Dehai News

On 10 December 2019, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali received the Nobel Peace Prize at the Oslo City Hall in Norway “for his efforts to achieve peace and international cooperation, and in particular for his decisive initiative to resolve the border conflict with neighbouring Eritrea.”

The first priority of Ethiopia’s then new government was reforming the economy and establishing peace with its neighbours while avoiding military conflicts. One main reason for this might have been the state of the Ethiopian military at the time in terms of outdated equipment in all branches of the Ethiopian Armed Forces. All that changed, however, with the outbreak of the war in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, which lasted for two years until 2022.

According to the 2024 military balance report on Ethiopia by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the country’s defence budget reached a peak in 2023 of $1.54 billion, and since then the development of its military capabilities has continued, beginning with defensive capabilities specifically to secure the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), the primary issue of the disagreement between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt.

While these countries do not disagree with the principle of Ethiopia’s renaissance, they want to see this on terms that do not harm the interests of any other party. However, Ethiopia has continued in an opposite direction, ignoring the interests of other parties and showing arrogance and stubbornness by making bellicose statements for local consumption.

In 2019, Ethiopia’s armaments included the Israeli Rafael SPYDER air-defence system, a specialised system with the capacity to deploy modern medium- and short-range missiles to replace or augment the outdated Soviet SA-75 and SA-125 systems that the country had previously.

Ethiopia’s defence capabilities improved greatly by 2023, thanks to the introduction of advanced radar systems such as the ST-68U Ukranian Radars and Russian Pantsir-S2. These are comparable to the Israeli system, but they also include machine guns for shooting down drones. The country has also developed electronic warfare capabilities including Russian Krasukha-4 systems to disrupt hostile offensive operations and interrupt satellite communications, thus targeting guided weapons such as missiles and bombs.

The Ethiopian military has multiple reconnaissance and combat drones that can be used for short-range offensive missions, such as the Iranian Mohajer-6, the Israeli WanderB mini unmanned vehicle, the Chinese Wing Loong 2, and the Turkish Bayraktar TB2. Already having more traditional artillery, according to the Military Africa website, an online resource providing information on military procurement in Africa, “in 2023 Ethiopia acquired extended-range Chinese-made PHL-03 300 mm MRLS, A-200 guided rocket artillery (GRA) systems, and M-20 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). Such weapons have a range of between 150 km (93 miles) and 300 km (186 miles).”

Such equipment can accurately direct missiles at targets via satellite, and it is far superior to the capabilities of the previous Ethiopian arsenal used in the war with Eritrea. Even so, it is still possible to accept the idea that the country has acquired all these offensive weapons with a maximum range of up to 300 km in order to gain the upper hand in internal conflicts or to secure its borders with neighbouring countries.

This year has witnessed a qualitative leap in the Ethiopian military’s offensive capabilities. In January at an Air Force ceremony Ethiopia showed off Russian Sukhoi Su-30 fighter jets and a Turkish Akinci combat drone. These systems can execute long-range strikes of over 1,500 km using a heavy load of precise munitions that have a significant destructive effect and surpass the other aircraft and drones in the Ethiopian arsenal.

They may not be available in great numbers at this time, but they add to the Ethiopian Air Force’s older models like Turkish TB-2 drones and Su-27P aircraft, which are simpler for pilots, maintenance crews, and pilots to operate.

The Ethiopian Air Force lacks the necessary infrastructure to handle more modern aircraft, like hangars, modern operations rooms, and extensive radar coverage. It lacks a long-range and multi-layered air-defence network to protect the nation’s airports and other key locations. Its pilots and operational commanders lack the necessary experience to execute complicated, long-range air operations, and it has in the past relied on foreign mercenaries for combat missions.

According to the New Humanitarian, a Swiss-based independent website, “an Eritrean government statement in May 2000 said that Ethiopia had hired 250 ‘mercenaries and foreign experts’ to its Air Force.” It is obvious, the site said, that “the possession of such new weapons reflects the new Ethiopian military’s long-range offensive strategy, which goes beyond neighbouring borders and can be a sign of threat.”

The decision is related to Ethiopia’s other ambitions including potential naval developments that may emerge with French assistance. According to the Military Africa website, “a discussion took place during a meeting on 17 January, which saw the participation of French military representatives and members of the Ethiopian parliament’s Foreign Affairs and Peace Standing Committee… The conversation highlighted Ethiopia’s commitment to peacekeeping and the critical importance of the Red Sea region to the country’s security interests.”

It is unclear whether the naval combat units that Ethiopia wants will be defensive or offensive. Ethiopia already has two agreements with Sudan and Djibouti to safeguard its trade in the Red Sea, but the new development is related mainly to the issue of the disputed territory of Somaliland, in which Ethiopia sees an ally in its quest for a route to the sea.

Somaliland is a key gateway to both the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, and as a result a deal has been signed granting Ethiopia the commercial and military use of the port of Berbera on the Red Sea in exchange for Addis Ababa’s recognition of Somaliland as an independent state. This caused a disagreement between Ethiopia and Somalia, which sees Somaliland as part of its territory, encouraging Turkey to interfere.

Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud stated last Saturday that “Ethiopia refuses to recognise Somalia as a sovereign neighbouring state” owing to its deal with Somaliland. “Ethiopia has violated international law and continues to refuse to comply with international laws in order to make negotiations possible,” he said. Ethiopia’s political leadership is mainly concerned with its own interests and as usual has acted alone.

Cairo condemned Ethiopia’s agreement with Somaliland in January, with Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukri saying in a speech during an emergency meeting of Arab foreign ministers that Ethiopia’s signing of an agreement on access to the Red Sea “proves what Egypt warned about the consequences of Ethiopia’s unilateral policies that are contrary to the rules of international law, as well as the principles of good neighbourliness.”

Last week, Egypt signed a defence agreement with Somalia. According to Egyptian strategic expert Samir Farag, the agreement represents an “indirect message” to Ethiopia after its agreement with Somaliland and its efforts to establish a military base there. This had prompted Cairo to opt for the “strategic containment” of Ethiopia’s neighbouring countries, he said, as it seeks to balance the Turkish presence in the region.

Earlier impressions of Ethiopia’s political leadership have begun to fade as the country shifts from pursuing a policy of stability and peace with neighbouring African nations to a policy of geopolitical gain. At the same time, it is implementing a military strategy shift from defensive to offensive, prompting a re-evaluation of Ethiopia’s policies due to reckless acts that negatively affect regional stability.