Ethiopia is going through a deep political and societal crisis, marked by ethnic tensions, economic problems, and increasing instability. The devastating civil war in the Tigray region (2020–2022) left the country in a state of exhaustion and uncertainty. Although the Pretoria peace agreement brought temporary calm, the rifts between the Ethiopian federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) remain deep.
Instead of securing lasting peace, the agreement has internally divided the TPLF. While some factions are willing to cooperate with Abiy Ahmed, others categorically reject his government. The Prime Minister attempted to exploit these internal divisions for his own power consolidation, but this strategy could prove to be dangerous. The risk of renewed armed conflict in Tigray is growing—a scenario that would further undermine the country’s fragile stability.
Another significant problem for Abiy Ahmed is the growing hostility of the Amhara, Ethiopia’s second-largest ethnic group. During the Tigray war, many Amhara militias fought alongside the government against the TPLF. They saw themselves as a crucial pillar of Abiy Ahmed’s war strategy and expected their interests to be considered after the victory. However, following the peace agreement, many Amharas felt betrayed by Abiy. The government began disarming some of their paramilitary forces, while unresolved land disputes in the region remained. The question of Wolkait and Raya, territories claimed by both Amharas and Tigrayans, continues to fuel tensions.
Since 2023, a new resistance movement has formed in Amhara. Armed groups are fighting against the Ethiopian army, and violent clashes are frequent. The government has declared a state of emergency and sent troops to the region, but the resistance persists. Amhara elites accuse Abiy of attempting to establish an Oromo hegemony—his own ethnic group—over Ethiopia and deliberately ignoring the interests of the Amhara.
Ironically, Abiy Ahmed is also facing growing resistance in his own home region of Oromia. Oromia is Ethiopia’s largest region and home to the Oromo, the country’s largest ethnic group. Many Oromo had high hopes when Abiy became Ethiopia’s first Oromo Prime Minister in 2018. However, today many feel disappointed and betrayed by him.
The Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), an armed resistance group, has waged a guerrilla war against the government for years. They accuse Abiy of neglecting Oromo interests and enforcing a centralized rule, rather than respecting Ethiopia’s federal structure. Especially in rural areas of Oromia, heavy fighting between government forces and OLA fighters occurs regularly. The humanitarian situation is deteriorating, and many Oromo citizens feel trapped between both sides. The ongoing conflict in Oromia is particularly problematic for Abiy, as it undermines his political base. Without the support of the Oromo, his government could be in jeopardy.
In addition to the ethnic conflicts, Ethiopia is also facing a severe economic crisis. Inflation is high, unemployment is rising, and many people are suffering from the consequences of past wars. Prices for staple foods such as teff, wheat, and oil have skyrocketed in recent years. Many families can hardly afford daily food. Especially young people are finding it increasingly difficult to find jobs. Economic insecurity is pushing many into the arms of armed groups or abroad. Ethiopia has high debts with international creditors such as China and the World Bank. The government must implement difficult economic reforms to avoid a financial disaster.
Ethiopia’s Desperate Pursuit of Access to the Sea
The combination of ethnic conflicts, political instability, and economic crisis could lead Ethiopia into a dangerous downward spiral. Some analysts are already warning that the country is heading toward a “failed state”—a state that can no longer guarantee its own security and stability. This development is clearly due to Abiy’s failed policies. Today, he stands with his back against the wall, having disappointed the hopes placed in him for more democracy, peace, and economic success. Abiy has now morphed from a beacon of hope to a warlord who allows his own people to be bombed with drones. In light of this, he is trying to deflect attention from his domestic failures through an aggressive foreign policy, attempting to free himself from this difficult situation.
A key element of this strategy is the demand for access to the sea. Since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia has been the world’s most populous landlocked country, entirely dependent on the ports of its neighboring countries, particularly Djibouti, which handles about 90% of Ethiopia’s foreign trade. Instead of seeking economic alternatives or establishing cooperative relations with coastal states through diplomacy, Abiy Ahmed uses the historical loss of the coastline as a political mobilization tool.
A Historical Pattern: Expansionism as a Distraction Strategy
The demand for access to the sea is by no means new in Ethiopia’s political history. Both Emperor Haile Selassie (1930–1974) and later dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam (1977–1991) used similar arguments to legitimize imperialistic ambitions. Haile Selassie considered Eritrea an essential part of the Ethiopian Empire and pursued a systematic annexation policy, which eventually led to Eritrea being fully incorporated as a province in 1962.
Mengistu Haile Mariam, on the other hand, fought a brutal war against Eritrean independence fighters in the 1970s and 1980s to maintain control over the region. This conflict ultimately led to a decades-long escalation, culminating in Eritrea’s final separation in 1993. Since then, Ethiopia has been haunted by the national trauma of the lost coastal access, which Abiy Ahmed is now using again to distract from domestic crises.
For months, the Prime Minister has been claiming that Ethiopia has historically and geographically been a coastal state and has a right to access the sea. He deliberately ignores that any access to coastal areas would require the approval of the neighboring countries. Yet instead of seeking diplomatic solutions, he increasingly resorts to aggressive rhetoric, which not only destabilizes the region but also jeopardizes relations with key partners.
The Controversial Agreement with Somaliland – A Geopolitical Risk
On January 1, 2024, Ethiopia signed a highly controversial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland, a de facto independent region that declared its independence from Somalia in 1991, though it is not internationally recognized. Under the terms of the agreement, Somaliland granted Ethiopia a 50-year lease for strategic access to the Red Sea—in exchange for potential diplomatic recognition by Addis Ababa.
This decision immediately sparked massive reactions. Somalia continues to regard Somaliland as an integral part of its territory and viewed the agreement as a blatant violation of its national sovereignty. The Somali government threatened harsh countermeasures and warned of further escalation that could destabilize the fragile balance in the region.
While the MoU with Somaliland has already caused diplomatic tensions, the growing hostility between Ethiopia and Eritrea could have even more dangerous consequences. Reports indicate that Ethiopia has been amassing troops along its border with Eritrea. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has repeatedly stated that his country cannot remain cut off from the coast forever. These statements are seen in Asmara as a direct threat.
The relationship between the two countries is historically fraught. The border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998–2000) claimed tens of thousands of lives and was only formally ended in 2018 with a peace treaty. During the Tigray war, Eritrea supported the Ethiopian government, but this alliance quickly broke down. Since then, tensions have escalated again.
A war between Ethiopia and Eritrea could quickly spread across the entire region. Eritrea has a highly militarized society and would defend itself with all its might against Ethiopian ambitions. Should an open conflict break out, Somalia, Djibouti, and possibly Sudan could also be drawn into the violence.
The Danger of a Regional Inferno
The Horn of Africa is already one of the most unstable regions in the world. The growing geopolitical tensions in the region highlight how fragile the power structure in the Horn of Africa is. A military conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea would not only further destabilize the already precarious situation but could trigger a dangerous chain reaction, pulling Somalia, Djibouti, and Sudan into the vortex of violence. Additionally, external actors such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates could become involved in the conflict, as each pursues its own strategic and economic interests in the region.
The humanitarian consequences would be devastating: millions of people could be forced to flee their homes, while hunger, poverty, and economic decline would continue to rise. Given the already existing challenges from droughts, resource scarcity, and fragile political systems, a new war could push the region over the edge.
It remains uncertain whether Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed can achieve his geopolitical ambitions through diplomatic negotiations rather than military force. However, one thing is certain: without a prudent and sustainable diplomatic solution, the Horn of Africa is at risk of plunging into a devastating conflict once again—with serious, unpredictable consequences for the entire region and far beyond. The international community faces the urgent task of acting to de-escalate the situation before the next major crisis zone in the world takes shape.
