By Daniel Haile*

October 23, 2024

An unstable Sudan poses a double-edged sword for its neighbors. Yet, a stable Sudan might prove even more problematic for Ethiopia and Egypt, as it could constrain their actions, driven by miscalculations rooted in uncertain fears surrounding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

Ethiopia and Egypt now find themselves at a crossroads, balancing individual and collective security regarding the future of the Nile. The absence of a mutually beneficial economic, political, and security agreement—amplified by mutual suspicion—could quickly escalate into a prolonged security conflict. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi face the challenge of preserving their political authority and legitimacy. Domestically, they cannot afford to appear weak, but they must avoid losing credibility internationally, as economically, politically, and militarily vulnerable states often fall prey to regional and global powers. This has locked Abiy and Sisi in a competitive struggle over regional security, each unable to trust the other’s motives or intentions fully. This lack of trust intensifies the security dilemma, raising the question: will it culminate in a protracted conflict between Ethiopia and Egypt?

Khartoum: The Sacrificial Lamb

An unstable, ungovernable Sudan deepens the security dilemma for both Ethiopia and Egypt. As Africa’s third-largest country by landmass, Sudan’s prolonged instability creates a breeding ground for Sunni Islamist non-state actors, including groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda. Ethiopia shares a 753 km border with Sudan, while Egypt’s border extends 1,220 km. Historically, Sudan has been a haven for terrorists, most notably providing refuge to Osama bin Laden in the 1990s and participating in the bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Ethiopia has long grappled with the threat of a failed state in Somalia, where it combats Al-Shabaab, a Sunni Islamist group. Egypt, similarly, has faced an ongoing insurgency in the Sinai Peninsulaled by Wilayat Sinai, an ISIS affiliate.

For both Addis Ababa and Cairo, a failed state in Sudan, particularly one that becomes a hotbed for Sunni extremists, would be catastrophic. Yet, paradoxically, both may prefer an unstable Sudan over a strong, independent one, as a fragile state serves their geopolitical and geoeconomic interests. A stable Sudan could open doors for security and economic interdependence, potentially paving the way for a tripartite agreement between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt to manage the Nile and the filling of the GERD. 

On the other hand, a weak Sudan maintains the delicate balance of power between Cairo and Addis Ababa. Ethiopia cannot afford to be encircled militarily by Egypt, nor can it risk Somalia and Sudan becoming launching pads for Egyptian military actions. Meanwhile, Egypt fears a strong Sudan that might act autonomously in the region. Cairo prefers Khartoum as a vassal state, aligning Sudan’s geopolitical interests with Egypt’s, especially concerning the Nile and the GERD. The worst outcome for Cairo would be a Sudan that not only remains neutral but potentially sides with Ethiopia, forming a coalition against Egypt.

Security-Driven Conflict

The Horn of Africa is locked in a cycle of destabilization and proxy conflict. The civil war in Sudan offers Ethiopia a strategic opportunity to avoid being sandwiched between two Egyptian allies, Sudan and Somalia, and prevent military encirclement by Cairo. An unstable Sudan offers leverage for Ethiopia, enabling it to impose costs on Egypt and limit Cairo’s ability to expand its influence beyond Somalia.

A Snapshot of the Conflict in Sudan

The ongoing military conflict in Sudan, pitting the Sudanese Army against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has been exacerbated by regional and international actors vying for control of Sudan’s geostrategic location and natural resources. The Sudanese civil war is a power struggle between General Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan, head of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti,” commander of the RSF. Against the backdrop of Ethiopian-Egyptian tensions over the Nile, Sudan risks becoming a pawn in a larger game of regional power projection, further complicated by the hostilities between Cairo and Addis Ababa.

>From Lake Victoria and Lake Tana to the Mediterranean

Is the Nile Abyssinian or Arab? In truth, it is neither. The Nile is African, belonging equally to the nations through which its waters flow, the states of the White and Blue Nile tributaries. The White and Blue Nile converge in Sudan to form the main Nile River, which passes through eleven countries: Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt, and South Sudan.

Egypt and Sudan must accept that the 1929 and 1959 Nile Water Agreements are obsolete, unethical, and no longer viable. These colonial-era agreements strategically excluded upstream Nile basin countries in favor of British geopolitical and geoeconomic interests. The 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty granted Egypt unilateral control over the Nile and veto power over projects proposed by upstream riparian states. The 1959 bilateral agreement further entrenched this control, effectively granting Sudan and Egypt sovereignty over the Nile River, while ignoring the rights of African nations.

Notably, 86% of the Blue Nile originates in Ethiopia, with the remaining 14% of the White Nile flowing from Burundi, the DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. These agreements are not only outdated but also unjust. A compromise that ensures equitable sharing of the Nile’s waters is necessary to address the region’s growing economic, environmental, political, and social challenges. This solution can only be achieved through negotiation and economic interdependence. Egypt must recognize that the geopolitical landscape has shifted, and it needs to embrace a new mindset at the negotiation table to avoid an all-out conflict over Nile waters.

Precarious Future of Uncertainty

Presently, the GERD is a symbol of Ethiopian nationalism, garnering broad domestic support for economic development. The construction of the GERD was strategically initiated during the Arab Spring, capitalizing on the turmoil following the fall of Hosni Mubarak. This unilateral action mirrors Egypt’s construction of the Aswan Dam and Sudan’s development of the Roseires Dam. The GERD is projected to generate 6,000 megawatts of energy to meet domestic consumption needs and to export excess electricity to neighboring countries.

The GERD promises to lift tens of millions of Ethiopians out of poverty. With a population of 126 million, Ethiopia is the second most populous nation in Africa, yet 70% of its people still lack access to electricity. Ethiopia began constructing the dam during a period of Egyptian political vulnerability, at a time when Cairo had little leverage for negotiation. Currently, Ethiopia is in the final stages of filling the GERD, which spans an area of 300 square kilometers— an area larger than the city of London.

Cairo and Mogadishu: A Strategic Marriage of Convenience

The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland, which grants Ethiopia access to the port of Berbera in exchange for recognition of Somaliland’s sovereignty, has paved the way for renewed relations between Somalia and Cairo—adhering to the principle that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Ethiopia’s actions have inadvertently exposed it to potential military encirclement by Egypt. Cairo has signed a defense pact with Somalia, positioning Somalia’s sovereignty as a critical component of regional stability. Egypt has followed through by suppling two shipments of weapons to Somalia.

Currently, Somalia is demanding the withdrawal of the 3,000 Ethiopian troops presently part of the African Union peacekeeping mission (ATMIS) tasked with combating Al-Shabaab by December 2024, with indications that Egypt may send 10,000 troops to Somalia to counter non-state actors and restore order.

Cairo’s political and military calculations appear strategically sound, given that Abiy Ahmed’s pursuit of sea access is a strategic maneuver aimed at consolidating his power by restructuring the state apparatus, neutralizing internal factions, rallying nationalist support, diverting attention from the Tigray humanitarian crisis, and stabilizing conflicts in the Amhara and Oromo regions. However, this strategy masks the deepening political, economic, and ethnic conflicts within Ethiopia, pushing the nation toward the Balkanization of Africa’s second most populous country.

The current political framework in Ethiopia is unsustainable, with deep-rooted ethnic and religious divisions threatening to tear the country apart. Cairo recognizes that Ethiopia is teetering on the brink of fragmentation, reminiscent of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Abiy Ahmed lacks a monopoly on violence, political legitimacy, and the consent of the governed. His regime is increasingly under siege, as evidenced by his struggle against the FANO insurgency, which represents the Amhara ethnic group, comprising 24% of the population.

Complicating the crisis further, Abiy’s government is also locked in conflict with the Oromo Liberation Army(OLA), which represents the interests of the Oromo, the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, constituting 35.8% of the population. Abiy also fought a two-year war against the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF), whose people account for 5.7% of the population. That conflict ended with the Pretoria Agreement, a fragile peace between the TDF and the Ethiopian government. Ethiopia is also home to the largest Somali population outside Somalia, primarily in the Ogaden region, which makes up 7.2% of the population.

Abiy Ahmed continues to face conflicts with Ethiopia’s four largest ethnic groups: Oromo, Amhara, Somali, and Tigray. His legitimacy and authority are rapidly eroding, leaving the Ethiopian state increasingly vulnerable to internal fragmentation. While Egypt views Ethiopia’s instability as an opportunity to undermine Abiy’s position, Addis finds itself in a security dilemma, struggling to manage its complex relationships with neighboring states.

The Window for Miscalculations Between Cairo, Mogadishu, and Addis Ababa

The ongoing conflict in Sudan has already claimed over 15,000 lives, displaced 8.2 million people, and left 25 million in urgent need of humanitarian aid. As the situation worsens, Libya and Syria could become mere footnotes compared to Sudan’s unfolding crisis. The dispute over the Nile has transformed Sudan into a battleground for Egyptian and Ethiopian influence, undermining Sudan’s territorial integrity. Egypt appears to be building a coalition to contain Ethiopia, with all eyes on Eritrea, where Egyptian and Somali leaders are convening for a tripartite summit on regional political and security cooperation.

What are the potential ramifications of this meeting for Sudan? Suppose Egypt and Ethiopia perceive the current political and military climate surrounding the GERD as an existential threat to their interests and survival. In that case, Cairo and Addis will be incentivized to destabilize Sudan further to maintain the balance of power and regional leverage.

The stakes are exceptionally high for Ethiopia, a nation fragmented along ethnic, religious, and linguistic lines. The Ethiopian government views a stable and united Somalia as a potential threat, particularly given the historical precedent of the Ogaden War in 1977, when Somalia nearly succeeded in annexing Ethiopia’s Ogaden region. A stable Somalia poses a significant threat to Ethiopia, as it could revive questions about the Ogaden region’s status within Ethiopian borders. As Somalis comprise 7.2% of Ethiopia’s population, Somali nationalism remains a persistent source of tension between the two countries.

Conclusion: The Path Ahead

The strategic stakes in Sudan and the surrounding region are precariously high, and the power dynamics are rapidly shifting. The conflict in Sudan cannot be viewed in isolation—it is a critical moment in the broader security landscape of the Horn of Africa. Sudan’s stability is now a pivotal security dilemma, entangling Ethiopia and Egypt in a complex struggle shaped by their historical legacies, contemporary challenges, and the pressing need for cooperative diplomacy between Cairo and Addis. Ethiopia and Egypt’s actions underscore the urgent need for a peaceful resolution to the GERD crisis; failing to do so risks escalating conflict among riparian states and undermining regional stability.

Cairo and Addis must acknowledge their economic, political, and security interdependence, viewing the Nile as a bridge for peace rather than a source of conflict. Genuine collaboration that addresses the needs of both parties can transform the current security dilemma into an opportunity for mutually assured economic and political development. The relationship between Cairo and Mogadishu could metamorphose from a transactional alignment against Ethiopia into a strategic partnership if Cairo and Addis fail to resolve their differences, turning the Horn of Africa into contested ground for regional influence.