Date: Tuesday, 11 March 2025
How Saudi Arabia’s Investment Could Redefine the Berbera Port and Horn of Africa’s Geopolitical Landscape.
Saudi Arabia is setting the stage for a profound strategic shift in the Horn of Africa through its planned multi-billion-dollar investment in Eritrea’s Assab port. This move not only positions Riyadh as a key player in the region but also challenges the existing dominance of other global powers such as the UAE, Turkey, and China within the crucial Red Sea trade corridor.
The investment in Assab port could significantly disrupt Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions. Given Ethiopia’s landlocked status, its government under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has long coveted access to the sea, viewing Eritrea’s ports as vital gateways. Secret reports suggest that Ethiopia might even consider military action to secure such access. However, Saudi Arabia’s involvement could deter such aspirations by enhancing Eritrea’s defensive capabilities and economic stability, making any aggressive move by Ethiopia both costly and politically untenable.
For Eritrea, aligning with Saudi Arabia could serve as a protective strategy against Ethiopian military ambitions, ensuring that its sovereignty over Assab remains unchallenged. This partnership would not only fortify Eritrea’s position but could also shift the regional power dynamics, potentially neutralizing Ethiopia’s influence over the Red Sea access points.
The potential Saudi investment in Assab port signifies more than just economic development; it reflects a strategic realignment in the Horn of Africa’s geopolitics. This realignment underscores a growing partnership between Saudi Arabia and Eritrea, aimed at safeguarding their interests along one of the world’s most vital maritime routes. Such a partnership could significantly alter regional power balances, offering Eritrea the backing needed to withstand Ethiopian pressures and enhancing Saudi influence in African geopolitics.
Furthermore, the move could recalibrate alliances and provoke reevaluations of strategic priorities among other regional players, including the UAE, Turkey, and China, all of whom have vested interests in the region’s maritime corridors. Each nation has been working to extend its influence through infrastructure investments and diplomatic engagements, and Riyadh’s new focus on Assab could prompt a rethinking of their strategies in response to the shifting sands of alliance and power.
For Somaliland, the developments surrounding Assab could have mixed implications. On one hand, a stronger Assab might divert some attention and resources away from Somaliland’s Berbera port, which has been backed by UAE investments. On the other hand, the geopolitical tensions and the strengthening of Assab could validate the strategic importance of having multiple allied ports along the Red Sea, potentially increasing the overall security and economic activity in the region.
The MOU signed between Somaliland and Ethiopia, which envisaged mutual recognition and economic cooperation, might also come under strain. Ethiopia’s potential isolation in the Red Sea arena could lead to a reevaluation of its foreign policy, especially towards its agreements with Somaliland.
Inconclusion, the anticipated Saudi investment in Assab is more than an economic venture; it is a strategic maneuver that could redefine regional alignments and power dynamics in the Horn of Africa. As the Red Sea becomes an increasingly contested geopolitical space, the actions of Saudi Arabia, coupled with the responses of other regional and global powers, will undoubtedly influence the future political landscape of this critical region.
