Sana’a Summit: Cooperation or Conspiracy?
  By: Eritrean Center for Strategic Studies (ECSS)
  October 28, 2002
  
  Political Analysis
  
  The Yemeni capital, Sana’a, witnessed on the period between October 13 to 15, 
  2002, a trilateral summit held by the Yemeni President, General Ali Abdallah 
  Salih, the Sudanese President, General Omer Al-Beshir of the Sudan and the Ethiopian 
  Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.
  
  It was hoped that the summit would create an opportunity for the three leaders 
  to discuss ways of co-operation among their states, which could have been in 
  the interest of their nation in particular and the region in general. Unfortunately 
  that was not the case.
  
  It is true that the impossible cannot be expected from the leaders of the systems 
  in Addis Ababa, Sana’a and Khartoum for they are all crippled by structural 
  crisis, lacking anything in common except their enmity towards Eritrea as a 
  country, people, Government and it’s Front, the People’s Front for Democracy 
  and Justice (PFDJ). The evidence for that is not difficult: the trio, before 
  verifying the allegations of the Sudanese government of an Eritrea military 
  intervention in eastern Sudan, following the fall of the Hameshekoreib garrison 
  to the Sudanese opposition forces, leashed its unjust denunciation against Eritrea 
  in its final communiqué issued October 15, 2002, in Sana’a. We need not, in 
  this respect, analyze the whole background of the affair. However, we limit 
  ourselves with pointing to the declared/clandestine agenda of this triateral 
  alliance, summing them up as the follows.
  
  Firstly: the formal agenda:
  
  1. Solidification of bilateral and trilateral relations, reinvigorating former 
  agreements between the three states.
  2. The political, economic, security and military co-operation.
  3. Harmonizing and co-coordinating positions concerning the Somali reconciliation 
  question.
  4. Coordinating policies over the African Horn and Southern Red Sea Zone.
  
  Secondly: the covert agenda 
  
  1. Working on the imposition of regional isolation on Eritrea.
  2. Supporting dissident and terrorist elements.
  3. Conspiring against the government and the people of Eritrea.
  4. Seeking to bring down the national Eritrean government and replace it with 
  a puppet government of traitors, to serve the ends of the trio states of the 
  Sana’a Summit.
  
  Thirdly: The Mechanism of Persecuting the True Agenda
  
  According to reliable sources that monitor the activities and movements of the 
  Addis-Sana’a-Khartoum axis, the three capitals have divided the roles in the 
  Sana’a summit to put their covert agenda into effect, as follows: 
  
  First: Ethiopia is to coordinate activities for:
  
  1. Organizing gatherings of the anti-nationalistic traitorous elements from 
  Eritrea, Ethiopia is to define their political program.
  2. Training and supplying arms to the groups of anti-nationalistic elements.
  3. Supplying financial backing.
  4. Connecting these elements with the Ethiopian foreign relations network, particularly 
  in Europe and USA, through the Ethiopian embassies.
  
  Second: Yemen’s task:
  
  1. Opening political and information offices.
  2. Presenting military and financial backing.
  3. Connecting these subversive terrorist groups with the Yemeni Arab relations 
  network, particularly the League of Arab States.
  
  Third: The Sudan:
  
  1. Establishing military training camps for the terrorist groups.
  2. Opening its borders for these terrorists to stage periodical attacks on Eritrea 
  from across the Sudanese border. In effect, the Khartoum regime under the cover 
  of allegation of an Eritrea aggression, is paving the way for the Sana’a backed 
  terrorists, to wage subversive attacks on Eritrea.
  3. Presenting military and financial backing.
  4. Connecting these elements with its network of diplomatic relations and with 
  the Islamic extremism and terrorist forces.
  
  The question that forcefully presents itself is that, what is the real problem 
  between Eritrea and the three states?
  
  In fact, Eritrea does not have the least problem with any of these states. Paradoxically, 
  the Eritrea government and the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (P.F.D.J) 
  did their best to help each of the three states to curb their chronic problems. 
  The evidences are:-
  
  A. The Eritrean government organized the first ever meeting between the Ethiopian 
  regime and its opposition in the capital Asmara in 1992 in the context of its 
  bids to nurture peace and stability in Ethiopia.
  B. President Isaias Afwerki among other high officials in the Eritrean government 
  lead sincere diplomatic efforts in 1994, to narrow gap between president Ali 
  Abdalla Salih and his former vice president Ali Salim Abeid, in a bid to avert 
  a civil war between the brothers in Northern and Southern Yemen, to sustain 
  the Yemeni unity.
  C. Since the day of Liberation in 1991, Eritrea has focused all the political 
  efforts at its disposal to broker a genuine solution to the Sudanese problem.
  
  These are the honest historical and political efforts that stem from a sense 
  of brotherhood, friendship and co-operation in the one hand and pursuance of 
  realizing peace, stability and security in the African Horn and the area south 
  of the Red Sea basin on the other. The ultimate goal is to make possible a common 
  groundwork leading to development, prosperity and welfare of the nations of 
  this part of the world, that suffered most from wars, conflicts, famines, chronic 
  poverty, that exposed these nations to be a soft prey for killer diseases that 
  ruthlessly sweep across their common borders.
  
  But what can Eritrea do, all by itself, in the presence of reckless systems 
  in Addis Ababa, Sana’a and Khartoum -- regimes/systems that failed in dealing 
  responsibly and objectively with their domestic problems? For that reason they 
  embarked on creating a series of conflicts with Eritrea, in desperate and poor 
  attempts to cover their internal problem. The best evidence is this:
  
  Ethiopia:
  
  The Ethiopian regime created the border conflict with Eritrea from nothing in 
  1997 and hurried to an all out war in 1998 in an attempt to subvert the national 
  sovereignty of Eritrea, and undermine the unity of the nation. After an atrocious 
  three-year war, the Ethiopian agenda was dashed upon the relentless stand of 
  the nation, government and defense forces. Ethiopia was dragged to the signing 
  of the Cessation of Hostilities in Algeria on June 18, 2000, then the Comprehensive 
  Peace Agreement on December 12, 2000. As a result the Commission for the Border 
  Demarcation was set up at The Hague and it gave its final verdict on April 13, 
  2002. Ever since, the Ethiopian regime is trying to realize its atrocious agenda 
  against Eritrea by all means. Ethiopia entangled itself in a series of endless 
  quarrels with the international peacekeeping forces on the one hand, and with 
  the cartographic unit commissioned to draw the border and later with the verdict 
  of that unit.
  
  It is worth mentioning here that the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), 
  through its web site in the Internet declared on October 11, 2002, that the 
  Ethiopian forces entered to ten kilometers in the Temporary Security Zone in 
  the northeast of Zalembessa and opened fire on the Indian contingent in the 
  area. What an evidence! This is apart from what the Ethiopian forces have been 
  engaged in violation of the T.S.Z and the acts of plunder and atrocities against 
  the Eritrean civilians residing there.
  
  
  Yemen:
  
  The Yemeni government had not presented any territorial claims over some islands 
  in the South of the Red Sea in the period prior to the Independence of Eritrea, 
  whether during the era of Emperor Haile Selassie or the era of Colonel Mengistu 
  Haile Mariam. All of a sudden, it embarked on imposing facts on the ground against 
  free Eritrea. The Eritrea government had categorically rejected that policy, 
  and worked on dealing with the matter with prudence, suggesting to the other 
  side right from the commencement of the crisis as follows:-
  
  1. The calm and friendly bilateral solution of the conflict.
  
  2. In case of failure, a third friendly arbitrator should be involved.
  
  3. In case of the failure of that mediator the whole file of the problem should 
  be referred to the International Court of Justice at The Hague.
  
  However, the Yemeni government brushed aside all the Eritrean proposals and 
  resorted to force. Eventually, the Yemeni government was forced into the principle 
  of submitting to international law. The French mediation between the two countries 
  succeeded and they signed the Paris Agreement on May 21, 1996, according to 
  which an international arbitration court was set and it issued on December 17, 
  1998, its first decision that provided for the question of sovereignty over 
  the disputed archipelagos in the Southern Red Sea that lead to contention between 
  Eritrea and Yemen, and the second and final award of the Court issued in December 
  12, 1999, was concerning the maritime delimitation. 
  
  Ever since the International Court ended its mission, the Yemeni government 
  did the unthinkable to get round the decision reached through baseless interpretation 
  and deliberate mystification of the verdict, and by pursuing provocative actions 
  against Eritrea not only in the field of propaganda, but by practically violating 
  the sovereignty of the Eritrean territorial water. Had it not been for the wise 
  and calm responses of the Eritrea leadership the situation in the Southern Red 
  Sea region would have deteriorated to unwelcome consequences.
  
  Here, too, rises a persistent question. What does Yemen demand from Eritrea
  ?
  In fact, Yemen has so much causes that compel it to ride rough waves to provoke 
  Eritrea. In the mean time, we focus on one point that is the true problem Yemen 
  has with the verdict of the International Court. Dissatisfied with the verdict, 
  it wants to gain more territories by pressuring Eritrea from all sides and rout 
  the whole matter, in order to gain what it could not gain by legal means. Neither 
  Eritrea, nor international law and international legitimacy accept the illegal 
  moves of Yemen.
  
  However, the question still must be asked as to what those Yemeni demands are.
  
  The Yemeni side maintains that the decision of the International Arbitration 
  Court gives the Yemeni fishermen the right to traditional fishing in the Eritrean 
  territorial waters, just as it has given the Eritrean fishermen the right to 
  traditional fishing in the Yemeni territorial waters. It need not be mentioned 
  that the verdict reached by the Court on October 9, 1998, was crystal clear, 
  transparent and gave no room for any misinterpretation. Article 527 of that 
  verdict provides the following:
  
  I. “The islands, islet, rocks, and low-tide elevations forming the Mohabbakah 
  islands, including but not limited to Sayal Islet, Harbi Islet, Flat Islet and 
  High Islet are subject to the territorial sovereignty of Eritrea;”
  
  II. “The islands, islet, rocks, and low-tide elevations forming the Haycock 
  islands including, but not limited to, north east Haycock, middle Haycock, and 
  South West Haycock, are subject to the territorial sovereignty of Eritrea;”
  
  III. “The South West Rocks are subject to the territorial sovereignty of Eritrea;”
  
  IV. “The islands, islet, rocks and low-tide elevations of the Zuqar-Hanish group, 
  including, but not limited to, Three Foot Rock, parking Rock, Rocky Islets, 
  Pin Rock, Suyul Hanish, Mid Islet, Double Peak Island, Round Island, North Round 
  Island, Quion Island (13 43’N, 42 46’E), Chor Rock, Greater Hanish, Peaky Islet, 
  Mushajirah, Addar Ail Islets; Haycock Island (13 47’N, 42 47’E; not to be confused 
  with the Haycock Islands to the southwest of Greater Hanish), Low Island (13 
  52N, 42 49’E) including the unnamed islets and rocks close north east, and south, 
  Lesser Hanish including the unnamed islets and rocks close north east, Tongue 
  Island and the unnamed islet close south, Near Island and the unnamed islet 
  close south east, Shark Island, Jabal Zuquar Island, High Land and the Abu Ali 
  Islands (including Quoin Island (14 05’N, 42 49’E) and Pile Island are subject 
  to the territorial sovereignty of Yemen;”
  
  V. “The island of Jabal Al-Tayr, and the islands, islets, rocks and low-tide 
  elevations forming the Zubayr group, including, but not limited to Quoin Island 
  (15 12’n, 42 03’ E), Haycock Island (15 10’N, 42 07’E; not to be confused with 
  the Haycock Islands to the southwest of Greater Hanish), Rugged Island, Table 
  peak Island, Saddle Island and the unnamed islet close north west, low is land 
  (15 06’N, 42 06_) and the unnamed rock close east, Middle Reef, Saba Island, 
  Connected Island, East Rocks, Shoe Rock, Jabal Zubayr Island, and Centre Peak 
  Island are subject to the territorial sovereignty of Yemen; and”
  
  VI. “The sovereignty found to lie with Yemen entails the perpetuation of the 
  traditional fishing regime in the region, including free access and enjoyment 
  for the fishermen of both Eritrea and Yemen.” 
  
  So much so, the International Court of arbitration had clearly confirmed this 
  matter in its decision concerning the maritime delimitation between the two 
  countries on December 17, 1999, specifically in article 103 that reads as follows:
  
  “The traditional fishing regime is not an entitlement in common to resources 
  nor is a shared right in them. Rather, it entitles both Eritrean and Yemeni 
  fishermen to engage in artisanal fishing around the islands which, in its Award 
  on Sovereignty, the Tribunal attributed to Yemen. This is to be understood as 
  including diving, carried out by artisanal means for shells and pearls. Equally, 
  these fishermen remain entitled freely to use these islands for those purposes 
  traditionally associated with such artisanal fishing the use of the islands 
  for drying fish, for way stations, for the provision of temporary shelter, and 
  for the effecting of repairs.”
  
  When the Yemeni part tried to directly or indirectly go round the International 
  Court’s decision, Eritrea presented a letter to the court demanding clarification 
  to the Yemeni allegations of the Yemeni right to traditional fishing in the 
  Eritrean territorial waters. The reply of the court was clear cut in two letters 
  sent to both governments, the Eritrean and Yemeni governments, one on February 
  25 and the other on March 31 of 2002, certifying the accuracy of the Eritrean 
  understanding to the Court’s decision, in letter and spirit; and the nullification 
  of the Yemeni interpretation for the same Court’s decision. The Yemeni side, 
  contrary to its former and later allegations, confirmed to the Court that it 
  did not have any difference with Eritrea over the interpretation of the verdict. 
  This happened before it raised these new allegations. Consequently, Eritrea 
  looks on the file of its conflict with Yemen as to have been legally resolved 
  and closed once and for all. However, if the Yemeni side wants to reopen this 
  file and to return back to square one, Eritrea considers it as absolutely a 
  Yemeni affair and it is not ready to compete with Yemen at such reckless policies. 
  The Yemeni government, solely, bears the consequences not only in front of Eritrea, 
  but also in front of the entire international community, because it obviously 
  tried to unilaterally nullify a decision reached by an international body. 
  
  Sudan 
  
  Before assuming power through a coup d'état in 1989 the NIF regime of Khartoum 
  established the so-called “Eritrean Jihad Movement,” it also opened training 
  camps for that movement’s terrorist elements. Sudan also opened its borders 
  to the Arab Afghans to carry subversive acts against civil Eritrean facilities, 
  in addition to their planting of mines in the public transport roads. A number 
  of innocent Eritrean civilians are still falling victims for that.
  
  Eritrea had repeatedly urged the Khartoum regime to stay away from its grave 
  policies, but to no avail. By the end of 1994 Eritrea was compelled to severe 
  diplomatic relations with the Sudanese regime. In 2000, President Omer Al-Beshir 
  admitted that it was the Sudan that wronged against Eritrea and not the reverse; 
  he went on to attribute that wrong to the existence of two heads of state, Beshir 
  himself and Dr. Hassan al- Turabi at the top of the state hierarchy. 
  
  It is true that the diplomatic relations between Asmara and Khartoum were back 
  to normal in 2001, but the attitude of the Khartoum regime towards Eritrea had 
  not changed, despite the tremendous diplomatic efforts carried out by Eritrea, 
  on levels of government and PFDJ in the quest for peace, security and stability 
  in Sudan.
  
  1. After the fall of the Hameshkoreib garrison to the Sudanese opposition forces 
  on October 5th 2002 the Khartoum regime lost bearings altogether, unjustly accusing 
  Eritrea of military intervention in the eastern Sudan to back the opposition.
  
  2. The Sudanese minister of foreign affairs Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail immediately 
  announced over the state media organs that “the Sudan will respond politically, 
  diplomatically and militarily to deter the Eritrean aggression.”
  
  3. Dr. Kotbi Al Mehdi, the Sudanese presidential adviser, in a statement to 
  the Sudanese TV Service on October 14, 2002. said, “Eritrea has become a burden 
  on the region.”
  
  4. However, no sooner than the foreign affairs minister backed down from his 
  threats of “military deterrence” to state before the Sudanese T.V. cameras that 
  the mission of the Sudanese government is centered on “rescuing the Eritrean 
  nation from its government.”
  
  5. The Sudanese government sees the salvation of the Eritrean nation can only 
  be achieved in the hands of the fundamentalist terrorist elements like the “Islamic 
  Salvation Movement” and the “Jihad Movement” two closely allied organizations 
  to the Al Qaida of Osama Bin Ladin. Thus, the formal Sudanese media organs were 
  freely servicing the terrorist warlords as Mohammed Ahmed Salih “Abu Suheil,” 
  Salih Mohammed Osman and Arafa Ahmed Mohammed, among others.
  
  6. The governor of Kassala state, General Adem Hamid Moussa announced, “The 
  border between Sudan and Eritrea will remain closed until the tyrant regime 
  of Eritrea falls” according to the Sudanese newspaper Al Rai Al’am of October 
  19, 2002.
  
  What can be deduced from the preceding analysis goes as follows:
  
  1. The Khartoum regime is the one that intervenes in the Eritrean domestic affairs; 
  in fact, it excused itself to speak on behalf of the Eritrean people and even 
  planning to remove their national government.
  
  2. The Sudanese government provides shelter, helps and hosts terrorist elements 
  to whom it opens its border with Eritrea to enable them to carry trans-border 
  attacks against the Eritrean citizens. 
  
  3. The Khartoum regime revived its old aggressive policies against Eritrea, 
  spreading its false accusations in the aftermath of the fall of Hameshkoreib 
  to the hands of the Sudanese opposition, surprisingly, after the Sudanese regime 
  signed an agreement on cessation of military operation all over the Sudan on 
  October 15, 2002, with SPLA.
  
  4. Eritrea is always in the heart of the African Horn where it belongs and can 
  never be a burden on it. On the contrary, Eritrea, ever since her independence, 
  had borne the brunt of aggression from hostile neighboring regimes. Dr. Kotbi 
  Al Mehdi should be ashamed to claim that Eritrea is becoming “the burden of 
  the region.” In essence, it can safely be said, that it is the Sudanese regime, 
  of which Dr. Kotbi Al Mehdi is part of, that is the burden not only on Eritrea 
  but on the Sudanese nation, the African Horn and the world at large, and the 
  evidences are:
  4.1 The NIF regime came to power through a coup de état in June 1989, toppling 
  a democratically elected government.
  4.2 The regime systematically carried grim acts of torture and brutality against 
  the Sudanese people in the notorious so-called “GHOST HOUSES.”
  4.3 The Sudanese government has routinely waged a policy of annihilation against 
  the peoples of the Southern Sudan. 
  4.4 Indeed, the international humanitarian bodies denounced the detestable acts 
  of slavery carried by that regime.
  4.5 After it assumed power, the NIF regime started exporting its brand of terrorism 
  through the “Popular Arabic Islamic Congress” to all corners of the world.
  4.6 Who does not know about the attempts on lives against international figures 
  like: 
  
  4.6.1 President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in Addis Ababa in 1995;
  4.6.2 President Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea in 1996 by the terrorist Nasr el-Din 
  Abu Al-Kheirat .
  4.6.3 Last but not least their attempt to assassinate Mr. Anthony Lake, the 
  former US National Security Adviser in 1996.
  
  5. In the same pattern, the Khartoum regime gave shelter to terrorist elements 
  most wanted by the international community like Carlos the Jackal and Osama 
  Bin Ladin among others.
  
  6. On October 21, 2002, the NIF regime of Khartoum committed grim atrocities 
  and arbitrary arrests among Eritrean nationals residing in the Sudan. The agents 
  of the regime’s security apparatus raided the complex of the Eritrean community 
  in Khartoum and arrested several Eritreans among whom were two of the Eritrean 
  embassy personnel.
  
  Observers are expecting more such measurements against the Eritreans in the 
  coming few days to come by the Khartoum regime, giving no heed to the voice 
  of reason.
  
  Now, the reader can make his/her own judgment concerning the question as to 
  who is the real burden on the region. In effect, we can conclude that the Sana’a 
  Summit between Ethiopia, Yemen and the Sudan is no summit that drew plans that 
  would benefit the broad range of the masses of the region as much as it was 
  a summit of conspiracy against the Eritrean nation, its unity and sovereignty 
  in all spheres. Lessons drawn form the historical experience affirm that the 
  three regimes are running counter to the interest of their own people, let alone 
  the broader range of the African Horn and the Southern Red Sea region. These 
  trio cannot give what they do not possess in the first place.
  
  To sum up, then, the three regimes of the Sana’a Summit are not only working 
  against Eritrea alone, but also against the laws and rules of the international 
  community, and the evidences are:
  
  1. Once the Border Commission declared its decision concerning the drawing of 
  the border with Eritrea, on April 13, 2002, Ethiopia constantly put hurdles 
  after hurdles in the way of the UN Peace Keeping Force and the border Mapping 
  Unit, in order to halt the decisions being put on the ground.
  
  2. On the other hand, the Sana’a regime is trying to evade the two decisions 
  taken by an international arbitration body, by deliberately misinterpreting 
  the decisions issued October 9, 1998, and December 17, 1999, respectively.
  
  3. Finally, the Khartoum regime, instead of solving the crisis bedeviling its 
  people, it made it its business to go and solve the problems of the Eritrean 
  people, directly or by way of the terrorist elements it hosts inside the Sudanese 
  territories, aiding with all the facilities they need, in stark challenge to 
  the international laws, starting with the laws of the African Union, IGAD principles 
  and the UN norms.