Ethiopia and Egypt (illustrative image - iStock)

Ethiopia’s rapid moves to reach the Red Sea are raising Egyptian concerns that go beyond Addis Ababa’s need for a trade outlet to facilitate its imports and exports, to include the nature of the presence that Ethiopia seeks on one of the most important maritime routes in the world, and the possibility of it becoming a military and security foothold that will redraw the balance of power in the Horn of Africa and Bab al-Mandab.

The debate resurfaced with the Ethiopian Navy hosting the third edition of the Regional Maritime Security Forum in Addis Ababa, with the participation of maritime and security representatives from several countries in the region, including Yemen, Oman, and Djibouti, as well as representatives from the regions of Somaliland and Puntland. The announced discussions focused on cooperation in search and rescue, the exchange of information and expertise, and addressing shared maritime threats.

But what is striking about this participation is the presence of representatives of two entities that do not have the same international status as states, at a time when Somaliland is still part of Somali territory according to the position of the Somali Federal Government and the general international position, while the Puntland region enjoys the status of a region with self-governance within Somalia.

These moves come at a time when the Ethiopian government continues to demand access to the sea, after it lost its coastline following Eritrea’s independence in 1993. This places Ethiopian maritime movements at the heart of regional security calculations and explains part of Egypt’s reservations about any arrangements that would grant a country not bordering the Red Sea a direct security or military role in it.

Why is Cairo hesitant about Ethiopian moves?

The Egyptian vision is based on considering the Red Sea a strategic waterway directly linked to the national security of the littoral states, and not merely an open maritime space subject to security arrangements led by external actors. From this perspective, Cairo rejects the participation of non-coastal states in Red Sea governance and security arrangements, or the establishment of a military presence on its shores through agreements that infringe upon the sovereignty of the littoral states.

Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdel-Aty reiterated this position in February 2026, emphasizing that the governance of the Red Sea is the exclusive responsibility of the littoral states and rejecting attempts by external parties to impose themselves as partners in its management or security arrangements. He also stressed the importance of activating the Council of Arab and African States Bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, as a framework for coordination among countries concerned with the security of this maritime corridor.

In July 2026, Cairo and Asmara reaffirmed the same position, stressing respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Red Sea littoral states, and rejecting unilateral actions that could undermine regional stability.

This position is not so much about depriving Ethiopia of commercial benefits from the ports, but rather about separating the right of a landlocked state to access the sea through transit arrangements and trade agreements, from its possession of a military base or imposing a security role in the Red Sea without the consent of the sovereign coastal states.

The Somaliland memorandum: a turning point in the crisis

One of the most prominent escalation points dates back to January 1, 2024, when Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with the Somaliland region, which included arrangements to grant Addis Ababa access to the coast, with a coastal area estimated at about 20 kilometers available for maritime, military and commercial uses, according to what the region’s authorities announced at the time, in exchange for Ethiopia’s move towards studying its recognition.

The memorandum sparked a strong objection from the Somali government, which considered it a violation of the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, stressing that any agreement relating to ports or military installations on Somali territory must be made through the federal government in Mogadishu.

The sensitivity of this move lies in the fact that Ethiopia not only proposed arrangements to facilitate trade through a neighboring port, but also entered into a direct agreement with a region that lacks international recognition as independent and is legally and politically subordinate to Somalia. Thus, the issue of access to the seaport has transformed from an economic matter concerning transportation and trade costs into a crisis related to sovereignty, borders, and the balance of security in the Horn of Africa.

In April 2024, Somalia rejected the establishment of an Ethiopian naval base in Somaliland, but expressed its willingness to consider arrangements that would allow Ethiopia to use commercial ports in accordance with international law, provided that the sovereignty of the Somali state is respected and the agreement signed by Addis Ababa with the region without Mogadishu’s consent is cancelled.

The Maritime Forum: Expanding Ethiopia's presence beyond its borders

Ethiopia’s hosting of the Regional Maritime Security Forum is of added importance given the timing of its convening and the parties participating in it, as Addis Ababa seeks to present itself as an active player in issues of maritime security, search and rescue and maritime cooperation, despite being a landlocked country that does not have a coast on the Red Sea or the Gulf of Aden.

According to Ethiopian media reports, the forum brought together representatives of naval forces and maritime security agencies in Yemen, Oman, Djibouti, Somaliland and Puntland, and discussed information exchange, developing search and rescue capabilities and joint training to counter maritime threats.

Officially, these topics fall under the umbrella of technical and regional cooperation, and participation in a forum or workshop does not, in itself, constitute evidence of establishing a military base or Ethiopia's claim to control the Red Sea. However, the notable presence of representatives from Somaliland and Puntland raises questions about the nature of the parties with whom Addis Ababa seeks to build cooperative channels, and the extent to which these moves are linked to its broader efforts to gain a maritime foothold.

These questions are increasing in light of the Ethiopian leadership’s insistence that access to the sea is a strategic priority for the country, which makes the diplomatic and military moves related to maritime security part of a broader context that goes beyond the goals of search and rescue and the exchange of expertise.

International law distinguishes between the right of passage and the possession of a military base.

Ethiopia bases its claim to access the sea on its geographical status as a landlocked country, a status that grants it rights to access ports and transit through the territories of neighboring countries according to the rules of international law.

Article 125 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates the right of landlocked states to access and from the sea, and to benefit from freedom of transit through the territory of transit states, provided that the conditions and mechanisms of this transit are determined through bilateral or regional agreements between the states concerned.

However, the same agreement, in the same article, affirms that transit states retain full sovereignty over their territories and the right to take necessary measures to protect their legitimate interests. This means that a landlocked state's right of access to ports does not automatically translate into a right to possess a coastal strip belonging to another state or to establish a naval base without its consent.

Hence, the legal difference becomes apparent between Ethiopia obtaining trade facilities in a port belonging to a sovereign state, and entering into agreements that grant it a military or security presence on the Red Sea coast, especially if those agreements are concluded with authorities that do not have the international authority to act in the territory subject to the agreement.

Therefore, the core of the dispute is not about the principle of Ethiopia benefiting from the ports, but rather about the nature and limits of the arrangements, who has the right to approve them, and the extent to which they respect the territorial sovereignty of the coastal states.

The Red Sea: Calculations that extend beyond Ethiopia and Egypt

The strategic importance of the Red Sea stems from its role as a link between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea via the Gulf of Aden, Bab al-Mandab, and the Suez Canal, making it one of the most important corridors through which international trade, energy, and goods pass between Asia and Europe.

Egypt views the security of this waterway as a direct extension of the security of the Suez Canal and maritime traffic, as well as being linked to the security of its coasts and its economic and strategic interests. Any change in the nature of military arrangements in the Red Sea or the Gulf of Aden could affect the regional balance of power, especially given the numerous military bases and international presences in the Horn of Africa.

In this context, Cairo does not view the issue of Ethiopia obtaining a sea outlet as an economic issue separate from the surrounding security environment, but rather it is monitoring whether this outlet will remain dedicated to trade and transportation, or whether it will turn into a military stronghold that allows Addis Ababa to expand its influence in the sea lanes near Bab al-Mandab.

Any such arrangements could also open the door to regional and international competition for influence in an area that includes Egyptian, Somali, Eritrean and Yemeni interests, as well as the interests of international powers that depend on the stability of shipping lanes.

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam adds another dimension to Egyptian calculations.

The Egyptian-Ethiopian tensions cannot be separated from the ongoing dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, although it is inaccurate to reduce the Egyptian position on Ethiopian maritime movements to the Nile water issue alone.

Cairo has been demanding for years a legally binding agreement that regulates the filling and operation of the dam, in a way that preserves the rights of the downstream countries, while it believes that Ethiopia’s unilateral actions in matters related to water or the territorial sovereignty of neighboring countries represent a challenge to the rules of international law and the principles of good neighborliness.

In February 2026, Cairo denied reports that it was prepared to facilitate Ethiopia’s access to a sea outlet in exchange for flexibility in its position on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, stressing that its position on water security is firm, and that the governance and security of the Red Sea remain the responsibility of the countries bordering it.

This denial reflects Egypt’s keenness not to treat the water and Red Sea files as a bargaining chip, as each has its own legal and security rules and direct interests, even if they intersect within the framework of the tense strategic relations between Cairo and Addis Ababa.

Why are the Ethiopian moves causing concern among the Egyptian military?

Major General Yassin Taher, a lecturer at the Egyptian Military Academy for Higher and Strategic Studies, believes that Ethiopia’s loss of its coastal access following Eritrea’s independence in 1993 prompted it to seek alternatives to reach the Red Sea, at a time when it relies on Djibouti’s ports to pass through a large part of its foreign trade at high economic costs.

Taher explained, in statements carried by Egyptian media, that the memorandum of understanding with Somaliland represented one of Addis Ababa’s most prominent attempts to obtain a naval base and a commercial port, noting that the move prompted Egypt, Somalia and Eritrea to strengthen diplomatic and security coordination, rejecting any arrangements that affect the regional sovereignty of the countries.

For his part, Dr. Haitham Omran, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Suez University, believes that the Ethiopian moves go beyond the goal of facilitating trade and exports in some aspects, touching on the issue of security and military influence in a global maritime corridor.

Imran pointed out that hosting representatives from Somaliland and Puntland at security-related events raises questions about the nature of the arrangements Addis Ababa is seeking to build, and whether it paves the way for expanding its presence in the Horn of Africa and near Bab al-Mandab.

These assessments reflect one aspect of Egyptian concerns that Ethiopia’s quest for a sea outlet could turn into a broader project to rearrange military and security influence in the region, rather than being satisfied with clear trade agreements with sovereign states.

Does Egypt absolutely reject Ethiopia's access to the sea?

Distinguishing between commercial access and military presence requires a more accurate reading of the Egyptian position; international law grants landlocked countries the right to access the sea through the territories of neighboring countries, and Ethiopia can negotiate the use of ports and the development of trade corridors, railways and land routes, in a way that achieves its economic interests and the interests of the host countries.

But Cairo refuses to allow this right to become an entry point for imposing security or military arrangements on the Red Sea by a non-coastal state, or for this to be done through agreements that diminish the sovereignty of a coastal state or bypass its internationally recognized government.

While Ethiopia’s need for genuine sea access remains an economic and geographical consideration that cannot be ignored, addressing this issue requires declared and mutually beneficial agreements that respect the sovereignty of states and clearly separate trade facilities from military and security rights.

Thus, the Egyptian rejection is mainly related to the nature of the means and arrangements through which Ethiopia seeks to reach the Red Sea, and what may result from this in terms of changes to the rules of managing the security of the maritime corridor and the balances of the Horn of Africa, and not merely to the Ethiopian economy benefiting from the commercial ports of neighboring countries.