n a significant diplomatic shift in the Horn of Africa, the leaders of Egypt, Somalia, and Eritrea convened in Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, on 10 October 2024. As their discussions centered on forming an alliance that could include a collective security framework or even economic sanctions against Ethiopia, the meeting raised concerns for the stability of the region.
Since August 2024, Egypt has forged a military cooperation and intelligence exchange agreement with Somalia and a similar security pact is expected with Eritrea. Now, as Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, Egypt’s Abdel Fattah al–Sisi, and Somalia’s Hassan Sheikh Mohamud unite for the first time to discuss this tripartite alliance, the meeting’s outcomes could significantly alter the region’s geopolitical landscape.
Indeed, the Horn of Africa has been in the news for quite some time now, particularly for the metastasizing two–year–long civil war in Ethiopia that has claimed 600,000 lives. Meanwhile in neighboring Sudan, two generals fighting for power has resulted in more than 150,000 deaths and an additional 10 million displacements, creating dangerous repercussions for the region.
And while the region has hardly had a chance to breathe, another more considerable tension is lurking that can tear the region apart: This ad–hoc anti–Ethiopian coalition in the making in response to Ethiopia’s controversial deal with Somaliland. Located in the northwestern part of Somalia, Somaliland broke away from Somalia in 1991 and declared its independence.
However, despite the de facto recognition of Taiwan, another breakaway region of China, no other country recognized Somaliland until the start of 2024 when Ethiopia, the most populous nation of the Horn of Africa and a regional powerhouse, signed a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland. The deal would provide landlocked Ethiopia with direct access to the Red Sea by using the port of Berbera in return for recognizing Somaliland’s sovereignty.
Nothing has remained the same since the deal. The deal has been widely condemned by Somalia, which views it as a violation of its territorial integrity. Other neighboring countries, particularly Egypt and Eritrea, have also expressed their resentment of the agreement. And the repercussions of the deal continue to reverberate across the region, even 10 months later.
Egypt’s strategy of encircling Ethiopia, with which it has long–standing tensions—especially regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile—appears to be effective. Cairo views the dam as an existential threat to its water supply. The agreement with Somaliland could enable Ethiopia to establish a naval military base along its coast, raising significant concerns for Eritrea—a foe of Ethiopia—about the prospect of an Ethiopian fleet operating nearby.
Therefore, an anti–Ethiopian tripartite group is already a diplomatic victory for Egypt. However, other than security assistance from Egypt, both Somalia and Eritrea stand to gain little from this arrangement. With existing tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia already elevated, this strategic shift could further exacerbate instability within Somalia.
Al Shabab in Somalia has grown more potent than ever, undoing the progress made by the Somali National Army over the past two years. Reports indicate between 12,000 to 13,000 Al Shabab fighters are now collaborating with Houthi militants present in Somalia. With a U.S. arms embargo limiting the flow of weapons into the country, Al Shabab is increasingly relying on connections with Iran to acquire advanced missiles and drones. As instability rises, it would be difficult for Somalia to govern Somaliland and other regions beyond the capital Mogadishu without external support.
Meanwhile, Eritrea remains as isolated as ever and continues to face sanctions. With this deal in place, Ethiopia may soon withdraw from the Algiers Agreement, which has kept the two neighbours from conflict. Instead, Eritrea’s genuine interest may lie in partnering with the Ethiopian government to confront their mutual rival, Tigray. Located in the north of Ethiopia, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) has been fighting an atrocious war against the Ethiopian government for autonomy since November 2020, killing more than 600,000 people. Although the war stopped in 2022, still around 2 million are at risk of starvation.
While another all–out war appears unlikely, this regional alignment raises concerns about potential Cold War–style proxy conflicts. The region may see a rise in diplomatic tensions and economic sanctions, affecting trade routes and military alliances. As the consequences of this turmoil will impact the stability of the Red Sea and beyond, these developments must draw attention from global powers and raise their concerns.
While the specifics of the alliance will be discussed and finalized in the coming days, the declaration has already established a framework for turbulent interstate relations in the Horn of Africa. This alliance could deter Ethiopia, prompting it to withdraw from the Somaliland deal and seek a negotiated peace. Or it could lead to a prolonged conflict that deepens regional rivalries. So far, Ethiopia has adopted a “wait and watch” approach, postponing the implementation of its controversial memorandum of understanding with Somaliland. However, as unconfirmed news of a visit by Somaliland President Muse Bihi to Ethiopia has started to emerge, if the tour happens, it would mean advanced discussions on the implementation plan of the MoU. It may prompt Egypt and its partner countries to take a stronger stance.
As many parts of the world stand on the brink of conflict, the Horn of Africa is rapidly becoming a tinderbox all its own, poised for escalating tensions and instability, potentially leading to a devastating war. This could become the deadliest conflict in the region in recent history. Yet, the region receives scant attention from the international community. As the saying goes, nothing is more dangerous than sincere ignorance. Ignoring the Horn of Africa may prove perilous for the global community.
