Date: Saturday, 22 February 2020
22nd February 2020
Fighting between the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by General Khalifa Haftar, and the Libyan Armed Forces (LAF), affiliated with the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA), resumed in Abugrein, 90km south of Misrata, on 26 January. The major flare up violated a truce struck between the rival factions just two weeks previously, and occurred less than a week after the Berlin conference on Libya, which had been hailed as a significant step forward for the faltering peace process.
The stark contrast between the Berlin conference conclusions (which made provisions for the ceasefire and the maintenance of an existing United Nations Security Council (UNSC) arms embargo, as well as economic, financial and security sector reforms) and the reality on the ground is a reflection of the two different levels upon which the war is unfolding in Libya.
Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli, which has been ongoing since April 2019, has provided a wide array of regional and international players with the opportunity to increase their support for the warring parties on the ground, escalating the conflict. Meanwhile, local actors, emboldened by foreign support, continue to enjoy a significant degree of autonomy, often to the detriment of their backers. Haftar’s formal rejection of the ceasefire shows that the local and international dimensions of the conflict are often disjointed.
Only days after the ceasefire was agreed in Moscow on 13 January, and on the eve of the Berlin conference, Haftar imposed a blockade on oil terminals in the east of the country, thereby raising doubts about the ability of foreign states to influence their proxies and, ultimately, the merits of international initiatives such as the Berlin process.
The main reason for the fragility of the truce lies in Haftar’s current position of advantage. Earlier this year, the LNA resumed its drive on Tripoli, making significant gains. On 6 January, Haftar’s troops captured the city of Sirte and took control of the Ghardabiya airbase. This airfield was strategically important for the GNA, as it would have served as a key hub for receiving logistical support from Turkey, its main ally.
Success on the ground gave Haftar greater leverage during the negotiations both in Moscow and Berlin, allowing him to make stricter demands on the GNA, such as the demobilisation of pro-government militias within 90 days. As Haftar’s conditions were met with resistance, the LNA not only attacked the city of Abugrein, but also intensified airstrikes in Tripoli, where Haftar’s forces are engaged in renewed fighting with local and Turkish-backed Syrian militiamen in the suburban areas of Salah al-Din and Tajoura. The LNA also repeatedly attacked Mitiga airport, where the LAF have reportedly deployed MiM-23 Hawk medium-range surface-to-air missile systems and Korkut self-propelled air-defence gun systems, which are most likely operated by Turkish military personnel.
The presence of foreign military forces – whether regular or mercenaries – and the supply of weapons and military equipment to local armed groups are clear violations of the commitments made in Berlin and represent an obstacle for the peace process. Supporting the GNA and the LNA respectively, Turkey and the UAE are among the states skirting around the arms embargo imposed on Libya, doubling down on their proxies after Haftar’s attack on Tripoli began last year.
Although both countries agreed to commit to UN Security Council Resolution 1970 (which was first established in 2011) in Berlin, in the aftermath of the summit the United Nations Support Mission in Libya reported a substantial inflow of advanced weapons, armoured vehicles, advisers and fighters. In the past few weeks alone, intense aerial activity has been registered over the LNA-controlled Benina airport and Al-Khadim airbase, where UAE-registered An-124 and Il-76 heavy-transport aircraft have allegedly been observed.
Similarly, Turkey has reportedly been using charter flights to deploy Syrian rebel fighters from the Free Syrian Army into the country. Furthermore, the appearance of two Turkish Gabya-class frigates, officially deployed to NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian, off the Libyan coast on 28 January, has been linked by French military intelligence to a further breach of the arms embargo. According to the French authorities, the two frigates were escorting a cargo ship into Tripoli’s port. If a video circulated by the LNA is verified, the Turkish maritime delivery to the LAF included ACV armoured personnel carriers, Oerlikon GDF and Korkut 35mm anti-aircraft guns and T-155 Firtina 155mm self-propelled artillery.
The failure by Ankara and Abu Dhabi to comply with the arms embargo now leaves the International Follow-Up Committee established in Berlin, as well as the UNSC, with the onerous task of finding a way to enforce its provisions. This is a formidable task, not least because of a lack of unity within the UNSC, as demonstrated during the long negotiations over the resolution 2510 (2020) that endorsed the Berlin conference’s conclusions[UP1] , as well as divisions within the EU.
A major sticking point has been the potential revival of EUNAVFOR MED. First launched in 2015, the operation was designed to disrupt human trafficking across the Mediterranean and to help implement the arms embargo on Libya. However, EUNAVFOR MED’s maritime component has not been operational since March 2019, when the Italian government toughened its approach to immigration.
Fresh talks over the revival of the maritime operation reportedly failed, due to the objections of the Austrian government, which opposes maritime patrols that, in its view, could encourage more migrants to cross the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe. Italy had in part agreed to reactivate EUNAVFOR MED on condition that it focuses exclusively on monitoring the arms embargo in Libya. However, any relaunch of the mission would have strategic implications, due to rising tensions in the eastern Mediterranean following a bilateral agreement on maritime boundaries signed by Turkey and the GNA. Signed in tandem with a military cooperation agreement in November 2019, the agreed delimitation of their respective economic exclusive zones angered their neighbours, which have considerable stakes in energy projects in the area.
The arrival of Turkish warships in Tripoli, as well as the stated willingness of French President Emmanuel Macron to deploy French frigates after talks with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsokatis, highlights the risk of a maritime confrontation off the coast of Libya, as well as the deepening fissures between major NATO allies.
Any strategy to fully implement the arms embargo in Libya must consider not only its maritime dimension and air transports of weapons and troops, but also the country’s land borders. For this reason, a meeting of Libya’s neighbouring countries that took place in Algiers on 23 January was particularly important. The meeting was held partly in response to the apparent lack of inclusiveness of the Berlin conference, which was decried by countries such as Tunisia – it only received a last-minute invitation despite being directly affected by the crisis in Libya.
Together with a gathering in Brazzaville of members of the African Union High Level Committee on Libya on 30 January, the Algiers meeting threw a spotlight on the African dimension of the Libya crisis, highlighting the need for better coordination among neighbouring countries. It provided a much-needed bridge between two blocs of countries (Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia on one side; Chad, Mali, Niger and Sudan on the other) that could lead to a more comprehensive approach to the crisis[UP2] . In their final statement, the assembled nations rejected any military solution or foreign interference in Libya, and instead called on the Libyan factions to resume the peace process sponsored by the UN with the support of the AU.
However, regional dynamics are very much shaped by the conflicting agendas of the main stakeholders, Algeria and Egypt, which support rival factions in Libya. Cairo has been frequently accused of violating the arms embargo by the UN Panel of Experts, allegedly providing weapons and military equipment to the LNA and carrying out airstrikes in support of Haftar’s forces. Meanwhile, Algeria is considered to have close ties with the authorities in Tripoli. Wary of Haftar’s progress in western Libya, Algiers has found itself in greater alignment with Ankara, despite the fact that the Turkish intervention in Libya is clearly at odds with Algeria’s traditionally non-interventionist stance.
Although regional diplomacy and international conferences are undoubtedly worthy efforts, the absence of a meaningful ceasefire makes the prospect of a workable solution to Libya’s conflict appear dismal. Any lasting deal is contingent on a genuine commitment to the truce by the parties on the ground and the implementation of effective measures to enforce the arms embargo.
The United Nations is currently pushing on both fronts, by facilitating a special committee made up of five military officials from each warring side and drafting a resolution aimed at imposing sanctions on countries that break the arms embargo. Whether these endeavours will produce any tangible result, or become another failed attempt at reconciliation, has yet to be seen.
Umberto Profazio
IISS Analyst for Libya
