"Final and Binding?"
by: Tekie Fessehatzion.
February 28, 2003
Prime Minster Meles’ latest reading
of the Border Commission’s decision on Badme is quintessential Woyane—replete
with Doublespeak, half truths, out and out lies, and poorly disguised
blackmail, telling the world community that if the Commission did
not change its decision to meet Ethiopia’s territorial demands,
there would be “problems.” The Prime Minister did not spell out
the problems the decision would cause, but he did not need to because
we have to assume that he would be the one responsible for causing
the problem, for example, by harboring the terrorists who recently
laid land mines in the Temporary Security Zone to frustrate the
implementation of a binding UN Security Council Resolution, demonstrating
the Prime Minister’s willful contempt for international law. Such
threat from a head of a government openly challenging the implementation
of a UN Security Resolution is not unheard of but is one the Security
Council does not take kindly. Just ask Saddam Hussein. Not that
Eritrea has any oil worth sending an international fighting force,
but the gravity of disobeying a UN Security council Resolution still
stands.
So used to having its way with the
OAU and the facilitators, Ethiopia thought it could push around
the Border Commission and UNMEE, both fully backed by several Security
Council resolutions. Too spoiled by the OAU and the facilitators
who coddled him and played to his whim at every turn, he finally
run into a Commission that took its task seriously. For once, the
government of Ethiopia miscalculated, hence its Prime Minister throwing
tantrum, a fit, because the boundary is to be drawn on the ground,
markers are about to be erected, and horror of horrors, detailed
photography of the border shows Badme on the Eritrean side of the
border, a final affirmation that the Eritrea-Ethiopia is fully backed
by international law, never to be challenged again. There’s also
another headache the Prime Minster has to contend with. The argument
that Eritrea is the aggressor in the conflict is seriously undermined
by the decision. Since when is defending your territory against
intruders considered an aggression for which act the defenders are
held culpable?
The Ethiopian government is in a
fix. When the decision was announced April 13, 2001, its Foreign
Minister, Mr. Seyoum Mesfin, wasted no time in declaring his government’s
full acceptance of the decision. His acceptance was total and unconditional.
And as is often the case when the Foreign Minster is near a microphone,
he could not resist making a gratuitous remark at the expense of
the Eritrean government. Walta Information reported that Ethiopian
officials were pleased with the outcome and it quoted Foreign Minister
Seyoum saying that “Sanity has won over insanity, and the rule
of law has prevailed over the law of the jungle.” According
to Walta, Mr. Seyoum added, “the decision rejected any attempt
by Eritrea to get rewarded for its aggression.” Now, almost
a year later, the Prime Minister is threatening to take the law
into his hands, and to quote his Foreign Minster, “opting for
the rule of the jungle over the rule of law” because he discovered
belatedly that he did not like the decision. What in the world is
happening? Welcome to the Woyane world, where things are not what
they seem.
Not saying what you mean, and not
mean what you are saying has been a hallowed tool of trade in Woyane’s
approach to diplomacy. Words lose their every day meaning. A decision
agreed in advance to be final and binding, becomes in Woyane’s view
conditional and provisional. Who would forget Woyane’s insistence
that “Badme and its environs” meant the entire stretch of the border,
all 1000 plus kilometers of it? And when all the key agreements
said the status of the disputed territory would be decided later
on the basis of the application of colonial treaties and international
law, Ethiopian diplomats insisted that the reference meant Ethiopian
territories. If you followed closely the tortuous diplomatic back
and forth around the issue you know the key stumbling block was
Ethiopia’s insistence that Eritrea recognize the disputed territory
as indisputably Ethiopian before the issue went to the Border commission.
If you go over the entire April
13, 2001 decision of the Border Commission with a fine comb you
will not find a single reference to substantiate Prime Minister
Meles’ assertion in the BBC interview that the Commission had said
that Badme should go to the country that administered it during
the war. It’s hard to think why the Prime Minster uttered such a
falsehood. By leaving the famous straight line portion of the border
essentially as is and explaining its reasoning in detail, the Commission
had explicitly rejected Ethiopia’s claims west of the line. Badme
town is west of the line. The Prime Minster talks about “fact” supporting
Ethiopia’s position but all he gave in the interview for facts is
an assertion of something nowhere in the document. But then in
Woyane’s lexicon facts and assertions are interchangeable.
The question must be asked. Why
did Ethiopia accept a final and binding decision only to reject
it three years later? No one knows for sure. The best we can do
is to consider several possibilities.
- First: Probably the prime reason Ethiopia
said “yes” to a final and binding decision at the beginning
was money. Ethiopia had applied for debt relief (1.5 billion
dollars), but was denied because of the war. Ethiopia’s acceptance
of the decision signaled to the lending community that Ethiopia
was now committed to peace, thus eligible for assistance. The
World Bank Board of Governors rewarded Ethiopia with a 400 million
dollars relief package to mitigate the ill effects of the war.
-
-
Second: Ethiopia said
it accepted the border decision because it was awarded all the
major areas it contested, including Badme. The government was
aware of the coordinates of the straight-line boundary and it
must have known where Badme was located. Still by falsely claiming
that Ethiopia was awarded Badme, the government sought to justify
to a gullible population that the huge human and material sacrifice
was justified.
-
Third: It’s unlikely
that the government ever thought the decision would be translated
into a real boundary line on the ground. Ethiopia has a well-documented
history of obstructing the implementation of agreements it willingly
signed on. No reason why the decision would be any different.
Ethiopia would obstruct the
implementation of the decision to cause interminable delays
to frustrate actual demarcation. In the mean time, Ethiopians
would move into formerly Eritrean areas to create new settlement
community of Ethiopians, to create facts on the ground similar
to the Israeli settlements in the West Bank.
-
Fourth: Ethiopia had
hoped that a post-Isaias government that Ethiopia has been working
hard to bring about but without much success would be more amenable
to exchange Badme for some promise of normalization including
the promise of use of Massawa and Asab ports.
-
Finally, Ethiopia had
hoped to appeal to Washington to prevail on Eritrea or the Commission
to make a border adjustment to move the straight-line border
to the west so as to leave Badme in Ethiopia’s hands. Indeed
several months ago Foreign Minster Seyoum Mesfin made the rounds
in Washington to argue that it would be politically suicidal
for the government to concede that Badme was in Eritrea. He
also added that the relocation of the ”hundreds of thousands”
of people the drawing of the border would entail would raise
massive humanitarian and logistical problems for Ethiopia. Wisely,
Washington said, no: the border decision was unalterable. Realizing
that time was running out, the Ethiopian government returned
to obstructionism.
Ethiopia wasted little time in frustrating
the work of UNMEE and the Border Commission. Tigrayans were moved
to Dembe Mengul, west of the straight-line border, indisputably
Eritrean territory. Not long after the April 13 decision was announced
Ethiopia closed the border, making it impossible for UNMEE to carry
out its assignment. Ethiopia engineered the mini crisis to derail
aerial photography of the border, a critical step towards demarcation.
Soon after Ethiopia demanded Major-General Patrick Cammaert,
Force Commander of UNMEE, to be expelled because Ethiopia said it
had lost confidence in him. Unfortunately for Ethiopia the Border
Commission did not stand idle while Ethiopia was frustrating UNMEE’s
work, the Commission went to the Security Council and obtained another
resolution (Resolution 1433(2002) of August 14, 2002) that
ordered Ethiopia to comply with the Commission’s binding Demarcation
Directives including the eviction of Ethiopian squatters at Dembe
Mengul. Slowly it became apparent for Ethiopia that demarcation
had reached a point of no return, something Ethiopia never thought
would happen, if Addis Ababa had anything to do with it. A determined
Border Commission backed by a series of Security Council Resolutions
was intent in marking the boundary line according to its April 13
decision.
Ethiopia’s about face change on
the decision is the long held but never publicly admitted belief
that demarcation of the border based on colonial treaties and international
law would not bend or move the famous straight line portion of the
border to sanction Tigray’s claim to territory west of the line.
The Prime Minister and his colleagues are well read on the history
of the area, but are unfortunately on denial that an Ethiopian emperor
willingly and freely signed the treaties that formed the basis of
the border separating the two countries. The colonial treaties,
remarked A.J Toynbee, responding to Emperor Haile Selassie’s claim
to Eritrea immediately after the War, were freely signed by Menelik
at his finest hour— after the defeat of Italy at Aduwa, thus Ethiopia
could have no legal claim to Eritrea. But Ethiopia’s newest rulers
are pretending that the treaties were not binding on them, and thus
a rectification of the border consistent with historic claims was
in order.
This explains their deep-seated
hostility to delimitation and demarcation based on international
law and colonial treaties. Even when Ethiopia agreed to the inclusion
of the key phrases in the documents it had signed to settle the
conflict, the Prime Minster and his colleagues were never serious
about implementation. They wanted Badme, if possible diplomatically
or politically, if not by force, an approach that never wavered
throughout the conflict. Prime Minister Meles knows he is taking
a risk by defying a final and binding UN Security Council Resolution.
He must think that it’s worth a gamble. There’s one problem, though.
Even if he succeeds in preventing the erection of markers through
out the border, the die has already been cast. The line on maps
and official documents will show the true coordinates of the border,
reflecting the permanency of the April 13, 2001 Border Commission
decision.