last name was well known in East Libya as the jihadist was included in Haftar's "most wanted list"  due to his participation in the assault against the US Consulate in Benghazi, back in September 2012. Ben Dardaf was killed in May 2019 by a Russian made "Kornet" missile that targeted his position. He was fighting in the lines of the Somoud Brigade, in support to al-Serraj's forces.

 

The presence of imported jihadists in Western Libya is an additional destabilizing factor for Libya and serious problem for Europe. It is also an issue that could have been prevented.

It is not a sin to say that part of the responsibility can also be traced to Italy's initial decision to support al-Serraj's government, due to its debatable legitimacy provided by actors such as the UN.

Italy and Libya

Italy historically maintained strong links with Western Libya (not only as a former colony, but also due to Eni installations and economic relations with Tripoli ); as a consequence, it was preferred to take Fayez al-Sarraj's side (together with Turkey and Qatar) while in the meantime maintaining the rhetoric of mediation, claiming not to be in favor of anyone but rather "in favor of the Libyan people".

However, Rome's connections to the GNA are evident from Italy's strong activity through its diplomatic HQ in Tripoli, its military presence (around 350 soldiers) in Misrata to safeguard the military field hospital, its political support to the al-Sarraj government and material support to its militias operating on the coast, officially to "contain illegal immigration", even though the results were not as positive as expected. Let's keep in mind how in July 2019 al-Sarraj flew to Milan to meet with Matteo Salvini (who was Minister of Interior at the time) in order to look for support as the situation became far more complicated for Tripoli. It was already clear at the time how Italy was moving towards a more neutral position, retreating the support to Serraj while, at the same time, not taking side with Haftar.

 

Was it a wrong move? Not necessarily. Infact, Italy should have never backed al-Serraj's government in the first place and the risks of such support were predictable.

First of all, al-Sarraj was not supported by a real army, but rather by a galaxy of militias related to different realities such as Ikhwanis, Salafis, local warlords and former members of the Libyan army, all kept together by specific economic and political interests. These militias have managed to create an oligopoly of resources, influencing all sectors in Western Libya. Can such actors be considered reliable representatives in order to pursue a stability in Libya? Obviously not.

Secondly, it is very likely that it is not Fayez al-Sarraj who is controlling the militias but it's rather the other way around.

Thirdly, al-Sarraj's government is heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood*, a radical Islamist organization that has been blacklisted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Emirates, Syria and Russia. Siding with Tripoli and Misrata means siding with Islamist and jihadist factions and facts speak for themselves. Any country that is taking into consideration a potential line up with Islamists should ponder very well such option, because it will very likely lead to serious consequences in the medium-long term, as Libya could very well become the next Syria.

 

In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the vicinity between the Islamist government in Tripoli and Rome can also be partially considered a heritage of the disastrous foreign policy perpetrated by the Obama administration during the so-called "Arab Springs", when the Muslim Brotherhood became the privileged political actor that was due to take over in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria as part of a regime-change project. However, things did not evolve as planned and the whole region collapsed into chaos.

The big question is, how wide is the Italian government's maneuver margin? Even within issues of its own national interest? Backing a side that showed clear signs of unreliability and making decisions that, as a consequence, brought hundreds, if not thousands, of jihadists a few miles away from the Italian coasts cannot be considered as pursing Italy's best interests.

Italian Communist leader Marco Rizzo recently claimed, during a video speech on Assad's interview that was transmitted by the Italian national TV "Rai", that in Italy there is no decision-making, but only executors who carry out directives that come from abroad. That's a very interesting point that is worth pondering on: how far can Italy go in taking decision for its own benefit?

In the meantime, the only thing to do is wait for the upcoming talks organized in Berlin, in order to see what the next chapter in Libya's tragic turmoil will be. At the moment the situation seems clear: Russia and Turkey are the ones in charge, Italy lost its "mediating" role, putting at stake its own interests and the EU does not have a common foreign policy in Libya.


Читайте больше на https://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/144227-libyan_chaos/

Libyan chaos as Berlin conference approaches and Italian fiasco

On January 14th 2020, the notorious Russian Telegram channel "Directorate4" showed the ID card of a Syrian "rebel" (by the name Muhammet Turkman) that was recovered in an area in the south-east of Tripoli, bringing up more evidence about the arrival of Syrian jihadists that have been transferred by Turkey from the north-west of Syria in order to support the Islamist government led by al-Serraj. A predictable move after Tripoli's official request for support that was granted by a signed agreement with Ankara.

The flow of Syrian jihadists to Libya was also cited by King Hussein of Jordan during an interview with the French TV channel France 24.

These same militias that were used in Syria with the objective of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad's government. An internationally-backed project that failed thanks to the Russian military intervention initiated in September 2015.

Additionally, the links between militias fighting on Tripoli's side and jihadists belonging to Isis and Ansar al-Sharia have emerged on several occasions and, as a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning the presence of individuals such as Adel al-Rubaie, Issa al-Busti, Massound al-Akouri and Mohamed Mahmoud Ben Dardaf; this last name was well known in East Libya as the jihadist was included in Haftar's "most wanted list"  due to his participation in the assault against the US Consulate in Benghazi, back in September 2012. Ben Dardaf was killed in May 2019 by a Russian made "Kornet" missile that targeted his position. He was fighting in the lines of the Somoud Brigade, in support to al-Serraj's forces.

 

The presence of imported jihadists in Western Libya is an additional destabilizing factor for Libya and serious problem for Europe. It is also an issue that could have been prevented.

It is not a sin to say that part of the responsibility can also be traced to Italy's initial decision to support al-Serraj's government, due to its debatable legitimacy provided by actors such as the UN.

Italy and Libya

Italy historically maintained strong links with Western Libya (not only as a former colony, but also due to Eni installations and economic relations with Tripoli ); as a consequence, it was preferred to take Fayez al-Sarraj's side (together with Turkey and Qatar) while in the meantime maintaining the rhetoric of mediation, claiming not to be in favor of anyone but rather "in favor of the Libyan people".

However, Rome's connections to the GNA are evident from Italy's strong activity through its diplomatic HQ in Tripoli, its military presence (around 350 soldiers) in Misrata to safeguard the military field hospital, its political support to the al-Sarraj government and material support to its militias operating on the coast, officially to "contain illegal immigration", even though the results were not as positive as expected. Let's keep in mind how in July 2019 al-Sarraj flew to Milan to meet with Matteo Salvini (who was Minister of Interior at the time) in order to look for support as the situation became far more complicated for Tripoli. It was already clear at the time how Italy was moving towards a more neutral position, retreating the support to Serraj while, at the same time, not taking side with Haftar.

 

Was it a wrong move? Not necessarily. Infact, Italy should have never backed al-Serraj's government in the first place and the risks of such support were predictable.

First of all, al-Sarraj was not supported by a real army, but rather by a galaxy of militias related to different realities such as Ikhwanis, Salafis, local warlords and former members of the Libyan army, all kept together by specific economic and political interests. These militias have managed to create an oligopoly of resources, influencing all sectors in Western Libya. Can such actors be considered reliable representatives in order to pursue a stability in Libya? Obviously not.

Secondly, it is very likely that it is not Fayez al-Sarraj who is controlling the militias but it's rather the other way around.

Thirdly, al-Sarraj's government is heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood*, a radical Islamist organization that has been blacklisted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Emirates, Syria and Russia. Siding with Tripoli and Misrata means siding with Islamist and jihadist factions and facts speak for themselves. Any country that is taking into consideration a potential line up with Islamists should ponder very well such option, because it will very likely lead to serious consequences in the medium-long term, as Libya could very well become the next Syria.

 

In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the vicinity between the Islamist government in Tripoli and Rome can also be partially considered a heritage of the disastrous foreign policy perpetrated by the Obama administration during the so-called "Arab Springs", when the Muslim Brotherhood became the privileged political actor that was due to take over in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria as part of a regime-change project. However, things did not evolve as planned and the whole region collapsed into chaos.

The big question is, how wide is the Italian government's maneuver margin? Even within issues of its own national interest? Backing a side that showed clear signs of unreliability and making decisions that, as a consequence, brought hundreds, if not thousands, of jihadists a few miles away from the Italian coasts cannot be considered as pursing Italy's best interests.

Italian Communist leader Marco Rizzo recently claimed, during a video speech on Assad's interview that was transmitted by the Italian national TV "Rai", that in Italy there is no decision-making, but only executors who carry out directives that come from abroad. That's a very interesting point that is worth pondering on: how far can Italy go in taking decision for its own benefit?

In the meantime, the only thing to do is wait for the upcoming talks organized in Berlin, in order to see what the next chapter in Libya's tragic turmoil will be. At the moment the situation seems clear: Russia and Turkey are the ones in charge, Italy lost its "mediating" role, putting at stake its own interests and the EU does not have a common foreign policy in Libya.


Читайте больше на https://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/144227-libyan_chaos/

Libyan chaos as Berlin conference approaches and Italian fiasco

On January 14th 2020, the notorious Russian Telegram channel "Directorate4" showed the ID card of a Syrian "rebel" (by the name Muhammet Turkman) that was recovered in an area in the south-east of Tripoli, bringing up more evidence about the arrival of Syrian jihadists that have been transferred by Turkey from the north-west of Syria in order to support the Islamist government led by al-Serraj. A predictable move after Tripoli's official request for support that was granted by a signed agreement with Ankara.

The flow of Syrian jihadists to Libya was also cited by King Hussein of Jordan during an interview with the French TV channel France 24.

These same militias that were used in Syria with the objective of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad's government. An internationally-backed project that failed thanks to the Russian military intervention initiated in September 2015.

Additionally, the links between militias fighting on Tripoli's side and jihadists belonging to Isis and Ansar al-Sharia have emerged on several occasions and, as a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning the presence of individuals such as Adel al-Rubaie, Issa al-Busti, Massound al-Akouri and Mohamed Mahmoud Ben Dardaf; this last name was well known in East Libya as the jihadist was included in Haftar's "most wanted list"  due to his participation in the assault against the US Consulate in Benghazi, back in September 2012. Ben Dardaf was killed in May 2019 by a Russian made "Kornet" missile that targeted his position. He was fighting in the lines of the Somoud Brigade, in support to al-Serraj's forces.

 

The presence of imported jihadists in Western Libya is an additional destabilizing factor for Libya and serious problem for Europe. It is also an issue that could have been prevented.

It is not a sin to say that part of the responsibility can also be traced to Italy's initial decision to support al-Serraj's government, due to its debatable legitimacy provided by actors such as the UN.

Italy and Libya

Italy historically maintained strong links with Western Libya (not only as a former colony, but also due to Eni installations and economic relations with Tripoli ); as a consequence, it was preferred to take Fayez al-Sarraj's side (together with Turkey and Qatar) while in the meantime maintaining the rhetoric of mediation, claiming not to be in favor of anyone but rather "in favor of the Libyan people".

However, Rome's connections to the GNA are evident from Italy's strong activity through its diplomatic HQ in Tripoli, its military presence (around 350 soldiers) in Misrata to safeguard the military field hospital, its political support to the al-Sarraj government and material support to its militias operating on the coast, officially to "contain illegal immigration", even though the results were not as positive as expected. Let's keep in mind how in July 2019 al-Sarraj flew to Milan to meet with Matteo Salvini (who was Minister of Interior at the time) in order to look for support as the situation became far more complicated for Tripoli. It was already clear at the time how Italy was moving towards a more neutral position, retreating the support to Serraj while, at the same time, not taking side with Haftar.

 

Was it a wrong move? Not necessarily. Infact, Italy should have never backed al-Serraj's government in the first place and the risks of such support were predictable.

First of all, al-Sarraj was not supported by a real army, but rather by a galaxy of militias related to different realities such as Ikhwanis, Salafis, local warlords and former members of the Libyan army, all kept together by specific economic and political interests. These militias have managed to create an oligopoly of resources, influencing all sectors in Western Libya. Can such actors be considered reliable representatives in order to pursue a stability in Libya? Obviously not.

Secondly, it is very likely that it is not Fayez al-Sarraj who is controlling the militias but it's rather the other way around.

Thirdly, al-Sarraj's government is heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood*, a radical Islamist organization that has been blacklisted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Emirates, Syria and Russia. Siding with Tripoli and Misrata means siding with Islamist and jihadist factions and facts speak for themselves. Any country that is taking into consideration a potential line up with Islamists should ponder very well such option, because it will very likely lead to serious consequences in the medium-long term, as Libya could very well become the next Syria.

 

In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the vicinity between the Islamist government in Tripoli and Rome can also be partially considered a heritage of the disastrous foreign policy perpetrated by the Obama administration during the so-called "Arab Springs", when the Muslim Brotherhood became the privileged political actor that was due to take over in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria as part of a regime-change project. However, things did not evolve as planned and the whole region collapsed into chaos.

The big question is, how wide is the Italian government's maneuver margin? Even within issues of its own national interest? Backing a side that showed clear signs of unreliability and making decisions that, as a consequence, brought hundreds, if not thousands, of jihadists a few miles away from the Italian coasts cannot be considered as pursing Italy's best interests.

Italian Communist leader Marco Rizzo recently claimed, during a video speech on Assad's interview that was transmitted by the Italian national TV "Rai", that in Italy there is no decision-making, but only executors who carry out directives that come from abroad. That's a very interesting point that is worth pondering on: how far can Italy go in taking decision for its own benefit?

In the meantime, the only thing to do is wait for the upcoming talks organized in Berlin, in order to see what the next chapter in Libya's tragic turmoil will be. At the moment the situation seems clear: Russia and Turkey are the ones in charge, Italy lost its "mediating" role, putting at stake its own interests and the EU does not have a common foreign policy in Libya.


Читайте больше на https://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/144227-libyan_chaos/

Libyan chaos as Berlin conference approaches and Italian fiasco

On January 14th 2020, the notorious Russian Telegram channel "Directorate4" showed the ID card of a Syrian "rebel" (by the name Muhammet Turkman) that was recovered in an area in the south-east of Tripoli, bringing up more evidence about the arrival of Syrian jihadists that have been transferred by Turkey from the north-west of Syria in order to support the Islamist government led by al-Serraj. A predictable move after Tripoli's official request for support that was granted by a signed agreement with Ankara.

The flow of Syrian jihadists to Libya was also cited by King Hussein of Jordan during an interview with the French TV channel France 24.

These same militias that were used in Syria with the objective of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad's government. An internationally-backed project that failed thanks to the Russian military intervention initiated in September 2015.

Additionally, the links between militias fighting on Tripoli's side and jihadists belonging to Isis and Ansar al-Sharia have emerged on several occasions and, as a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning the presence of individuals such as Adel al-Rubaie, Issa al-Busti, Massound al-Akouri and Mohamed Mahmoud Ben Dardaf; this last name was well known in East Libya as the jihadist was included in Haftar's "most wanted list"  due to his participation in the assault against the US Consulate in Benghazi, back in September 2012. Ben Dardaf was killed in May 2019 by a Russian made "Kornet" missile that targeted his position. He was fighting in the lines of the Somoud Brigade, in support to al-Serraj's forces.

 

The presence of imported jihadists in Western Libya is an additional destabilizing factor for Libya and serious problem for Europe. It is also an issue that could have been prevented.

It is not a sin to say that part of the responsibility can also be traced to Italy's initial decision to support al-Serraj's government, due to its debatable legitimacy provided by actors such as the UN.

Italy and Libya

Italy historically maintained strong links with Western Libya (not only as a former colony, but also due to Eni installations and economic relations with Tripoli ); as a consequence, it was preferred to take Fayez al-Sarraj's side (together with Turkey and Qatar) while in the meantime maintaining the rhetoric of mediation, claiming not to be in favor of anyone but rather "in favor of the Libyan people".

However, Rome's connections to the GNA are evident from Italy's strong activity through its diplomatic HQ in Tripoli, its military presence (around 350 soldiers) in Misrata to safeguard the military field hospital, its political support to the al-Sarraj government and material support to its militias operating on the coast, officially to "contain illegal immigration", even though the results were not as positive as expected. Let's keep in mind how in July 2019 al-Sarraj flew to Milan to meet with Matteo Salvini (who was Minister of Interior at the time) in order to look for support as the situation became far more complicated for Tripoli. It was already clear at the time how Italy was moving towards a more neutral position, retreating the support to Serraj while, at the same time, not taking side with Haftar.

 

Was it a wrong move? Not necessarily. Infact, Italy should have never backed al-Serraj's government in the first place and the risks of such support were predictable.

First of all, al-Sarraj was not supported by a real army, but rather by a galaxy of militias related to different realities such as Ikhwanis, Salafis, local warlords and former members of the Libyan army, all kept together by specific economic and political interests. These militias have managed to create an oligopoly of resources, influencing all sectors in Western Libya. Can such actors be considered reliable representatives in order to pursue a stability in Libya? Obviously not.

Secondly, it is very likely that it is not Fayez al-Sarraj who is controlling the militias but it's rather the other way around.

Thirdly, al-Sarraj's government is heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood*, a radical Islamist organization that has been blacklisted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Emirates, Syria and Russia. Siding with Tripoli and Misrata means siding with Islamist and jihadist factions and facts speak for themselves. Any country that is taking into consideration a potential line up with Islamists should ponder very well such option, because it will very likely lead to serious consequences in the medium-long term, as Libya could very well become the next Syria.

 

In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the vicinity between the Islamist government in Tripoli and Rome can also be partially considered a heritage of the disastrous foreign policy perpetrated by the Obama administration during the so-called "Arab Springs", when the Muslim Brotherhood became the privileged political actor that was due to take over in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria as part of a regime-change project. However, things did not evolve as planned and the whole region collapsed into chaos.

The big question is, how wide is the Italian government's maneuver margin? Even within issues of its own national interest? Backing a side that showed clear signs of unreliability and making decisions that, as a consequence, brought hundreds, if not thousands, of jihadists a few miles away from the Italian coasts cannot be considered as pursing Italy's best interests.

Italian Communist leader Marco Rizzo recently claimed, during a video speech on Assad's interview that was transmitted by the Italian national TV "Rai", that in Italy there is no decision-making, but only executors who carry out directives that come from abroad. That's a very interesting point that is worth pondering on: how far can Italy go in taking decision for its own benefit?

In the meantime, the only thing to do is wait for the upcoming talks organized in Berlin, in order to see what the next chapter in Libya's tragic turmoil will be. At the moment the situation seems clear: Russia and Turkey are the ones in charge, Italy lost its "mediating" role, putting at stake its own interests and the EU does not have a common foreign policy in Libya.


Читайте больше на https://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/144227-libyan_chaos/

Libyan chaos as Berlin conference approaches and Italian fiasco

On January 14th 2020, the notorious Russian Telegram channel "Directorate4" showed the ID card of a Syrian "rebel" (by the name Muhammet Turkman) that was recovered in an area in the south-east of Tripoli, bringing up more evidence about the arrival of Syrian jihadists that have been transferred by Turkey from the north-west of Syria in order to support the Islamist government led by al-Serraj. A predictable move after Tripoli's official request for support that was granted by a signed agreement with Ankara.

The flow of Syrian jihadists to Libya was also cited by King Hussein of Jordan during an interview with the French TV channel France 24.

These same militias that were used in Syria with the objective of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad's government. An internationally-backed project that failed thanks to the Russian military intervention initiated in September 2015.

Additionally, the links between militias fighting on Tripoli's side and jihadists belonging to Isis and Ansar al-Sharia have emerged on several occasions and, as a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning the presence of individuals such as Adel al-Rubaie, Issa al-Busti, Massound al-Akouri and Mohamed Mahmoud Ben Dardaf; this last name was well known in East Libya as the jihadist was included in Haftar's "most wanted list"  due to his participation in the assault against the US Consulate in Benghazi, back in September 2012. Ben Dardaf was killed in May 2019 by a Russian made "Kornet" missile that targeted his position. He was fighting in the lines of the Somoud Brigade, in support to al-Serraj's forces.

 

The presence of imported jihadists in Western Libya is an additional destabilizing factor for Libya and serious problem for Europe. It is also an issue that could have been prevented.

It is not a sin to say that part of the responsibility can also be traced to Italy's initial decision to support al-Serraj's government, due to its debatable legitimacy provided by actors such as the UN.

Italy and Libya

Italy historically maintained strong links with Western Libya (not only as a former colony, but also due to Eni installations and economic relations with Tripoli ); as a consequence, it was preferred to take Fayez al-Sarraj's side (together with Turkey and Qatar) while in the meantime maintaining the rhetoric of mediation, claiming not to be in favor of anyone but rather "in favor of the Libyan people".

However, Rome's connections to the GNA are evident from Italy's strong activity through its diplomatic HQ in Tripoli, its military presence (around 350 soldiers) in Misrata to safeguard the military field hospital, its political support to the al-Sarraj government and material support to its militias operating on the coast, officially to "contain illegal immigration", even though the results were not as positive as expected. Let's keep in mind how in July 2019 al-Sarraj flew to Milan to meet with Matteo Salvini (who was Minister of Interior at the time) in order to look for support as the situation became far more complicated for Tripoli. It was already clear at the time how Italy was moving towards a more neutral position, retreating the support to Serraj while, at the same time, not taking side with Haftar.

 

Was it a wrong move? Not necessarily. Infact, Italy should have never backed al-Serraj's government in the first place and the risks of such support were predictable.

First of all, al-Sarraj was not supported by a real army, but rather by a galaxy of militias related to different realities such as Ikhwanis, Salafis, local warlords and former members of the Libyan army, all kept together by specific economic and political interests. These militias have managed to create an oligopoly of resources, influencing all sectors in Western Libya. Can such actors be considered reliable representatives in order to pursue a stability in Libya? Obviously not.

Secondly, it is very likely that it is not Fayez al-Sarraj who is controlling the militias but it's rather the other way around.

Thirdly, al-Sarraj's government is heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood*, a radical Islamist organization that has been blacklisted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Emirates, Syria and Russia. Siding with Tripoli and Misrata means siding with Islamist and jihadist factions and facts speak for themselves. Any country that is taking into consideration a potential line up with Islamists should ponder very well such option, because it will very likely lead to serious consequences in the medium-long term, as Libya could very well become the next Syria.

 

In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the vicinity between the Islamist government in Tripoli and Rome can also be partially considered a heritage of the disastrous foreign policy perpetrated by the Obama administration during the so-called "Arab Springs", when the Muslim Brotherhood became the privileged political actor that was due to take over in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria as part of a regime-change project. However, things did not evolve as planned and the whole region collapsed into chaos.

The big question is, how wide is the Italian government's maneuver margin? Even within issues of its own national interest? Backing a side that showed clear signs of unreliability and making decisions that, as a consequence, brought hundreds, if not thousands, of jihadists a few miles away from the Italian coasts cannot be considered as pursing Italy's best interests.

Italian Communist leader Marco Rizzo recently claimed, during a video speech on Assad's interview that was transmitted by the Italian national TV "Rai", that in Italy there is no decision-making, but only executors who carry out directives that come from abroad. That's a very interesting point that is worth pondering on: how far can Italy go in taking decision for its own benefit?

In the meantime, the only thing to do is wait for the upcoming talks organized in Berlin, in order to see what the next chapter in Libya's tragic turmoil will be. At the moment the situation seems clear: Russia and Turkey are the ones in charge, Italy lost its "mediating" role, putting at stake its own interests and the EU does not have a common foreign policy in Libya.


Читайте больше на https://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/144227-libyan_chaos/

Libyan chaos as Berlin conference approaches and Italian fiasco

On January 14th 2020, the notorious Russian Telegram channel "Directorate4" showed the ID card of a Syrian "rebel" (by the name Muhammet Turkman) that was recovered in an area in the south-east of Tripoli, bringing up more evidence about the arrival of Syrian jihadists that have been transferred by Turkey from the north-west of Syria in order to support the Islamist government led by al-Serraj. A predictable move after Tripoli's official request for support that was granted by a signed agreement with Ankara.

The flow of Syrian jihadists to Libya was also cited by King Hussein of Jordan during an interview with the French TV channel France 24.

These same militias that were used in Syria with the objective of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad's government. An internationally-backed project that failed thanks to the Russian military intervention initiated in September 2015.

Additionally, the links between militias fighting on Tripoli's side and jihadists belonging to Isis and Ansar al-Sharia have emerged on several occasions and, as a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning the presence of individuals such as Adel al-Rubaie, Issa al-Busti, Massound al-Akouri and Mohamed Mahmoud Ben Dardaf; this last name was well known in East Libya as the jihadist was included in Haftar's "most wanted list"  due to his participation in the assault against the US Consulate in Benghazi, back in September 2012. Ben Dardaf was killed in May 2019 by a Russian made "Kornet" missile that targeted his position. He was fighting in the lines of the Somoud Brigade, in support to al-Serraj's forces.

 

The presence of imported jihadists in Western Libya is an additional destabilizing factor for Libya and serious problem for Europe. It is also an issue that could have been prevented.

It is not a sin to say that part of the responsibility can also be traced to Italy's initial decision to support al-Serraj's government, due to its debatable legitimacy provided by actors such as the UN.

Italy and Libya

Italy historically maintained strong links with Western Libya (not only as a former colony, but also due to Eni installations and economic relations with Tripoli ); as a consequence, it was preferred to take Fayez al-Sarraj's side (together with Turkey and Qatar) while in the meantime maintaining the rhetoric of mediation, claiming not to be in favor of anyone but rather "in favor of the Libyan people".

However, Rome's connections to the GNA are evident from Italy's strong activity through its diplomatic HQ in Tripoli, its military presence (around 350 soldiers) in Misrata to safeguard the military field hospital, its political support to the al-Sarraj government and material support to its militias operating on the coast, officially to "contain illegal immigration", even though the results were not as positive as expected. Let's keep in mind how in July 2019 al-Sarraj flew to Milan to meet with Matteo Salvini (who was Minister of Interior at the time) in order to look for support as the situation became far more complicated for Tripoli. It was already clear at the time how Italy was moving towards a more neutral position, retreating the support to Serraj while, at the same time, not taking side with Haftar.

 

Was it a wrong move? Not necessarily. Infact, Italy should have never backed al-Serraj's government in the first place and the risks of such support were predictable.

First of all, al-Sarraj was not supported by a real army, but rather by a galaxy of militias related to different realities such as Ikhwanis, Salafis, local warlords and former members of the Libyan army, all kept together by specific economic and political interests. These militias have managed to create an oligopoly of resources, influencing all sectors in Western Libya. Can such actors be considered reliable representatives in order to pursue a stability in Libya? Obviously not.

Secondly, it is very likely that it is not Fayez al-Sarraj who is controlling the militias but it's rather the other way around.

Thirdly, al-Sarraj's government is heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood*, a radical Islamist organization that has been blacklisted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Emirates, Syria and Russia. Siding with Tripoli and Misrata means siding with Islamist and jihadist factions and facts speak for themselves. Any country that is taking into consideration a potential line up with Islamists should ponder very well such option, because it will very likely lead to serious consequences in the medium-long term, as Libya could very well become the next Syria.

 

In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the vicinity between the Islamist government in Tripoli and Rome can also be partially considered a heritage of the disastrous foreign policy perpetrated by the Obama administration during the so-called "Arab Springs", when the Muslim Brotherhood became the privileged political actor that was due to take over in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria as part of a regime-change project. However, things did not evolve as planned and the whole region collapsed into chaos.

The big question is, how wide is the Italian government's maneuver margin? Even within issues of its own national interest? Backing a side that showed clear signs of unreliability and making decisions that, as a consequence, brought hundreds, if not thousands, of jihadists a few miles away from the Italian coasts cannot be considered as pursing Italy's best interests.

Italian Communist leader Marco Rizzo recently claimed, during a video speech on Assad's interview that was transmitted by the Italian national TV "Rai", that in Italy there is no decision-making, but only executors who carry out directives that come from abroad. That's a very interesting point that is worth pondering on: how far can Italy go in taking decision for its own benefit?

In the meantime, the only thing to do is wait for the upcoming talks organized in Berlin, in order to see what the next chapter in Libya's tragic turmoil will be. At the moment the situation seems clear: Russia and Turkey are the ones in charge, Italy lost its "mediating" role, putting at stake its own interests and the EU does not have a common foreign policy in Libya.


Читайте больше на https://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/144227-libyan_chaos/

Libyan chaos as Berlin conference approaches and Italian fiasco

On January 14th 2020, the notorious Russian Telegram channel "Directorate4" showed the ID card of a Syrian "rebel" (by the name Muhammet Turkman) that was recovered in an area in the south-east of Tripoli, bringing up more evidence about the arrival of Syrian jihadists that have been transferred by Turkey from the north-west of Syria in order to support the Islamist government led by al-Serraj. A predictable move after Tripoli's official request for support that was granted by a signed agreement with Ankara.

The flow of Syrian jihadists to Libya was also cited by King Hussein of Jordan during an interview with the French TV channel France 24.

These same militias that were used in Syria with the objective of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad's government. An internationally-backed project that failed thanks to the Russian military intervention initiated in September 2015.

Additionally, the links between militias fighting on Tripoli's side and jihadists belonging to Isis and Ansar al-Sharia have emerged on several occasions and, as a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning the presence of individuals such as Adel al-Rubaie, Issa al-Busti, Massound al-Akouri and Mohamed Mahmoud Ben Dardaf; this last name was well known in East Libya as the jihadist was included in Haftar's "most wanted list"  due to his participation in the assault against the US Consulate in Benghazi, back in September 2012. Ben Dardaf was killed in May 2019 by a Russian made "Kornet" missile that targeted his position. He was fighting in the lines of the Somoud Brigade, in support to al-Serraj's forces.

 

The presence of imported jihadists in Western Libya is an additional destabilizing factor for Libya and serious problem for Europe. It is also an issue that could have been prevented.

It is not a sin to say that part of the responsibility can also be traced to Italy's initial decision to support al-Serraj's government, due to its debatable legitimacy provided by actors such as the UN.

Italy and Libya

Italy historically maintained strong links with Western Libya (not only as a former colony, but also due to Eni installations and economic relations with Tripoli ); as a consequence, it was preferred to take Fayez al-Sarraj's side (together with Turkey and Qatar) while in the meantime maintaining the rhetoric of mediation, claiming not to be in favor of anyone but rather "in favor of the Libyan people".

However, Rome's connections to the GNA are evident from Italy's strong activity through its diplomatic HQ in Tripoli, its military presence (around 350 soldiers) in Misrata to safeguard the military field hospital, its political support to the al-Sarraj government and material support to its militias operating on the coast, officially to "contain illegal immigration", even though the results were not as positive as expected. Let's keep in mind how in July 2019 al-Sarraj flew to Milan to meet with Matteo Salvini (who was Minister of Interior at the time) in order to look for support as the situation became far more complicated for Tripoli. It was already clear at the time how Italy was moving towards a more neutral position, retreating the support to Serraj while, at the same time, not taking side with Haftar.

 

Was it a wrong move? Not necessarily. Infact, Italy should have never backed al-Serraj's government in the first place and the risks of such support were predictable.

First of all, al-Sarraj was not supported by a real army, but rather by a galaxy of militias related to different realities such as Ikhwanis, Salafis, local warlords and former members of the Libyan army, all kept together by specific economic and political interests. These militias have managed to create an oligopoly of resources, influencing all sectors in Western Libya. Can such actors be considered reliable representatives in order to pursue a stability in Libya? Obviously not.

Secondly, it is very likely that it is not Fayez al-Sarraj who is controlling the militias but it's rather the other way around.

Thirdly, al-Sarraj's government is heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood*, a radical Islamist organization that has been blacklisted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Emirates, Syria and Russia. Siding with Tripoli and Misrata means siding with Islamist and jihadist factions and facts speak for themselves. Any country that is taking into consideration a potential line up with Islamists should ponder very well such option, because it will very likely lead to serious consequences in the medium-long term, as Libya could very well become the next Syria.

 

In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the vicinity between the Islamist government in Tripoli and Rome can also be partially considered a heritage of the disastrous foreign policy perpetrated by the Obama administration during the so-called "Arab Springs", when the Muslim Brotherhood became the privileged political actor that was due to take over in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria as part of a regime-change project. However, things did not evolve as planned and the whole region collapsed into chaos.

The big question is, how wide is the Italian government's maneuver margin? Even within issues of its own national interest? Backing a side that showed clear signs of unreliability and making decisions that, as a consequence, brought hundreds, if not thousands, of jihadists a few miles away from the Italian coasts cannot be considered as pursing Italy's best interests.

Italian Communist leader Marco Rizzo recently claimed, during a video speech on Assad's interview that was transmitted by the Italian national TV "Rai", that in Italy there is no decision-making, but only executors who carry out directives that come from abroad. That's a very interesting point that is worth pondering on: how far can Italy go in taking decision for its own benefit?

In the meantime, the only thing to do is wait for the upcoming talks organized in Berlin, in order to see what the next chapter in Libya's tragic turmoil will be. At the moment the situation seems clear: Russia and Turkey are the ones in charge, Italy lost its "mediating" role, putting at stake its own interests and the EU does not have a common foreign policy in Libya.


Читайте больше на https://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/144227-libyan_chaos/

Libyan chaos as Berlin conference approaches and Italian fiasco

On January 14th 2020, the notorious Russian Telegram channel "Directorate4" showed the ID card of a Syrian "rebel" (by the name Muhammet Turkman) that was recovered in an area in the south-east of Tripoli, bringing up more evidence about the arrival of Syrian jihadists that have been transferred by Turkey from the north-west of Syria in order to support the Islamist government led by al-Serraj. A predictable move after Tripoli's official request for support that was granted by a signed agreement with Ankara.

The flow of Syrian jihadists to Libya was also cited by King Hussein of Jordan during an interview with the French TV channel France 24.

These same militias that were used in Syria with the objective of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad's government. An internationally-backed project that failed thanks to the Russian military intervention initiated in September 2015.

Additionally, the links between militias fighting on Tripoli's side and jihadists belonging to Isis and Ansar al-Sharia have emerged on several occasions and, as a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning the presence of individuals such as Adel al-Rubaie, Issa al-Busti, Massound al-Akouri and Mohamed Mahmoud Ben Dardaf; this last name was well known in East Libya as the jihadist was included in Haftar's "most wanted list"  due to his participation in the assault against the US Consulate in Benghazi, back in September 2012. Ben Dardaf was killed in May 2019 by a Russian made "Kornet" missile that targeted his position. He was fighting in the lines of the Somoud Brigade, in support to al-Serraj's forces.

 

The presence of imported jihadists in Western Libya is an additional destabilizing factor for Libya and serious problem for Europe. It is also an issue that could have been prevented.

It is not a sin to say that part of the responsibility can also be traced to Italy's initial decision to support al-Serraj's government, due to its debatable legitimacy provided by actors such as the UN.

Italy and Libya

Italy historically maintained strong links with Western Libya (not only as a former colony, but also due to Eni installations and economic relations with Tripoli ); as a consequence, it was preferred to take Fayez al-Sarraj's side (together with Turkey and Qatar) while in the meantime maintaining the rhetoric of mediation, claiming not to be in favor of anyone but rather "in favor of the Libyan people".

However, Rome's connections to the GNA are evident from Italy's strong activity through its diplomatic HQ in Tripoli, its military presence (around 350 soldiers) in Misrata to safeguard the military field hospital, its political support to the al-Sarraj government and material support to its militias operating on the coast, officially to "contain illegal immigration", even though the results were not as positive as expected. Let's keep in mind how in July 2019 al-Sarraj flew to Milan to meet with Matteo Salvini (who was Minister of Interior at the time) in order to look for support as the situation became far more complicated for Tripoli. It was already clear at the time how Italy was moving towards a more neutral position, retreating the support to Serraj while, at the same time, not taking side with Haftar.

 

Was it a wrong move? Not necessarily. Infact, Italy should have never backed al-Serraj's government in the first place and the risks of such support were predictable.

First of all, al-Sarraj was not supported by a real army, but rather by a galaxy of militias related to different realities such as Ikhwanis, Salafis, local warlords and former members of the Libyan army, all kept together by specific economic and political interests. These militias have managed to create an oligopoly of resources, influencing all sectors in Western Libya. Can such actors be considered reliable representatives in order to pursue a stability in Libya? Obviously not.

Secondly, it is very likely that it is not Fayez al-Sarraj who is controlling the militias but it's rather the other way around.

Thirdly, al-Sarraj's government is heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood*, a radical Islamist organization that has been blacklisted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Emirates, Syria and Russia. Siding with Tripoli and Misrata means siding with Islamist and jihadist factions and facts speak for themselves. Any country that is taking into consideration a potential line up with Islamists should ponder very well such option, because it will very likely lead to serious consequences in the medium-long term, as Libya could very well become the next Syria.

 

In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the vicinity between the Islamist government in Tripoli and Rome can also be partially considered a heritage of the disastrous foreign policy perpetrated by the Obama administration during the so-called "Arab Springs", when the Muslim Brotherhood became the privileged political actor that was due to take over in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria as part of a regime-change project. However, things did not evolve as planned and the whole region collapsed into chaos.

The big question is, how wide is the Italian government's maneuver margin? Even within issues of its own national interest? Backing a side that showed clear signs of unreliability and making decisions that, as a consequence, brought hundreds, if not thousands, of jihadists a few miles away from the Italian coasts cannot be considered as pursing Italy's best interests.

Italian Communist leader Marco Rizzo recently claimed, during a video speech on Assad's interview that was transmitted by the Italian national TV "Rai", that in Italy there is no decision-making, but only executors who carry out directives that come from abroad. That's a very interesting point that is worth pondering on: how far can Italy go in taking decision for its own benefit?

In the meantime, the only thing to do is wait for the upcoming talks organized in Berlin, in order to see what the next chapter in Libya's tragic turmoil will be. At the moment the situation seems clear: Russia and Turkey are the ones in charge, Italy lost its "mediating" role, putting at stake its own interests and the EU does not have a common foreign policy in Libya.


Читайте больше на https://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/144227-libyan_chaos/

Libyan chaos as Berlin conference approaches and Italian fiasco

On January 14th 2020, the notorious Russian Telegram channel "Directorate4" showed the ID card of a Syrian "rebel" (by the name Muhammet Turkman) that was recovered in an area in the south-east of Tripoli, bringing up more evidence about the arrival of Syrian jihadists that have been transferred by Turkey from the north-west of Syria in order to support the Islamist government led by al-Serraj. A predictable move after Tripoli's official request for support that was granted by a signed agreement with Ankara.

The flow of Syrian jihadists to Libya was also cited by King Hussein of Jordan during an interview with the French TV channel France 24.

These same militias that were used in Syria with the objective of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad's government. An internationally-backed project that failed thanks to the Russian military intervention initiated in September 2015.

Additionally, the links between militias fighting on Tripoli's side and jihadists belonging to Isis and Ansar al-Sharia have emerged on several occasions and, as a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning the presence of individuals such as Adel al-Rubaie, Issa al-Busti, Massound al-Akouri and Mohamed Mahmoud Ben Dardaf; this last name was well known in East Libya as the jihadist was included in Haftar's "most wanted list"  due to his participation in the assault against the US Consulate in Benghazi, back in September 2012. Ben Dardaf was killed in May 2019 by a Russian made "Kornet" missile that targeted his position. He was fighting in the lines of the Somoud Brigade, in support to al-Serraj's forces.

 

The presence of imported jihadists in Western Libya is an additional destabilizing factor for Libya and serious problem for Europe. It is also an issue that could have been prevented.

It is not a sin to say that part of the responsibility can also be traced to Italy's initial decision to support al-Serraj's government, due to its debatable legitimacy provided by actors such as the UN.

Italy and Libya

Italy historically maintained strong links with Western Libya (not only as a former colony, but also due to Eni installations and economic relations with Tripoli ); as a consequence, it was preferred to take Fayez al-Sarraj's side (together with Turkey and Qatar) while in the meantime maintaining the rhetoric of mediation, claiming not to be in favor of anyone but rather "in favor of the Libyan people".

However, Rome's connections to the GNA are evident from Italy's strong activity through its diplomatic HQ in Tripoli, its military presence (around 350 soldiers) in Misrata to safeguard the military field hospital, its political support to the al-Sarraj government and material support to its militias operating on the coast, officially to "contain illegal immigration", even though the results were not as positive as expected. Let's keep in mind how in July 2019 al-Sarraj flew to Milan to meet with Matteo Salvini (who was Minister of Interior at the time) in order to look for support as the situation became far more complicated for Tripoli. It was already clear at the time how Italy was moving towards a more neutral position, retreating the support to Serraj while, at the same time, not taking side with Haftar.

 

Was it a wrong move? Not necessarily. Infact, Italy should have never backed al-Serraj's government in the first place and the risks of such support were predictable.

First of all, al-Sarraj was not supported by a real army, but rather by a galaxy of militias related to different realities such as Ikhwanis, Salafis, local warlords and former members of the Libyan army, all kept together by specific economic and political interests. These militias have managed to create an oligopoly of resources, influencing all sectors in Western Libya. Can such actors be considered reliable representatives in order to pursue a stability in Libya? Obviously not.

Secondly, it is very likely that it is not Fayez al-Sarraj who is controlling the militias but it's rather the other way around.

Thirdly, al-Sarraj's government is heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood*, a radical Islamist organization that has been blacklisted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Emirates, Syria and Russia. Siding with Tripoli and Misrata means siding with Islamist and jihadist factions and facts speak for themselves. Any country that is taking into consideration a potential line up with Islamists should ponder very well such option, because it will very likely lead to serious consequences in the medium-long term, as Libya could very well become the next Syria.

 

In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the vicinity between the Islamist government in Tripoli and Rome can also be partially considered a heritage of the disastrous foreign policy perpetrated by the Obama administration during the so-called "Arab Springs", when the Muslim Brotherhood became the privileged political actor that was due to take over in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria as part of a regime-change project. However, things did not evolve as planned and the whole region collapsed into chaos.

The big question is, how wide is the Italian government's maneuver margin? Even within issues of its own national interest? Backing a side that showed clear signs of unreliability and making decisions that, as a consequence, brought hundreds, if not thousands, of jihadists a few miles away from the Italian coasts cannot be considered as pursing Italy's best interests.

Italian Communist leader Marco Rizzo recently claimed, during a video speech on Assad's interview that was transmitted by the Italian national TV "Rai", that in Italy there is no decision-making, but only executors who carry out directives that come from abroad. That's a very interesting point that is worth pondering on: how far can Italy go in taking decision for its own benefit?

In the meantime, the only thing to do is wait for the upcoming talks organized in Berlin, in order to see what the next chapter in Libya's tragic turmoil will be. At the moment the situation seems clear: Russia and Turkey are the ones in charge, Italy lost its "mediating" role, putting at stake its own interests and the EU does not have a common foreign policy in Libya.


Читайте больше на https://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/144227-libyan_chaos/

Libyan chaos as Berlin conference approaches and Italian fiasco

On January 14th 2020, the notorious Russian Telegram channel "Directorate4" showed the ID card of a Syrian "rebel" (by the name Muhammet Turkman) that was recovered in an area in the south-east of Tripoli, bringing up more evidence about the arrival of Syrian jihadists that have been transferred by Turkey from the north-west of Syria in order to support the Islamist government led by al-Serraj. A predictable move after Tripoli's official request for support that was granted by a signed agreement with Ankara.

The flow of Syrian jihadists to Libya was also cited by King Hussein of Jordan during an interview with the French TV channel France 24.

These same militias that were used in Syria with the objective of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad's government. An internationally-backed project that failed thanks to the Russian military intervention initiated in September 2015.

Additionally, the links between militias fighting on Tripoli's side and jihadists belonging to Isis and Ansar al-Sharia have emerged on several occasions and, as a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning the presence of individuals such as Adel al-Rubaie, Issa al-Busti, Massound al-Akouri and Mohamed Mahmoud Ben Dardaf; this last name was well known in East Libya as the jihadist was included in Haftar's "most wanted list"  due to his participation in the assault against the US Consulate in Benghazi, back in September 2012. Ben Dardaf was killed in May 2019 by a Russian made "Kornet" missile that targeted his position. He was fighting in the lines of the Somoud Brigade, in support to al-Serraj's forces.

 

The presence of imported jihadists in Western Libya is an additional destabilizing factor for Libya and serious problem for Europe. It is also an issue that could have been prevented.

It is not a sin to say that part of the responsibility can also be traced to Italy's initial decision to support al-Serraj's government, due to its debatable legitimacy provided by actors such as the UN.

Italy and Libya

Italy historically maintained strong links with Western Libya (not only as a former colony, but also due to Eni installations and economic relations with Tripoli ); as a consequence, it was preferred to take Fayez al-Sarraj's side (together with Turkey and Qatar) while in the meantime maintaining the rhetoric of mediation, claiming not to be in favor of anyone but rather "in favor of the Libyan people".

However, Rome's connections to the GNA are evident from Italy's strong activity through its diplomatic HQ in Tripoli, its military presence (around 350 soldiers) in Misrata to safeguard the military field hospital, its political support to the al-Sarraj government and material support to its militias operating on the coast, officially to "contain illegal immigration", even though the results were not as positive as expected. Let's keep in mind how in July 2019 al-Sarraj flew to Milan to meet with Matteo Salvini (who was Minister of Interior at the time) in order to look for support as the situation became far more complicated for Tripoli. It was already clear at the time how Italy was moving towards a more neutral position, retreating the support to Serraj while, at the same time, not taking side with Haftar.

 

Was it a wrong move? Not necessarily. Infact, Italy should have never backed al-Serraj's government in the first place and the risks of such support were predictable.

First of all, al-Sarraj was not supported by a real army, but rather by a galaxy of militias related to different realities such as Ikhwanis, Salafis, local warlords and former members of the Libyan army, all kept together by specific economic and political interests. These militias have managed to create an oligopoly of resources, influencing all sectors in Western Libya. Can such actors be considered reliable representatives in order to pursue a stability in Libya? Obviously not.

Secondly, it is very likely that it is not Fayez al-Sarraj who is controlling the militias but it's rather the other way around.

Thirdly, al-Sarraj's government is heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood*, a radical Islamist organization that has been blacklisted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Emirates, Syria and Russia. Siding with Tripoli and Misrata means siding with Islamist and jihadist factions and facts speak for themselves. Any country that is taking into consideration a potential line up with Islamists should ponder very well such option, because it will very likely lead to serious consequences in the medium-long term, as Libya could very well become the next Syria.

 

In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the vicinity between the Islamist government in Tripoli and Rome can also be partially considered a heritage of the disastrous foreign policy perpetrated by the Obama administration during the so-called "Arab Springs", when the Muslim Brotherhood became the privileged political actor that was due to take over in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria as part of a regime-change project. However, things did not evolve as planned and the whole region collapsed into chaos.

The big question is, how wide is the Italian government's maneuver margin? Even within issues of its own national interest? Backing a side that showed clear signs of unreliability and making decisions that, as a consequence, brought hundreds, if not thousands, of jihadists a few miles away from the Italian coasts cannot be considered as pursing Italy's best interests.

Italian Communist leader Marco Rizzo recently claimed, during a video speech on Assad's interview that was transmitted by the Italian national TV "Rai", that in Italy there is no decision-making, but only executors who carry out directives that come from abroad. That's a very interesting point that is worth pondering on: how far can Italy go in taking decision for its own benefit?

In the meantime, the only thing to do is wait for the upcoming talks organized in Berlin, in order to see what the next chapter in Libya's tragic turmoil will be. At the moment the situation seems clear: Russia and Turkey are the ones in charge, Italy lost its "mediating" role, putting at stake its own interests and the EU does not have a common foreign policy in Libya.


Читайте больше на https://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/144227-libyan_chaos/

Libyan chaos as Berlin conference approaches and Italian fiasco

On January 14th 2020, the notorious Russian Telegram channel "Directorate4" showed the ID card of a Syrian "rebel" (by the name Muhammet Turkman) that was recovered in an area in the south-east of Tripoli, bringing up more evidence about the arrival of Syrian jihadists that have been transferred by Turkey from the north-west of Syria in order to support the Islamist government led by al-Serraj. A predictable move after Tripoli's official request for support that was granted by a signed agreement with Ankara.

The flow of Syrian jihadists to Libya was also cited by King Hussein of Jordan during an interview with the French TV channel France 24.

These same militias that were used in Syria with the objective of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad's government. An internationally-backed project that failed thanks to the Russian military intervention initiated in September 2015.

Additionally, the links between militias fighting on Tripoli's side and jihadists belonging to Isis and Ansar al-Sharia have emerged on several occasions and, as a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning the presence of individuals such as Adel al-Rubaie, Issa al-Busti, Massound al-Akouri and Mohamed Mahmoud Ben Dardaf; this last name was well known in East Libya as the jihadist was included in Haftar's "most wanted list"  due to his participation in the assault against the US Consulate in Benghazi, back in September 2012. Ben Dardaf was killed in May 2019 by a Russian made "Kornet" missile that targeted his position. He was fighting in the lines of the Somoud Brigade, in support to al-Serraj's forces.

 

The presence of imported jihadists in Western Libya is an additional destabilizing factor for Libya and serious problem for Europe. It is also an issue that could have been prevented.

It is not a sin to say that part of the responsibility can also be traced to Italy's initial decision to support al-Serraj's government, due to its debatable legitimacy provided by actors such as the UN.

Italy and Libya

Italy historically maintained strong links with Western Libya (not only as a former colony, but also due to Eni installations and economic relations with Tripoli ); as a consequence, it was preferred to take Fayez al-Sarraj's side (together with Turkey and Qatar) while in the meantime maintaining the rhetoric of mediation, claiming not to be in favor of anyone but rather "in favor of the Libyan people".

However, Rome's connections to the GNA are evident from Italy's strong activity through its diplomatic HQ in Tripoli, its military presence (around 350 soldiers) in Misrata to safeguard the military field hospital, its political support to the al-Sarraj government and material support to its militias operating on the coast, officially to "contain illegal immigration", even though the results were not as positive as expected. Let's keep in mind how in July 2019 al-Sarraj flew to Milan to meet with Matteo Salvini (who was Minister of Interior at the time) in order to look for support as the situation became far more complicated for Tripoli. It was already clear at the time how Italy was moving towards a more neutral position, retreating the support to Serraj while, at the same time, not taking side with Haftar.

 

Was it a wrong move? Not necessarily. Infact, Italy should have never backed al-Serraj's government in the first place and the risks of such support were predictable.

First of all, al-Sarraj was not supported by a real army, but rather by a galaxy of militias related to different realities such as Ikhwanis, Salafis, local warlords and former members of the Libyan army, all kept together by specific economic and political interests. These militias have managed to create an oligopoly of resources, influencing all sectors in Western Libya. Can such actors be considered reliable representatives in order to pursue a stability in Libya? Obviously not.

Secondly, it is very likely that it is not Fayez al-Sarraj who is controlling the militias but it's rather the other way around.

Thirdly, al-Sarraj's government is heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood*, a radical Islamist organization that has been blacklisted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Emirates, Syria and Russia. Siding with Tripoli and Misrata means siding with Islamist and jihadist factions and facts speak for themselves. Any country that is taking into consideration a potential line up with Islamists should ponder very well such option, because it will very likely lead to serious consequences in the medium-long term, as Libya could very well become the next Syria.

 

In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the vicinity between the Islamist government in Tripoli and Rome can also be partially considered a heritage of the disastrous foreign policy perpetrated by the Obama administration during the so-called "Arab Springs", when the Muslim Brotherhood became the privileged political actor that was due to take over in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria as part of a regime-change project. However, things did not evolve as planned and the whole region collapsed into chaos.

The big question is, how wide is the Italian government's maneuver margin? Even within issues of its own national interest? Backing a side that showed clear signs of unreliability and making decisions that, as a consequence, brought hundreds, if not thousands, of jihadists a few miles away from the Italian coasts cannot be considered as pursing Italy's best interests.

Italian Communist leader Marco Rizzo recently claimed, during a video speech on Assad's interview that was transmitted by the Italian national TV "Rai", that in Italy there is no decision-making, but only executors who carry out directives that come from abroad. That's a very interesting point that is worth pondering on: how far can Italy go in taking decision for its own benefit?

In the meantime, the only thing to do is wait for the upcoming talks organized in Berlin, in order to see what the next chapter in Libya's tragic turmoil will be. At the moment the situation seems clear: Russia and Turkey are the ones in charge, Italy lost its "mediating" role, putting at stake its own interests and the EU does not have a common foreign policy in Libya.


Читайте больше на https://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/144227-libyan_chaos/

Libyan chaos as Berlin conference approaches and Italian fiasco

On January 14th 2020, the notorious Russian Telegram channel "Directorate4" showed the ID card of a Syrian "rebel" (by the name Muhammet Turkman) that was recovered in an area in the south-east of Tripoli, bringing up more evidence about the arrival of Syrian jihadists that have been transferred by Turkey from the north-west of Syria in order to support the Islamist government led by al-Serraj. A predictable move after Tripoli's official request for support that was granted by a signed agreement with Ankara.

The flow of Syrian jihadists to Libya was also cited by King Hussein of Jordan during an interview with the French TV channel France 24.

These same militias that were used in Syria with the objective of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad's government. An internationally-backed project that failed thanks to the Russian military intervention initiated in September 2015.

Additionally, the links between militias fighting on Tripoli's side and jihadists belonging to Isis and Ansar al-Sharia have emerged on several occasions and, as a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning the presence of individuals such as Adel al-Rubaie, Issa al-Busti, Massound al-Akouri and Mohamed Mahmoud Ben Dardaf; this last name was well known in East Libya as the jihadist was included in Haftar's "most wanted list"  due to his participation in the assault against the US Consulate in Benghazi, back in September 2012. Ben Dardaf was killed in May 2019 by a Russian made "Kornet" missile that targeted his position. He was fighting in the lines of the Somoud Brigade, in support to al-Serraj's forces.

 

The presence of imported jihadists in Western Libya is an additional destabilizing factor for Libya and serious problem for Europe. It is also an issue that could have been prevented.

It is not a sin to say that part of the responsibility can also be traced to Italy's initial decision to support al-Serraj's government, due to its debatable legitimacy provided by actors such as the UN.

Italy and Libya

Italy historically maintained strong links with Western Libya (not only as a former colony, but also due to Eni installations and economic relations with Tripoli ); as a consequence, it was preferred to take Fayez al-Sarraj's side (together with Turkey and Qatar) while in the meantime maintaining the rhetoric of mediation, claiming not to be in favor of anyone but rather "in favor of the Libyan people".

However, Rome's connections to the GNA are evident from Italy's strong activity through its diplomatic HQ in Tripoli, its military presence (around 350 soldiers) in Misrata to safeguard the military field hospital, its political support to the al-Sarraj government and material support to its militias operating on the coast, officially to "contain illegal immigration", even though the results were not as positive as expected. Let's keep in mind how in July 2019 al-Sarraj flew to Milan to meet with Matteo Salvini (who was Minister of Interior at the time) in order to look for support as the situation became far more complicated for Tripoli. It was already clear at the time how Italy was moving towards a more neutral position, retreating the support to Serraj while, at the same time, not taking side with Haftar.

 

Was it a wrong move? Not necessarily. Infact, Italy should have never backed al-Serraj's government in the first place and the risks of such support were predictable.

First of all, al-Sarraj was not supported by a real army, but rather by a galaxy of militias related to different realities such as Ikhwanis, Salafis, local warlords and former members of the Libyan army, all kept together by specific economic and political interests. These militias have managed to create an oligopoly of resources, influencing all sectors in Western Libya. Can such actors be considered reliable representatives in order to pursue a stability in Libya? Obviously not.

Secondly, it is very likely that it is not Fayez al-Sarraj who is controlling the militias but it's rather the other way around.

Thirdly, al-Sarraj's government is heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood*, a radical Islamist organization that has been blacklisted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Emirates, Syria and Russia. Siding with Tripoli and Misrata means siding with Islamist and jihadist factions and facts speak for themselves. Any country that is taking into consideration a potential line up with Islamists should ponder very well such option, because it will very likely lead to serious consequences in the medium-long term, as Libya could very well become the next Syria.

 

In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the vicinity between the Islamist government in Tripoli and Rome can also be partially considered a heritage of the disastrous foreign policy perpetrated by the Obama administration during the so-called "Arab Springs", when the Muslim Brotherhood became the privileged political actor that was due to take over in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria as part of a regime-change project. However, things did not evolve as planned and the whole region collapsed into chaos.

The big question is, how wide is the Italian government's maneuver margin? Even within issues of its own national interest? Backing a side that showed clear signs of unreliability and making decisions that, as a consequence, brought hundreds, if not thousands, of jihadists a few miles away from the Italian coasts cannot be considered as pursing Italy's best interests.

Italian Communist leader Marco Rizzo recently claimed, during a video speech on Assad's interview that was transmitted by the Italian national TV "Rai", that in Italy there is no decision-making, but only executors who carry out directives that come from abroad. That's a very interesting point that is worth pondering on: how far can Italy go in taking decision for its own benefit?

In the meantime, the only thing to do is wait for the upcoming talks organized in Berlin, in order to see what the next chapter in Libya's tragic turmoil will be. At the moment the situation seems clear: Russia and Turkey are the ones in charge, Italy lost its "mediating" role, putting at stake its own interests and the EU does not have a common foreign policy in Libya.


Читайте больше на https://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/144227-libyan_chaos/

Libyan chaos as Berlin conference approaches and Italian fiasco

On January 14th 2020, the notorious Russian Telegram channel "Directorate4" showed the ID card of a Syrian "rebel" (by the name Muhammet Turkman) that was recovered in an area in the south-east of Tripoli, bringing up more evidence about the arrival of Syrian jihadists that have been transferred by Turkey from the north-west of Syria in order to support the Islamist government led by al-Serraj. A predictable move after Tripoli's official request for support that was granted by a signed agreement with Ankara.

The flow of Syrian jihadists to Libya was also cited by King Hussein of Jordan during an interview with the French TV channel France 24.

These same militias that were used in Syria with the objective of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad's government. An internationally-backed project that failed thanks to the Russian military intervention initiated in September 2015.

Additionally, the links between militias fighting on Tripoli's side and jihadists belonging to Isis and Ansar al-Sharia have emerged on several occasions and, as a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning the presence of individuals such as Adel al-Rubaie, Issa al-Busti, Massound al-Akouri and Mohamed Mahmoud Ben Dardaf; this last name was well known in East Libya as the jihadist was included in Haftar's "most wanted list"  due to his participation in the assault against the US Consulate in Benghazi, back in September 2012. Ben Dardaf was killed in May 2019 by a Russian made "Kornet" missile that targeted his position. He was fighting in the lines of the Somoud Brigade, in support to al-Serraj's forces.

 

The presence of imported jihadists in Western Libya is an additional destabilizing factor for Libya and serious problem for Europe. It is also an issue that could have been prevented.

It is not a sin to say that part of the responsibility can also be traced to Italy's initial decision to support al-Serraj's government, due to its debatable legitimacy provided by actors such as the UN.

Italy and Libya

Italy historically maintained strong links with Western Libya (not only as a former colony, but also due to Eni installations and economic relations with Tripoli ); as a consequence, it was preferred to take Fayez al-Sarraj's side (together with Turkey and Qatar) while in the meantime maintaining the rhetoric of mediation, claiming not to be in favor of anyone but rather "in favor of the Libyan people".

However, Rome's connections to the GNA are evident from Italy's strong activity through its diplomatic HQ in Tripoli, its military presence (around 350 soldiers) in Misrata to safeguard the military field hospital, its political support to the al-Sarraj government and material support to its militias operating on the coast, officially to "contain illegal immigration", even though the results were not as positive as expected. Let's keep in mind how in July 2019 al-Sarraj flew to Milan to meet with Matteo Salvini (who was Minister of Interior at the time) in order to look for support as the situation became far more complicated for Tripoli. It was already clear at the time how Italy was moving towards a more neutral position, retreating the support to Serraj while, at the same time, not taking side with Haftar.

 

Was it a wrong move? Not necessarily. Infact, Italy should have never backed al-Serraj's government in the first place and the risks of such support were predictable.

First of all, al-Sarraj was not supported by a real army, but rather by a galaxy of militias related to different realities such as Ikhwanis, Salafis, local warlords and former members of the Libyan army, all kept together by specific economic and political interests. These militias have managed to create an oligopoly of resources, influencing all sectors in Western Libya. Can such actors be considered reliable representatives in order to pursue a stability in Libya? Obviously not.

Secondly, it is very likely that it is not Fayez al-Sarraj who is controlling the militias but it's rather the other way around.

Thirdly, al-Sarraj's government is heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood*, a radical Islamist organization that has been blacklisted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Emirates, Syria and Russia. Siding with Tripoli and Misrata means siding with Islamist and jihadist factions and facts speak for themselves. Any country that is taking into consideration a potential line up with Islamists should ponder very well such option, because it will very likely lead to serious consequences in the medium-long term, as Libya could very well become the next Syria.

 

In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the vicinity between the Islamist government in Tripoli and Rome can also be partially considered a heritage of the disastrous foreign policy perpetrated by the Obama administration during the so-called "Arab Springs", when the Muslim Brotherhood became the privileged political actor that was due to take over in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria as part of a regime-change project. However, things did not evolve as planned and the whole region collapsed into chaos.

The big question is, how wide is the Italian government's maneuver margin? Even within issues of its own national interest? Backing a side that showed clear signs of unreliability and making decisions that, as a consequence, brought hundreds, if not thousands, of jihadists a few miles away from the Italian coasts cannot be considered as pursing Italy's best interests.

Italian Communist leader Marco Rizzo recently claimed, during a video speech on Assad's interview that was transmitted by the Italian national TV "Rai", that in Italy there is no decision-making, but only executors who carry out directives that come from abroad. That's a very interesting point that is worth pondering on: how far can Italy go in taking decision for its own benefit?

In the meantime, the only thing to do is wait for the upcoming talks organized in Berlin, in order to see what the next chapter in Libya's tragic turmoil will be. At the moment the situation seems clear: Russia and Turkey are the ones in charge, Italy lost its "mediating" role, putting at stake its own interests and the EU does not have a common foreign policy in Libya.


Читайте больше на https://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/144227-libyan_chaos/

Libyan chaos as Berlin conference approaches and Italian fiasco

On January 14th 2020, the notorious Russian Telegram channel "Directorate4" showed the ID card of a Syrian "rebel" (by the name Muhammet Turkman) that was recovered in an area in the south-east of Tripoli, bringing up more evidence about the arrival of Syrian jihadists that have been transferred by Turkey from the north-west of Syria in order to support the Islamist government led by al-Serraj. A predictable move after Tripoli's official request for support that was granted by a signed agreement with Ankara.

The flow of Syrian jihadists to Libya was also cited by King Hussein of Jordan during an interview with the French TV channel France 24.

These same militias that were used in Syria with the objective of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad's government. An internationally-backed project that failed thanks to the Russian military intervention initiated in September 2015.

Additionally, the links between militias fighting on Tripoli's side and jihadists belonging to Isis and Ansar al-Sharia have emerged on several occasions and, as a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning the presence of individuals such as Adel al-Rubaie, Issa al-Busti, Massound al-Akouri and Mohamed Mahmoud Ben Dardaf; this last name was well known in East Libya as the jihadist was included in Haftar's "most wanted list"  due to his participation in the assault against the US Consulate in Benghazi, back in September 2012. Ben Dardaf was killed in May 2019 by a Russian made "Kornet" missile that targeted his position. He was fighting in the lines of the Somoud Brigade, in support to al-Serraj's forces.

 

The presence of imported jihadists in Western Libya is an additional destabilizing factor for Libya and serious problem for Europe. It is also an issue that could have been prevented.

It is not a sin to say that part of the responsibility can also be traced to Italy's initial decision to support al-Serraj's government, due to its debatable legitimacy provided by actors such as the UN.

Italy and Libya

Italy historically maintained strong links with Western Libya (not only as a former colony, but also due to Eni installations and economic relations with Tripoli ); as a consequence, it was preferred to take Fayez al-Sarraj's side (together with Turkey and Qatar) while in the meantime maintaining the rhetoric of mediation, claiming not to be in favor of anyone but rather "in favor of the Libyan people".

However, Rome's connections to the GNA are evident from Italy's strong activity through its diplomatic HQ in Tripoli, its military presence (around 350 soldiers) in Misrata to safeguard the military field hospital, its political support to the al-Sarraj government and material support to its militias operating on the coast, officially to "contain illegal immigration", even though the results were not as positive as expected. Let's keep in mind how in July 2019 al-Sarraj flew to Milan to meet with Matteo Salvini (who was Minister of Interior at the time) in order to look for support as the situation became far more complicated for Tripoli. It was already clear at the time how Italy was moving towards a more neutral position, retreating the support to Serraj while, at the same time, not taking side with Haftar.

 

Was it a wrong move? Not necessarily. Infact, Italy should have never backed al-Serraj's government in the first place and the risks of such support were predictable.

First of all, al-Sarraj was not supported by a real army, but rather by a galaxy of militias related to different realities such as Ikhwanis, Salafis, local warlords and former members of the Libyan army, all kept together by specific economic and political interests. These militias have managed to create an oligopoly of resources, influencing all sectors in Western Libya. Can such actors be considered reliable representatives in order to pursue a stability in Libya? Obviously not.

Secondly, it is very likely that it is not Fayez al-Sarraj who is controlling the militias but it's rather the other way around.

Thirdly, al-Sarraj's government is heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood*, a radical Islamist organization that has been blacklisted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Emirates, Syria and Russia. Siding with Tripoli and Misrata means siding with Islamist and jihadist factions and facts speak for themselves. Any country that is taking into consideration a potential line up with Islamists should ponder very well such option, because it will very likely lead to serious consequences in the medium-long term, as Libya could very well become the next Syria.

 

In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the vicinity between the Islamist government in Tripoli and Rome can also be partially considered a heritage of the disastrous foreign policy perpetrated by the Obama administration during the so-called "Arab Springs", when the Muslim Brotherhood became the privileged political actor that was due to take over in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria as part of a regime-change project. However, things did not evolve as planned and the whole region collapsed into chaos.

The big question is, how wide is the Italian government's maneuver margin? Even within issues of its own national interest? Backing a side that showed clear signs of unreliability and making decisions that, as a consequence, brought hundreds, if not thousands, of jihadists a few miles away from the Italian coasts cannot be considered as pursing Italy's best interests.

Italian Communist leader Marco Rizzo recently claimed, during a video speech on Assad's interview that was transmitted by the Italian national TV "Rai", that in Italy there is no decision-making, but only executors who carry out directives that come from abroad. That's a very interesting point that is worth pondering on: how far can Italy go in taking decision for its own benefit?

In the meantime, the only thing to do is wait for the upcoming talks organized in Berlin, in order to see what the next chapter in Libya's tragic turmoil will be. At the moment the situation seems clear: Russia and Turkey are the ones in charge, Italy lost its "mediating" role, putting at stake its own interests and the EU does not have a common foreign policy in Libya.


Читайте больше на https://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/144227-libyan_chaos/

Libyan chaos as Berlin conference approaches and Italian fiasco

On January 14th 2020, the notorious Russian Telegram channel "Directorate4" showed the ID card of a Syrian "rebel" (by the name Muhammet Turkman) that was recovered in an area in the south-east of Tripoli, bringing up more evidence about the arrival of Syrian jihadists that have been transferred by Turkey from the north-west of Syria in order to support the Islamist government led by al-Serraj. A predictable move after Tripoli's official request for support that was granted by a signed agreement with Ankara.

The flow of Syrian jihadists to Libya was also cited by King Hussein of Jordan during an interview with the French TV channel France 24.

These same militias that were used in Syria with the objective of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad's government. An internationally-backed project that failed thanks to the Russian military intervention initiated in September 2015.

Additionally, the links between militias fighting on Tripoli's side and jihadists belonging to Isis and Ansar al-Sharia have emerged on several occasions and, as a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning the presence of individuals such as Adel al-Rubaie, Issa al-Busti, Massound al-Akouri and Mohamed Mahmoud Ben Dardaf; this last name was well known in East Libya as the jihadist was included in Haftar's "most wanted list"  due to his participation in the assault against the US Consulate in Benghazi, back in September 2012. Ben Dardaf was killed in May 2019 by a Russian made "Kornet" missile that targeted his position. He was fighting in the lines of the Somoud Brigade, in support to al-Serraj's forces.

 

The presence of imported jihadists in Western Libya is an additional destabilizing factor for Libya and serious problem for Europe. It is also an issue that could have been prevented.

It is not a sin to say that part of the responsibility can also be traced to Italy's initial decision to support al-Serraj's government, due to its debatable legitimacy provided by actors such as the UN.

Italy and Libya

Italy historically maintained strong links with Western Libya (not only as a former colony, but also due to Eni installations and economic relations with Tripoli ); as a consequence, it was preferred to take Fayez al-Sarraj's side (together with Turkey and Qatar) while in the meantime maintaining the rhetoric of mediation, claiming not to be in favor of anyone but rather "in favor of the Libyan people".

However, Rome's connections to the GNA are evident from Italy's strong activity through its diplomatic HQ in Tripoli, its military presence (around 350 soldiers) in Misrata to safeguard the military field hospital, its political support to the al-Sarraj government and material support to its militias operating on the coast, officially to "contain illegal immigration", even though the results were not as positive as expected. Let's keep in mind how in July 2019 al-Sarraj flew to Milan to meet with Matteo Salvini (who was Minister of Interior at the time) in order to look for support as the situation became far more complicated for Tripoli. It was already clear at the time how Italy was moving towards a more neutral position, retreating the support to Serraj while, at the same time, not taking side with Haftar.

 

Was it a wrong move? Not necessarily. Infact, Italy should have never backed al-Serraj's government in the first place and the risks of such support were predictable.

First of all, al-Sarraj was not supported by a real army, but rather by a galaxy of militias related to different realities such as Ikhwanis, Salafis, local warlords and former members of the Libyan army, all kept together by specific economic and political interests. These militias have managed to create an oligopoly of resources, influencing all sectors in Western Libya. Can such actors be considered reliable representatives in order to pursue a stability in Libya? Obviously not.

Secondly, it is very likely that it is not Fayez al-Sarraj who is controlling the militias but it's rather the other way around.

Thirdly, al-Sarraj's government is heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood*, a radical Islamist organization that has been blacklisted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Emirates, Syria and Russia. Siding with Tripoli and Misrata means siding with Islamist and jihadist factions and facts speak for themselves. Any country that is taking into consideration a potential line up with Islamists should ponder very well such option, because it will very likely lead to serious consequences in the medium-long term, as Libya could very well become the next Syria.

 

In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the vicinity between the Islamist government in Tripoli and Rome can also be partially considered a heritage of the disastrous foreign policy perpetrated by the Obama administration during the so-called "Arab Springs", when the Muslim Brotherhood became the privileged political actor that was due to take over in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria as part of a regime-change project. However, things did not evolve as planned and the whole region collapsed into chaos.

The big question is, how wide is the Italian government's maneuver margin? Even within issues of its own national interest? Backing a side that showed clear signs of unreliability and making decisions that, as a consequence, brought hundreds, if not thousands, of jihadists a few miles away from the Italian coasts cannot be considered as pursing Italy's best interests.

Italian Communist leader Marco Rizzo recently claimed, during a video speech on Assad's interview that was transmitted by the Italian national TV "Rai", that in Italy there is no decision-making, but only executors who carry out directives that come from abroad. That's a very interesting point that is worth pondering on: how far can Italy go in taking decision for its own benefit?

In the meantime, the only thing to do is wait for the upcoming talks organized in Berlin, in order to see what the next chapter in Libya's tragic turmoil will be. At the moment the situation seems clear: Russia and Turkey are the ones in charge, Italy lost its "mediating" role, putting at stake its own interests and the EU does not have a common foreign policy in Libya.


Читайте больше на https://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/144227-libyan_chaos/

Libyan chaos as Berlin conference approaches and Italian fiasco

On January 14th 2020, the notorious Russian Telegram channel "Directorate4" showed the ID card of a Syrian "rebel" (by the name Muhammet Turkman) that was recovered in an area in the south-east of Tripoli, bringing up more evidence about the arrival of Syrian jihadists that have been transferred by Turkey from the north-west of Syria in order to support the Islamist government led by al-Serraj. A predictable move after Tripoli's official request for support that was granted by a signed agreement with Ankara.

The flow of Syrian jihadists to Libya was also cited by King Hussein of Jordan during an interview with the French TV channel France 24.

These same militias that were used in Syria with the objective of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad's government. An internationally-backed project that failed thanks to the Russian military intervention initiated in September 2015.

Additionally, the links between militias fighting on Tripoli's side and jihadists belonging to Isis and Ansar al-Sharia have emerged on several occasions and, as a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning the presence of individuals such as Adel al-Rubaie, Issa al-Busti, Massound al-Akouri and Mohamed Mahmoud Ben Dardaf; this last name was well known in East Libya as the jihadist was included in Haftar's "most wanted list"  due to his participation in the assault against the US Consulate in Benghazi, back in September 2012. Ben Dardaf was killed in May 2019 by a Russian made "Kornet" missile that targeted his position. He was fighting in the lines of the Somoud Brigade, in support to al-Serraj's forces.

 

The presence of imported jihadists in Western Libya is an additional destabilizing factor for Libya and serious problem for Europe. It is also an issue that could have been prevented.

It is not a sin to say that part of the responsibility can also be traced to Italy's initial decision to support al-Serraj's government, due to its debatable legitimacy provided by actors such as the UN.

Italy and Libya

Italy historically maintained strong links with Western Libya (not only as a former colony, but also due to Eni installations and economic relations with Tripoli ); as a consequence, it was preferred to take Fayez al-Sarraj's side (together with Turkey and Qatar) while in the meantime maintaining the rhetoric of mediation, claiming not to be in favor of anyone but rather "in favor of the Libyan people".

However, Rome's connections to the GNA are evident from Italy's strong activity through its diplomatic HQ in Tripoli, its military presence (around 350 soldiers) in Misrata to safeguard the military field hospital, its political support to the al-Sarraj government and material support to its militias operating on the coast, officially to "contain illegal immigration", even though the results were not as positive as expected. Let's keep in mind how in July 2019 al-Sarraj flew to Milan to meet with Matteo Salvini (who was Minister of Interior at the time) in order to look for support as the situation became far more complicated for Tripoli. It was already clear at the time how Italy was moving towards a more neutral position, retreating the support to Serraj while, at the same time, not taking side with Haftar.

 

Was it a wrong move? Not necessarily. Infact, Italy should have never backed al-Serraj's government in the first place and the risks of such support were predictable.

First of all, al-Sarraj was not supported by a real army, but rather by a galaxy of militias related to different realities such as Ikhwanis, Salafis, local warlords and former members of the Libyan army, all kept together by specific economic and political interests. These militias have managed to create an oligopoly of resources, influencing all sectors in Western Libya. Can such actors be considered reliable representatives in order to pursue a stability in Libya? Obviously not.

Secondly, it is very likely that it is not Fayez al-Sarraj who is controlling the militias but it's rather the other way around.

Thirdly, al-Sarraj's government is heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood*, a radical Islamist organization that has been blacklisted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Emirates, Syria and Russia. Siding with Tripoli and Misrata means siding with Islamist and jihadist factions and facts speak for themselves. Any country that is taking into consideration a potential line up with Islamists should ponder very well such option, because it will very likely lead to serious consequences in the medium-long term, as Libya could very well become the next Syria.

 

In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the vicinity between the Islamist government in Tripoli and Rome can also be partially considered a heritage of the disastrous foreign policy perpetrated by the Obama administration during the so-called "Arab Springs", when the Muslim Brotherhood became the privileged political actor that was due to take over in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria as part of a regime-change project. However, things did not evolve as planned and the whole region collapsed into chaos.

The big question is, how wide is the Italian government's maneuver margin? Even within issues of its own national interest? Backing a side that showed clear signs of unreliability and making decisions that, as a consequence, brought hundreds, if not thousands, of jihadists a few miles away from the Italian coasts cannot be considered as pursing Italy's best interests.

Italian Communist leader Marco Rizzo recently claimed, during a video speech on Assad's interview that was transmitted by the Italian national TV "Rai", that in Italy there is no decision-making, but only executors who carry out directives that come from abroad. That's a very interesting point that is worth pondering on: how far can Italy go in taking decision for its own benefit?

In the meantime, the only thing to do is wait for the upcoming talks organized in Berlin, in order to see what the next chapter in Libya's tragic turmoil will be. At the moment the situation seems clear: Russia and Turkey are the ones in charge, Italy lost its "mediating" role, putting at stake its own interests and the EU does not have a common foreign policy in Libya.


Читайте больше на https://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/144227-libyan_chaos/

Libyan chaos as Berlin conference approaches and Italian fiasco

On January 14th 2020, the notorious Russian Telegram channel "Directorate4" showed the ID card of a Syrian "rebel" (by the name Muhammet Turkman) that was recovered in an area in the south-east of Tripoli, bringing up more evidence about the arrival of Syrian jihadists that have been transferred by Turkey from the north-west of Syria in order to support the Islamist government led by al-Serraj. A predictable move after Tripoli's official request for support that was granted by a signed agreement with Ankara.

The flow of Syrian jihadists to Libya was also cited by King Hussein of Jordan during an interview with the French TV channel France 24.

These same militias that were used in Syria with the objective of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad's government. An internationally-backed project that failed thanks to the Russian military intervention initiated in September 2015.

Additionally, the links between militias fighting on Tripoli's side and jihadists belonging to Isis and Ansar al-Sharia have emerged on several occasions and, as a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning the presence of individuals such as Adel al-Rubaie, Issa al-Busti, Massound al-Akouri and Mohamed Mahmoud Ben Dardaf; this last name was well known in East Libya as the jihadist was included in Haftar's "most wanted list"  due to his participation in the assault against the US Consulate in Benghazi, back in September 2012. Ben Dardaf was killed in May 2019 by a Russian made "Kornet" missile that targeted his position. He was fighting in the lines of the Somoud Brigade, in support to al-Serraj's forces.

 

The presence of imported jihadists in Western Libya is an additional destabilizing factor for Libya and serious problem for Europe. It is also an issue that could have been prevented.

It is not a sin to say that part of the responsibility can also be traced to Italy's initial decision to support al-Serraj's government, due to its debatable legitimacy provided by actors such as the UN.

Italy and Libya

Italy historically maintained strong links with Western Libya (not only as a former colony, but also due to Eni installations and economic relations with Tripoli ); as a consequence, it was preferred to take Fayez al-Sarraj's side (together with Turkey and Qatar) while in the meantime maintaining the rhetoric of mediation, claiming not to be in favor of anyone but rather "in favor of the Libyan people".

However, Rome's connections to the GNA are evident from Italy's strong activity through its diplomatic HQ in Tripoli, its military presence (around 350 soldiers) in Misrata to safeguard the military field hospital, its political support to the al-Sarraj government and material support to its militias operating on the coast, officially to "contain illegal immigration", even though the results were not as positive as expected. Let's keep in mind how in July 2019 al-Sarraj flew to Milan to meet with Matteo Salvini (who was Minister of Interior at the time) in order to look for support as the situation became far more complicated for Tripoli. It was already clear at the time how Italy was moving towards a more neutral position, retreating the support to Serraj while, at the same time, not taking side with Haftar.

 

Was it a wrong move? Not necessarily. Infact, Italy should have never backed al-Serraj's government in the first place and the risks of such support were predictable.

First of all, al-Sarraj was not supported by a real army, but rather by a galaxy of militias related to different realities such as Ikhwanis, Salafis, local warlords and former members of the Libyan army, all kept together by specific economic and political interests. These militias have managed to create an oligopoly of resources, influencing all sectors in Western Libya. Can such actors be considered reliable representatives in order to pursue a stability in Libya? Obviously not.

Secondly, it is very likely that it is not Fayez al-Sarraj who is controlling the militias but it's rather the other way around.

Thirdly, al-Sarraj's government is heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood*, a radical Islamist organization that has been blacklisted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Emirates, Syria and Russia. Siding with Tripoli and Misrata means siding with Islamist and jihadist factions and facts speak for themselves. Any country that is taking into consideration a potential line up with Islamists should ponder very well such option, because it will very likely lead to serious consequences in the medium-long term, as Libya could very well become the next Syria.

 

In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the vicinity between the Islamist government in Tripoli and Rome can also be partially considered a heritage of the disastrous foreign policy perpetrated by the Obama administration during the so-called "Arab Springs", when the Muslim Brotherhood became the privileged political actor that was due to take over in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria as part of a regime-change project. However, things did not evolve as planned and the whole region collapsed into chaos.

The big question is, how wide is the Italian government's maneuver margin? Even within issues of its own national interest? Backing a side that showed clear signs of unreliability and making decisions that, as a consequence, brought hundreds, if not thousands, of jihadists a few miles away from the Italian coasts cannot be considered as pursing Italy's best interests.

Italian Communist leader Marco Rizzo recently claimed, during a video speech on Assad's interview that was transmitted by the Italian national TV "Rai", that in Italy there is no decision-making, but only executors who carry out directives that come from abroad. That's a very interesting point that is worth pondering on: how far can Italy go in taking decision for its own benefit?

In the meantime, the only thing to do is wait for the upcoming talks organized in Berlin, in order to see what the next chapter in Libya's tragic turmoil will be. At the moment the situation seems clear: Russia and Turkey are the ones in charge, Italy lost its "mediating" role, putting at stake its own interests and the EU does not have a common foreign policy in Libya.


Читайте больше на https://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/144227-libyan_chaos/
By Telesur

Nine years after the military intervention, led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to overthrow Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi, Libya remains trapped in a spiral of violence involving armed groups, sectarian, ethnic groups and external interference that have led the country into absolute chaos.

On Oct. 20, 2011, amid protests supported by the governments of the United States and the European Union, an armed uprising that plunged the country into a civil war, the Libyan leader was captured and brutally murdered by the rebels.

Being one of the most prosperous countries in the African continent, thanks to its vast oil fields, after the fall of Gaddafi, the North African country was divided between rival governments in the east and west, and among multiple armed groups competing for quotas of power, control of the country and its wealth.

Gaddafi ruled for 42 years, leading Libya to a significant advance in social, political and economic matters that were recognized and admired by many African and Arab nations at the time. Despite his controversial government, Gaddafi came to represent an important figure for anti-imperialist struggles for his position mainly against the U.S. and the policies carried out from Washington on the Middle East.

It is for this reason, his life and death became pivotal events in Libya and key to understand the current situation.

Libya Before Gaddafi

After World War II, Libya was ceded to France and the United Kingdom, and both countries linked it administratively to their colonies in Algeria and Tunisia.

However, the U.K. favored the emergence of a monarchy controlled by Saudi Arabia and endorsed by the U.N., the Senussi dynasty, which ruled the country since its “independence” in 1951 under the monarchy of King Idris I, who kept Libya in total obscurantism while promoting British economic and military interests.

When oil reserves were discovered in 1959, the exploitation of wealth did not translate into benefits for the people. According to political analyst Thierry Meyssan, during the monarchy, the nation was mired in backwardness in education, health, housing, social security, among others.

The low literacy rates were shocking, according to Meyssan, only 250,000 inhabitants of the four million could read and write.

But it was in 1969 that the Senussi dynasty was overthrown by a group of officers led by Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi who proclaimed true independence and removed the dominant foreign forces from the country.

One of Gaddafi’s immediate policies was to share the benefits and wealth to all Libyans.

Libya With Gaddafi

Since Gaddafi took power, oil has been the main resource in the hands of the leader of the newly proclaimed Libyan Arab Republic. The triumph of the 1969 revolution marked a paradigm shift, moving the new government to use its oil income to boost redistributive measures among the population, generating a new model of economic and social development for the country.

According to analysts, among the measures of “economic sovereignty” which drove Gaddafi’s policies were the nationalization of various Western oil companies such as British Petroleum (BP) and the creation of the National Oil Corporation (NOC), which characterized the configuration of a more socialist model.

Throughout Gaddafi’s tenure, ambitious social programs were launched in the areas of education, health, housing, public works and subsidies for electricity and basic foodstuffs. These policies led to a substantial improvement in the living conditions of Libyans, from being one of the poorest countries in Africa in 1969 to being the continent’s leader in its Human Development Index in 2011.

In fact, the United Nations Development Programme (2010) considered Libya a high-development country in the Middle East and North Africa. This translated status meant a literacy rate of 88.4 percent, a life expectancy of 74.5 years, gender equality, among several other positive indicators.

At the national level, Gaddafi was able to deal with two central dilemmas characteristic of Libyan society, on the one hand, the difficulty of exercising control over the tribes, and, on the other, the fragmentation of society into diverse and sometimes opposite tribal and regional groups.

Gaddafi had the ability to hold together these territories with little connection to each other. It is estimated that there are about 140 tribes in the Libyan territory, each with different traditions and origins.

At the international level, Pan-Arabism should be highlighted with the confrontation opened to the United States due to the opposition that Gaddafi exerted on the influence of this country, reaching closer ties with other Arab countries to carry out common policies of rejection of Washington’s policies on the Middle East and Africa.

The Libyan leader worked to strengthen ties with neighboring countries such as Egypt, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Chad, among others, as well as maintaining close relations with countries like France and Russia. Gaddafi also connected with Latin American countries such as Venezuela and Cuba, which led him to cultivate an extensive network of contacts and uncomfortable influence for Europe and the U.S.

By the time of his killing, Libya had the highest GDP per capita and life expectancy on the continent. Fewer people lived below the poverty line than in the Netherlands.

The Fall of Gadaffi

The citizen protests that began in Tunisia in December 2010 (Arab Spring) arrived a month later in neighboring Libya, although in a different way, as the mass and popular demonstrations that characterized Tunisia and Egypt were not replicated. In contrast, in Benghazi, where the anti-Gaddafi movement focused, Islamists groups predominated.

Some political analysts agree that in Libya there was never a mass movement on a national scale like the other countries, nor was there popular support to overthrow Gaddafi’s government.

However, the uprisings in Benghazi were enough for the U.N. Security Council and NATO to intervene on behalf of the Responsibility to Protect (Resolution 1973) and launched a bombing campaign between March and October 2011 that had a decisive impact on the assassination of Gaddafi.

According to Meyssan, NATO’s interference in the internal affairs of Libya and the overthrow of Gaddafi were not the result of a conflict between Libyans but to a long-term regional destabilization strategy for the whole group the Middle East.

Nine years after his death, residents in the chaos-wracked country’s capital have grown to miss the longtime leader as the frustrations of daily life mount.

“I hate to say it but our life was better under the previous regime,” Fayza al-Naas, a 42-year-old pharmacist told AFP in 2015, referring to Gaddafi’s rule. A sentiment shared by many Libyans, including those who opposed him at some point.

The economically and socially stable Libya under the Gaddafi versus a fragmented country, without a government, devastated by attacks, bombings, and continuous clashes, is the result of the NATO invasion in 2011. A conclusion that many regret supporting almost a decade later.


6ይ ክፋል: ማዕበል ስርሒት ፈንቅል - የካቲት 1990 - ሰነዳዊት ፊልም| sirihit fenkil 1990 - part 6 - ERi-TV Documentary

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