The Trump administration stands at a pivotal crossroads, with a rare chance to reshape the Horn of Africa by moving beyond the idealistic foreign policies of previous administrations and adopting a pragmatic approach that aligns with the region’s complex realities while advancing American interests in a volatile geopolitical landscape.

By forging a pragmatic economic, political, and military partnership with Eritrea, a country that stands as a pillar of stability in one of the world’s most volatile regions, the Horn of Africa, the United States could position Eritrea as a crucial strategic asset in enhancing regional security. Asmara has the potential to serve as a catalyst for stability, playing a pivotal role in the Sudanese civil war, countering piracy along the Red Sea, supporting Somalia in eradicating non-state actors, and ensuring secure shipping routes for international commerce. More importantly, Eritrea could help curb Iranian influence in Yemen and degrade the Houthis by providing critical real estate along the Red Sea.

The Trump administration has a unique opportunity to break from the inconsistent policies of its predecessors, which often applied coercive economic sanctions to punish specific states for failing to pursue democratic reforms while turning a blind eye to other authoritarian regimes and nations staging performative elections to placate the international community. A Pontious Pilate and selective amnesia foreign policy is an inconsistent and detrimental foreign policy approach in the Horn of Africa, and it undermines Washington’s credibility and strategic objectives.  The America First policy requires a more balanced, pragmatic, and strategic foreign policy grounded in collective security, trade, and investment while forgoing foreign aid.

Washington’s Engagement in the Horn of Africa: A High-Stakes Gamble

The United States must confront the region’s complex realities to reinforce stability in the Horn of Africa. Sudan has been mired in a bloody civil war since 2023; Ethiopia’s perceived unity masks fragile ethnic tensions rooted in historical animosity; Somalia remains a failed state and a haven for non-state actors; Djibouti operates as a one-man dictatorship and a hub for foreign military bases; and Eritrea, a carbon copy of Enver Hoxha’s Albania, stands as a pillar of stability with its robust military, highly centralized governance, and one-party rule.

Compounding East Africa’s fragility is the escalating anarchy in Yemen, with Houthi forces destabilizing global trade through Red Sea attacks, targeting U.S. warships, and deploying surface-to-surface missiles toward Israel, further exacerbating regional volatility. The Trump administration faces a critical decision: to either relinquish its influence in East Africa to global competitors like China, Russia, and emerging power brokers such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and India or to counter these actors assertively.

To offset Chinese expansion and Russian influence, the United States should pursue a comprehensive engagement strategy with Eritrea, cultivating a strategic partnership that transcends transient leadership. If Washington capitalizes on this opportunity, establishing a U.S. military presence in Assab, Massawa, or Tio could become a reality along the Red Sea. Such a move would position Asmara as a future ally and a critical strategic partner for the United States in one of the world’s most volatile regions.

A military base along the Eritrean coastline would provide Washington with strategic options in the Horn of Africa, addressing both geoeconomic and geopolitical challenges with significant implications for international commerce and security.

Chinese Influence in Djibouti: If Djibouti succumbs to China’s debt-trap diplomacy, Beijing’s economic and political leverage could severely constrain Washington’s freedom of movement in the region. Although China’s $3.5 billion free trade zone may appear to foster economic development, Chinese loans now constitute 85% of Djibouti’s GDP, giving Beijing outsized influence. China strategically aligns its economic dominance to erode U.S. influence in Djibouti, potentially outmaneuvering Washington over time.

Russia’s Naval Aspirations: Moscow’s pursuit of a naval base in Port Sudan is becoming increasingly viable, particularly as Bashar al-Assad is no longer in power. Russia’s strategic footholds in Tartus and Hmeimim, once cornerstones of its regional influence, are now vulnerable due to the shifting dynamics within Syria, where a terrorist organization masquerading as a rebel group has taken control. As a result, Russia is recalibrating its geostrategic priorities, aiming to establish a strategic presence in Sudan and Libya to extend its military and economic influence across the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

Djibouti’s Overcrowded Military Presence: Djibouti’s strategic real estate is already saturated with foreign military bases, hosting Italian, Japanese, French, and Chinese forces. Establishing a U.S. military presence in Eritrea would counterbalance China’s growing influence and expand Washington’s operational reach.

Historical Precedent: During the Cold War, the United States maintained Kagnew Station, a military base in Eritrea. Reviving a similar presence today would align with Washington’s broader objectives of countering Chinese soft and hard power in the region while securing a foothold in the strategically vital Horn of Africa.

The Horn of Africa stands as a paradoxical anchor of instability and a geopolitical tipping point. Just as military leaders must wage war with the forces and equipment they have, Washington must engage with East African leaders and states as they are, without the pretense of preconditions. The Horn of Africa, encompassing of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia, has never been democratic, likely cannot conform to Western governance ideals, nor is it likely to do so in the foreseeable future. Instead, U.S. foreign policy should adopt a pragmatic approach, prioritizing stability, security, and economic development over the promotion of democracy, freedom, and human rights.

As harsh as it may sound, reality offers a common foundation for engagement. Djibouti has been under the rule of Ismail Omar Guelleh since 1999, Eritrea under Isaias Afewerki since 1991, and Ethiopia experienced 21 years of Meles Zenawi’s leadership, followed by Abiy Ahmed’s ongoing tenure since 2018. Meanwhile, Somalia has been ungovernable since 1991, plagued by anarchy. The entrenchment of autocratic regimes extends beyond the Horn, with Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni ruling since 1986 and Sudan enduring 30 years under Omar al-Bashir until his ouster in 2019. The Horn of Africa is not fertile ground for democracy, and peaceful transitions of power, like those in Kenya or Somaliland, remain the exceptions rather than the rule.

In a region as volatile as the Horn, centralized states led by strongmen provide the stability and security that countries like Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Libya lack. While many analysts consider Ethiopia a pillar of stability, this perception is an illusion. Ethiopian unity is fragile at best, as Abiy Ahmed’s government contends with active insurgencies in the Amhara region, a tenuous peace in Tigray, and a lack of legitimacy within his own Oromo ethnic group. Ethnic divisions undermine Ethiopia’s cohesion, making its stability precarious. The broader regional crisis is exacerbated by Sudan’s ongoing civil war, which began in 2023. With over 14 million internally displaced people and more than 62,000 lives lost, Sudan increasingly mirrors the chaos of Syria and Libya.

Eritrea stands out as an anomaly. While it is the most authoritarian state in Africa, a modern-day carbon copy of Communist Albania under Enver Hoxha, Eritrea is also the Horn’s most stable nation. Its authoritarianism, though harsh, has shielded it from the chaos engulfing its neighbors. A pragmatic approach is essential in the Horn of Africa, where security rather than idealism or hopes for change should guide engagement in this volatile yet strategically critical region.

Isaias Afwerki: Marxist Idealist, Nationalist Visionary, or Master of Political Survival?

Asmara and Washington’s formal relationship began when Eritrea was recognized as an independent and sovereign nation de jure in 1991 and de facto in 1993. Eritrea’s domestic and foreign policies were forged during its 30-year liberation struggle, with the sacrosanct principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty as their foundation. Eritrea’s aggressive foreign policy is intricately linked to its highly centralized and secretive internal authoritarianism, a byproduct of its challenging geographical and geopolitical context.

Eritrea is a one-party state, and Isaias Afwerki has ruled Eritrea for 33 years. But labeling him solely as a Marxist idealist or nationalist visionary oversimplifies his political identity. While his close confidants may adhere to Marxist or nationalist ideologies, Afwerki himself is better characterized as an African Rasputin, a Machiavellian figure adept at political survival.

Afwerki is also China’s longest-standing ally in the Horn of Africa, a relationship that dates back to his education at a Chinese military academy during the Cultural Revolution. Despite this connection, the United States should not shy away from exploring a strategic partnership with Eritrea. Afwerki’s rule is nearing its conclusion, but the state and party apparatus of the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) will endure. This presents Washington with a critical window of opportunity to establish a foothold in Eritrea, building a partnership that transcends the Afwerki era.

Afwerki is not a communist but a strategic authoritarian whose alliances with external actors are often transactional and transient. Eritrea’s relationships with nations like China, Qatar, Sudan, Libya, Ethiopia, and Somalia are superficial, dictated by immediate interests rather than enduring loyalty. For instance, during the horrific global distraction of 9/11, Afwerki capitalized on the moment to imprison government ministers and journalists, consolidating his grip on power. Eritrea’s foreign policy is similarly opportunistic: it abandoned Qatar during the Gulf crisis in favor of Saudi Arabia and granted the UAE a naval base in Assab to conduct operations against the Houthis. Afwerki’s indifference to religious ideology is evident in Eritrea’s persecution of Orthodox, Pentecostal, and Evangelical Christians, as well as Sunni Muslim leaders, whenever their authority threatens his rule.

Eritrea’s proxy war against Ethiopia further illustrates its strategic calculus. By aligning with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, Afwerki eliminated the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) as a political adversary while imposing significant costs on Abiy’s regime. This marriage of convenience served Asmara’s interests, but it underscores Afwerki’s readiness to pivot alliances if it prolongs his reign.

Washington must approach Eritrea with a clear-eyed understanding of its leader’s pragmatism. Afwerki’s ability to navigate regional and global dynamics reflects his Machiavellian ethos, but his era will eventually come to an end. The question is whether the United States can seize the opportunity to engage with Eritrea’s state apparatus and forge a mutually beneficial path forward that serves both American strategic interests and those of Eritrea in the Horn of Africa.

Eritrea at the Crossroads: How Washington Can Turn Suspicion into Strategic Opportunity in the Horn of Africa

The ruling party, the PFDJ and President Isaias Afwerki view Washington with deep suspicion. This skepticism stems from two key historical grievances: first, the denial of Eritrea’s independence under the principles of self-determination during the Cold War in 1952 and the subsequent forceful annexation of Eritrea by Emperor Haile Selassie; and second, Washington’s failure to fully support the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) decision during Meles Zenawi’s tenure as Ethiopia’s prime minister.

Despite these historical tensions, the members of the PFDJ are highly educated and pragmatic. The eventual departure of Afwerki will usher in a more open and reformist Eritrea, although it is highly improbable that the PFDJ will adopt a Western-style system of governance. Instead, Eritrea’s political apparatus will remain a one-party state under a new leader, with the PFDJ carefully nominating a successor before Afwerki’s exit to ensure political stability and continuity. Economic reforms, similar to those implemented by China under Deng Xiaoping, will be accelerated, with Eritrea preserving its one-party system while gradually opening its economy and introducing elements of capitalism to drive economic development with Eritrean characteristics.

Given Eritrea’s critical geostrategic location, Washington’s careful engagement with the country is becoming increasingly essential. The rise of China’s economic, political, and military influence, coupled with Russia’s resurgence and Iran’s growing malign presence in the Red Sea, makes Eritrea a potentially valuable strategic partner for the United States. In this context, Eritrea could become a key asset in strengthening regional security in the Horn of Africa, stabilizing a region fraught with instability.

In the pursuit of a foreign policy that prioritizes U.S. interests, America First does not necessarily mean abandoning international norms and the global order. Rather, it signifies the realignment of U.S. geopolitical and geoeconomic interests to create strategic partnerships that benefit both the U.S. and its partners. In the Horn of Africa, where fragile states like South Sudan and Ethiopia coexist with failed states like Somalia and Sudan, there is a growing need for Washington to adjust its approach. This recalibration aligns with the broader objectives of America First policies, which do not require abandoning international norms but instead advocate for realigning U.S. geopolitical priorities to serve national interests. A partnership with Eritrea would support these goals, creating a mutually beneficial framework that bolsters regional stability and secures U.S. geoeconomic and geopolitical interests.

The alignment of Ethiopia, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia with the BRICS bloc, the potential establishment of a Russian naval base in Port Sudan, Iran’s increasing influence in Yemen and along the Red Sea, and the destabilizing effects of the Houthis all underscore the urgent need for a geopolitical shift from Washington. Additionally, China’s expanding footprint in the region, alongside the rise of regional powers like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and India, highlights the strategic importance of Eritrea in the evolving geopolitical landscape. New leadership in Washington has an opportunity to recalibrate its foreign policy in the Horn of Africa to secure its interests and counterbalance rising external influences.