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ISSAfria.org: Analysis: Is Russia’s War Against Ukraine Spilling Over Into Africa?

Posted by: Berhane Habtemariam

Date: Saturday, 10 August 2024

Dangerous signs of a proxy Russia-Ukraine war on the continent could have grave implications for Africa. 

 

Russia appears to be intensifying its offensive – on various fronts – to gain influence in Africa, and its enemy Ukraine is fighting back, threatening to make the continent a major proxy battlefield.

Minor military skirmishes elsewhere in Africa exploded last week when Moscow’s Wagner (now Africa Corps) took heavy casualties in a battle with Tuareg separatists and jihadists in Tinzaouaten, Mali. This was a setback for the Kremlin, which appeared to be expanding its presence or at least rebuffing Western efforts to regain lost African ground.

Russian soldiers had already begun filling the vacuum left by the United States (US) with the withdrawal of its last troops this week from Agadez, Niger. The US base had been used to monitor Islamist extremists throughout the Sahel. In Faustin-Archange Touadéra’s Central African Republic – effectively a client state of Moscow’s for some years – Wagner operatives scuppered attempts by the US security outfit Bancroft Global Development to establish itself in Bangui in January.

Though Moscow’s African offensive is broadly aimed at the West, it’s also more narrowly aimed at Ukraine

Russia has also maintained a strong foothold in Libya, fighting on the side of strongman Khalifa Haftar, the military head of the eastern government based in Benghazi, against the United Nations (UN)-recognised government in Tripoli, in the west.

That war went cold in 2020, but as Chatham House Libya expert Tim Eaton told ISS Today, thousands of Wagner troops were expected to remain in Libya. The Russians still operate their airbase at Jufra in central Libya, and Russian military material is still entering the east. ‘There is a lot of speculation over the extent to which Russian engagement in Libya is about Libya, or access to Africa (particularly the Sahel) or both,’ Eaton said. 

On the propaganda front, Russia’s state-owned television network RT seems to be trying to relaunch or rebrand itself in Africa. An extensive marketing campaign of billboards and other advertising media featured images of liberation heroes such as Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere, Uganda’s Apollo Milton Obote, Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah and Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe. ‘Your Values. Shared,’ the billboards insist. In a press release, RT claims it is committed to the ‘dismantling of neo-colonialist narratives in news media.’

But it’s difficult to establish RT’s actual presence in Africa. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the network was widely pulled off the air and now seems to be operating largely through Chinese proxies.

South African media analyst Anton Harber said RT’s campaign was ‘too dated’ to hold much sway with young Africans. Also, ‘There is a huge irony in RT promoting itself as a voice of anti-colonialism at a time when Russia is increasing its influence on the continent in ways that could be described as neo-colonial. One thing we know about RT is that it is not an African voice, but Putin’s outlet, there to serve him and his country. So it is dressing up its ambitions for influence in Africa, with a paternalistic anti-colonial rhetoric.’

However, Samuel Ramani, Russia-Africa relations expert at the Royal United Services Institute and Oxford University, believes plugging the old anti-Western colonialism line ‘will definitely increase Russia’s soft power over time.’

After the Mali attack, Russia accused Ukraine of opening a new front in Africa – which is deeply ironic

Russia’s information war, as in the US in 2016, is also being conducted below the radar in Africa, with bots trying to influence election outcomes in South Africa, Madagascar and perhaps elsewhere.

Though Moscow’s African offensive is broadly aimed at the West, it is also more narrowly aimed at Ukraine, at least concerning propaganda. And Ukraine is fighting back.

Ukraine’s special envoy for Africa and the Middle East, Maksym Subkh, said the country was opening several new embassies in Africa. This was not only to boost diplomatic, economic and other relations but to counter Russia’s anti-Ukraine propaganda. A wider diplomatic footprint would allow Ukraine to help Africans counter Wagner’s influence because, he said, Kyiv had learnt how to deal with Wagner when it was fighting it in Ukraine.

After last week’s fierce battle in Tinzaouaten, when Tuareg separatists claimed to have killed 84 Wagner fighters and 47 Malian troops, senior Ukrainian intelligence agency spokesperson officer Andriy Yusov said the Malian rebels had received the ‘necessary’ information to conduct the attack – implying it came from Ukraine.

In response, Mali’s military junta severed diplomatic relations with Ukraine, accusing it of supporting ‘international terrorism.’ Ukraine deniedthe charge, saying Mali had acted hastily without investigating the full circumstances of the incident or providing evidence of Ukraine’s involvement.

Mali’s fellow military junta regime in Niger also broke diplomatic ties with Kyiv. And Russia accused Ukraine of opening a new front in Africa – which is of course deeply ironic.

If the Russia-Ukraine war has indeed spilt over into Africa, the implications for the continent could be grave

If the Russia-Ukraine war has indeed spilt over into Africa, that could have grave implications for the continent. The Economic Community of West African States, in a rather general statement, condemned ‘foreign interference in the region … as well as any attempt to draw the region into the current geopolitical confrontations.’ The African Union seemingly hasn’t responded.

But this development may not be entirely new in Africa. Ramani suggests that if Ukraine were indeed involved in Wagner’s defeat in Mali, that would be consistent with its strategy towards Africa, which he said had two prongs. First, diplomatic outreach through establishing new embassies and second, ‘Below-the-radar special operations like we have seen against the RSF in Sudan.’

‘RSF’ referred to the Rapid Support Forces which are engaged in a ferocious civil war with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Russia, and particularly Wagner, are widely known to have been supporting the RSF. And in February, the Kyiv Post reported that Ukrainian special forces were operating in Sudan, backing the SAF against the RSF-aligned Wagner forces.

Ramani suggested that Wagner’s defeat in Mali was no cause for complacency. It would lead to introspection, and Wagner forces probably being placed under greater state control, ‘much like the process currently underway in Libya.’

He added that ‘it might also give Burkina Faso and Niger, which are allowing small contingents of Russian advisers to operate in their countries … second thoughts about entrusting Russia more broadly with counter-terrorism missions.’ But Ramani says Russia has suffered major military setbacks before – and will bounce back.

‘Russia is a very agile, flexible and nimble player which can take advantage of coups and crises. Its influence is likely to endure mainly because African countries see it as an integral pole within the international system and a power to be engaged with alongside others, and not a country that should be isolated like the West wants them to.’


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