Date: Tuesday, 24 March 2026
https://ericzuesse.substack.com/p/recent-news-thats-of-historical-significance
https://theduran.com/recent-news-thats-of-historical-significance/
Recent News that’s of Historical Significance
24 March 2026, by Eric Zuesse. (All of my recent articles can be seen here.)
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_iamdZjEgcQ&t=37s
“‘WW3 has BEGUN!’: Lavrov’s chilling Iran war warning, demands IAEA action on US-Israel aggression”
24 March 2026, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov speaks to The Economic Times:
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Some experts including those in Russia have already begun to
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describe and classify what is happening as a third world war.
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These are specific events that arise directly from attempts by the
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western minority of states to maintain and preserve the remnants of their dominance on the international stage by
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using crude and forceful methods completely disregarding any previously signed and ratified obligations under
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international law. This concerns relations truly civilized relations between all sovereign states in strict
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accordance with the principles of the UN charter. The year began with an armed invasion of Venezuela by the United
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States. Dozens were killed and the lawfully elected president and his spouse were captured and taken out of the country.
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Since the end of February, the United States and Israel have been carrying out a harsh military aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran.
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The situation threatens to destabilize not only the Persian Gulf region which has already happened and not only the entire Middle East which is happening
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now but also global trade. We can all see this perfectly well. It also threatens global energy security as well
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as international transport and business communications
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under attack and these have been declared legitimate targets are Iran's top leadership and civilian
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infrastructure including nuclear energy facilities that are under IAEA safeguards. Furthermore, the leadership
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of the International Atomic Energy Agency is reacting in a way that I would describe as very inadequate and largely
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ineffective regarding the direct threats to nuclear safety created by this ongoing military aggression.
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And of course, ordinary people, the residents of the antagonist countries both in Iran and in Israel. But other
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countries in the region are also suffering.
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The states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, these are the Arab monarchies.
…
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https://www.rt.com/news/635748-how-far-could-gulf-conflict-spread/
“How far could the Gulf conflict spread? A Kremlin aide has a warning”
21 March 2026
Nikolay Patrushev: The conflict is not in the interests of either side. There is no justification or objective reason for it. For the US itself, it is destructive, as Americans are single-handedly destroying their status as a guarantor of security for allies around the world. Faith in the ability of Western military bases to ensure the security of the countries in which they are located is evaporating before our very eyes. Similarly, the belief that an alliance with America will save you from an economic crisis is also diminishing. Restrictions on energy supplies will inevitably lead to the closure of energy-intensive industries in Japan, South Korea, Australia, and European Union countries.
Yes, hydrocarbon prices are rising, but this will not continue indefinitely. Russia has developed close trade, economic, scientific and technical ties with each of the countries currently affected by the war over decades, including in the maritime sector. We are therefore following the unfolding events with great concern. We sincerely regret the completely unjustified loss of life, including members of Iran’s senior leadership whom I knew personally. We mourn the civilian casualties in Iran and our friendly Gulf States, as well as the sailors from various nations who lost their lives. All of these casualties could have been avoided.
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https://www.ft.com/content/06db9d82-01f3-49ba-951c-3bb784ae4eb2
“Middle East war live: Iran contradicts Donald Trump and says no direct talks to end war”
23 March 2026
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https://www.rt.com/business/636081-us-eu-energy-trade-deal/
“US threatening EU energy supply to push through trade deal”
Brussels could lose “favorable” access to American gas if it fails to “go forward” with the agreement, Washington’s envoy has warned
Published 24 Mar, 2026 19:30
The US ambassador to the EU has urged Brussels to ratify the previously signed trade deal with Washington or risk losing “favorable” access to American energy supplies.
Under the deal reached last summer, the bloc agreed to a baseline tariff of 15% for all EU goods entering the US, while slashing its own levies on US industrial goods and some agricultural products to zero. The EU also agreed to buy $750 billion worth of US energy by 2028. The European Parliament is scheduled to vote on its ratification this week.
“I don’t know what will happen with respect to energy if they don’t go forward with the agreement,” Andrew Puzder told the Financial Times on Monday. Washington would still do business with the bloc “but just the terms may not be as favorable,” according to the US envoy.
The diplomat cautioned that, if the EU is “going to survive economically, they need energy, and we can supply it.” Washington would still want to “be encouraged to do that,” he added.
Read more EU faces energy price ‘tsunami’ – Putin envoy
Meanwhile the conflict in the Middle East, triggered by the US-Israeli attack on Iran, has led to energy price hikes globally.
The bloc has been struggling to meet its energy needs following its decision to ditch cheaper Russian energy imports. Some major EU economies like Germany, which were previously largely reliant on Russian energy, have become heavily dependent on US imports. The German Environmental Aid Association (DUH) reported in January that 96% of the nation’s LNG imports in 2025 came from the US.
Some EU politicians have called for the decision to ditch Russian energy to be reviewed, but the European Commission maintains that it will continue to pursue the full phase-out of Russian fossil fuels by 2027.
Kremlin envoy Kirill Dmitriev warned last week that the bloc could face an energy price “tsunami,” as a result of Brussels’ “stubborn strategic stupidity.” He also explained that Moscow has shifted it focus elsewhere and the EU could end up being “at the end of the queue” of Russian energy buyers.
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https://www.rt.com/news/636076-nato-serbia-target-again/
“Under NATO’s shadow, Serbia is being targeted again”
A new alliance is forming in the Balkans, aiming to give Kosovo an army and make Belgrade a pariah
Published 24 Mar, 2026 19:37
By Ladislav Zemánek, non-resident research fellow at China-CEE Institute and expert of the Valdai Discussion Club
This Tuesday marks 27 years since the start of the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, and the Western Balkans today is drifting toward a dangerously familiar pattern: polarization, militarization, and the construction of rival blocs. At the center of this unfolding story stands Serbia – once again cast not as a partner in regional security, but as a problem to be contained.
For years, Belgrade has pursued a policy of military neutrality, positioning itself as a stabilizing force in a region still haunted by the unresolved legacies of the 1990s. Serbia has balanced East and West, maintained open channels with Brussels, Washington, Moscow, and Beijing alike, and avoided the kind of rigid alignment that historically turned the Balkans into a geopolitical battlefield.
That neutrality, however, is now under mounting pressure – not because it has failed, but because others are abandoning restraint.
The making of an anti-Serbian bloc
The March 2025 Joint Declaration on Defense Cooperation between Croatia, Albania, and Kosovo should be understood for what it is: the foundation of a bloc explicitly designed to shift the balance of power against Serbia once again.
Its language speaks of a “shared vision for a secure future,” of alliances forged through “sacrifices for freedom.” Yet behind the rhetoric lies a hard strategic core: mutual military assistance, joint exercises, intelligence sharing, coordinated responses to “hybrid threats,” and – perhaps most provocatively – support for Kosovo’s deeper integration into Western military and political structures.
By anchoring itself in NATO’s Strategic Concept and the EU’s Strategic Compass, the trilateral initiative effectively imports great-power competition into one of Europe’s most fragile regions. The push to expand defense budgets under NATO’s Industrial Expansion Pledge and the EU’s ‘ReArm Europe’ plan only accelerates this process. What is being built is not a confidence-building mechanism, but a forward-leaning security architecture that excludes – and implicitly targets – Belgrade.
The prospect of Bulgaria joining this arrangement would only deepen the sense of encirclement. One does not need to indulge in paranoia to recognize the emerging geometry: a tightening ring of militarily aligned states, increasingly interoperable, increasingly coordinated, and increasingly willing to define Serbia as the ‘other’.
Read more Plot to assassinate Serbia’s Vucic thwarted – Interior Ministry
Kosovo: From dispute to military factor
Nowhere is this shift more dangerous than in Kosovo. For Serbia, Kosovo is not merely a political dispute; it is a question of sovereignty, identity, and international law. Yet under the umbrella of this new alliance, Pristina is being steadily transformed from a lightly armed security actor into a de facto military force.
The plan to convert the Kosovo Security Forces into a full-fledged army by 2028 is not occurring in a vacuum. With Albania and Croatia acting as conduits, Kosovo gains indirect access to NATO standards, training, and potentially even material support. This creates a reality in which an entity that five EU states and numerous countries worldwide, including Russia and China, do not recognize as sovereign is nevertheless being equipped and legitimized as a military actor.
That is a recipe for escalation. It also sends a deeply destabilizing message: that political disputes in the Balkans can be “resolved” not through dialogue, but through the gradual accumulation of force under the protection of larger alliances.
The consequences are already visible. What the architects of this trilateral alignment present as defensive cooperation has, in practice, triggered a regional arms dynamic. Serbia cannot – and will not – ignore a coordinated military buildup on its borders, particularly one that includes a disputed territory. This is how arms races begin – with mutual suspicion and incremental steps that, taken together, create a spiral of insecurity.
The Western Balkans is uniquely ill-suited to absorb such a spiral. Political institutions remain fragile, ethnic tensions unresolved, and external actors all too willing to exploit divisions. Increased militarization injects even more volatility into such an environment.
Serbia’s response: Reluctant but resolute
In Belgrade, there is no illusion about what is unfolding. President Aleksandar Vučić has been unusually blunt in his assessment: the global order is eroding, international law is selectively applied, and the guarantees that once underpinned stability are losing their credibility. To remain passive in this environment means to increase your vulnerability.
Serbia’s response, therefore, has been measured but unmistakable. Plans to significantly expand military capabilities over the next 18 months reflect a shift toward deterrence. The reintroduction of mandatory military service, short in duration but symbolically powerful, signals a broader mobilization of national resilience.
At the same time, Serbia is deepening strategic partnerships that can offset the rising external threat. The strengthening of defense ties with Hungary is particularly notable. Since 2023, the two countries have developed a dense network of military cooperation, from joint exercises to coordinated procurement.
Hungary’s role is not incidental. As both an EU and NATO member, it provides Serbia with a crucial bridge into Western structures – one that is not conditioned on abandoning its core interests. The historical memory of 1999, when Budapest’s position – under the leadership of Viktor Orbán, who was in his first term as prime minister back then – helped prevent an even more devastating escalation, still resonates. Today, that legacy is being translated into practical cooperation.
Read more Britain’s Balkan ruse: How the UK turned ‘press freedom’ into a weapon
China and the rebalancing of power
Yet it is Serbia’s partnership with China that has most dramatically altered the regional equation.
In recent years, Beijing has become Belgrade’s primary defense supplier, accounting for the majority of its major arms imports. This is not simply a matter of cost or availability; it reflects a strategic choice to diversify away from traditional suppliers and secure capabilities that might otherwise be politically constrained.
The results are tangible. Serbia now fields Chinese-made drones, advanced air defense systems, and – most strikingly – the CM-400AKG air-to-surface ballistic missile. By integrating this system onto its MiG-29 fighters, Serbia has achieved something that would have been unthinkable a decade ago: transforming a modest air force into one capable of long-range precision strikes.
This is a qualitative leap. With a range of up to 400 kilometers and the ability to target high-value assets, the CM-400AKG fundamentally enhances Serbia’s deterrent posture. It allows Belgrade to hold at risk threats that previously lay beyond its reach, narrowing the gap with better-equipped neighbors.
Critics will inevitably label this escalation. But that argument ignores the sequence of events. Serbia did not initiate the current wave of militarization – it is responding to it. In a region where others are aligning, rearming, and integrating into larger military frameworks, standing still is not an option.
The joint ‘Peacekeeper 2025’ exercise with China further underscores this shift. For the first time, Serbian and Chinese forces trained together on Chinese soil – a signal that the partnership is evolving beyond procurement into operational cooperation.
[And, finally, here is the definitive account of the Trump Administration’s astonishing incompetency that produced the catastrophic decision by Trump to bomb Iran on February 28th:]
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https://www.youtube.com/live/FOs4skvj5F8?t=359s
“Prof. Ted Postol: Israel’s Air Defense in TOTAL COLLAPSE”
23 March 2026, Dialogue Works. Ted Postol analyzes
It's important
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that people understand that these air defenses have never been functioning
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because it's important to understand that this is a gigantic fraud that has
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been perpetrated by the US government and the Israeli government on American and uh Israeli
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citizens, not to mention Europeans, who have paid enormous amounts of money for
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air defense systems that do not work against ballistic missiles. They do work against aircraft and drones.
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Um but that's another discussion. And of course, when they run out of interceptors,
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it means that the most problematic threat
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they uh that the Israelis and others face now are the drones because the
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drones are extremely accurate. They can be programmed from thousands of
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kilometers range. They have the ability to look at the targets prior to the
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final homing phase. and they essentially can run into the targets of uh of
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interest and we have seen that in the first day of the war. I mean when the
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Iranians basically destroyed the entire base of missile defense radars in
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Israel. Now from my point of view, speaking as a person who looks at it
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from a military point of view, that was the most important first step in a
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process where the Iranians are going about destroying all the air defense
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radars as well. There is no air defense. Without radars, you have no air defense.
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You can't shoot down drones and um and those drones are from the
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point of view of interceptor capabilities relatively easy to hit. But
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if you don't have radars to to observe the incoming drones and track them,
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those interceptors are useless. And we are now getting to a second phase
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where um the Iranians are able to tear down the remnants of
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air defense. Air defense being distinct from ballistic missile defense.
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And those air defense uh capabilities are critical because the drones are
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extraordinarily accurate. So the drones and cruise missiles will now begin to become the major inflictors
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of damage as things proceed. And uh in Demona, we saw what looks like
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uh a couple of ballistic missiles with significant warheads on them come in and do damage. There's some nonsense about
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falling debris. There's no falling debris. these things came in, they were un unengaged or if they were engaged,
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they were actually there was some evidence. I I've been very busy trying to do analysis. My problem is I I can't
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follow the news and do analysis at the same time and I'm trying to identify issues that the audience should be
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thinking about in the future at least. And the issue I will talk mostly about
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now is the potential escalation to nuclear weapon use. Because to me, this is the gravest
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danger we now face. Because Iran is now beginning to bring the full weight of
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its strike capabilities to bear on Israel and the and the military
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installations in the Persian Gulf. And this is going to do more and more
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and more damage and it's going to cause more and more desperation in the Israeli and the US government.
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So, um, we saw a very I I want to underscore I I I don't take a lot of
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solace in this, but we saw a little bit of sense
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shown by Donald Trump when he stepped back from this unbelievably
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escalatory threat to destroy Iran's uh
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uh energy production uh system. And the Iranians basically told him what
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anybody could have told him. You know, his advisors, I presume, told
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him this, that the Iranians are in a position to destroy the energy
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production facilities throughout the Middle East, which is what apparently the Iranians returned as a threat. And
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it's good that somebody was listening.
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somebody in the white house, I presume it's the intelligence people who went to Trump who and you know he
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doesn't he obviously didn't listen to them initially, but basically said you know you're going to have trouble like
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you have never seen before if if you go ahead because the Iranians will respond
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they're in a war uh for survival, and they're not fooling around they have
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reached the point where it's clear to them, I'm not speaking for the Iranians, but I'm speaking as a person who
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observed their situation. Um, it's clear to them that they will get no relief of
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any kind unless they make it clear that uh if you don't give them some space,
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they're going to bring everything down with them. That's that's what they're saying, you know, in a more polite way,
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but that's basically what they're saying. And uh and you know I don't think they have a
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choice myself. I mean in their position I would do the same. I mean uh they um
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uh they agreed to this uh uh joint comprehensive plan of action
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uh in 2015 uh which was uh an exceptionally
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constraining uh agreement which I take as an indication that they
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really weren't ever trying to well maybe at some point earlier they were thinking
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about building nuclear weapons But there's no way they would have agreed to this uh joint comprehensive plan of
…
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“U.S. Negotiators Were Ill-Prepared for Serious Nuclear Negotiations with Iran”
ARMS CONTROL NOW BLOG
March 11, 2026
Less than 48 hours before the U.S. and Israeli coordinated strikes on Iran began on Feb. 28, U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and President Donald Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner met with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Geneva for a third round of Omani-mediated talks aimed at reaching a nuclear agreement.
Despite Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi’s assessment that the United States and Iran made “substantial progress” toward a nuclear deal during the Feb. 26 talks and the agreement to meet again on March 2 for technical talks, Trump said he was “not happy” with the progress or the “way they’re negotiating.” The following day, the United States and Israel illegally attacked Iran, using Tehran’s nuclear program as one justification for the attack.
By the time the third round of talks ended in Geneva, Trump had likely already made the decision to go to war. It is unlikely that any outcome short of complete Iranian capitulation to U.S. demands at the negotiating table would have averted the strikes.
But Trump’s dissatisfaction and impatience with the negotiating process appear to have been fed, in part, by Witkoff and Kushner’s accounts of the U.S.-Iran talks. Comments made by Witkoff in two background briefings with reporters on Feb. 28 and March 3, as well as media appearances since the strikes began, made clear that Witkoff did not have sufficient technical expertise or diplomatic experience to engage in effective diplomacy. His lack of knowledge and mischaracterization of Iran’s positions and nuclear program throughout the process likely informed Trump’s assessment that talks were not progressing and Iran was not negotiating seriously.
The Arms Control Association received recordings and/or transcripts from several participants in the Feb. 28 and March 3 briefings. The Arms Control Association has not seen a copy of the Iranian proposal from the Feb. 26 talks but has heard descriptions of it from officials familiar with the contents. The description coincides with media reports: after a multi-year pause on uranium enrichment, Iran would resume an enrichment program based on fueling its planned reactors. Iran would not accumulate enriched uranium gas and would agree to broad International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight. The scope of the enrichment program was based on what was likely an overly ambitious ten-year reactor plan and included enriching uranium up to 20 percent with a prescribed number of advanced centrifuges.
The Iranian proposal, as presented on Feb. 26, did not meet the maximalist terms that the White House demanded, including no enrichment, dismantlement of Iran's nuclear facilities, and removal of enriched uranium gas from Iran. Nor did it appear to be sufficiently restrictive from a nonproliferation perspective to be an effective bulwark against weaponization. But the proposal showed some flexibility in the Iranian position. It was also an opening offer and unlikely Iran’s bottom line.
Although further negotiations may have revealed that the gulf between the White House demands and the Iranian positions was irreconcilable, Wikoff’s failure to comprehend key technical realities suggests he misunderstood the Iranian nuclear proposal and was ill-prepared to negotiate an effective nuclear agreement.
The following is a brief analysis of key misstatements and misconceptions in the post-attack briefings conducted primarily by Witkoff.
1. Witkoff perceived the Tehran Research Reactor as a threat and a ploy. It is not clear why.
Some of Witkoff’s most puzzling and factually-challenged statements during the March 3 call with reporters centered on the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), which is used to produce medical isotopes. The TRR, supplied by the United States, became operational in 1967. Originally, it ran on 90 percent enriched uranium fuel (weapons grade), but it was later converted by Argentina to run on 20 percent enriched uranium fuel.
During the call, Witkoff claimed there was “subterfuge” at the TRR and that it was being used to stockpile uranium fuel “to bring it towards a weapons-grade enrichment level.”
This assessment seemed based primarily on Witkoff’s conclusion that Iran possessed an “overabundance” of fuel for the reactor. He alleged that:
“the seven to eight years’ supply of fuel that they had been retaining at TRR was being stockpiled along with all the other stockpiling that had been done at Natanz, Esfahan, and Fordow. So, the claim that they were using a research reactor to do good for the Iranian people was a complete and false pretense to hide the fact that they were stockpiling there.”
The fuel that Iran has stockpiled for the TRR is not “hidden” and its existence should not come as a surprise. The IAEA has tracked TRR fuel and documented in its May 2025 report on Iran’s nuclear program that it had 45.5 kg of uranium enriched to 20 percent in fuel assemblies.
The 45.5 kg in fuel assemblies is about a seven-to eight-year supply for the TRR, which uses roughly 5-7 kg of 20 percent enriched uranium per year. The stockpile size was likely more than was strictly necessary for continued operations, but it is neither alarming nor surprising. The growth and fluctuations in the fuel supply were documented. Politically, the decision to keep a multi-year supply may have been driven in part by past challenges in obtaining fuel. Iran also imported fuel for the reactor from Russia in incremental shipments, thereby contributing to the supply.
More importantly, it is unclear why Wikoff appeared to view excess reactor fuel as nefarious. From a proliferation risk perspective, the 45.5 kg of 20 percent enriched uranium in the fuel assemblies was a small fraction of Iran’s overall stockpile: …
So, it is unclear why Witkoff claimed in his briefing that the stockpile of fuel meant that “the only other use it could be, would be to bring it towards a weapons-grade enrichment level.”
Witkoff also claimed in the briefing that TRR was not producing medical isotopes. The IAEA’s regular reports do not provide information about the TRR’s products, but information about nuclear materials in fresh and irradiated fuel assemblies appears to contradict Witkoff’s claim that the reactor was a ruse. The agency noted its accountancy and monitoring of the irradiated TRR fuel assemblies, which supports that the TRR has been operating, and in several reports, such as those issued in 2023, notes when Iran has loaded new fuel assemblies into the reactor.
Furthermore, the IAEA reports do not appear to contain any recent concerns about misuse of the TRR. (In 2003, Iran acknowledged conducting plutonium separation experiments at the TRR that were not declared to the IAEA, but that does not appear to be what Witkoff is referring to, given it was more than 20 years ago and did not involve uranium enrichment.)
Witkoff also made several other mistakes regarding the TRR. He claimed that there was enrichment at the TRR—there is not. …
2. Witkoff’s suspicion of the TRR led him to prematurely dismiss the Iranian proposal.
Witkoff’s unfounded conclusion that the TRR was a nefarious ploy by Iran to stockpile 20 percent fuel appeared to have negatively influenced his assessment of the proposal Iran brought to the Geneva talks on Feb. 26.
According to the March 3 backgrounder, Witkoff said Iran’s proposal for uranium enrichment was based on assessed needs for the TRR and “a few other research reactors” Iran planned to build over the next ten years. Based on this plan, Iran determined the scope of an enrichment program, including enriching uranium up to 20 percent. However, because Witkoff thought Iran was engaged in a “complete lie” about the TRR, he suggested that Iran’s proposal to enrich uranium up to 20 percent was deliberately designed to “peel off two months from the enrichment cycle,” by which he presumably meant Iran's "breakout time," or the time it takes to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a bomb (25 kilograms of uranium enriched to 20 percent). A limit of 20 percent was also unacceptable and demonstrated a lack of seriousness because it was "more than five times" what was allowed by the 2015 nuclear deal, Witkoff said, which capped enrichment at 3.67 percent. That is true, but it appears Witkoff was overly focused on the enrichment level as an indicator of risk and made erroneous assumptions about a ceiling of 20 percent.
It is certainly true that 20 percent enriched uranium can be enriched to weapons-grade more quickly than if Iran started with natural uranium or reactor-grade enriched uranium (less than five percent). But it is unclear how or why Witkoff assessed that enriching to 20 percent would take two months off the breakout time. Breakout is a technical calculation influenced by a number of factors, including enrichment capacity (number and efficiency of centrifuges), the enrichment level of the feed, and the size of the feed stockpile.
Witkoff also did not seem to take into account the implications of Iran’s offer not to accumulate enriched uranium in assessing how Iran might breakout and the proliferation implications of Iran’s plan.
It would not be surprising if, in the proposal, Iran overestimated its capacity to expand its civil nuclear program and its timeframe for reactor construction. Nor would it be surprising if Iran asked for a larger enrichment program that it was willing to accept—nobody puts their bottom line in a first proposal. But Wikoff appeared to dismiss engaging with Iran on the premise of a needs-based enrichment program (after a multi-year pause) because he misunderstood the operation of the TRR.
3. Witkoff viewed Iran’s rejection of free fuel for life as a “tell” that Iran was not interested in diplomacy. The rejection should not have surprised him.
Witkoff said in the call that, after deciding that Iran’s proposed enrichment plan was based on the TRR ‘lie’ he offered Iran “free fuel” for its research reactors. He claimed that “if its really about building radioisotopes and creating medicines” Iran will take the free fuel from the United States. He said Iran rejected the offer by saying that free fuel was “an assault on our dignity.” He also expressed surprise that Iran had emphasized its ‘right to enrich.”
Witkoff said he concluded from Araghchi’s rejection that Iran was “angry for another reason” and was trying to “divert our attention away from the fact that all they really wanted to do was enrich.”
Iran’s rejection of free fuel and emphasis on fueling its reactors should not have been a surprise to Witkoff. Nor should it have been viewed as a “tell” that Tehran was not negotiating in good faith.
On a political level, Iran views enrichment as an issue of national sovereignty, a right conferred by the peaceful uses of nuclear energy provision (in Article IV) of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. It is consistent with Iran’s past position for negotiators to reject any nuclear agreement if the price was zero enrichment.
Furthermore, why would Iran trust the United States to follow through? Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018, despite Iran’s compliance, and participated in Israel’s strikes against Iran in June while diplomacy was ongoing. It is not surprising that Iran would have doubts about U.S. credibility. …
4. Witkoff appeared to believe Iran had been engaged in weaponization efforts since 2003.
During the March 3 call with reporters, Witkoff was asked about a statement made the previous day by IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi, where Grossi said the IAEA does not see a “structured program to manufacture nuclear weapons.”
Witkoff, however, suggested that Grossi misspoke said that Iran has “tested around weapons” since 2003. In a March 10 interview with CNBC Witkoff made a similar statement, saying that “everybody knows that [Iran] has been testing for weaponization since 2003.”
Prior to 2003, Iran had an active nuclear weapons development effort, conducted in violation of its safeguards obligations. In a 2007 Unclassified National Intelligence Estimate, the United States intelligence community assessed that the organized nuclear weapons program ended in 2003.
The IAEA similarly assessed in 2015 that Iran abandoned its organized weapons program in 2003, that some activities relevant to weaponization continued through 2009, but that there was no credible evidence of those activities after 2009.
In the 2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment, the U.S. intelligence community stated that “We continue to assess Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and that Khamenei has not reauthorized the nuclear weapons program he suspended in 2003, though pressure has probably built on him to do so.” …
5. Witkoff said the United States agreed that missiles were a regional issue, then viewed the lack of progress as an indicator Iran did not want a nuclear deal.
Following the U.S. attack, Trump and other senior officials, including Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, have pointed to Iran’s ballistic missiles as an "imminent threat" to the United States (they were not). Hegseth went further and suggested Iran’s missiles and drones would enable Iran to develop a “conventional shield” to engage in “nuclear blackmail.”
Witkoff made clear in the March 3 call, however, that the Trump administration made a deliberate decision to “allow the region to talk about proxies and also to talk about ballistic missiles, because it’s a regional issue.” He said the missiles are an issue for the United States as well but addressing it at the regional level would streamline the process.
Delegating the missile issue to the other states in the Gulf region to negotiate with Iran seems to undermine U.S. claims regarding the missile threat. If the Trump administration viewed Iran’s missiles as a threat that warranted an illegal preventive strike, why tell Iran that negotiations over those systems should be explored on a regional basis?
In his March 3 briefing with reporters, Witkoff then accused Iran of making no effort to convene a regional discussion on missiles. This may be true, but if Iran was not expecting to talk to the U.S. about missiles, because Witkoff agreed it should be handled at the regional level, Iran’s failure to “talk about missiles” during the Feb. 26 Geneva negotiations should hardly be viewed as a surprise nor as an indicator of Iran’s view of the nuclear talks.
Serious Negotiations Require A Top-Notch Negotiating Team
Beyond these misperceptions, Witkoff’s statements are riddled with errors that again suggest that Witkoff was out of his technical depth. At one point, he expressed surprise that Iran produces centrifuges—it has for decades—and referred to Iran’s IR-6 centrifuge as “probably the most advanced centrifuge in the world” (it is not). He also called Natanz, Fordow, and Esfahan “industrial reactors” (they are not). …
Trump should replace Witkoff as his lead negotiator. Witkoff’s failure to learn the nuclear file and surround himself with the technical expertise necessary to negotiate an effective deal was a diplomatic disservice to U.S. and international nonproliferation goals.—KELSEY DAVENPORT, director for nonproliferation policy
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MY COMMENTS:
It’s not just that Trump and his team are evil, they are grossly incompetent. Their evil includes their psychopathy, but they are so evil that they fool them stupid selves to believe whatever they WANT to believe; and this combination of evil and stupidity (which results from America’s being a dictatorship by their billionaires, and billionaires are rabidly neoconservative; so, the entire world is in great danger) is bringing the world to the precipice of WW3.
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Investigative historian Eric Zuesse’s latest book, AMERICA’S EMPIRE OF EVIL: Hitler’s Posthumous Victory, and Why the Social Sciences Need to Change, is about how America took over the world after World War II in order to enslave it to U.S.-and-allied billionaires. Their cartels extract the world’s wealth by control of not only their ‘news’ media but the social ‘sciences’ — duping the public.
