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During 18 months of fighting, a succession of mediation initiatives by the U.S., Saudi Arabia, Egypt and African leaders have come to nothing. One reason for this is that each time al-Burhan agrees to meet Hemedti, or to send a delegation to do so, the leader of Sudan’s powerful Islamists, Ali Karti, vetoes the move. Washington has put Karti under sanctions for “actively obstructing efforts to reach a ceasefire.” Karti now lives in Doha.

The Sudanese Islamists have longstanding ties to Hamas, which was a member of the Khartoum-based Popular Arab and Islamic Congress from the early 1990s, where it established offices, businesses, and training camps. Hamas sourced weapons from Sudan, provoking Israeli airstrikes. Active cooperation cooled in 2014, under pressure from Saudi Arabia.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia, despite their long-standing aversion to the Muslim Brothers, have come to believe that the Sudanese Islamists can be managed and no longer pose a threat beyond their own borders. (Egypt’s recent tripartite pact with Eritrea and Somalia also embraces the Damul Jadid group, a branch of the Muslim Brothers in Somalia.) Cairo and Riyadh have been ready to see money and weapons flow to SAF from Qatar, Turkey and even Iran. But Abu Dhabi remains hostile to Islamists, so far unpersuaded by Egypt’s argument that if it can live with the Muslim Brothers next door, the Emirates should be able to do so too.

It's long been clear that a deal in Arab capitals is a prerequisite for ending the fighting in Sudan. The question is how to get there. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has no visible interest in engaging at the high level that is needed. Initially, he put State Department Africa bureau officials in charge of the file, who are ignored by the Arab powerbrokers. While the current special envoy, Tom Perrellio, in theory reports to Blinken, in practice he doesn’t have the top-level backing needed.

When MBZ met with President Joe Biden last month, and affirmed a ”dynamic strategic partnership,” the Joint Statement included boilerplate words on Sudan’s war and humanitarian crisis.

Israel could change the equation. Even preliminary exploration of a plan to relocate Hamas to Sudan would need Israel to chart a path to a deal between al-Burhan and Hemedti. In turn, that will need a change in the military and financial equation—a credible show of force by SAF and its Egyptian backers, along with Emirati leverage on the RSF.

Whatever interests Abu Dhabi may have in Sudan, its stakes with Israel are far higher, and it has both carrots and sticks to pressure Hemedti.

The Hamas-to-Sudan story may be a straw in the wind. Even if it becomes a real prospect, Netanyahu or Hamas’s new leaders could pull out at any moment. Sudan’s generals are no pawns: they are experts at manipulating foreign patrons. But the chatter reaffirms how the fate of Sudan lies in the realpolitik of the Middle East, in the hands of states that see Sudan and its people as tokens in their power games.