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Jeffrey Sachs Tells the Real History of How We Got to The Brink of WW3

Posted by: ericzuesse@icloud.com

Date: Friday, 01 August 2025

https://ericzuesse.substack.com/p/jeffrey-sachs-tells-the-real-history

https://theduran.com/jeffrey-sachs-tells-the-real-history-of-how-we-got-to-the-brink



 

Jeffrey Sachs Tells the Real History of How We Got to The Brink of WW3


1 August 2025, by Eric Zuesse. (All of my recent articles can be seen here.)


On July 31st, the excellent geostrategic commentator Daniel Davis briefly interviewed John Mearsheimer, headlining “U.S. Will NOT Accept Ukraine Defeat /John Mearsheimer”, in a fascinating discussion of Trump’s having gotten himself now fully committed to continuing the wars that Biden, and before him Obama, had started in 2014 Ukraine, and in the Middle East, joining now with Israel in its genocide against the Gazans, and also in invading Iran and Lebanon. All of these wars created by the U.S. and its colonies or ‘allies’, are importantly connected with America’s ongoing and main war, the ‘Cold War’ since 1945 against Russia. Though everything that they said is true, neither of those exceptionally competent commentators had been personally involved in the historical events that he was describing. However, the economist Jeffrey Sachs is also a superb and trustworthy commentator on such matters, and he speaks additionally as a person who very importantly DID participate, and at a very high level, in the events that he describes.


Sachs was personally and deeply involved in achieving what almost everyone believed at the time was the “end of the Cold War,” when the Soviet Union, under first Gorbachev, and then Yeltsin, democratized and ended its communism, and then broke up into separate independent countries, in 1991, and then, as now only Russia, ended its Warsaw Pact military alliance that the Soviet Union had started in 1955 as a response to America’s having formed in 1949 its NATO military alliance to conquer the Soviet Union (INCLUDING, of course, Russia). As everyone now knows, the U.S. secretly continued its side of the Cold War even after 1991, and NATO more than doubled — just at the time when Russia no longer posed any threat. It is THAT history about which Sachs spoke. This was the period of history that the famous neconservative Sovietologist Francis Fukuyama labeled in 1992 as being “The End of History,” because, for the first time ever, the world now had a single nation ruling the world (“hegemony”), dominating over and ultimately controlling (through its U.N., World Bank, IMF, and the rest of “the Washington Consensus”), all other nations, and especially those that the U.S. had Treaties, including international trade agreements, with. 


On July 31st, Sachs gave an interview with the great geostrategic analyst Alexander Mercouris, in which Sachs recounted and revealed what he did and why, during this climactic period in human history. He was a central, if not the central, person, who planned it. However, as he tells the story, he had fierce disagreements with all U.S. Presidents about it, and with the entire neoconservative objective that the U.S. Government must be the world’s dictator-regime to all other nations, which he believe is heading the world into World War Three: 


——


https://theduran.com/the-price-of-empire-w-jeffrey-sachs-live/

“The Price of Empire w/ Jeffrey Sachs (Live)”


3:18

The way

3:19

that wars end, whether hot wars like World War I or cold wars, uh, like the

3:26

end in 1991, make a huge difference for the fate of the planet. And, and that was a lesson I

3:34

learned as a young economist uh, when I read a book that I regard as perhaps the

3:41

most important book of the 20th century written by an economist. It's John

3:46

Maynard Keines's book written in 1919 called The Economic Consequences of the

3:53

Peace. Uh the the title referred to the peace agreement reached at Versailles

4:00

that ended World War I. And John Maynard Keynes, who was the the greatest political

4:06

economist of the 20th century, a British economist had been a junior member of

4:12

the British delegation to the Versailles treaty, and he uh was just crestfallen by

4:20

the treaty, because it was an onorous treaty that put all war blame on the

4:27

Germans and all financial burdens on the Germans, especially reparations [to the victors — pure Might-makes-right here]

4:34

and Keynes wrote a scathing diatribe against the treaty that was

4:41

utterly prophetic, fascinating to read and for me as a

4:47

young economist was probably the the most insightful single book that I have

4:53

ever read as a professional economist. Basically, Keynes said if you punish your

4:59

foe, that will come back to haunt you. And Keynes said that by putting these

5:06

burdens on Germany, this would give rise to a monster even far greater than

5:12

anything that was experienced in World War I. And, of course, this was prophecy

5:17

that devastatingly came true. I began my own career in the

5:23

1980s, uh working with countries that were in fiscal crisis, in debt crisis [like John Perkins described in his 2004 masterpiece Confessions of an Economic Hitman],

5:30

in hyperinflations and that was uh my specialty and my activity in the 1980s

5:38

starting in Latin America and then in Eastern Europe, and I took Keynes's

5:44

message to heart, which is you cannot punish countries uh whether for wars or

5:52

other uh reasons, without potentially devastating human consequences that

5:58

would follow. So I always believed that one needed a response, uh whether it was

6:06

to a crushing debt uh or to the aftermath of the cold war, that was

6:12

attuned to basic ethics, basic decency, basic

6:18

respect for people that uh one is dealing with, and a way forward that

6:25

wasn't punitive, uh and that wouldn't give rise to monsters in the future. And

6:32

so when I came to be, uh, by strange quirks of fate, Poland's leading external

6:40

advisor uh in 1989, in those first days when the

6:47

uh Soviet rule over Eastern Europe was ending — by the way, not because of the

6:52

Soviet collapse but because Mikhail Gorbachev was a [naive about capitalism] man of peace, and I watched

6:57

his deft maneuvers to make it a peaceful end of the cold war, and I regard him to

7:06

this day as the greatest statesman of that era because he believed in peace.

7:12

Things could have gone so many other ways, but he actually, for example, called

7:19

the communist president of Poland Jaruzelski, and said let those people from

7:24

solidarity join a coalition with you. In other words, he wanted peace. And I

7:31

witnessed that, uh, first-hand. When I became Poland's adviser, I

7:36

advised the Western governments. Look, this country [Poland then] is burdened by debt, uh, the

7:42

Soviet era debt. It's not debt that it's its own fault. It needs a fresh start.

7:47

It's now a democracy. It is the end of this era of the Cold War. Let it breathe

7:55

again. And this was a kind of unusual message, but, uh, because of the dynamics

8:02

of cold war politics, Poland was clearly on the US side. And there were lots of

8:07

Polish Americans in the United States and Illinois and in Michigan and elsewhere. And so the politicians in the

8:14

White House, yeah, said, "Okay, we'll follow what Sachs says." And Poland's debts were cancelled. And Poland began

8:23

an economic recovery that actually lasted more than 30 years. It was a

8:29

period that most historians of Poland, looking back over the last 500 years, say is Poland's best 30 years of economic

8:37

development that they ever had. And Poland went from about a third of

8:42

Western European living standards to about 70% of Western European living

8:48

standards, or Germany’s in particular in that period. So, quite remarkable. Well,

8:53

on that basis, a young and very brilliant and very decent Soviet

8:59

economist, Grigory Yavlinsky, whom you mentioned, called me up and said, "Can I

9:05

meet you in Warsaw,” and we spent a long time talking about what was happening in

9:11

Poland, and Grigory, uh who is a remarkable person to this day, he became

9:17

a a leading voice in Russia after the cold war and remains so today. He's very

9:25

brilliant, very decent; said, "My my boss, Mickhail Gorbachev, would would like

9:30

to do the same basically, which is we want to make basic reforms, democratize

9:36

the Soviet Union, make Perestroika,” that old word, which meant reform of the

9:43

economy, turn to a market economy, open like China, had opened successfully and

9:49

so forth. “Would the West help?” [As it turned out, they were asking their permanent enemies — racist-imperialist fascist-supremacists — for help, but even Sachs didn’t know this at that time, hat this was the case.] And I being young, naive

9:57

uh uh and um seeing what had happened in Poland, I said, "Grigory, of course the

10:03

West will help. This is the biggest moment in modern history. This is the

10:08

end of the Cold War. Mikhail Gorbachev is is a great statesman. Of course, the

10:14

West will help." And I recounted how the advice that I had given for Poland was

10:19

accepted by the White House. [That was only to warm things up, set the trap, which would be sprung only later.] Sometimes, you can't even imagine the turnaround

10:25

time of advice [from the time Sachs gave that advice, to the time] that I gave to [from] the White House agreeing was within eight hours, uh

10:31

in those days for Poland. So I felt pretty good about things. Oh, they're listening to me. This is uh and of

10:38

course they're going to help Gorbachev. And so I I worked with uh Grigory. He

10:44

organized an an effort together of his group and then we put together a group

10:51

in the United States at Harvard in particular uh to sketch out how this

10:57

could be done. And the idea was very much modeled on the evident successes of

11:03

what was happening in Poland. And more generally, uh the whole idea of Churchill

11:11

had said it also, in victory magnanimity. Uh, and this was essentially what was

11:17

needed right now. The cold war was ending. You had a statesman who wanted

11:23

peace — a a statesman who said, "We want a common European home from Rotterdam to

11:30

Vladivosto." He meant it. This was not a a show. This was not a game. Gorbachev

11:37

unilaterally disbanded the Warsaw pact. By the way, for all of these things, he's regarded as utterly naive today. I

11:47

regard him as a great man. But yes, if you are a cynical deep down realist, who

11:55

believes the worst always of everything, then you could call Gorbachev cynical. I

12:01

believe he helped save the world from war [he actually postponed the overt aggression by the U.S. side]. But the West and in particular the

12:09

idiots, if I could use a technical term, that led the United States, and they are idiots, and they're idiots [this is rabidly false: they were/are neocons, and maybe smarter than he was/is] till today.

12:16

They're fools. They said, "Oh, this man's weak. We won. He lost. Help him.

12:23

Are you crazy?" [Here’s confirmation of that, coming from the U.S. President himself, George HW Bush: On 24 February 1990, he responded to Kohl’s understanding that NATO would not expand after the Warsaw Pact would end, the actual U.S. position, by telling him, “To hell with that. We prevailed and they didn't. We cannot let the Soviets clutch victory from the jaws of defeat.”] And so we made a proposal for help. [Sachs still doesn’t acknowledge the intentional deceit that had fooled him at that time.] The the numbers are

12:32

$30 billion a year for five years for the whole Soviet

12:38

Union, of which Russia was half. This was for 300 million people. The numbers

12:45

are so small. Look, Elon Musk could do it out of his pocket. This is unbelievable

12:53

how small this was. I was trying to get something through. I wasn't in some

13:00

crazy uh dream, you know, expecting that the United States was going to turn over

13:07

many% of GDP. This was tiny, tiny.

13:14

Now, what happened was it was completely rejected and all I heard in June 1991

13:25

was the White House turned it down. It was 34 years later that I finally

13:33

read the minutes of that meeting and I sent them to you. Uh, and you could post

13:40

them uh uh if you'd like because they're publicly available. [The Duran decided not to do that — not to provide a link to it.] If you want to see

13:46

the stupidity, the arrogance, the ignorance of  [actually, the DECEIT BY] American leaders,

13:53

it is on display in almost every word of the meeting that considered should the

14:00

US help the Soviet Union at this time of massive reform at the end of the cold

14:07

war when Mikhail Gorbachev is unilaterally disbanding the Soviet

14:14

military apparatus, and the response of the West should have been let's end NATO because

14:21

NATO was to absolutely uh respond to a potential

14:27

Soviet invasion. Now there's unilateral uh disarmament on the Soviet side,

14:33

disbanding the Warsaw Pact. That should have been the answer, for a tiny amount

14:40

of what we were spending on the military [but it expanded American billonaires’ — owners of U.S. armaments firms — wealth exponentially]. We could have helped to facilitate a smooth and peaceful

14:48

economic transformation to a market economy and we would have gone on to

14:54

live in peace. Well, this was turned down in June.

15:01

Gorbachev went to the G7 soon afterwards. Came back empty-handed.

15:08

The uh some of the politicians in the Soviet Union said, "You see what an

15:14

idiot Gorbachov is. He was abducted." That was the attempted putsch. In the

15:20

summer of 1991, Yeltsin stood on top of the tank, you'll recall, uh and soon Yeltsin was basically

15:28

in political charge. Now, for me, again kind of a kid but you

15:36

know with with a little bit of track record, I have to say, because I had ended hyperinflations in a few countries, I had

15:42

helped get Poland reorganized, I was following Keynes's

15:47

logic, I was called this time not by Yavlinsky but by Yeltsin's economic

15:54

advisor Yegor Gaidar, another wonderful person, uh, who wanted reform, wanted

16:02

normalcy, and he said, Jeff come come to the dacha outside of Moscow in September

16:09

1991, help us, it's it's going to be the Yeltsin government now, it's going to be our team.

16:18

So I flew to Moscow and I spent a

16:24

in the dacha with the Yegor Gaidar and with others who would soon be the young

16:30

reformist cabinet of the new independent Russian government. Of course, I didn't

16:37

know exactly what was going to happen, but uh I knew that Yeltsin had the initiative at that point. And in

16:45

November 1991, the so-called G7 deputies, which meant

16:52

that the uh deputy finance ministers of the G7 came as a group to Moscow to meet

17:01

with Gaidar. Now by this time I had some experience on on these issues and I briefed Gaidar

17:07

at length, and I said Yegor, you need to get from the G7 deputies a standstill on

17:16

your debt payments right now. What this means is that Russia had or Soviet Union

17:21

had taken on debts uh in the late 1980s. Part of the US. ploy at the time was to

17:27

drive down oil prices in cahoots with the Gulf countries which they had done.

17:32

This put the Soviet Union into financial stress. {Why didn’t Sachs, by that time, recognize that he was actually serving as a tool of the billionaires-serving U.S. gangsters who were controlling the U.S. Government?] Uh, the Soviet Union took on

17:38

debts under Gorbachev. Those debts were short-term. They were coming due. The uh

17:45

Soviet Union had no reserves uh to speak of uh and so they were running out of

17:51

hard currency cash. And I said to Gaidar, the most standard thing that you say in

17:59

a fiscal crisis like this, which is you need a standstill on debt payments. Now

18:05

mind you, two years earlier, I had called for not only a standstill on Poland's debt payments, but an outright

18:12

cancellation of the debts, which had been accepted by the G7 governments. So

18:18

what I regarded as the most minimal possible request was just a postponement

18:25

of any payments coming due because the Soviet Union and Russia had no financial

18:32

reserves. Gaidar went into the meeting. An hour later

18:37

he came out, I could see in distress. I said Yegor, what happened? He said, "They

18:45

told me if we don't pay every penny the moment it is due, all ships on the high

18:51

seas, uh, heading for Russia with food or other supplies, will immediately be

18:58

turned around and that will be the end of any financial cooperation with Russia."

19:03

In other words, exactly the opposite of what was needed then. Russia continued

19:10

to pay the interest uh and the uh debt as it was falling due and it ran out of

19:16

money in uh the first weeks of uh 1992.

19:22

Now just to uh conclude this little saga:

19:27

in mid December 1991, Gaidar asked me to brief President Yeltsin.

19:36

And so I went with, as with a little delegation, to the Kremlin, and sat in a

19:43

giant room in the Kremlin. And you, I don't know if you can imagine, this was, you know, the end of the cold war [but actually NOT on the U.S. side]. This

19:51

was, events that were so startling, I could not even imagine I was there. But

19:58

sitting in the Kremlin waiting for President Yeltsin to come. It was a huge

20:05

room. The door in the in the far back, on the right hand side, opens, there strides in

20:12

confidently President Yeltsin, and he walks across the long room, sits down

20:17

immediately in front of me, and says” gentlemen, I want to announce the Soviet Union is

20:26

over, and then he pointed to the back of the room, and he said do you know who's in

20:32

the adjoining room? That is the military leadership, and they have just agreed

20:38

with me that the Soviet Union will be dissolved at the end of this month and

20:43

Russia will be an independent state. So, I heard that out of President Yelson's

20:50

own mouth, real time, and I said this is, these events are

20:57

moving pretty damn quick. And then President Yeltsin said,

21:04

"We want to be a normal country. We want to be at peace. We want to end this

21:12

central planning. We want a market economy. We want to be friends with the United States. We want to be friends

21:19

with Europe. We want your help." Well, it was my turn to speak, and I

21:26

said, "Mr. president. This is uh one of the most important

21:32

moments of modern history.” I'm sorry to tell you guys, I said it

21:37

again: I said “I have no doubt that the West will help you. This isn't even

21:44

about the Soviet Union anymore. This is now about an independent Russia led by

21:50

President Yeltsin. Absolutely.” Who has said communism is over. We want a normal market economy.

21:58

We want to be friends. I said, "How can the west turn this down?"

22:05

You learn. And uh it was a very painful lesson to tell you the truth. I

22:13

could not really understand it for some many years to come. Actually, I went

22:20

back to Washington, went to the IMF because the IMF was kind of the

22:26

coordinator for the G7, met the deputy managing director of the IMF, Richard

22:32

Erb, and he told me, Jeff, none of that's going to happen. There's not

22:39

going to be big aid. There's not going to be a stabilization fund as I had

22:45

created uh in Poland or helped to design and was my idea, and it worked to

22:51

stabilize the currency. None of that's going to happen, Jeff. And I said to him, “Richard,

22:58

Dick, why? Why? It's it's the right economics.” And he stood there completely

23:06

unresponsive. Wouldn't give me an answer, just said it's not going to happen.

23:14

And to complete the story and give you a little bit more of an insight into this,

23:22

I'm a um pretty persistent and and stubborn and had lots of experiences

23:30

where I was told no, something won't happen and then you press press because it's the right thing and then something

23:36

does happen. So, of course, I I kept on for two years trying to campaign for

23:42

Western help for Russia because it's the right thing to do. It's how stabilization is done. It's how every

23:49

successful stabilization is ended with some outside support. Not huge amounts,

23:56

but modest debt standstills or debt reductions or debt restructuring or

24:01

financial stabilization. And I didn't succeed. But in March of 1992, so just now three

24:10

months after the events that I was describing, I was on a newsshour uh the MacNeil Lehrer

24:18

NewsHour [you can see and hear it here], which was our public television, and I was uh paired with the

24:24

acting secretary of state, Lawrence Eagleberger. Uh, the secretary of state, uh James Baker,

24:32

uh had stepped down to head the re-election campaign of George Bush. And

24:37

so we had an acting secretary of state, Lawrence Eagleberger, and I was debating him on the NewsHour [that segment starts at 10:00 in the video or -49:00 in the archived version] where I

24:45

was saying we should help Russia, and he was saying no no no we have to be very

24:50

prudent, no reason to rush into anything and so on. He of course knew no

24:56

economics, didn't care and whatever. So, at the end of the NewsHour debate,

25:03

he said to me very nicely, "Jeff, let me give you a ride back to uh to DC because

25:10

we were in a studio in Alexandria, Virginia." So I got into the limousine of of the Secretary of State. And as we

25:18

were driving back, he said to me, "Uh, Jeff, uh,

25:23

suppose I told you I suppose just for purpose of argument that I agree with you."

25:31

Yeah. And and and “Jeff, suppose that I told you that the Polish finance

25:36

minister, Leszek Balcerowicz, had just been in Washington and um, he said the same

25:42

thing as you, actually.” Yeah. “Well, well, Jeff, I just want to tell you

25:48

it's not going to happen.” And I said, "But Mr. Secretary, why?

25:55

It's it's the right thing." He said, "Jeff, suppose I agree with you. It's

26:01

not going to happen. Do you know what this year is?"

26:06

And I I said, "Yes, it's 1992." He said, "Do you know what that means?" I said

26:13

that it's an election year. He says yes, it's not going to happen.

26:21

So that was the explanation that was given by the acting secretary of state. [Whether Eagleberger was lying or not, Sachs didn’t know that President Bush had privately said on 24 February 1990 that the U.S. empire was ultimately going to make Russia into just another U.S. colony. Perhaps Sachs still doesn’t know it.] 

26:27

Not that the arguments are wrong, that the economics are wrong, that the logic is wrong, but that the United States is

26:34

not going to help Russia because Russia is an enemy.

26:39

Okay, I took that for a long time as kind of basic uh electoral politics, you

26:47

know, that that Bush was cowardly, couldn't lead, was afraid of Patrick

26:52

Buchanan on his right and so forth. But the truth is it was much deeper than

26:58

what Eagleberger was saying because already by that moment

27:05

uh Wolfowitz, Cheney, uh the neocons, had taken hold of power in Washington and

27:12

would hold it till today, basically till today.

27:17

And their view is something that's very important to understand.

27:22

They did not want peace. They did not want cooperation.

27:29

They wanted dominance [they want actually that the U.S. Government be the dictator to all other nations — that is the ‘dominance’ they seek: hegemony over the entire planet]. The idea of the end of the cold war was

27:35

not that we would have peace and a common European home from Rotterdam to

27:40

Vladivostok. The idea of the end of the cold war is that the United States would be the

27:47

global hegemon. We know this now. It's almost commonplace. It honestly, again,

27:54

I apologize for my naivete. It didn't dawn on me in 1992,

28:00

when you’re [when I was] listening to Gorbachev and to Yeltsin and I was adviser in Ukraine

28:07

also to President Leonid Kuchma. This isn't Russia versus Ukraine. I was

28:14

adviser all over the region. And to my mind, this is the greatest

28:21

chance for peace that we have ever had. But already in the mentality in

28:28

Washington, this was the chance for global dominance [global dictatorship]. And no need to help a

28:36

foe or a former forward, not even to define it as a foe. Any country that

28:42

would not be subservient to the United States was  [is] an enemy. And in the US

28:48

mentality, there's no such thing as neutrality. There's no such thing as autonomy.

28:56

You're either with us or you're against us, as was famously put by George Bush

29:01

Jr. And this is the mentality. It took me

29:07

actually years and years to understand this, because I thought Clinton would be

29:14

different. Clinton came in no difference at all, by the way, on the particular

29:20

issue of financing for Russia. None at all. In fact, his Russia adviser uh

29:29

refused to join the administration and wrote to me in November 1992, “Jeff

29:36

Clinton's going to be no better than Bush on these big questions.” I didn't believe it, again because I'm kind of

29:43

stubborn and I was naively thinking this had something to do with economics and something to do with the logic of the

29:49

situation and something to do with peace. But of course, we now know the history afterwards.

29:55

The Cold War never ended in the US mentality. This is the hard truth.

30:00


To understand Sachs more deeply, one needs to know what the basis of his “shock therapy” for the till-then communist European nations, and for Latin American nations, actually meant — and that it had imperialism BUILT INTO IT.


Wikipedia’s article on “Shock therapy (economics)” is a part of their series on “Neoliberalism” (called “Libertarianism” in America), and says:


Economic liberalism rose to prominence after the 1960s and liberal shock therapy became increasingly used as a response to economic crises, for example by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.[5] Shock therapy has been controversial, with its proponents arguing that it helped to end economic crises, stabilized economies, and paved the way for economic growth, while its critics including economist Joseph Stiglitz believed that it helped deepen them unnecessarily and created unnecessary social suffering.[6]

In post-Soviet Russia and other post-Communist states, neoliberal reforms based on the Washington Consensus resulted in a surge in excess mortality[7][8][9] and decreasing life expectancy,[10] along with rising economic inequalitycorruption, and poverty.[11][12] Isabella Weber of the University of Massachusetts said: "As a result of shock therapy, Russia experienced a rise in mortality beyond that of any previous peacetime experiences of an industrialized country."[2]: 2  The Gini ratio increased by an average of 9 points for all post-Communist states.[11] The average post-Communist state had returned to 1989 levels of per-capita GDP by 2005,[13] although some are still far behind that.[14] In Russia, the average real income for 99 percent of people was lower in 2015 than in 1991.[2]: 2  According to William Easterly, successful market economies rest on a framework of law, regulation, and established practice,[15] which cannot be instantaneously created in a society that was formerly authoritarian, heavily centralised, and subject to state ownership of assets.[16]

German historian Philipp Ther asserted that the imposition of shock therapy had little to do with future economic growth in Europe.[17] Notable proponent Jeffrey Sachs[18] has stated that he believes shock therapy should be accompanied by debt forgiveness.[19] 


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Sachs is not a progressive, but instead a liberal, and a libertarian (or “neoliberal”). (A liberal libertarian disagrees with strict libertarianism because he/she accepts Keynesianism. Pure libertarians do not — they are 100% conservatives.) However, so far as I am aware, all of what he said in this interview is true, true history told first-person by an actual particiant in it, and therefore a very important document. However, I believe that he is stuck in liberalism, not open to recognizing that though he wasn’t outright evil (neoconservative — pro-hegemonic, hegemoniacal, power-worshipping) like America’s recent Presidents have been, privatization (which was a central part in his plan) is a significant portion of fascism and yields short-term benefits to the leaders and to the super-rich, while it provides long-term suffering to the public, and so it’s wrong, morally, democratically, and scientifically wrong, because any social theory that produces harm and even misery for 99% of the people that its practice affects is FALSE as a social theory. It ignores the constructiveness of equal-rights-and-equal-obligations for all citizens; it ignores the fundamental evilness of the supremacist idea (the opposite of equality — of fundamental rights — under the law) as a social theory. Current economic theory has no way even to acknowledge that for any society, it is better for everyone to have equal wealth, than for only one person — some dictator — to have 100% of the wealth (and everyone else to have nothing). That is ridiculous, and it is how unscientific economic theory actually is — and economists never even, as economists, acknowledge this fact, because under existing economic theory, it does’t exist, because existing theory doesn’t acknowledge that it is actually and incontravertibly true. Some few of them, such as Stiglitz, have intimations of it, but none outright acknowledge this fact, because it isn’t stated in any of their postulates. I disagree basically with Sachs on that, because I don’t accept economic theory as it is, since it is false. His shock therapy was bad, though not as bad as the way that American Presidents (such as Nixon during Pinochet’s dictatorship over Chile) applied it (as blatant supremacists). I believe that Sachs is sincerely closed-minded, not intending to misrepresent, as he does, by selectively telling a history that lacks some details that are actually essential for a fully truthful understanding of the situation that’s being described and supposedly explained. I believe that very strict limitations ought to be applied to the selection and disposing of state-owned assets in a switch away from a Marxist economy to a mixed, part-socialist and part-capitalist, economy. This was not done in the plans that Sachs recommended. He applied existing economic theory.


Therefore, I believe that Sachs’s account here is a major historical document, but that he fails to understand that his underlying understanding of economics contains some empirical theoretical falsehoods (fase assumptions) — particularly concerning the distribution of wealth and the impact that it has upon the economy — and the impact that the Government’s policies necessarily have upon the distribution of wealth. The fundamental misunderstanding in the social sciences is that, instead of the false neoliberal assumption that a Government is founded upon an economy, an economy is actually founded upon a Government. Without a Government — a state, which imposes and enforces laws that cover such things as contracts and crimes — there can be no economy and really not even any property,  and therefore society itself is in a “state of nature” instead of some sort of civilization. They (today’s social ‘scientists’) have it upside-down, and this falsehood benefits the super-rich enormously, at the expense to everyone else. Economic theory, as it currently exists, is thus trash. I have proposed a replacement for it, in “4. Economic Theory — The Biggest Con,” pages 194-348 in my 2020 book “Scientizing the Social Sciences”.


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Investigative historian Eric Zuesse’s latest book, AMERICA’S EMPIRE OF EVIL: Hitler’s Posthumous Victory, and Why the Social Sciences Need to Change, is about how America took over the world after World War II in order to enslave it to U.S.-and-allied billionaires. Their cartels extract the world’s wealth by control of not only their ‘news’ media but the social ‘sciences’ — duping the public.


ፈንቅል - 1ይ ክፋል | Fenkil (Part 1) - ERi-TV Documentary

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