Today, the Horn of Africa is still reeling from the impacts of Ethiopia’s January memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Somaliland (the unrecognized breakaway republic in northern Somalia), which granted Ethiopian naval forces access to twenty kilometers of Somaliland’s coastline. In return, according to claims by the government in Hargeisa, Ethiopia agreed to begin a process considering the recognition of Somaliland’s independence.
Nine months later, the situation has been exacerbated by decisions made by countries outside of the Horn, such as Egypt’s signing of a security agreement with Somalia. The agreement includes the delivery of weapons, troops, and military hardware, the first tranche of which was sent to Somalia on August 27. The involvement of other players in the Horn of Africa’s security landscape is a prime example of how middle-power politics and diplomacy in one region could, over time, create a tinderbox of conditions: one in which even a small mistake could cause a rapid escalation.
A nine-month downward spiral
In 2018, Ethiopia and Somalia had seen a détente in relations thanks to Prime Minister of Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed’s attempt to reshape regional alliances and exert Ethiopian influence. But the MOU—which Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, in an address days after the signing, said is a denial of his country’s territorial sovereignty—has set back nearly all progress made.
Somalia has reacted in various ways: In his address, Mohamud declared Ethiopia one of the greatest enemies of the state, on par with Al-Shabaab. He also signed a law that he said nullified the MOU. In the nine months that followed, negative rhetoric against Somaliland worsened, and Mohamud began a diplomatic blitz to rally support against the MOU. Nevertheless, the MOU lives on, with Somaliland and Ethiopia strengthening their relations, exchanging ambassadors, training security forces, and regularly setting up meetings between leaders.
Over the past nine months, other countries have made moves that have had implications for the already inflamed turmoil in the region. In February, Turkey and Somalia, reaffirming their long-standing security partnership, signed the Defense and Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement. The agreement is formally aimed at helping “Somalia develop its capacity and capabilities to combat illegal and irregular activities in its territorial waters,” but no doubt also serves as a counterweight to any growth in Ethiopian naval capabilities. Upon signing this deal, Somaliland warned Turkey against any form of naval deployment in its territorial waters; but in July, Turkey’s parliament approved a deployment of the Turkish military to Somalia (including Somalia’s territorial waters). Beyond hard power, the Turks have been flexing their political muscles in the Horn, not only offering vocal support to Somalia following the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU but also hosting negotiations between Somalia and Ethiopia at Abiy’s request. The negotiations in Ankara amounted to little success.
Starting in January, Egypt was a vocal opponent of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has spoken up for Somalia, declaring that “Egypt will not allow anyone to threaten Somalia or affect its security.” Following the signing of the MOU, Egypt hosted Mohamud for high-profile meetings with Egyptian and Arab League officials in January, and since then, Sisi has been a staunch Somalia advocate. In August, Somalia and Egypt signed their security agreement.
There are several likely reasons that can explain why Egypt is strengthening its ties with Somalia: For example, the countries’ shared Islamic identity and Arab League affiliation, Egypt’s genuine desire to support Somalia in its fight against terrorism, or the trade opportunities that could come from a safer Gulf of Aden. Nevertheless, a significant motivation for Egypt is likely its animosity with Ethiopia. The two countries, among the largest military and economic powers on the African continent, have been at odds since 2011, when Ethiopia began construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Nile River. While Ethiopia argues the dam would generate significant economic and development gains for the country, Egypt asserts that the dam jeopardizes its access to water and threatens Egyptian agriculture, a major part of its economy. Despite many rounds of negotiations, Egypt and Ethiopia have yet to find a solution, pushing Egypt to look for additional channels to pressure the Ethiopians. Adding to the pressing nature of this conflict, the Egyptian foreign minister said on September 1 that he had written to the UN Security Council with serious concerns about Ethiopia’s approval of the fifth phase of dam construction.
The Al-Shabaab throughline
Throughout all of this, Al-Shabaab has grown stronger and still poses a threat to all the countries of the region. Despite Mohamud having launched what he called in 2022 an “all out war” against the militant group, Al-Shabaab has regrouped and made significant gains since the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU, with reports saying the group has had an influx of financial capital and a surge in recruiting, particularly drawing in people who do not like Ethiopia. In February, Al-Shabaab attacked an Emirati-run military base in the region, and the following month attacked several Somalian military sites in the Lower Shabelle region. In June, it was reported that US intelligence learned of discussions between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab about the former providing weapons to the latter. In August, Al-Shabaab killed thirty-two and injured more than sixty in a suicide bombing at a beach in Mogadishu.
At the same time, the current international mandate to fight Al-Shabaab, the African Union (AU) Transition Mission in Somalia, is in the final stages of its drawdown, and a proposal was submitted to replace it with the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) on January 1, 2025, pending approval by the African Union in November. Though Ethiopia has played a massive role in fighting Al-Shabaab in Somalia—with three thousand troops deployed under the current AU mission and 5,700 troops deployed throughout the Somali security sphere—Somalia requested that Ethiopia not contribute forces to AUSSOM and said it would expel Ethiopian troops from Somalia unless it cancels the MOU with Somaliland. Meanwhile, Egypt plans to commit five thousand troops to AUSSOM at the start of the deployment and another five thousand troops separately.
This is a slap in the face for the Ethiopian troops who sacrificed over the past nineteen years in the name of regional security. For the Egyptians, this is an opportunity to exert regional influence and pressure the Ethiopians. Moreover, regional infighting among political leadership risks the viability of the AU Transition Mission in Somalia ahead of its pivotal transition to AUSSOM. Lack of cooperation between Ethiopia, Somalia, Egypt, and Somaliland undermines the effectiveness of the counterterrorism effort—and a weakened counterterrorism environment is fertile ground for Al-Shabaab to gain footing in its efforts to destabilize the Horn of Africa.
What to expect in the short-term
In the near future, regional tensions bring into doubt the future of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU. Ethiopia took a big risk by embarking on a deal with an unrecognized state. Though the risk could produce a high return on investment—increased trade revenue in the region, greater security in the Gulf of Aden, and for both Ethiopia and Somaliland a boost to national pride—the pressure is on for Ethiopia to take a different path. Despite progress with Somaliland, there is still room for Ethiopia to walk its commitments back. Already bogged down in conflict in the Ethiopian region of Amhara and scarred by his mishandling of the war in Tigray, Abiy is looking for a win in building the Ethiopian navy back up. Yet facing pressure from actors on all sides, he may be keen to look for another avenue to naval power, such as Djibouti’s recent proposal to give Ethiopia access to a new port and trade corridor. Supporters of the Somaliland MOU must think strategically about how to ensure the reward of coastal access is worth the risk posed to Ethiopia, and all eyes should be focused on the next round of negotiations in Ankara.
If Ethiopia, Egypt, and Somalia all continue down this path, there may soon be a situation in which Ethiopian and Egyptian troops are stationed opposite one another along the Somalian border, the Ethiopians in their territory and the Egyptians in Somalia as a part of AUSSOM. With two powerful militaries stationed across from each other, increased proximity heightens the risk, even if small, that mistakes could escalate into skirmishes or worse—interstate conflict in the Horn. Even if Egypt and Ethiopia were to go to war directly, it’s easy to fathom a situation in which the various regional players end up on different sides of proxy wars. Conflicts in and near the Horn of Africa have long been hotbeds for proxy conflicts, as typified by the ongoing Sudanese civil war.
Instability between regional countries could also empower Al-Shabaab to escalate its aggression in the Horn. The militant group has benefited from the past nine months of instability, and periods of transition between military deployments are always fragile. According to the nonprofit organization Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, the first nine months of 2024 have already seen 127 events of violence targeting civilians perpetrated by Al-Shabaab, with 187 reported fatalities. This year has also seen an increase in recruitment efforts by the militant group, fueled by the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU. With Ethiopia, Egypt, and Somalia at odds, it will be incredibly challenging to successfully transition the current mission to AUSSOM without things falling through the cracks. Moreover, if Ethiopia (with its extensive experience fighting Al-Shabaab) does not contribute to the deployment, a critical base of institutional knowledge will be missing. An emboldened Al-Shabaab with ties to the Houthis, in a region where leaders are unable to cooperate with each other on matters of security, would pose a threat to countries around the world. If left unmanaged, there could be much larger consequences for the international community down the line.
Looking toward the future
Though the moment feels catastrophically tense, increased violence is not inevitable. Ethiopia, Egypt, and Somalia may walk their rhetoric back, negotiations may succeed in Ankara, and the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU could still go through and lead to many positive outcomes for the parties and the region. Yet those invested in the Horn of Africa must keep a close eye on how things develop. Though different in many ways, the leaders of the countries involved in Horn geopolitics share one thing in common: They are all opportunistic leaders who are looking for a chance to gain the upper hand in a battle for power, influence, and opportunity at a time when the global system is under immense strain.
Ultimately, noncooperation in this part of the world will lead to many lost opportunities. Immense potential in the Horn remains untapped while the region suffers from clashes. Restoring peace to the region, reducing the threats posed by violent extremism, addressing critical challenges around food and energy security (amid climate change, no less), and harnessing the political and economic opportunities of the Red Sea all depend on greater collaboration and cooperation—not fragmentation and hostility. Cooperation will not only benefit the people of the region and the security interests of the international community but will also address the needs of those same leaders looking to stitch themselves into the fabric of their countries’ national ethos.
The past decade has seen a rise in middle-power politics around the world. The situation in the Horn of Africa is not unique, but it is a prime example of where this new form of competition could serve as a tinderbox, igniting regional war, if not handled properly.
*Maxwell Webb is an independent Horn of Africa and Middle East analyst who currently serves as the coordinator of leadership initiatives at the Israel Policy Forum’s IPF Atid program.
