Date: Thursday, 26 September 2024
Cairo continues to push to strengthen relations with African countries, with the ultimate aim of bolstering Egypt's position vis-à-vis the GERD dispute. However, some risk factors must not be ignored.
Egyptian president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi (R) welcoming Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, at Ittihadiya Palace in Cairo, on January 21, 2024. / Photo: AFP
An anti-Ethiopia camp that includes several Horn of Africa countries seems to be consolidating. Egypt, which for many years has clashed with Addis Ababa over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), is opportunistically making the most of such dynamics.
Since 2011, the Ethiopians have been working on this controversial mega-dam, which they see as critical to their country’s development. Ethiopia recently completed the fifth phase of filling up the reservoir behind the GERD and authorities in Addis Ababa are optimistic about the hydroelectric dam being fully operational in 2025.
"The dam is now almost completed," declared Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed last month. The GERD is to provide millions of households in Ethiopia with electricity.
Addis Ababa says GERD, a $4 billion hydropower project with an estimated capacity of more than 6,000 megawatts, is crucial to powering its economic development. [FILE] / Photo: Reuters
However, Egyptians view the GERD as an existential threat because of how much their country depends on the river for water. Policymakers in Cairo are worried about the implications of disruptions to the river's flow, especially in the event of a years-long drought.
Dealmaking
Against this backdrop, news broke last month of Egypt making its first delivery of military aid to Somalia in over 40 years and the signing of a Cairo-Mogadishu security pact. Then on September 23, an Egyptian warship docked at the Mogadishu Sea Port to deliver a second cache of weapons such as artillery and anti-aircraft guns. Egypt also offered to contribute 10,000 troops to a new African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission in Somalia set to be launched in 2025.
News of Egypt making this offer could exacerbate tensions given Ethiopia's firm opposition to any such Egyptian deployment to Somalia, where Addis Ababa is a major security actor.
Meanwhile, Somalia and Ethiopia have generally maintained good relations in recent years. But in early January, officials in Addis Ababa angered their counterparts in Mogadishu by signing a deal with Somaliland to lease coastal territory to Ethiopia.
This grants the landlocked African country access to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, reportedly in exchange for Addis Ababa recognising the breakaway republic's independence.
From Mogadishu's perspective, the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal constitutes a serious breach of Somalia's sovereignty. Mogadishu has vowed to obstruct the deal, which could lead to the Ethiopians having a port and even naval base in Somaliland.
On September 20, authorities in Mogadishu accused their counterparts in Addis Ababa of violating Somalia's sovereignty by delivering an "unauthorised" shipment of weapons to the self-declared autonomous state of Putland, situated in northeastern Somalia. The Somali foreign ministry warned of "serious implications for national and regional security."
Officials in Cairo also oppose the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal, seeing it as a threat to Egypt's national interests. On September 22, the Egyptian embassy in Somalia, citing the "unstable security situation," called on Egypt’s citizens to leave Somaliland as quickly as possible.
"Egypt is alarmed by Ethiopia's attempts to control the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which means it will threaten the country's two lifelines: the Nile and the Suez Canal," said Yusuf Hassan, an independent analyst and researcher specialising in Africa and the Middle East.
Speaking to TRT World, Hassan said that Egypt is strategically supporting Somalia's efforts to become a stable and independent state to reduce the perceived threat from Ethiopia and encourage the country to adopt "a more conciliatory approach regarding the Nile.
Cairo now realises that Ethiopia's intransigence is partly due to the weakened states of Somalia and Sudan, which have allowed Ethiopia to act without significant repercussions.
"Egypt's retreat from African politics over the past 30 years, particularly after the failed assassination attempt on (former President Hosni) Mubarak in Addis Ababa, was a strategic error given Egypt's national security interests in the Horn of Africa. Cairo now realises that Ethiopia's intransigence is partly due to the weakened states of Somalia and Sudan, which have allowed Ethiopia to act without significant repercussions," he added.
Eritrea is an important part of the picture too. Despite having overcome past hostilities with Ethiopia a few years ago to begin a brief period of good relations, old grievances in Asmara-Addis Ababa ties are resurfacing. At this point, analysts have gone as far as arguing that a potential war between the two countries could erupt.
Dangerous environment
Given all these worsening regional tensions, experts warn of potentially dangerous scenarios that could play out as Ethiopia grows increasingly isolated, despite support from the United Arab Emirates.
"The most interesting aspect is the 'geographical' shift in the competition between Egypt and Ethiopia," said Federico Donelli, assistant professor of international relations at the University of Trieste.
Speaking to TRT World, he said "For many years, the centre of gravity of the rivalry was the Nile basin, largely because of the GERD. With increased Egyptian involvement in Somalia, the focus of the confrontation is shifting to the Red Sea.
The risk is that neither Egypt nor Ethiopia can handle a confrontation in an unstable context like Somalia. As a result, there is a danger that the situation could spiral out of control for either of them."
Diplomacy unlikely
Today, Egypt is reassessing its foreign policy vis-à-vis the Horn of Africa and taking advantage of an opportunity in Somalia to put more pressure on Addis Ababa as the dam project nears completion. What will be important to watch is how Addis Ababa responds to what it considers a particularly provocative move by Cairo.
Regardless of how these tensions play out, it seems safe to conclude that, after several failed rounds of negotiations in the past, the prospects for a diplomatic solution to the GERD dispute can only dim within the context of these strategic shifts.
As William Davison, the editor and owner of Ethiopia Insight website, stressed, the growing Egypt-Somalia partnership "surely makes it less likely that Ethiopia is going to cooperate any deeper than it already is with Cairo over the GERD and any future Ethiopian projects in the Blue Nile basin."
Egypt appears set on its strategy of leveraging regional states like Eritrea and Somalia to challenge Addis Ababa and counter its interests. Amid fears of proxy conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia escalating regional tensions to a new level, it is unfortunately more difficult than ever to imagine Cairo and Addis Ababa reaching a compromise.
