Date: Monday, 05 May 2025
For over six months, the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait have returned to the forefront of global strategic concerns.
One of the most crucial routes for global energy trade has transformed into a hybrid battlefield, where non-state actors—armed and trained by regional powers—test the reaction capabilities of superpowers and probe the limits of the international order. The Yemeni Houthi group, a Shiite militia with strong ideological and military ties to Iran, has claimed responsibility for a long series of attacks against merchant ships and oil tankers linked to Western interests. Their stated motivation is solidarity with the population of Gaza and the desire to strike at “Israel’s allies.” However, upon closer examination, the stakes are much broader: strategic control of maritime routes, redefinition of power relations in the Gulf, and indirect pressure on the West during a time of political and military vulnerability.
The geographical area in question is not merely a commercial passage. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, only 30 kilometers wide, represents a true bottleneck through which nearly 10% of global maritime trade passes, along with over 30% of the oil and liquefied gas traffic destined for Europe. Transiting ships connect Saudi and Kuwaiti ports to the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean, and thus to the entire Euro-Atlantic market. In this context, any disruption represents a direct blow to the international economy. It is precisely on this point that the Houthi strategy finds its raison d’être: attacking where global vulnerability is most exposed, generating low-cost instability, and provoking disproportionate reactions from actors like the United States, thereby transforming asymmetric conflict into a diplomatic lever.
Symbolically, attacks on American oil tankers send a clear message: no power can consider itself immune from risk, even if thousands of kilometers away from the battlefield. The Houthis, despite not being a recognized state or possessing a traditional naval force, have managed to assert themselves as a geopolitical actor capable of altering the perception of global energy security. This is not merely a military affront; it is a reversal of the deterrence paradigm. For decades, Western naval supremacy has guaranteed freedom of the seas. Today, a peripheral actor, with the support of an ambitious regional ally like Iran, demonstrates that even an unstable area like Yemen can become the epicenter of global crises.
Complicating the situation further is the simultaneity of other international tension hotspots: the conflict in Ukraine, growing frictions between the United States and China in the Pacific, and the upcoming American presidential elections. In this scenario, Washington’s attention and strategic resources are diluted, and each new crisis holds the potential to multiply chaos. The instrumental use of local crises to produce systemic pressure is a well-known technique: from Syria to Libya, including the migrant crisis, Moscow and Tehran have often played the card of controlled disorder. Today, the Red Sea is the stage for a new iteration of this logic: targeted attacks, calibrated escalation, skillful use of media and satellite imagery, and impactful public claims. All constructed to maximize psychological and media impact with relatively limited military engagement.
The oil tanker crisis in the Red Sea cannot be understood in isolation from other elements of Iranian strategy and the deeper processes of fragmentation of the international order. The Houthis do not operate in a vacuum but within a context where respect for shared rules is increasingly challenged by revisionist actors ready to use every available tool to redraw power geometries in their favor. The attack on maritime routes is, ultimately, an attack on an entire economic and political model that presupposes security, reliability, and predictability. It is precisely these certainties that are at stake today in one of the most dangerous games of the international system.
Since the end of March 2025, the Houthis have intensified attacks against commercial ships, particularly targeting oil tankers linked to the United States traversing the Red Sea. This new wave of operations is no longer sporadic; it has taken on the characteristics of a systematic and well-planned military campaign. Targets have been carefully selected, favoring ships flying Liberian, Cypriot, or Greek flags but linked to American companies or joint energy ventures with American interests. The Houthis have employed naval drones, medium-range ballistic missiles, floating explosives, and even imitations of civilian cargo to evade radar detection. The operational zone has extended to the Gulf of Aden and near the Suez Canal, directly endangering energy routes supplying Europe.
Meanwhile, the United States has adopted a pincer strategy: on one side, intensifying military attacks against key targets in Yemen—radars, hangars, fuel depots, drone factories—and on the other, implementing a new series of economic sanctions. These sanctions have targeted shipping companies accused of serving as “legal camouflage” for transporting oil to ports controlled by the Houthis. A diplomatic campaign has also been launched to persuade countries like China and India to exert indirect pressure on Iran to contain the escalation. However, the results of these efforts have been partial. Illegal commercial flows continue through the Gulf of Aden, and Tehran denies any direct involvement, instead accusing Washington of exploiting the conflict to justify its military presence in the Middle East.
Overall, the current phase of the conflict shows a substantial transformation of the Houthis from a rebel force rooted in Yemen to an operational arm of a broader regional strategy. Their objective is no longer merely to negotiate better internal conditions or gain media visibility: they aim to sit at the table of regional powers with credible leverage. This leverage consists of selective chaos, economic pressure, military challenge, and symbolic influence. The facts gathered so far leave no doubt: the Red Sea crisis has entered a new phase where simple American naval deterrence is no longer sufficient to restore balance.
Behind the intensification of Houthi military operations in the Red Sea lies a deliberate and multi-level strategy by Iran. Tehran has never abandoned its project to expand Shiite influence through what is often referred to as the “Shiite crescent,” a strategic arc connecting Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen under the direct or indirect aegis of the Islamic Republic. In this logic, the Houthis represent a fundamental pivot to exert pressure on two key fronts: on one side, the Arab partners of the United States in the Gulf, such as Saudi Arabia and the Emirates; on the other, the very Western maritime projection in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. It is likely that Iran has identified the current moment as a unique window of opportunity: the United States is overexposed on multiple fronts—Ukraine, Taiwan, internal crises—and less reactive than in the past.
The very nature of Houthi attacks reinforces this hypothesis: these are not isolated or uncoordinated actions but a military campaign with precise timing, objectives, and tools. The use of medium-range missiles, armed drones, and targeted threats against tankers linked to Washington denotes an operational sophistication incompatible with the autonomy of a poorly equipped Yemeni insurgent group. This suggests that Iran not only provides weapons and training but also participates in defining the overall strategy, choosing when and how to escalate or de-escalate the conflict. The ultimate goal is not just to destabilize the region but to exploit the chaos to renegotiate its international role from a position of strength, perhaps reopening the nuclear dossier or forcing a redefinition of spheres of influence in the Persian Gulf.
However, a second level of analysis must be considered: that of the strategic autonomy of the Houthis themselves. While Iranian support is crucial, it is equally true that the Yemeni group no longer acts merely as a passive proxy. In recent years, the movement has built its own bureaucracy, a war economy, an intelligence network, and a widespread propaganda capability. Attacks on tankers and civilian and military infrastructure are also a tool to assert their own protagonism within the Middle Eastern theater. The Houthis know that their political survival depends on their ability to assert themselves not only against Saudi Arabia but also as a legitimized actor in the broader regional game. In this perspective, every missile that crosses the Red Sea is a message addressed as much to Riyadh as to Tehran: “We are not mere pawns, but autonomous players.”
Finally, it is worth emphasizing the possible attempt by the Iran-Houthi-Hezbollah axis to test the cohesion of the West. If the United States appears reluctant to defend its commercial assets for fear of escalation, the perception that Washington is no longer able to guarantee global order would grow—a development that could have enormous repercussions not only in the Middle East but also in Asia and Africa. Iran has every interest in eroding this credibility, especially on the eve of a new U.S. electoral cycle that could change the global balance of power. This is why the Red Sea today is not just the theater of a regional war: it is the litmus test of America’s ability to defend its allies, its routes, and its strategic image.
Best Case Scenario
In the most favorable scenario, the international community successfully contains the escalation through intensive multilateral diplomatic efforts. Unlike previous regional crises, this time the interest in de-escalation would not be limited to the directly involved actors but would also include powers like China, India, and even some African states, all heavily dependent on the stability of maritime trade through the Red Sea. We might witness the formation of a new international naval coalition with a technical mandate and limited objectives: protecting maritime corridors, deterring new attacks, and creating de-confliction channels among the parties. Simultaneously, Qatar or Oman—traditionally capable of engaging in dialogue with Tehran—could mediate a suspension of hostilities involving not only the Houthis but also Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and more or less official Iranian actors.
This tactical de-escalation could offer a unique opportunity to reopen the Iranian nuclear dossier from a broader perspective, linking Gulf security to the partial removal of sanctions and the provision of humanitarian corridors to Gaza and Yemen. In return, the West would achieve relative stabilization of the energy market and an end to attacks on maritime infrastructure. Economically, this would lead to a rapid decrease in speculation on oil prices, positively impacting global logistics costs and inflation in net importing countries. Major insurance companies would reduce risk premiums for maritime transit, and we might even see a revival of foreign investments in infrastructure projects in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, currently frozen due to fears of prolonged instability.
In the medium term, such a scenario would favor the resumption of internal peace talks in Yemen, with renewed UN involvement and the possible extension of the ceasefire at the national level. Even partial and imperfect stability in the Red Sea would reinvigorate the European Union’s mediation role and allow the United States to reduce its direct military engagement in the region, increasingly delegating functions to reliable regional partners. The perception that “the crisis can be managed” would itself become a deterrent against new attacks: the Houthis, having gained visibility and recognition, would have less incentive to further escalate tensions. However, achieving this scenario would require strong and coordinated political will, which is currently not yet evident in practice.
Worst Case Scenario
In the worst imaginable scenario, the crisis in the Red Sea would rapidly escalate into a multi-front regional conflict. A particularly devastating Houthi attack—such as the sinking of a large American oil tanker or a successful strike on an Israeli military base—could trigger an uncontrollable chain reaction. Israel, already engaged on the northern front with Hezbollah and in a full-blown crisis with Gaza, might decide to directly strike Houthi positions in Yemen, opening a new armed front. Saudi Arabia, historically an enemy of the Yemeni Shiite movement, could be compelled to intervene again, with the concrete risk of a large-scale Sunni-Shiite escalation. The Emirates, increasingly aggressive in protecting their trade routes, might launch unilateral operations in the Gulf of Aden. At that point, Iran, facing a combined attack on its allies, could abandon strategic ambiguity and intervene directly.
Such a move would pave the way for further militarization of the Strait of Hormuz, through which over 20% of the world’s oil passes. Tehran could threaten a partial or total blockade of maritime traffic, triggering an unprecedented oil crisis. The price per barrel could exceed $150–180, causing chain reactions in financial markets, a sharp increase in global inflation, and a collapse of confidence in international logistics networks. The most exposed countries—particularly in Africa and Asia—could face food crises and political instability. In Europe, discussions about rationing and reactivating coal-fired power plants to compensate for gas shortages would resurface. Globally, this scenario would lead to a new phase of geopolitical fragmentation: increased protectionism, distrust in free trade, and new coalitions oriented more towards security than commerce.
Strategically, the image of the United States would suffer a severe blow. The inability to prevent or contain a crisis of this magnitude would confirm—in the eyes of Moscow, Beijing, and Ankara—the irreversible erosion of American leadership in the international system. We might witness an acceleration of ongoing multipolar dynamics, with an explicit return to spheres of influence and a marginalization of multilateral institutions. In this context, the Houthis would have achieved much more than a simple tactical victory: they would have impacted the global power structure. But the price to pay would be extremely high for everyone: the destabilization of the Red Sea would become permanent, and global trade would be irreparably damaged.
